What is reality?

Here are some remarks by Peter Thomae on the notion of reality. one should keep these definitions in mind when reading Scotist thought.

Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de modis distinctionum q. 2 a. 1 (ed. forthcoming ca. 2030)

De tertio, scilicet quid sit realitas, dico duo:

Primum est quod realitas non dicit proprie rem, sed aliquid aliud ad rem pertinens. Hoc patet ex modo significandi, nam ab hoc quod ‘res’ derivatur ‘reale’, unde illud dicitur ‘reale’ quod est ad rem pertinens; sed ab hoc quod dicitur ‘reale’ derivatur ‘realitas’; realitas ergo proprie non dicit rem sed aliquid ad rem pertinens.

Secundum est descriptio quam pono de realitate, quae talis est: illud voco ‘realitatem’ quod est aliquid positivum in re ex natura rei, non contentum in alio | ut in pure passivo vel activo praecise vel sicut in superiori inferius sed actualiter et formaliter inexistens, ita quod ultimate abstractum nullum illorum a quo formaliter distinguitur includit impossibile est in actuali existentia ab illis separari per aliquam potentiam.

Translation:

Concerning the third [section], namely, 'what is reality', I say two things"

First is that 'reality' does not mean properly 'thing', but something other pertaining to a thing. This is clear from the mode of understanding, for from this that 'real' is derived from 'thing', it is said that 'real' is that is pertaining ot a thing; but from 'real' is derived 'reality'; therefore, reality properly does not mean thing but something pertaining to a thing.

Second is the description which I posit of reality, which is thus: I call that [a] 'reality' which is something positive in a thing from the nature of a thing, not contained in anthoer as in the purely passive or purely active or as an inferior in a superior, but formally and actually existing-in, so that when it is ultimately abstracted it includes none of those from which it is formally distinguished [and] it is possible that it can be spearated from them in actual existence by some power.

Hmmm. well, it is based on two manuscripts. Good manuscripts, sure, but maybe something is missing. Commentary to come.

What is a Formality IV: Franciscus de Mayronis

For the previous posts in the series, see Petrus Thomae, Antonius Andreas, Nicolaus Bonetus. Today I am translating a question from Francis of Meyronnes, the French Scotist known as the Princeps Scotistarum in later ages. I haven't looked much into his commentaries on the Sentences, but apparently there are some three versions. He initially lectured at Paris in 1320, [a bunch of stuff then happened, before, voila] a final version known as the Conflatus appeared and was later printed several times. He died ca. 1328. For more information see the "Franciscan authors" website. What follows is only a translation, as the question is too long to type out in Latin in full.

Conflatus I d. 8 q. 5 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 48vb-49ra):

...Therefore I say that some distinction between the formal rationes or formalities and realities must be posited necessarily, and not as between formality and formality but as between formality and intrinsic mode.

For the evidence of which it must be known first what a formality is, second what an intrinsic mode is.

As far as the first, 'what a formality is', some [people] say that 'formality' is said from 'form', just as materiality is said from matter. And therefore some [people] say that there cannot be many formalities without many forms, just as neither many materialities without many matters.

Against this: that is a very coarse[grossa] and asinine imagination, which is clear from two reasons. First thus: because just as formality is said from form, so 'essential' from 'essence'. We, however, posit in the divine being many essential features, and nevertheless there are not there many essences, as is clear expressly through Blessed Dionysius cap. 3 De unica et discreta theologia. Therefore neither does a multitude of forms follow upon the position of many formal rationes as you say.

Second, because in the person of the Father in the divine being are posited many personal features, namely ungenerated, paternity, active spiration, all of which are personal features and nevertheless the person of the Father is single(unica); therefore, etc.

Furthermore, many material things, according to the ones speaking commonly, are posited in one composite, namely many material accidents; and nevertheless many matters are not posited there; so in man many human features, not nevertheless unless one man.

Therefore others say that formalities are real rationes which are posited in the same simple thing.

Against this: first because formalities are not only posited in simple things but also in composites, according to the ones positing the formalities. Therefore that is not a good description. Second because not all formalities are real, for man in potency has a formality and nevertheless not a reality. Likewise beings of reason have formalities but not realities.

Therefore others say that those formalities are certain modalities.

