Ruminations on the Fall

A post over at Vox Nova caused me to pause and think (imagine the scene in Fellowship where Gandalf suspects the ring might be the 'One' and sits in the corner muttering and smoking). Much of the content is standard pseudo-Dionysianism; God is beyond all being, predication, affirmation, negation, etc. etc., though no one ever seems to draw the obvious conclusion from this, viz. that God is completely unknowable. Longtime readers will already know the standard Scotistic responses that I could trot out, that there is a univocal concept of being, that theology presupposes said univocal concept, that the object of the intellect is being, and so on. I was more interested in their view that the fall has corrupted human nature, even that logic has been corrupted. Not just that the human capacity to reason has been corrupted, but that 'logic' was as well (I suppose then that if Adam hadn't sinned, not only would no one ever commit a fallacy of equivocation but fallacy's of equivocation would have been valid? and in light of recent posts here, perhaps square-circles would be possible beings?).

It is interesting to note that Scotus stands as opposed to this appearance of christian platonism, if it is that, rather than some baleful influence of Luther, as he does to negative theology. He really seems to have been one of the post positive theologians of the middle ages. Forget Doctor subtilis et Marianus, we should call him the Doctor Positivus. For his view of human nature with respect to the fall seems to be summed up in the notion that what was lost by Adam's sin was rectitude in the will. There was no darkening of the intellect, weakening of nature, etc., or anything of the kind. To be sure, the preternatural gifts were lost, though perhaps only immortality. A hasty consultation of Ott's Fundamentals reveals that these in fact are the only two effects of the fall that are 'de fide' (that is, loss of immortality and sanctifying grace; the latter of these Scotus would associate with a quality in the will). This trend towards the negative and pessimistic is by no means restricted to the vox nova crowd; they are just echoing what really seems to be the common opinion of the contemporary thomist-platonist movement. I suspect this may be the root cause of the hatred (yes, I say hatred) of the Cambridge Phantasists (for our newer readers, that is our preferred name for 'radical' 'orthodoxy'), who seek to counter nihilism by embracing a negation; Scotus is their polar opposite on this as well as probably many other issues.

I will close by nuancing somewhat Scotus' positive position. Although he does not think that the fall has corrupted human nature or damaged all our natural powers, his view that being is the object of the intellect requires qualification. For if true, we would expect that since God is infinite being, and being is the object of the intellect, our intellects would be moved by God in this life. Or to put it another way, we would know everything that falls under the concept of being. Scotus denies this, and says that pro statu isto, as far as the wayfaring state is concerned, the object of the intellect is the quiddity of sensible things. He says this may be part of the punishment of original sin (punishment; still not a darkening, though it may amount to what the endarkeners mean by the term), or part of the natural concord of the powers, or merely from the will of God. Whatever the reason, it is not from the nature of the intellect as intellect.

Hervaeus Natalis on the Order of Divine Cognition

This is from (the Thomist) Hervaeus Natalis O.P.'s discussion of the divine ideas. Apparently William of Alnwick was right; the common opinion after Scotus did follow some version of his application of instants of nature to the order of divine understanding and the production of intelligilible being. Note however, that Hervaeus claims there are five stages, as opposed to Scotus' four.

Hervaus Natalis, I Sent. (Lectura, ca. 1303) d. 34 q. 1 a. 3 (ed. Paris 1647, p. 143):

"Secundo sciendum est quod talis videtur esse ordo in agnitione divina secundum quod procedit a cognitione sui, ad cognitionem creaturarum scilicet, quod primo intelligitur essentia divina ut obiectum primum, natum movere intellectum divinum quasi possibilem. Secundo intelligitur actus intelligendi causatus a tali obiecto movente. Tertio intelligitur dictus actus terminati ad essentiam divinam sicut ad primum obiectum et quia in essentia divina intellecta relucent omnia alia ab ea, intelligitur essentia divina, ut idea et exemplar ad cognitionem creaturae. Quarto accipitur ipsa creatura intellecta. Quinto est ipsum intelligi ideae ut idea est, ita quod intelligamus Deum prius idealitate sua, ut medio cognoscendi quo cognoscit creaturam, quam habeat ut obiectum cognitum, licet illud quod est idea sit prius cognitum quam creatura, sicut patuit in exemplo de cognitoine fumi, et de cognitione ignis per fumum, et de cognitione illius mediationis secundum quam fumus est causa cognoscendi ignem."

