Bettoni on Scotus

Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, pp.192 ff.:

The history of Scotism has not yet been written. It is still in the preparatory phase, as this or that Scotistic figure is chosen as the object of a particular study, or this or that Scotistic doctrine is considered in its evolution and set in relation to other doctrines. This is not the place to mention even briefly the main contributions that modern Scotistic literature can offer to a researcher. While an expert in the field is no doubt acquainted with them, to the ordinary reader they would be of no interest. It is an indisputable fact, however, that along with the Thomistic school, a Scotistic school of thought has emerged and flourished. Throughout the centuries it has given to the Church a great number of first-class theologians, saintly preachers, and formidable defenders of the faith. The number of philosophical and theological works written in the name of Scotus during the centuries is imposing, for they are counted by the hundreds.

Duns Scotus' influence upon modern nonscholastic philosophers is almost nil. This is due to the fact that very few among them have had a direct knowledge of scholasticism. Father Scaramuzzi has pointed out certain important parallels between the thought of Duns Scotus and that of Giambattista Vico. It is also an undeniable fact that some modern historians, like Windelband, have noticed a certain speculative affinity between Scotistic doctrines and various doctrines of Leibniz. It would be of great historical interest to study the extent to which Rosmini was inspired by Duns Scotus, whom he knows and quotes with great respect in working out his doctrine of the idea of being.

Some historians have considerably exaggerated Duns Scotus' influence upon the nominalistic movement. They have gone so far as to affirm that Ockham  mere draws natural conclusions from Scotistic doctrines. This historical thesis has met with some favor. However, the best of the medieval historians of today, when they do not reject this thesis entirely, raise at least some doubt as to its foundation. It is beyond question that some Scotistic doctrines taken out of context, such as the doctrine of "haecceity" and the doctrine concerning the knowability of the singular, which is closely related to it, could have been exploited by the nominalists. But it s one thing to admit this, and an entirely different thing to affirm that Scotistic philosophy necessarily prepares the way for nominalism. Otherwise, any great thinker could be held responsible for the more or less indirect paternity of all later philosophies claiming dependence on him or on some of his doctrines. The fact that Ockham was a Franciscan, and had probably been a disciple of Duns Scotus, does not in itself constitute any solid ground for the assertion that his system depends on Duns Scotus' doctrine. The history of philosophy teaches us us that a thinker's most formidable rival usually emerges from his school. Shall we say that Duns Scotus paves the way to nominalism precisely because nominalism is the natural outcome of opposition to his philosophy? In this case, we definitely commit ourselves to an abuse of terms. One philosophical movement prepares the way for another only when this later is a logical outgrowth of the former.

In Catholic cultural circles not only is Duns Scotus set aside and neglected, but he often looked upon with suspicion as though he were an insidious forerunner of heresy. This attitude might perhaps be conceivable in regard to certain Catholic thinkers, like Rosmini, for example. A strong support of such an attitude is found in the fact that the Church has condemned forty doctrinal propositions attributed-whether rightly or wrongly, it is not for us to decide-to the philosopher of Rovereto. However, it is difficult to understand how this same attitude could have become traditional in regard to Duns Scotus. There is not a single document of the Church that either directly or indirectly puts the Catholic scholars on their guard against any error or possible danger in the Scotistic speculation. Quite the opposite! There are authoritative acts and statement showing that the Church has always held Duns Scotus' work in high esteem. This is true in the first place of his theology, but it can be said to be equally true of his philosophy, which in him, as in any other scholastic, is intimately connected with theological doctrine. here are some of these acts and statements [...].

Scotus and Ecumenism

"The Vatican" and the Lutherans released a new document recently, that lays another charge at Scotus' door:

"146. Luther’s main objection to Catholic eucharistic doctrine was directed against an understanding of the Mass as a sacrifice. The theology of the eucharist as real remembrance (anamnesis, Realgedächtnis), in which the unique and once-for-all sufficient sacrifice of Christ (Heb 9:1–10:18) makes itself present for the participation of the faithful, was no longer fully understood in late medieval times. Thus, many took the celebration of the Mass to be another sacrifice in addition to the one sacrifice of Christ. According to a theory stemming from Duns Scotus, the multiplication of Masses was thought to effect a multiplication of grace and to apply this grace to individual persons. That is why at Luther’s time, for example, thousands of private masses were said every year at the castle church of Wittenberg."

So he's responsible for the reformation not only because of univocity as the postmodern theologians tell us, but because he allowed for the apparent abuse of multiple masses and he forgot that the mass was just the unique sacrifice of calvary.

Hmm...

The document does not cite a source, but this corresponds to Scotus' discussion in his Quodlibet q. 20. From the document, it sounds like Scotus is wrong, and that Catholics do not believe that the priest can apply grace from multiple masses to the soul of an individual (i.e. in Purgatory). But of course this is wrong. Catholics, even today, have masses said for their deceased relatives on the anniversaries of their deaths and other occasions (and indeed, still pay the priest a stipend). What would be the point of doing this if the grace or merit from a particular mass could not be applied to a soul? All Scotus did was formulate a principle that is still operative today, at least in practice. And if this theory did indeed originate with Scotus, how can we account for the fact that private masses for the dead were said long before Scotus was born?

The document links this teaching of Scotus with a late medieval forgetfulness of the mass being a re-presentation of the single sacrifice of Christ on Calvary; but if Scotus' view in fact is still accepted by the Church today, then the Church today is also forgetful of the unique nature of the sacrifice of the mass. But this may be a separate issue. Catholic apologists spend a great deal of time explaining this aspect of the mass today; and really, once the mass is described as a sacrifice, the fact that there has been more than one mass since Calvary is what requires explanation. It doesn't really matter whether there is just one mass per year or a thousand.

Earlier in the document we find that Cajetan, the most brilliant Catholic theologian of the 16th century, was to blame in causing the rift of Protestantism since he did not try to understand Luther in Luther's own framework, but only in his own, Thomistic framework. So I think we can all agree that Scotus is the remote cause of the reformation, but Cajetan is the proximate cause.

Thomism After Vatican II

So apparently there is a "Renewal of Thomism" conference going on in DC right now. Here is a link to one of the papers, 'Thomism after Vatican II", by fr. T.J. White OP. I found it a very encouraging read, if it is representative of the younger Thomists. He expresses some interest in Aquinas' contemporaries, eschews the pratice of accusing all medieval thinkers save Aquinas of  Heideggerian ontotheology, and even argues that Thomism and Catholicism are not synonyms, that one can be the latter without being the former. Somewhere in the past few days I read a report of a conference in Prague devoted to Thomism that took place a few years ago; they said over 100 professors of Thomism where present. In light of that fact, and the encouraging sings in the linked paper, I think we can safely pronounce that Thomism has been renewed.