Against this: for the ones positing them divide them against modes. Second because modes are not able to be first in beings, because a mode is always posterior to that of which it is a mode; but formalities are posited simply first in beings, for the ratio of entity is a certain formality and the ratio of deity, which  are absolutely prior to all others.

Therefore others say that formalities are definitive rationes, for the definitive ratio of each one is called formal and it is clear that it is a formality.

Against this doubly: first because the categories are not definable, becasue they are absolutely simple  and nevertheless they have formalities by which they are formally distinguished [from each other]. Second because the ratio of being and ratio of deity are posited as formalities and nevertheless they cannot be defined because every definition is given through prior [features, such as genus and difference]; but than these [categories] nothing is prior.

I say therefore that a formality is a quiddity of each thing haveing a quiddity whether it is definable or not, because the formal ratio of each thing is that which is present in [inest] it in the first mode of predicating per se; such however are all quidditative [features, aspects].

Argument for the Formal Distinction

I was leafing through my copy of Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae by J.S. Hickey (Dublin, 1912), and in volume 1, page 315, I came across the following passage in a long footnote given in English. It's attributed to a Jesuit named Rickaby, but there's no complete bibliographical citation. As far as I can tell - it's a little unclear - it's from a book called First Principles of Knowledge:

The Scotists within what, as a thing, is undifferenced, profess to find actually different "realities," which they also call "formalitates." . . . The individual man, Peter, is one undifferenced object, yet the individuality, considered formally as the individuality is not the humanity considered formally as the humanity. Hence the Scotists argue that there must be some real difference between them a parte rei, in the object itself: it need not be a difference between thing and thing, but at least it is a difference between a real formality and another real formality in one thing. Their opponents deny that the conclusion follows from the premises: they affirm that our method of abstracting one aspect from another is such, that two different aspects can be taken of an object which in itself presents no real distinction of its own, to correspond with that which we mentally make. Of itself it offers to the mind a ground for drawing the distinction, but it does not do more. There is then a virtual distinction, but there is not an actual one. This explanation seems intelligibly to meet all the requirements of the case: whereas the Scotist distinction between res and realitas is an enigma, which its proposers have no right to force upon our acceptance. Either they mean no more than our explanation admits, or if they do mean more the addition is not acceptable. For it would drive us to suppose, that whenever the weakness of our intelligence obliges us to conceive an object by a succession of ideas, one of which does not include the notes contained in another, there we come across some actual distinction in the object conceived. A doctrine which fits in better with a sound system of philosophy is, that what in itself is undistinguished is to us distinguishable by mental abstraction.

This is a pretty fair account of the formal distinction and sounds like a pretty fair critique. The problem that I have with it is twofold:

1) First, the notion of the "undistinguished in itself" which nevertheless provides a "ground" for the distinction of reason, which in the thing remains "virtual", is specious. Either Socrates' humanity and Socrateity are in every respect absolutely identical, or they are not. If so, what is the "ground" in the thing for distinguishing between them in abstraction? If not, and if all agree that Socrates' humanity and his individuating factor cannot be separated and are not really distinct, then we need some intermediate distinction.

2) I deny that the Scotist distinction between res and realitas is an enigma. On the contrary, it is quite clear. Socrates is one and self-identical. Socrateity and humanity in Socrates are not altogether and in every respect the same. Socrateity is of itself individual; humanity is common. Socrateity exists only in Socrates; humanity exists both in Socrates and in Plato. While it is the case that humanity is inseparable from Socrateity, in the sense that this particular instance of humanity cannot exist apart from Socrates, because Socrates without this humanity is not Socrates, just as Socrates without Socrateity is not Socrates, nevertheless humanity as a common nature, as existing both in Socrates and in Plato - and it does not belong to humanity as common and as a specific formal ratio to belong to Socrates, but only insofar as it is also a this, which is outside its formal ratio and provided precisely by the additional determination of its individuating factor - it can and does exist outside of Socrates. Therefore this really existing humanity in Socrates and the individuating formal factor in Socrates cannot be separated in reality, and yet they are not wholly identical, but are distinct to the extent just explained, and so are distinct in this sense prior to any consideration by the intellect. So they are formally distinct.