Translation:

Second, is should be known that there is such an order in the divine recognition, which proceeds from the cognition of itself to the cognition of creatures. First, the divine essence is understood as first object, naturally suited to move the quasi divine possible intellect. Second, the act of understanding caused a such a moving object is understood. Third, the act terminating at the divine essence as to first object is understood, and because all other things than the divine essence shine forth from it, the divine essence is understood as idea and exemplar for the cognition of creatures. Fourth, the creatures themselves are received as understood. Fifth, the understanding of an idea as it is an idea, so that we understand God prior to his ideality, as a means of knowing by which he knows a creature, which he has as object known, although that which is the idea is known first than is the creature, as appears in the example of the cognition of smoke, and of the cognition of fire through smoke, and of the cognition of that means according to which smoke is the cause of knowing fire.

Paradox!

Item quaritur de hoc quod dicit: 'Confessio ibi commendatur: Iustus in principio est accusator sui'. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut accusat se iustus in quantum iustus aut in quantum peccator. Se in quantum iustus, sed omnis qui accusat iustum in quantum huiusmodi, accusat iustitiam; et omnis qui accusat iustitiam est iniustus: ergo, si accusat se in quantum iustus, est iniustus. Si accusata se secundum quod peccator, sed omnis qui accusat peccatorem secundum quod peccator, accusat peccatum; et omnis talis iuste accusat et est iustus: ergo, si accusat secundum quod peccator, accusator est iustus, et ita secundum quod peccator est iustus.

--St Bonaventure, Sententiarum Lib.IV Dist. XVI. Pars I. Dubium IV

A Warm and Fuzzy Syllogism

I have not read much in medieval sacramental theology, so I do not know if this position is common or not. It came up when I was reading a series of questions on the efficacy of circumcision; the question I have quoted from below is from one dealing with whether there was some remedy for original sin prior to the institution of circumcision.

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.1 pars 4 incidentalis q.2 n.389 (XI 138):

"Nullo tempore dimisit Deus cultores suos sine remedio necessario ad salutem; sed omni tempore-post lapsum-fuit necessaria ad salutem deletio originalis; ergo quocumque tempore erat aliquod remedium efficax ad deletionem illius peccati"

At no time did God leave his worshippers without a remedy necessary for salvation; but at every time after the fall the removal of original [sin] was necessary for salvation; therefore at every time there was some efficacious remedy for the removal of that sin.

More Bonaventure on Satisfaction

Here's another passage, from IV Sent. Dist. XV. Pars I. Art. Un. Q. I:

de omni eo quod est in peccato non fit satisfactio, quoniam hoc est impossibile. Unde et Deus non exigit satisfactionem de omni eo quod est in culpa, sed aliquid condonat per misericordiam, de aliquo requirit satisfactionem per iustitiam, ut simul sit his "misericordia et veritas"; nec unquam est satisfactio, nisi praecedat condonatio, sicut nunquam est meritum nisi praecedat donum gratuitum.

Unde notandum est quod in peccato duo sunt, scilicet offensa Dei et libido deordinata. Offensa Dei est infinita, et pro illa non fit satisfactio, sed Dei misericordia illa remittit suam dando gratiam. Libido autem perversa finita est; et quia Deus iustus est, non totum remittit, sed pro illa exigit poenam condignam; et quantum ad hoc possibile est Deo satisfacere.

"Satisfaction cannot be made for everything that is in sin, because this is impossible. Whence God does not demand satisfaction for everything that is [involved] in guilt, but he lets something go through mercy, and requires satisfaction for something through justice, that there may be at once both "mercy and truth"; nor is there ever satisfaction unless it preceded by something being let go, just as there is never merit without it being preceded by a gratuitous gift.

Whence it must be noted that there are two things [involved] in sin, namely the offense against God and the disordered desire. An offense against God is infinite, and there can be no satisfaction for it, but the mercy of God remits it by giving his grace. But a perverse desire is finite; and because God is just, he does not [simply] remit the whole, but exacts for that [the perverse will] an appropriate punishment, and according to this it is possible to make satisfaction to God."