Scotus on Baptism of Jews and Muslims

Our BFF blog "laodicea" has recalled to everyone's memory Scotus' comments on forcible baptism of Jewish and Muslim children and points out it has been criticized by a pope. Here. I too have posted on this issue. Here (sorry, can't find it; it was years ago). It also came up in our discussion with Mark Wauk, here. And also David Lantigua discusses it here. There is currently a scholar from Brazil researching early modern scholasticism in latin America at Notre Dame who told me randomly the other day that the passage in question was widely misinterpreted. For what that's worth.

I quote Laodicea's post and comment below.

“Scotus in book 4 [of his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard], dist. 4, q. 9, no.2, and in questions related to no. 2, thought that a prince could laudably command that small children of Hebrews and unbelievers be baptised, even against the will of the parents, provided one could prudently see to it that these same children were not killed by the parents…. Nevertheless, the opinion of St Thomas prevailed… it is unlawful to baptise Hebrew children against the will of their parents” – Postremo mense Benedict XIV

Comment: Great. Thank's for sharing. I was unaware of this text and I am glad to learn of it. I don't think anyone today would follow Scotus on this point. It's hard to blame Scotus, however, for as the Thomists of the Strict Observance inform us, it is impossible to understand the meaning of the terms used in theology unless one uses them as St. Thomas did (which is why all Thomists everywhere agree on what every text of St. Thomas means and certainly never write articles about how the entire Thomist tradition up to them has misinterpreted a fundamental point of St. Thomas).

One question: what is the deal with the ellipses? They are also present in the latin text on the Vatican website.

Benedict XIV goes on to say this does not apply if the child is abandoned or in danger of death. It is interesting that Scotus should have held this objectionable opinion given the connection Benedict XVI drew in his Regensburg Lecture between Scotism and religious violence.

“In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the claim that we can only know God’s voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God’s freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazm and might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness.”

Comment: Not to beat a retired horse, but come on! First an exegetical point: Laodicea says that there is a connection between "Scotism" and religious violence. But all Benedict XVI says is that "there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments...". He doesn't say Scotists.

So what is a Scotist? The normal "narrative" here (and why is it that all Thomists become relativists when it comes to history and historical "narratives"?) is that Scotus leads to Ockham who makes the potentia absoluta/ordinata distinction a central feature of his thought, which then leads to protestantism, modernism, war, abortion, murder, nuclear war, and certainly nothing good like increased quality of life via advanced medical care or pepparoni pizza. But is Ockham really a Scotist? This would mean everyone who disagrees with someone is really a follower of that person. So I would be a Lutheran and a Kantian (as well as being a Thomist and a Laodiceist!). Ockham disagrees with Scotus on almost every point. But he was influenced unconsciously by him you say. Fine. But then Scotus was influenced by Henry, making him really a Henrician and not a Scotist, and Henry was influenced by Thomas, which makes him a Thomist, which places the blame for Ockham at St. Thomas' door (narratives are problematic for a variety of reasons, not just their relativism).

Laodicea is also shifting emphasis here from a particular censure of a Scotist opinion to a general false association with "Scotism" and violence. But it's a blog post, so we can let our present comments suffice.

Thomism and the Magisterium

From time to time I receive emails about Thomism and whether one is required to hold, in the Church of Today, Thomistic theses instead of Scotistic ones.  So here I summarize my views/posts on the matter.

There are numerous Thomist links one could post about how one must in some way be Thomist.

Here. Here. Here.

There have been posts to the contrary on this blog about these issues before,

Here. Here. And the Church Authority category on the sidebar.

The reason for this is that the popes have authoritatively proclaimed that the 'perennial philosophy' is a necessary foundation for Catholic dogma and Aquinas is the primary exponent of this philosophy.

My thoughts on the matter are thus (and my co-blogger should feel free to add/revise this post):

1. The magisterial prescriptions generally recommend Aquinas as a model, but do not prescribe particular doctrines as to be held. But everyone admits Aquinas is great and a model for theologizing or philosophizing in accordence with the Church.  But this isn't very helpful in determining whether the real distinction between essence and existence is a point of dogma. When particular doctrines are mentioned, they are ones that all or most of the scholastics agree about, such as the existence of God, or divine conservation.

2. Current canon law mentions Aquinas only once, in canon 252.3; but this only states that seminarians should be educated in Thomism. Again, it does not prescribe any particular thesis. Fr. Z claims that Aquinas is mentioned implicitly in canon 151; this canon mandates that seminarians be educated in philosophy by recourse to the perennial philosophy.  

3. There is also this shocking statement from JP II's Veritatis splendor: "Certainly the Church's Magisterium does not intend to impose upon the faithful any particular theological system, still less a philosophical one."

For the sake of argument, let's assume the opposite: Thomism is universally binding on every catholic, down to its particular theses.  What might follow?

1. Philosophy is destroyed and we are left with fideism.

2. Theology becomes mere commentary on Aquinas through the adjudication of the Thomistic commentary tradition.

3. Papal interventions will be required to dogmatically establish the interpretations of Thomistic texts (if the real distinction between essence and existence is a Thomistic thesis it is dogmatic; but some thomists have denied that Aquinas holds that essence and existence are really distinct; ergo we need authoritative interpretations of Aquinas' texts.

4. The Immaculate conception will have to be abandoned.

So it seems that the individual catholic philosopher can think what he/she/ likes (given that it does not contradict revealed truth).  This shouldn't surprise the non-Thomist overmuch. When one looks at the context and objects of the early modern statements on Thomism, they are generally directed at modern novelties, not novelties within the Scholastic tradition.

There you have it; the combox awaits.

Update:

Commentator Jared has posted some printed sources that bear on the question, which I repost here.

Willibrord Lampen, Bl. Ioannes Duns Scotus et Sancta Sedes (Rome, 1929).

Franz Pelster, “The Authority of St. Thomas in Catholic Schools and Sacred Sciences," Franciscan Studies 13 (1953): 1-26.

Charles Balić, “Duns Scotus in the Present Moment of the Church” in Scotus Speaks Today: 1266-1966: Seventh Centenary Symposium (Southfield, MI: Duns Scotus College, 1966), 21-62

Also, Fr. Finigan has a post from several years ago about this, which involved one of the commentators who has posted here. Fr. Finigan posts the quote from Denzinger about the letter of the Jesuits to the pope about the 24 Thomistic theses.