Similarly, the poem the Iliad is a single intelligible matter (this collection of words) with a single intelligible form (this arrangement of those words). Within this poem many formal realities can be distinguished, examined individually, and considered apart from one another. For instance, the character of Achilles is not the same thing as the plot of the poem as a whole; neither is the same as the style of the poem; nor are any of these identical with the hexametric rhythm. All of these - the character of Achilles, the plot, the style, the rhythm - pervade the poem and are in some sense present in all its parts (Achilles' character is present throughout, for instance, as the (proximate or remote) efficient and final causes of most of the action, even when he's not onstage). None of these elements are really distinct from these words in this order, nor consequently from each other. However, they are clearly not all absolutely identical with each other either. None of them could be removed from the Iliad without destroying the poem; but any of them can exist somewhere else without the others. As this, as actually existing in this poem, they necessarily coeexist; as considered as formal ratios in themselves, they need not necessarily coeexist. For instance, the style is almost inevitably lost, along with the hexametric rhythm, in a translation which retains the plot and the character. Or a new poem could be written containing the character of Achilles, but not the plot; or the same plot could be recycled with different characters, and so on. This clearly shows that the distinction between these different elements is not purely a product a product of my mind, but rather my mind's distinguishing follows from what in the poem is already distinct.

We don't posit the formal distinction, then, because the "weakness of our intellect obliges" us to conceive of things as different which are really inseparable; but because our intellect grasps the different realities which, although in the thing as individually existing are really and inseparably identical, are not wholly identical and may in some circumstances, in another individually existing thing, exist apart.

In the main text Hickey, after giving another summary account of the formal distinction, says, along with a quote from someone else named Liberatore (I'm clearly not completely up on my manualist writers):

Atvero invenire . . . quamdam tertiam distinctionem, subtilius est quam quod intelligi possit. Porro, "haec opinio . . . est vana et periculosa. Est vana, quia ad distinguenda ea, propter quae adstruitur, sufficit distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re. Est autem periculosa, quia, quum istae formalitates a natura rei proponantur ut totidem distinctae perfectiones, officit simplicitati divinae naturae."

I translate:

And they find a certain third distinction, unthinkably subtle. Yet "this opinion is vain and dangerous. Vain, because a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing is sufficient to distinguish those on account of which it is added. Dangerous, because, since those formalities are proposed as being on the side of the nature of thing, as so many distinct perfections, it impedes the simplicity of the divine nature."

Of course, from our point of view, and as we have argued here and elsewhere many, many times, the beauty of the formal distinction is precisely that, without positing any composition whatsoever in God, it serves to render meaningless any difficulties that might arise from positing an absolute identity between, say, the intellect and will in God. Because the formalities are not really distinct - they are not, for instance, different parts - they don't detract from perfect and complete simplicity. But because they do not formally include one another and so are not absolutely and in every respect identical, it is possible, for instance, that God understands something which he does not create, or understands necessarily what he creates contingently.

More on the formal distinction, among other places, here.

Divine Simplicity II: Divine Attributes

This post covers another aspect of divine simplicity, namely, how it can be reconciled with a plurality of divine attributes. This problem itself is an expression of the more general problem of the relation between divine transcendence and human language. Divine simplicity is one way to ensure that God is unlike everything in the created world, for it is, after all, a negative doctrine: God is not composed, does not have parts, etc.

The scholastics came up with three solutions to the problem. The first was largely semantic. God is so transcendent and ineffable that he cannot be grasped by human thought or captured by human language. Divine attributes, such as wisdom and justice, are all one in God; when these are predicated of God, they signify primarily the divine essence as one. But there is also a secondary sense of these terms, which connotes the created realm as an effect of God. Only in the second sense are they considered distinct. Most of the twelfth-century thinkers held this view, and it was revived by Ockham and Auriol in the fourteenth century.

The second solution was primarily concerned with elaborating the role of the human intellect. Divine attributes are distinct only as a result of the operation of the intellect (that there are divine attributes is generally assumed based on the Dionysian via eminentiae). The intellect is too weak on its own in its present state to directly grasp God, so it requires a plurality of concepts. This plurality of concepts corresponds to the plurality of attributes. This second solution was authored by Bonaventure and Aquinas; or, more accurately, Bonaventure sketched it out and Aquinas developed it more fully. But he could never make up his mind about it, and one of his students that held one of his views was secretly investigated, and in general, Aquinas' changing views caused lots of problems for his would-be followers (such as, what "causes" the attributes, how can the divine essence be the fundamentum in re, is a "ratio" just a concept in the human mind or does it have an objective correlate in God?). So we will omit any further discussion of Aquinas. And in any case, Aquinas is irrelevant for understanding Scotus on this issue.

