Wednesday, October 17, 2007

Back to Scotus

Lest my gentle readers think I have some grudge against women or all feminism due to my latest posts, let me reassure you of the contray. I have something against pointless applications of postmodernism to the medieval era, coupled with complete ignorance of the culture itself in question conducted by certain feminist "medievalists" I have been forced to read lately for class. And the quote on books, though somewhat misogynistic, does have a grain of truth. Or so I have noticed in the past. Luckily my current love interest (so far) is not like the women mentioned in my previous post, and understands my love of books. In other news, Tomorrow I am off to St. Bonaventure for the Scotus congress, first of the Quodruple. Should be good times, as long as Noone brings his harmonica.

Here's some Scotus to tide y'all over until I get back, from Reportatio I A d. 29 q. unica (Oxford, Merton College Library, MS. 61, f. 139r. cited in Mohle's Formalitas und Intrinsecus Modus p. 20):

"Quia relationi reali et rationis non est unus conceptus eiusdem rationis, quia licet posset abstrahi unus conceptus univocus a Deo et creatura, non tamen a re rationis et a re reali, quia conceptus abstractus a Deo et creatura esset ex utraque parte realis et ita eiusdem rationis, non sic autem ab ente rationis et ente reali quia ex una parte esset realis, et ex alia non, sed tantum rationis. maior enim et prior est divisio entis in ens reale et rationis quam in ens creatum et increatum, quia ens reale, ut unum membrum alterius divisionis, est commune utrique membro secundae divisionis, ut enti creato et increato, quia utrumque est ens reale, et sic magis conveniunt sub ratione unius conceptus."

Translation: "Because there is not one concept of the same meaning [rationis] to a real relation and a relation of reason, because although one univocal concept between God and creatures can be abstracted, nevertheless not one from a being of reason and a real thing, because a concept abstracted from God and creatures would be reale from each side and so of the same meaning [rationis], not so however a concept abstracted from a being of reason and a real thing because from one side it would be real and the other not, but only of reason. For the division of being into real being and being of reason is greater and prior than the division into uncreated and created being, because real being,as one member of the other division, is common to each member of the second division, as to being created and uncreated, each is real being, and so they agree in the meaning [ratione] of one concept."


1 comment:

Michael Sullivan said...

I suppose this is why he says there are only essences of existing things . . .