Another update:

An essay on "traditionalism" that contains relevant material.

More on Thomism and Vatican II

Here's an interesting article on Thomism and Vatican II by fr. Komonchok.  My favorite lines:

"Vae hominis unius libri! Vae Eccleisiae unius doctoris!"

Christian Philosophy

Some of us over the years have wondered about Dr William Vallicella's religious views. Now he tells us clearly: he is not a Christian. He indicates his own position as being closest to the following formulation. Christian dogmas:

are false and/or incoherent in many of their formulations, but hide nuggets of truth that can excavated and refined and reformulated in ways that are rationally acceptable. An example of this is Kant's project in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.

Dr Vallicella posits five possible attitudes towards Christian dogmas. What he does not do is distinguish the attitude of the Christian philosopher against any possible attitude of the non-Christian philosopher. The attitude of the Christian philosopher is, in its classic formulation from St Anselm, who got it from St Augustine, credo ut intellegam, I believe so that I may understand.

Now I agree, with Fr John Wippel against Etienne Gilson and the earlier Maritain, that there is no such thing as a "Christian philosophy". There is just philosophy, practiced by Christians and by non-Christians. Sometimes the practice of philosophy can be a praeambulum to Christianity, as in the case of St Justin Martyr and many other famous and less-famous cases. But philosophizing per se is not a religious activity and has no essentially religious content. Philosophy is the unrestricted and holistic application of reason to life.

That being said, philosophizing doesn't happen in a vacuum. Man is a rational, but also a religious animal. Socrates questioned the stories of the poets about the gods, but, contrary to his accusers, did not challenge or reject the gods of the city, much less the existence of the God of philosophy, the One - whoever he was - that gave him his vocation. And Aristotle always took as his starting-point on any particular issue the doxa, the opinions of the common man and of his own philosophical predecessors, rejecting what was faulty or inadequate in favor of a better formulation, but never assuming that the doxa were to be utterly rejected and replaced by complete novelties. This would be hubristically and arrogantly to assume that oneself is already wise and that all other men have always been fools.

The Christian philosopher, then, doesn't have some special kind of philosophy that atheists or pagans don't have; but at the same time he doesn't begin philosophizing neutrally, as though everything he believes might just as well turn out to be false. If modern philosophy has given us one apodictic certitude it's that radical Cartesian doubt is foolish, that it begins with nothing and ends with nothing, or worse. This is not to say that the philosopher holds rigidly to his beliefs no matter what the result of his reasoning, either: otherwise the notion of rational conversion would be absurd. But philosophes have not only gone from Christianity to apostasy and libertinism under the influence of reason; they have also gone from any number of positions to a rational Christianity. I myself am a convert to the Catholic Church.

One does not reason to Christianity or reason to Catholicism in the sense that philosophy ever proves (in any sense) that the Christian doctrines are true. On the other hand, neither does one prove against Descartes or Kant that we experience the world, or that we are awake. We can't prove everything, because doing so would produce an infinite regress. We can however show that to believe that I am now, as I write, am asleep is absurd, that to deny that I experience the world is unreasonable. We can also argue that the doctrines of Christianity are not unreasonable. This does not show that they are true, but it shows that I might reasonably believe that they are true. And if I believe that they are true, I can think about them rationally and philosophically as truths.

The orientation towards religious doctrines as truths - not as puzzles, not as myths, not as more or less acceptable attempts at formulating truths - is the attitude of the credo ut intellegam. It is fundamentally different from the attitude an unbeliever like Dr Vallicella will take towards them. The Anselmian formulation is paralleled by the Augustinian one, "unless you believe you will not understand" - not because the doctrines of the faith are unreasonable or unintelligible, but because without the light of faith the thinker will remain like Aristotle's blind man reasoning about colors: the syllogisms may be logically valid but the thinker will have no way to know to what extent they relate to reality. It's as though a Cartesian were to entertain, but merely as an amusing hypothesis, his existence outside of his brain-vat; except that (in my opinion) real existential Cartesian doubt is absurd and impossible, but real religious doubt is not. The existence of a subjective world of beings beyond my experience of an objective world constituted and co-caused by my mental activity is self-evident, its contrary formulated only with enormous difficulty and under the influence of powerful sophistries; I don't perceive the truth of religious doctrine in the same way or with the same rational force.

There is an ineradicable element of will in belief, analogous to accepting that someone loves me. I can know that my wife exists and that she has a mind like mine; but that she loves me, and that her love is the key fact whereby I ought to interpret her words and actions towards me rather than some more cynical alternative, is not unreasonable, but is also unprovable: I must choose to accept or not accept it, and act accordingly. The unbelieving philosopher, like the suspicious spouse, has access to all the same data as the believer, but sees that the data can rationally be taken another way, and wills so to take it or to abstain from committing to a judgment one way or the other.

The Christian philosopher then is not simply a thinker who chooses to think about the dogmas of Christianity, rather than some other puzzles, or one who finds the traditional dogmatic solutions to the puzzles the most rationally satisfying (this is the entirely modern phenomenon of "philosophy of religion" which, insofar as it is separate on the one hand from metaphysics and on the other from theology, I abominate and abhor). Like the philosopher of the ancient schools, or the modern existentialist, his discipline is not (merely) a logical game or a quasi-scientific method or technique, but an approach (among possible approaches) to being. He is a philosopher who believes in God, Christ, the sacraments, Mary and the Saints, sin, heaven and hell, as he believes in friendship and in love, as unprovable but obviously there; who approaches his God rationally as he approaches his own soul and the world, as concrete beings in need of rational explication; who looks to philosophy to help him both think and live, but who looks to religion, as to direct experience, to provide the things to think about and live among and towards.

Except from Pius XI, Studiorum Ducem

Here is some food for thought for that inimitable species of humankind, the internet Thomist, who prowl about the ‘net seeking the ruin of... well, interesting philosophy and freedom of theological opinion.

Pius XI, Studiorum Ducem, trans. James H. Ryan in The Encyclicals of Pius XI, p. 95 : “No one, of course, may exact of professors either more or less than the Church, the mother and teacher of all, demands of them, for on those questions on which different authorities of our Catholic schools express different views and are not in agreement, certainly no teacher can be compelled to accept an opinion which does not appear to him the more logical one”.