The relevant thinkers are Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines (and, to a lesser extent, Thomas of Sutton). Henry has very complicated views on attributes, and they probably do a lot more work in his system than any other medieval thinker I know. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that Henry had a view regarding the origin of the attributes similar to Scotus' theory of instants of nature (see all the posts labeled "intelligible being"). Henry basically applies the three acts of the intellect from the Aristotelian commentary tradition to God. So we have an instant of simple apprehension in which the divine intellect apprehends the divine essence as one simple thing or one simple nature. But "then" it starts to reason about the essence, and by doing this it generates the attributes (attribute=divine essence+ratio from the intellect). However, and this is important, it does not generate the will, even though it is a sine qua non cause of volitional acts. So in the third instant the will is actualized and begins to go through its own series of movements. In the end we have then two fundamental attributes that cannot be reduced to each other, and all other divine attributes are ordered to one of these primary attributes (incidentally, intellect and will serve as the principles for the emanation of the divine persons, but visit the "Henry of Ghent" blog for more on this).

Godfrey of Fontaines thought all this was bullcrap, and instead extended Aquinas' views on divine ideas to help out the problem of attributes. Basically, ignoring his arguments against Henry, Godfrey thinks that God can compare the divine essence to any creature, and since he is omniscient, and because creatures imitate the divine essence in various ways (hence the multiplicity of perfections that are attributed to God), God can compare his essence to the contents of the human mind and see that the human mind, because of its weakness, sees a plurality of attributes in God. So the distinction of attributes is not really in God at all, just the human mind, but God does know that in a derivative sense he has attributes. So in the end, Godfrey cannot avoid positing some movement in divinis either. [this is not entirely accurate, but I don't want to reread either Godfrey or that chapter of my diss.]

We turn now to Scotus. As is probably well known now to all readers of this blog, Scotus has two commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a Lectura and an Ordinatio, as well as a series of student reports, Reportationes, the most trusty of which seems to be the one labeled I-A. In the first two commentaries, Scotus’ discussion of divine attributes is in d. 8 q. 4 in Reportatio I-A, although the doctrine is the same (save more possible variations regarding the formal distinction), the discussion of it has migrated to d. 45, which is about the divine will. Consequently, I will focus here on the Ordinatio. I do recommend reading the Reportatio, however, for it adds the notion of the propositio famosa, which holds that whatever is distinct in reason can be treated as if it were really distinct; Scotus uses this principle to help him escape from objections to his views based on the identity of indiscernables (as Scotus puts it, if a is the same as c and b is the same as c, then a is the same as b).

The basic point that Scotus argues is that the attributes are distinct prior to or apart from any operation of the intellect, whether the intellect in question is divine, human, or angelic. To start off, in the solution of d.8 q.4 Scotus accepts that there are distinctions of reason in God, as well as distinct formal objects, that is, between different modes of conceiving the same object. This suffices for distinctions between say ‘wise’ and ‘wisdom’, but not between entities like wisdom and truth. This is because God knows the divine essence intuitively (see here for intuitive cognition), and can only find these entities in the essence; he does not cause them by means of his intellect. Here is the argument to this effect:

Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 257):

“Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto – sive sit distinctiorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus – sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia ‘ut relationem rationis’, ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.”

Translation:
"Furthermore, an intuitive understanding has no distinction in an object except according as it is existing, because just as it does not know some object save as existing, so it does not know something to be formally distinct in the object unless as it is existing. Since therefore the divine intellect does not know its essence except by an intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether it is of distinct formal objects or as definitions caused by the act of the intellect – it follows that that distinction will be in the object as it is existing in act; and so if that is of formally distinct objects in the object, they will be formally distinct (and then the matter at hand follows, that such a distinction of formal objets precedes the act of the intellect), if however it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, therefore the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence, as a relation of reason, as it is existing, which seems absurd."