As for how suffering accomplishes this, the old patristic idea of spiritual discipline or exercise makes sense to me. If we've gotten lazy and our muscles have atrophied, we have to put down the chips, get off the couch, and do some exercise. Our past laziness might be forgiven freely but that won't by itself reduce my craving for chips, my hatred of greens, or the pains of working out necessary to correct the damage I've done. If God expects our souls to be "fit" according to our capacity, he might forgive the offense to him and the neglect of our duty to ourselves and others in letting ourselves go, but he won't wave his hand and restore us to our former spiritual capacities without us doing some exercise of our own. If we confess our sins we'll be forgiven, but if we want our temptations to go away and to enjoy permissible things, we have to actually resist temptation and do the laudable things.

Bonaventure on Satisfaction and Guilt in Purgatory

A prominent clerical member of the Catholic blogophere asked me a question today about a passage in St Bonaventure's Breviloquium in which he mentions making satisfaction in Purgatory. Since my answer involved doing a bit of research I thought I should make the fruits of it available for all to see who care.

Most of the time when you want St B to clarify or expand on something you need to go to his Sentences Commentary. I've just done so, and here's what I find: In IV Sent. Dist. XV. Pars II. Art. I Q.I St Bonaventure asks what satisfaction is. After a discussion of various definitions he says the following:

ad satisfactionem completam duo requiruntur, scilicet emenda praesens pro culpa praeterita et propositum firmum invitando futuram; et ista duo tangit in hac notificatione. Quantum ad emendam pro culpa perpetrata dicit: peccatorum causas excidere. Non enim potest pro culpa melius emenda fieri quam ea a se cum dolore et poena praecidendo removere, qua cum amore sequendo peccavit. Quantum ad firmum propositum de futuro dicit: et suggestionibus aditum non indulgere.

My hasty translation:

"For complete satisfaction two things are required, namely to correct (or repair) one's present state on account of past guilt, and to summon up a firm intention for the future. The first means to root out the causes of sin. For one can repair one's past guilts in no better way than by removing them with sorrow and punishment, by cutting out those things which, by following them with [inordinate] love, caused one to sin. The second means not to indulge in suggestions which arise [to repeat the sin]."

In purgatory, of course, one is punished with both sorrow and pain for past guilt. The second condition may not be as relevant since the will is fixed after death, i.e. I don't think Bonaventure would admit that a soul in purgatory would be capable of further sin, so the intention to avoid sin may or may not be superfluous.

Also, perhaps, of interest on the matter: IV Sent. Dist. XXI. Pars. I. Art. II. Q. I: Whether in purgatory after this life there is accomplished some purgation from some sin or only from punishment. That is, are sins actually remitted in purgatory or is it only that we make satisfaction for already-forgiven sins there? In the article St Bonaventure admits that it's a very common opinion that sins are not forgiven after death, "that sins are remitted only according to their status or [unfulfilled] punishment and are purified (*purgantur*) only according to the dross [that is, the nasty effects left behind in the soul by sin] or aftereffects (*sequela*)." According to St B many theologians of his day thought this; but he says, "But although this opinion is very reasonable (*multum rationi consona*), nevertheless the authorities of the Saints seem to expressly contradict it." Especially, St Gregory the Great in his "Dialogue" says that some sins are forgiven after this life, and St Isidore explicitly says that some sins committed after baptism are forgiven through purgatorial fire. Bonaventure also cites Matthew 12:32. St B concludes from their words that in purgatory some sins are remitted, not merely according to punishment, but also according to guilt.

So, he says, although some people think otherwise, this is the opinion of Peter Lombard and of "multitudinous" authoritative Saints. "It should be said therefore that some sins, namely venial ones, can be and are remitted not only in this life (*in hoc saeculo*), but also in purgatory, when someone passes over with venial sins [unconfessed or unrepented], when the final grace given at death had not deleted them, and therefore he needs help." For instance, if someone dies without receiving the sacraments just before death and has not made a perfect act of contrition for the venial sins since his last confession, he can die with venial sins on his conscience and these still need to be forgiven. Since the soul is dead and the time of merit has passed, he cannot ask for further grace and therefore needs external help. Since there are no sacraments after death, the purgatorial fire can act in their place to not only remove the dross and aftereffects of various sins from the soul, but also to remove the guilt of unrepented venial ones. "And this is possible because, as it was shown in the preceding problem, for the removal of venial sins it suffices that free choice conform itself with grace, nor is it necessary that it help it [i.e. no actual effort of the will or positive contrition is required, but only not to provide an obstacle]." If you die with unrepented mortal sins, though, it's too late.