Benedict XVI on Duns Scotus

Pope Benedict's wednesday audience of July 7, 2010 was about Duns Scotus; translation by Zenit:

Dear brothers and sisters,

This morning -- after a few catecheses on several great theologians -- I wish to present to you another important figure in the history of theology: John Duns Scotus, who lived at the end of the 13th century. An ancient inscription on his tomb summarizes the geographical coordinates of his biography: "England received him; France instructed him; Cologne, in Germany, keeps his remains, he was born in Scotland." We cannot overlook this information, because we have very little information on the life of Duns Scotus.

He was born probably in 1266 in a village, which in fact is called Duns, on the outskirts of Edinburgh. Attracted by the charism of St. Francis of Assisi, he entered the Family of the Friars Minor and was ordained a priest in 1291. Gifted with a brilliant intelligence geared to speculation -- an intelligence that merited him by tradition the title of doctor subtilis, "subtle doctor" -- Duns Scotus was directed to the study of philosophy and theology at the famous Universities of Oxford and Paris. Having concluded his formation successfully, he undertook the teaching of theology at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and then Paris, beginning his commentary, as all teachers of the time, on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The main works of Duns Scotus represent, in fact, the mature fruit of these lessons, and take the title of the places in which he taught: Opus Oxoniense (Oxford), Reportatio Cambrigensis (Cambridge), Reportata Parisiensia (Paris).

Duns Scotus left Paris when a serious conflict broke out between King Philip IV the Fair and Pope Boniface VIII, preferring voluntary exile rather than signing a document hostile to the Supreme Pontiff, as the king had imposed on all religious. Thus -- out of love for the See of Peter -- he left the country together with his Franciscan Brothers.

Dear brothers and sisters, this fact invites us to recall how many times in the history of the Church believers have met with hostility and even with persecutions because of their fidelity and their devotion to Christ, to the Church and to the Pope. We all look with admiration to these Christians, who teach us to guard faith in Christ and communion with the Successor of Peter, and thus with the universal Church, as a precious good.

However, relations between the king of France and Boniface VIII's successor soon became friendly again and in 1305 Duns Scotus was able to return to Paris to teach theology with the title of magister regens, today we would say ordinary professor. Subsequently, his superiors sent him to Cologne as professor of the Franciscan Theological Studium, but he died on Nov. 8, 1308, when only 43 years of age, leaving, however, an important number of works.

Because of his fame for holiness, devotion to him soon spread in the Franciscan Order and Venerable Pope John Paul II wished to confirm him solemnly blessed on March 20, 1993, describing him as "singer of the Incarnate Word and defender of the Immaculate Conception." Synthesized in this expression is the great contribution Duns Scotus made to the history of theology.

First of all, he meditated on the mystery of the incarnation and, as opposed to many Christian thinkers of the time, he maintained that the Son of God would have become man even if humanity had not sinned. In the Reportata Parisiensia he affirms: "To think that God would have given up such work if Adam had not sinned would be altogether irrational! I say, therefore, that the fall was not the cause of the predestination of Christ, and that -- even if no one had fallen, not angels or man -- in this hypothesis Christ would still have been predestined in the same way" (in III Sent., d. 7, 4).

This, perhaps, rather surprising thought is born because for Duns Scotus the incarnation of the Son of God, projected from all eternity by God the Father in his plan of love, is the fulfillment of creation, and makes it possible for every creature, in Christ and through him, to be filled with grace and give praise and glory to God in eternity. Duns Scotus, though aware that, in reality, because of original sin, Christ has redeemed us with his passion, death and resurrection, confirms that the incarnation is the greatest and most beautiful work of the whole history of salvation, and that it is not conditioned by any contingent fact, but is the original idea of God to finally unite the whole of creation with himself in the person and flesh of the Son.

Duns Scotus, faithful disciple of St. Francis, loved to contemplate and preach the mystery of the salvific passion of Christ, expression of the immense love of God, who communicates with enormous generosity outside of himself the rays of his goodness and his love (cf. Tractatus de primo principio, c. 4). And this love is not only revealed on Calvary, but also in the Most Blessed Eucharist, to which Duns Scotus was most devoted and which he saw as the sacrament of the real presence of Jesus and as the sacrament of the unity and community that induces us to love one another and to love God as the supreme common good (cf. Reportata Parisiensia, in IV Sent., d. 8, q. 1, n. 3).

Dear brothers and sisters, this theological vision, intensely "Christocentric," opens us to contemplation, to wonder and to gratitude: Christ is the center of history and of the cosmos; he it is who gives meaning, dignity and value to our life! Like Pope Paul VI in Manila, I also would like to cry out to the world today: "[Christ] reveals the invisible God, he is the firstborn of all creation, the foundation of everything created. He is the Teacher of mankind, and its Redeemer. He was born, he died and he rose again for us. He is the centre of history and of the world; he is the one who knows us and who loves us; he is the companion and the friend of our life. ... I could never finish speaking about him" (Homily, Nov. 29, 1970).

Not only the role of Christ in the history of salvation, but also Mary's [role] is the object of the reflection of the doctor subtilis. In Duns Scotus' times, the majority of theologians offered an objection that seemed insurmountable to the doctrine that Most Holy Mary was free from original sin from the first instant of her conception. In fact, the universality of the redemption wrought by Christ, at first glance, might seem compromised by such an affirmation, as if Mary had no need of Christ and of his redemption. Because of this theologians were opposed to this thesis.

To make this preservation from original sin understood, Duns Scotus then developed an argument which later would also be adopted by Blessed Pope Pius IX in 1854, when he defined solemnly the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary. And this argument is that of the "preventive redemption," according to which the Immaculate Conception represents the masterpiece of the redemption wrought by Christ, because in fact the power of his love and of his mediation obtained that the Mother be preserved from original sin. Hence Mary is totally redeemed by Christ, but already before her conception. The Franciscans, his brethren, accepted and spread this doctrine enthusiastically, as did other theologians who -- often with a solemn oath -- committed themselves to defend and perfect it.

In this regard, I would like to highlight something, which it seems to me is important. Valuable theologians, such as Duns Scotus with the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, enriched with their specific thought what the People of God already believed spontaneously about the Blessed Virgin, manifested in acts of piety, in the expressions of art and, in general, in Christian living. Thus faith in the Immaculate Conception or in the bodily assumption of the Virgin was already present in the People of God, while theology had not yet found the key to interpret it in the totality of the doctrine of the faith. Thus the People of God precede theologians and all this thanks to that supernatural sensus fidei, namely, that capacity infused by the Holy Spirit, which qualifies us to embrace the reality of the faith, with humility of heart and mind.