The result of this is that there is a distinction preceding the operation of an intellect, such that wisdom is in God and goodness is in God, but wisdom in God is not formally goodness in God. Scotus thinks he has an argument that proves this.

Ord. I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 n. 192 (ed. Vat. IV, 261)
Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi. Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen ‘gradus’ est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter ‘ut in communi, in communi’, nec ‘ut infinitum, infinitum’.

Translation:
"This is proved: because if infinite wisdom would be formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common. For infinity does not destroy the formal ratio of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which grade, nevertheless, is a grade of that perfection), the formal ratio of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, so if it [wisdom], as in common, does not formally include [goodness] in common, neither [will wisdom] as infinite [include goodness] as infinite."

This is a pretty compressed argument, and I’m not at all sure what’s going on at the end. This is the clear part:

If infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common.

The likely interpretation of this is that Scotus has in mind his doctrine of ultimate abstraction from Lec./Ord. I d. 5. According to this notion, the mind can perform a series of abstractions from a material object and ultimately arrive at a pure quiddity or definition. With this in mind, the argument means that if wisdom and justice, qua infinite, are the same, then at the level of pure abstraction (that is, with infinity having been abstracted) wisdom and justice must also be the same. Scotus takes this to be false, and the remainder of the quoted passage supports the claim that infinity does not alter the definition of something, in this case, a pure perfection.

Scotus follows this argument with further considerations on what if means to be formally included in the definition of something:

Ordinatio I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 261-62)

Hoc declaro, quia ‘includere formaliter’ est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaretur, inclusum esset definitio vel pars definitionis; sicut autem definitio bonitatis in communi non habet in se sapientiam, ita nec infinita infinitam: est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles. Definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatum ab intellectu, sed quiditatem rei: est ergo non-identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens istam ‘sapientia non est formaliter bonitas’, non causat actu suo collativo veritatem hiuius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione fit actus verus.

Translation:
I declare this, because ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential definition, so that if a definition of the including could be assigned, the included would be a definition or part of a definition; just as the definition of goodness in common does not contain wisdom, so neither [does the definition of] infinite [goodness contain the definition of] infinite [wisdom]. Therefore there is some formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness, insofar as they would have distinct definitions, if they were definable. A definition, however, does not only indicate the notion/definition caused by the intellect, but the quiddity of the thing. Therefore there is formal non-identity form the side of the thing, and I understand this in such a way that the intellect composing that proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not cause the truth of the proposition by its own comparative act, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the composition of which the act is made true."

The basic idea here is that none of the divine attributes include each other in their definitions or parts of definitions, and this is true apart from any operation of the intellect.

So there you have it. The attributes are distinct ex natura rei (which means they are distinct prior to the operation of any intellect, human or divine), a distinction that is formal (the formal distinction is doing most of the work here, so see the relevant post). In God the attributes all exist under the extrinsic mode of infinity, which safeguards divine simplicity (for more on infinity see the ‘natural knowledge of God’ post in this series). When ultimate abstraction is performed, the intellect discovers that these attributes are distinct because none of them fall into the definitions of the others.

"Inspired Metaphysics"

From a review by Mark Wenzinger of Inspired Metaphysics? Gustav Siewerth's Hermaneutic Reading of the Onto-Theological Tradition by Andrzej Wiercinski.

Much of continental "post-modern" philosophy stands in great need of being disabused of its prejudiced notion that ancient and medieval philosophy is simply onto-theology that seeks only to valorize "presence" by suppressing absence and alterity, all in order to secure a foundation of mastery and control over the totality of the contexts in which human life is lived

[...]

.... Inspired Metaphysics serves as a valuable introduction not only to the thought of Siewerth in particular, but also to the hermeneutic manner of reading both the Thomistic and continental traditions in general. Not the least of the book's many merits is its exposition of the unfortunate manner in which Siewerth himself, seeking to distinguish Thomistic metaphysics from that which Heidgger took to be onto-theology, failed in hermeneutical charity by being content to demonize Scotistic metaphysics as the source of Western philosophy's alleged forgetfulness of Being. In like manner, as Wiercinski points out, much of contemporary Catholic theology likewise fails hermeneutically by uncritically accepting Heidegger's equation of metaphysics with onto-theology and an alleged valorization of "presence", a term that is in fact highly equivocal and that need not at all be understood as Heidegger himself understood it. Contemporary Catholic theology therefore needs to find its own way back to a hermeneutically sensitive appropriation of Scholastic thought, which would involve first, the effort to recognize Thomism and Scotism as mutually complementary, rather than mutually exclusive, manners of philosophical and theological thinking, and second, the effort to recognize the continuity as well as the discontinuity that obtains between the Scholastic and continental traditions.... The goal of Inspired Metaphysics is precisely to make philosopher and theologian alike better capable of engaging in the ongoing conversation that ought never to cease both within and between the Scholastic and continental traditions.