Sorry for no Latin passages on that last question, but I need to get back to work.

Grace

Proof of something.

Ordinatio III d. 13 qq. 1-4, n. 92:

"Et ideo tam in via quam in patria ponitur aliqua forma creata, ut voluntas possit uti illa forma in operando, et sit forma in potestate eius, et sic laudabiliter operetur."

"And therefore, some created form is posited both in the wayfaring state and in the fatherland [ie, "heaven"], so that the will might be able to use that form in operating, and the form be in its power, so that it might operate in a praise-worthy manner."

Proof, that is, against certain interpretations of Scotus that would like to maximize his similarity to later Reformation views, by stressing 'forensic justification'; for whatever reason (this isn't directed against, say, Cross, as after reading the intro to his book I think the problem is mainly that he's trying to appeal to as many groups as possible...which is why he also compares Scotus almost exculsively to Thomas, the very difficulty with Gilson's book).The 'created form' he's talking about is, of course, that of grace conceived as a quality inhering in the will, without which human actions cannot be meritorious.

De peccato actuali

I'm deep in fall semester now, but am trying to finish up vol. 8. At the moment I am wending my way through the discussion of actual sin, one of the most complicated questions, textually speaking, that I have encountered in the subtle doctor's writings; five interlaced questions. There is a lot of Anselm, Augustine, with ocassional references to arguements of Aquinas and Bonaventure, though it may not be direct "contra Thomam" argumentation, but borrowing arguments for a position from their writings. The editors give quotes from Aquinas, and point out a dual influence from Anselm and Augustine; Scotus discusses Augustine, but is much closer to Anselm's position, and even adopts it explicitly in the matter of original sin. It is a very different account of sin than what I have heard before, and I think I made some errors in my post on penance. Not that I think it falls afoul of Trent or anything. Even Ott points out a few places where Trent specifically left the scholastic dispute unresolved. Anyway, I will put up a few quotes.

Ord. II d. 34-37 qq.1-5, n. 46-47:

"Concedo ergo ... quod peccatum est corruptio rectitudinis in actu secundo... non autem naturalis, nec cuiuscumque habitualis, sed moralis actualis. Sed non intelligo de corruptione quae est mutatio ab esse ad non-esse (potest enim peccatum manere post talem mutationem iustitae ab esse ad non-esse, potest etiam inesse absque tali mutatione ab esse ad non-esse), sed intelligo corruptionem formaliter, sicut privatio dicitur formaliter corruptio sui habitus; hoc enim modo ratio peccati est formaliter corruptio rectitudinis in actu secundo, quia opponitur illi rectitudini ut privatio habitui: non quidem rectitudini quae inest (quia tunc duo opposita simul inessent), nec quae prius infuit isti actui (quia actus non manet ut alteretur ab opposito in oppositum), sed quae deberet inesse."

I grant, therefore, that sin is corruption of rectitude in second act [think of Aristotle's first and second acts here]; not however of a natural act, nor of any habitual one, but of a moral act. But I do not mean by 'corruption' a change from being to non-being (for sin can remain after such a change of justice from being to non-being, it is able also to inhere without such a change from being to non-being), but I use 'corruption' formally, just as a privation is called formally a corruption of its habit; for in this way the definition of sin is formally the corruption of rectitude in second act, because it is opposed to that rectitude as privation is opposed to its habit: not indeed to the rectitude which inheres (because then two opposites would inhere simultaneously), nor what first was present to that act (because act does not reman so that it might be changed from opposite into opposite), but what ought to inhere.

"Voluntas enim libera debitrix est ut omnem actum suum eliciat conformiter regulae superiori, videlicet secundum praeceptum divinum; et ideo quando agit difformiter ab ista regula, caret iustitia actuali debita (hoc est, iustitia quae deberet inesse actui et non inest): haec carentia, in quantum est actus voluntatis deficientis (sicut dicetur in aliqua solutione), est formaliter peccatum actuale."

Free will is a debtor, so that it elicits its every act in conformity to superior rules, namely, according to the divine commands. And therefore when it acts in a manner opposed to those rules, it lacks the actual requried justice (that is, the justice which ought to inhere or be present to the act and does not inhere). This lack, insofar as it as an act of the will turning aside is formally actual sin."

Bad, I know, but "debita" and "deficio" are always a nightmare to translate, almost as bad as "natum."