In this sense, the People of God is "magisterium that precedes," and that later must be deepened and intellectually accepted by theology. May theologians always be able to listen to this source of faith and have the humility and simplicity of little ones! I made this reminder a few months ago saying: "There have been great scholars, great experts, great theologians, teachers of faith who have taught us many things. They have gone into the details of Sacred Scripture, ... but have been unable to see the mystery itself, its central nucleus. ... The essential has remained hidden! On the other hand, in our time there have also been 'little ones' who have understood this mystery. Let us think of St. Bernadette Soubirous; of St. Thérèse of Lisieux, with her new interpretation of the Bible that is 'non-scientific' but goes to the heart of Sacred Scripture" (Homily. Holy Mass with the Members of the International Theological Commission, Dec. 1, 2009).

Finally, Duns Scotus developed a point to which modernity is very sensitive. It is the topic of liberty and its relation with the will and with the intellect. Our author stresses liberty as a fundamental quality of the will, initiating an approach of a voluntaristic tendency, which developed in contrast with the so-called Augustinian and Thomistic intellectualism. For St. Thomas Aquinas, who follows St. Augustine, liberty cannot be considered an innate quality of the will, but the fruit of the collaboration of the will and of the intellect.

An idea of innate and absolute liberty placed in the will and preceding the intellect, whether in God or in man, risks, in fact, leading to the idea of a God who would not even be linked to the truth and to the good. The desire to save the absolute transcendence and diversity of God with an affirmation about his will that is so radical and impenetrable fails to take into account that the God who revealed himself in Christ is the God "logos," who acted and acts full of love toward us.

Certainly, as Duns Scotus affirms, in line with Franciscan theology, love surpasses knowledge and is increasingly capable of perceiving thought, but it is always the love of the God "Logos" (cf. Benedict XVI, Address at Regensburg, Teachings of Benedict XVI, II [2006], p. 261). Also in man the idea of absolute liberty, placed in the will, forgetting the nexus with truth, ignores that liberty itself must be freed of the limits imposed on it by sin.

Speaking to Roman seminarians last year, I reminded that "[s]ince the beginning and throughout all time but especially in the modern age freedom has been the great dream of humanity" (Address to the Pontifical Major Roman Seminary, Feb. 20, 2009). However, modern history itself, in addition to our daily experience, teaches us that liberty is authentic, and helps the construction of a truly human civilization only when it is reconciled with truth. If it is detached from truth, liberty becomes, tragically, a principle of destruction of the interior harmony of the human person, source of malversation of the strongest and the violent, and cause of suffering and mourning. Liberty, as all the faculties with which man is gifted, grows and is perfected, affirms Duns Scotus, when man opens himself to God, valuing that disposition of listening to his voice, which he calls potentia oboedientialis: When we listen to divine Revelation, to the Word of God, to accept it, then we have been reached by a message that fills our life with light and hope and we are truly free.

Dear brothers and sisters, Blessed Duns Scotus teaches us that what is essential in our life is to believe that God is close to us and that he loves us in Christ Jesus, and therefore to cultivate a profound love of him and of his Church. We are witnesses of this love on earth. May Mary Most Holy help us to receive this infinite love of God that we will enjoy fully for eternity in heaven, when our soul will finally be united for ever to God, in the communion of saints.

[Translation by ZENIT] [The Holy Father greeted the people in several languages. In English, he said:]

Dear Brothers and Sisters, In our catechesis on medieval Christian culture, we now turn to the distinguished Franciscan theologian, Blessed John Duns Scotus. A native of Scotland, he taught at the universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Paris. Duns Scotus is best known today for his contribution to the development of Christian thought in three areas. First, he held that the Incarnation was not directly the result of Adam's sin, but a part of God's original plan of creation, in which every creature, in and through Christ, is called to be perfected in grace and to glorify God for ever. In this great Christocentric vision, the Incarnate Word appears as the centre of history and the cosmos. Secondly, Scotus argued that Our Lady's preservation from original sin was a privilege granted in view of her Son's redemptive passion and death; this theory was to prove decisive for the eventual definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Finally, Duns Scotus paid great attention to the issue of human freedom, although by situating it principally in the will, he sowed the seeds of a trend in later theology that risked detaching freedom from its necessary relation to truth. May the teaching and example of Blessed John Duns Scotus help us to understand that we attain happiness, freedom and perfection by opening ourselves to God's gracious self-revelation in Christ Jesus. I offer a warm welcome to the members of the General Chapter of the Congregation of Holy Cross, together with my prayerful good wishes for the spiritual fruitfulness of your deliberations. Upon all the English-speaking visitors present at today's Audience, especially the groups from Wales, Ireland, the Philippines, Canada and the United States of America, I invoke God's abundant blessings.

Thomism and Freedom in Theology

The following is from the manual Sacrae theologiae summa, by M. Nicolau, S.J. and I. Salaverri, S.J. (BAC, 1962), 4-5:

Porro in quaestionibus, quae inter catholicos bonae notae Theologos libere controvertuntur, omni cura sectari conati sumus aureum illud Pii XI criterium, quo edixit: "Inter amatores Sti. Thomae . . . honestam illam quidem cupimus iusta in libertate aemulationem, unde studia progrediuntur, intercedere, at obtrectationem nullam, quae nec veritati suffragatur et unice ad dissolvenda valet vincula caritatis. Sanctum igitur unicuique eorum esto, quod in Codice Iuris Canonici praecipitur . . . At ne quid eo amplius alii ab aliis exigant, quam quod ab omnibus exigit omnium Magistra et mater Ecclesia: neque enim in iis rebus, de quibus in scholis catholicis inter melioris notae auctores in contrarias partes disputari solet, quisquam prohibendus est eam sequi sententiam, quae sibi verisimilior videatur". Quae sane paterna monita hortationesque, ad proficuam nempe aemulationem, conciliatricem moderationem et ligitimam in studiis libertatem, eo libentius adimplenda curavimus, quod sua etiam fecerit Pius XII atque ipsis sacrorum alumnis servanda commendaverit.

"And then as for those questions which are freely disputed among Catholic theologians of good repute, we have tried with all diligence to follow that golden criterion of Pius XI, where he said "Among the lovers of St Thomas . . . we desire that honest emulation in proper liberty, whereby studies progress, to intervene, but with none of that disparagement which does not help the truth and is good only for dissolving the bonds of charity. . . . for neither, in those things about which the authors of better reputation are accustomed to dispute on opposite sides in the Catholic schools, should anyone be prohibited from following the opinion which seems more true to him". And we have the more willingly taken care to fulfill this sane, paternal admonition and exhortation, very suitable for emulation, conciliating moderation and liberty in studies, because Pius XII has made it his own and has commended it to be kept by the pupils of sacred things."

It should not be forgotten, then, that even as the Church has commended "the principles and doctrine" of St Thomas to be taught in seminaries and held by theologians, She has also defended the legitimacy of scholastic opinions other than those insisted on by Thomism. Even good Thomists should recognize this! Thomas is a sure guide for avoiding heterodoxy and defeating Modernism; let this be fully granted without reservation. Does this mean that we as good Catholic Scotists are not to argue that the formal distinction allows for a more rigorous and coherent articulation of Trinitarian doctrine, or cannot in good conscience suggest that St Bonaventure and Bl Scotus might be better adapted to reconciling the Latin and the Greek traditions than St Thomas? Not, I think, if we are allowed to insist that they are Catholic theologians of good repute, and that in certain (compared to the moderns, very minor) points are on opposite sides in the Catholic schools from St Thomas. Being a Scotist, and disagreeing with Thomas on certain points on universals or individuation or existence as an extrinsic principle, does not make one a nominalist or a modernist! In fact I'm not sure it even makes one a non-Thomist, taking Thomism to mean the exemplar of the scholastic doctrine which the Church prescribes as normative.

Most important to recognize, I think, is that in the matter of theological doctrine Scotism and Thomism are essentially identical, and that this is what the Church prescribes. The differences largely lie in the philosophical (and especially metaphysical) categories and structures in which the theological doctrine is expressed and explained; but as far as this is concerned the Church appears to leave us in perfect freedom, within a general scholastic framework. It's another matter entirely to jettison all scholastic terminology and methods, as modern theologians have done. Another way to express this: the theological disagreements between Thomism, Bonaventureansim, Scotism etc., are only even possible and intelligible because of the vast shared body of doctrine and similarity of method between them. How would a modern Liberation Theologian or someone raised on Heidegger adjudicate between them when he may not share any of their common premises?

Scotus on Church Authority

By the way, in the same question that the last post was based on there is a text that sheds light a post of Faber's from nearly two years ago: http://lyfaber.blogspot.com/2008/05/duns-scotus-papalist.html

The Ordinatio text parallel to the Reportatio I-A text commented on there clears up any doubt. Scotus is commenting on a past controversy between Richard of St Victor and Peter Lombard, Master of the Sentences. Richard had declared a position of the Lombard's on the generation of the Son from the divine essence suspect or even heretical. Scotus holds that the Church's approval of the Lombard's theology destroys Richard's case. From Ordinatio I.Dist.5 P.1 Q.1 paragraph 26:

. . . non nullam habet pro se auctoritatem, sed habet illam universalis Ecclesiae in capitulo praeallegato, quae maxima est, quia dicit Augustinus Contra epistolam Fundamenti: "Evangelio non crederem nisi Ecclesiae crederem catholicae", - quae Ecclesia sicut decrevit qui sunt libri habendi in auctoritatem in canone Bibliae, ita etiam decrevit qui libri habendi sunt authentici in libris doctorum, sicut patet in canone, et post illam auctoritatem canonis non invenitur in Corpore iuris scriptum aliquod ita autenticum sicut magistri Petri in capitulo praeallegato.

To paraphrase (but only slightly): Richard claimed that the Lombard had no authority (i.e. from the Fathers) to support his position. Scotus declares that, on the contrary, he had the authority of the Church, which is the greatest of all authorities, for as Augustine says, "I would not believe in the Gospel unless I believed in the Catholic Church". And just as the Church has declared which books are to be held as authoritative in the canon of the Bible, so also she has decreed which books, among all the books of the doctors of the Church, are to be held as authentic - just as in the canon! - and after the authority of the canon of Scripture itself there cannot be found any writing given so much authority by the Magisterium as that of Master Peter.

One could take this text by Scotus as laying the theological framework for the practice of declaring Doctors of the Church. And coincidentally the first four such Doctors were declared more or less contemporaneously with the writing of the Ordinatio, i.e. in 1298! However, Peter Lombard himself is not on the list of Doctors. Nevertheless Scotus' text above gives a good foundation for the disposition to hold the writings of St Thomas, St Bonaventure, etc., in higher regard and as of more weight than those of other theologians, including those of our own day (and I would take either over Rahner or von Balthasar a thousand times over), as well as giving extra weight to those who have been repeatedly singled out for praise by the Magisterium, or even used in the expression and formulation of the Church's doctrines--such as, preeminently, Bl John Duns Scotus (whose doctrines, as Faber has pointed out, lie behind the formulation of several important Magisterial definitions, including those of the Beatific Vision and the Immaculate Conception) and Ven. John Henry Newman (whose works - even the Parochial and Plain Sermons, from his Protestant days! - are cited in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, if I'm not mistaken more times than any other non-biblical, non-magisterial, non-patristic source). May they both be enrolled in the list of Doctors soon! Amen.

More on Plantinga, Divine Simplicity

It would seem that Catholics, at least, cannot follow Plantinga in his claim that God is other than his nature (philosophical arguments aside, for the moment), due to the decrees of the council of Rheims against Peter of Poitiers. Of course, it was not an ecumenical council, but its decrees are included in Denzinger. In any case here it is, #745

Quod divina essentia, substantia et natura, quae dicitur divinitas, bonitas, sapientia, magnitudo Dei, et quaeque similia, non sit Deus, sed forma, qua est Deus.

that the divine essence, substance and nature which is called the divinity, goodness, wisdom, magnitude of God, and suchlike, is  not God, but a form by which God is.

Angels on Pinheads

Although it does not seem that the scholastics ever actually asked how many angels could dance on the head of a pin, still it must be admitted that they do at times discuss questions which seem, at least from this distance, just as trite and ridiculous. Take, for instance, St Bonaventure's In IV Sententiarum Dist. VIII. Pars II. Art. I Q. II ob. 7-8, where someone in Bonaventure's class is worrying about the fact that in the words of consecration--"This is the cup of my blood"--the principle thing referred to, the Precious Blood, is, horror of horrors, declined rather than in the nominative case, that is, crooked obliquo rather than straight recto! I have to admit it's hard to see why anyone would think this is a legitimate problem, or why Bonaventure would deem it worthy of response. It should at least be recalled that Bonaventure's Sentences commentary is a revised record of actual classroom lectures, and that even silly questions might come up and be discussed in a classroom setting which an academic professional would not today include in his published work.

At the same time the present question is extremely interesting in a number of other respects. For one, it sheds light on the present-day "pro multis" controversy. Just a few objections after the frivolous declension ones, it is asked why the words of consecration are "pro vobis et pro multis", for you and for many, and not "pro omnibus," for all, given that the blood of Christ was in fact shed for all. Bonaventure replies that by "pro vobis" Christ meant the Apostles to whom he was speaking, and by extension the Jews, and that by "pro multis" he meant the gentiles; or, similarly, by "for you" Christ meant the priests, the ministers of the sacrament he was instituting, and by "for many" he meant those to whom the priests were to minister. So that "for you and for many" in fact means the same thing as "for all". In the body of the question Bonaventure ventures the opinion that the *exact words* of the Roman canon are not *absolutely necessary* for confecting the sacrament--for one thing they are not the words found in the New Testament--and that so long as the sense remains identical the words might vary without changing the sacrament's form: forma in illis verbis omnibus salvatur, et modica variatio verbi, salvo sensu, formam non mutat. So thanks to St Bonaventure we can dispense with that canard of today's Traditionalists.

In any case, the "for you and for all" translation in today's English mass was approved specifically by Rome. In this same Responsio St B also deals with the question of *why* the form of confection differs from any of the formularies found in scripture, and his response is simply that the Roman Church has declared that this is the form. He affirms Roman primacy--based of course on its founding by Peter and Paul the princes of the Apostles--in explicit and strong terms, as well as the priority of the unwritten Tradition handed down by the Apostles over the authority of Scripture, at greater length than I care to quote and translate.

So here we have an excellent demonstration of the awesomeness of the scholastic method. Right next to merely absurd grammatical quibbles and scruples--just making sure we leave no stone left unturned, thank you--we have an exposition and defense of some of the central doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, with immediate applicability to controversies very much alive today within that Church. Did I mention that St Bonaventure is great?

Another Scotist Dogma?

I have in mind the constitution Benedictus Deus issued by Benedict XII in 1336. According to the recent book by Avery Cardinal Dulles, this decree is one of the view such from the Medieval period that theologians hold to be clearly infallible. Trottmann takes it as the end-point of his massive tome on the beatific vision, which I think may be the source of my information. I was having an argument with a Thomist about this, as I think I remember Trottmann claiming that this doctrine endorsed the Scotist position on the beatific vision, as being an example of intuitive cognition. I quote the relevant passage, from Denzinger 67:

"[the angels and "court of heaven"] viderunt et vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratine obiecti visi se habente, sed divina essenta immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente, quodque sic videntes eadem divina essentia perfruuntur, nec non quod ex tali visione et fruitione eroum animae, qui iam decessertun, sunt vere beatae et habent vitam et requiem aeternam, et etiam illorum, qui postea decedent, eamdem divinam videbunt essentiam, ipsaque perfruentur ante iudicium generale; ac quod visio huiusmodi divinae essentiae eiusque fruitio actus fidei et spei in eis evacuant, prout fides et spes propriae theologicae sunt virtutes; quodque postquam inchoata fuerit vel erit talis intuitiva ac facialis visio et fruitio in eisdem, eadem visio et fruitio sine aliqua intercisione seu evacuatione pradicateae visionis et fruitionis continuata extitit et continuabitur usque ad finale iudicium et ex tunc usque in sempiternum"

Now the point of all this was to resolve whether the dead see God after death or not, and the document does define that the blessed dead enjoy intuitive cognition of the divine essence (sorry, seventh-day adventists, you lose). By saying this may be a "Scotist" dogma I am not saying that it is necessarily opposed to Thomism. Thomas if I recall my recent exam question correctly, thinks that the divine essence becomes a form for the intellect; so it is also direct. But Thomas does not use the term "intuitive" which, while not coined by Scotus, did historically seem to explode in the extent of its usage due to his employment of it. By this I mean that after Scotus, discussions of intuitive and abstractive cognition became standard fare in the prologues to Sentence commenaries, though he does not talk about intuitive cognition at all in the prologue to his Parisian Reportatio, instead develops a complicated and controversial usage of abstractive cognition. Essentially, Scotus thinks intuitive cognition is the direct cognition of something qua existing in the here and now. Abstractive cognition "abstracts" from the here and now, and is mediated by an intelligible species. Returning to Benedictus Deus, then, Benedict XII is using a technical term known have been developed in its "modern", 14th century sense by Scotus.

Of course, this does not exactly constitute a dogma...the dogma is that there is a vision of God after death that is intuitively immediate. The Scotistic part is the manner of the vision. The tricky part of all this is that intuitive cognition is a mode of cognition naturally had by the intellect (its manner of functioning in this life is unclear in Scotus and highly disputed by scholars). While this may be logically distinct from his notion of being as the object of the intellect, in that context he denies the existence of the lumen gloriae, which if you, gentle readers, recall from an earlier post, apparently is dogma [though as the affirmation of it was directed against the Beghards and not a scholastic, and as I read an article the other day saying certain other parts of the council of Vienne weren't considered dogma, I am entirely unsure of the status of that bit on the lumen gloriae]; but, all is not lost, for he says that God is maximally intelligible, and maximally light, and so therefore does seem to shine on the intellect (this bit is from Ord. III where he talks about the knowledge of Christ). But the whole point of the lumen gloriae is that the intellect of itself can't see God and needs to be elevated by the divine light [I am reminded of a recent entry on energetic processions in which Perry I think lamented some intellectual propterty issues he was having...in the area of Scotistic studies and 14th century philosophy, the field is so wide open that I gladly here give the status questionis of an article someone could write]. Such are my rambling thoughts of the day. Now its time for bed so I'll sign off now. enjoy

Duns Scotus the Papalist?

I came across the following quote today, in a discussion of the Joachim of Fiore's criticism of Peter Lombard, to the effect that his views entail a quaternity in divinis. It is from Reportatio I-A, d.5 pars 1 q.1 n.10: 

"Quantum ad primum errorem, respondet Papa et tenet pro Magistro Petro; et in hoc Papa confirmat et canonizat opinionem Petri, cuius auctoritas forte maior est quam scripturae vel sanctorum-sed non curo hoc asserere- et ostendit quod non sequitur consequentia quaternitatis..."

"As far as to the first error, the Pope responds and holds to Master Peter [Lombard]; and in this the Pope confirms and canonizes the opinion of Peter, whose authority perhaps is greater than scripture or the saints-but I do not care to assert this-and he shows that the consequence of quaternity does not follow..."

Now the relative pronoun 'cuius' is ambiguous, and could refer to either the Pope or Peter Lombard. In translation my natural sense is that it refers to Lombard, though that would be a rather odd claim. A bishop of Paris, who compiled various sayings of the fathers into a textbook is possessed of greater authority than the saints or scripture themselves? It seems more likely that it is referring to the Pope; after all, as one can read in his discussions of the Eucharist, Scotus is a firm believer in the authority of the Church to determine doctrine and holds to transubstantiation purely on the authority of Lateran IV.  This passage could be meant along those lines. And it is not so terribly far from the modern teachings on infallibility, etc., though one probably not want to take this to mean that the Pope has authority over scripture. Perhaps we might want also to substitute 'magisterium' for pope here. Well, that's all folks.

varia

Ord. III d.1 pars 2 q. unica n. 210:

“...nihil, quod non est expresse articulus fidei, tenendum est tamquam simpliciter credendum, nisi sequatur ex aliquo simpliciter credendo.”

"...nothing, which is not expressly an article of faith, should be held as to be believed absolutely, unless it follows from something that must be believed absolutely."

I rather like that one. The editors refer to several other passages where he says something similar. The context is the question in book III (obviously) where he is asking what it is that terminates the relation of dependence of the assumed nature..is it the divine essence, the word, etc. It is rather an interesting question as Scotus takes it as an opportunity to revisit the question from book I about whether the persons are consituted by something absolute. He ultimately opts for the authority of tradition, even though he thinks the arguments are not very good; they do not 'conclude'. So he still thinks his theory is better, and can be held as the constitution of divine persons is not an article of faith nor follows directly from one.

It is somewhat surprising to read something like this, as we tend to think of the medievals as being rather unsophisiticated in most areas. Scotus in general, however, as I have tried to show in other posts, has a very developed sense of the uses of theology, quite apart from the whole faith-reason thing for which he is often maligned (by Thomists, and their bastard children Radical Orthodoxy). The statement seems true to me, however. It is one of those unexpressed and unknown truths in the background of my conversion to the Church, I suspect. The doctrinal chaos of much of protestantism has nothing to compare. Some things really are fundamental and settled, leaving whole new vistas of theology open for investigation and private opinion (bracketing, of course, the whole problem of making past dogma relevant in the present...to me medieval theology is probably more present and alive than is that of Rahner, von Balthasar, or the latest pomo trend). It is also a justification for my denial of most Thomist doctrines (mainly philosophical...the theological ones I object to are the explanations, not the articuli fidei themselves) as well as the arguments of those Thomists of the Strict Observance who claim on the basis of papal opinions and encyclicals dating from the days of the Neo-thomistic revival (1879-1965 are contentious dates I would assign for the institutional side of things) that the faithful are obligated to give religious assent to things like the 25 Thomistic theses. I've read some pretty crazy stuff on that topic (such as, Pelzer or Pelster's article from the early days of Franciscan Studies responding to Spanish Dominicans claiming that one is obligated to hold with religious assent everything Thomas said except in an area where the commentary tradition itself is in doubt as to the mentem Thomae. But I could go on all day about such things, and would probably get less charitable as I went due to the fact that I am in a fell mood today (sept. 14 has come and gone, and the promised tlm chapel was cold and dark).

To return to the 14th s., here is a bit on relations and will, from the same question as above.

ord. III d. 1 pars 2 q. unica n.241
“I say that every real relation is between extremes really distinct, but sometimes by a distinction preceding the relations, sometimes not, but only formally caused by those relations; and this not only among the divine persons but among creatures and also in accidental relations. For the will moves itself and is moved by itself, and not only is there a real relation of the will to volition, but also the will as active to itself as passive.... And nevertheless the will, which is the foundation of those opposed relations ‘of moving and moved’, and is denominated (denominatur) by each of them, itself is not distinguished by a distinction of those relations, but only by the distinction made by them.”

De constitutivo divinarum personarum

Today's snippet is from Scotus's discussion of whether the divine persons are consituted by something relative or absolute. In the Ordinatio he doesn't explicitly side with one opinion or the other, but gives thorough replies to objections for both positions. The vat. editors say that he holds the absolute side as being more probable than the common opinion. As far as I could tell, it comes from considering the intellect and will as principles of the processions and in same way as quasi effective causes. The part I'm posting is actually part of his defense of the absolute position, where he talks about Scriptural and Ecclesiastical authority with respect to theological opinion. It's too long to type out the latin too.

Ord. I d. 26 q. un. nn.70-72 [vat. ed. 6 p. 29]:

It seems therefore that it can be said that if the New Scriptures expressly preferred that those persons are relative, and this is of the substance of the faith, nevertheless it is not found expressly that relations are the primary forms [primae formae], primarily constituting and distinguishing the persons, -the church has not declared this. It was not declared in the Apostle’s Creed, nor in the Nicene Creed, nor in the general council under Innocent III, nor in the general council under Gregory X in Lyon, nor in any other council, because still some authentic things are clearly handed down in the Scriptures [I’m not sure how to take this last bit; it almost seems contradictory: “quod adhuc manifeste videatur traditum in Scriptura aliqua authentica].

If therefore Christ did not teach this nor the Church declare it, namely, that the persons are distinguished primarily by relatins, it does not seem then that this should be asserted as being of the faith, because if that is not true, it does not seem to be reverently said about the divine persons that they are "subsistent relations"; nevertheless if it is true, but not handed down as if it were a certain truth, it does not seem safe to assert this just as if it must be held as a certain truth. And although it may be true that the persons are distinguished by relations (et by standing in this generally, the saints labored how distinction of persons could stand with unity of essence), nevertheless it is not fitting to deny that some distinction quasi prior can be posited, which also grants that distinction [ie, that the persons are constituted by relations] -so that every way holds that affirmative true, that namely the divine persons are distinguished by relations, although some way might say that some real distinction quasi preceeds that distinction. Nor is it fitting to bind an article of faith handed down in general, to one special meaning, as if that general meaning cannot be true unless in that special: and just as that article, that the "Word of God is made man", is not fitting to be limited to one determinate mode (which is not expressed in the canon nor by the Church), so that it cannot be true unless that mode whould be true; for this is to reduce an article of faith to uncertainty, if something might be uncertain which is not handed down just as an article of faith (for it seems uncertain that it cannot be held without another uncertain one).

If that position be held, it should be said that that absolute reality, - constituting the persons and distinguishing them - would not be a reality to itself [ad se] just as essentials are to themselves, but a personal reality and to itself in the second mode [1st mode=quid, 2nd =aliquem], according to the distinction of that master [Bonaventure-this has incensed various Bonaventurian editors] posited in the beginning of the opinion.