[...]

Not the least of Wiercinski's contributions to the facilitating of dialogue both between philosophy and theology and between the medieval and continental traditions is his recognition of the baneful effect of Siewerth's reductive and misleading critique of the ontology of Duns Scotus as thought that valorizes conceptually unitary "presence" at the expense of ontological difference and that therefore initiates Western philosophy's forgetfulness of Being. Wiercinski accomplishes for Scotus what Ferdinand Alquie accomplishes for Descartes: a "metaphysical rehabilitation" that shows that Scotus and Thomas can be related to one another in a complementary rather than in a reductively oppositional and antagonistic manner. Wiercinski indicates the possibilities for the renewal of ontology in a post-Heideggerian age that could arise starting with a dialogical reading of the Thomistic and Scotistic metaphysical traditions.

Hugo de Novo Castro on the Threefold Distinction

Hugo was another Parisian Scotist, who got his degree sometime in the 1310's. He also took a doctorite in law. Enjoy the following quote, which I mostly post to keep somewhere for when I need it 15 years down the road.

Hugo de Novo Castro, I Sent. d. 9 q. 1 ad 4 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15864, f. 14vb)

Ad quartam dico quod relatio ex se non est infinita ex propria ratione set si est infinita, hoc est propter ydemptitatem cum essentia. In creaturis enim videmus triplicem distinctionem. Una est rei et rei et voco hec rem sive suppositum individuum sive partes reales individuum ut facit(?) materia et forma sive substantialis sive accidentalis. Alia est distintio in eadem re realitatis et realitatis parcialis. Voco autem hic realitatem parcialem perfectionem formalem limitatam extra intellectum in eadem re simplici ut in albedine ubi extra omnem intellectum perfectio coloris et albedinis distinguitur et hoc vocatur(?) ab aliis distinctio perfectionis intentionis et illa distinctio est in omni re citra primum quia in omni re citra primum est distinctio generis et differentie sicut patet de sensitivo et intellectivo in homine que quantumcumque essent in eadem re simplici cum dicunt perfectiones distinctas realiter. Tertia distinctio est non rei et rei nec realitatis et realitatis sed modi et modi realis quam quidem aliqui vocant distinctionem rationis realis. In Deo autem numquam est prima distinctio nec secunda propter infinitatem omnium perfectionum...

To the fourth I say that a relation is not of itself infinite from its definition, but if it is infinite, this is because of its identity with the essence. For in creatures there is a triple distinction. One is of thing and thing, and I cal this thing or individual supposit or real individual parts, such as mater and form, or substantial and accidental (parts). Another is a distinction in the same thing of reality and partial reality. I here call a partial reality a formal, limited, perfection outside the intellect in the same simple thing as is the case with whiteness, where outside of all intellectual operation the perfection of color and whiteness is distinguished. And this is called by others a distinction of perfection-intention, and that distinction is in every thing beneath the first, because in everything beneath the first there is a distinction of genus and difference, just as is clear concerning the sensitive and intellective (parts) in man, howsoever they are found in the same simple thing since they are really distinct perfections. The third distinction is not of thing and thing nor of reality and reality but of mode and real mode, which some call the distinction of real reason. In God however are found neither the first nor the second distinction, on account of the infinity of all perfections...

Francis of Meyronnes on Kinds of Distinctions

Here is the Biographical note on Francis from the "Franciscan authors" website:

"Born in Meyronnes (Alpes de Haute-Provence). His family had close contacts with Charles I of Anjou (Count of the Provence). Became friar in the Digne convent (Provence province). Probably followed a lectorate course at the Paris studium (Fall 1304-July 1307), where he became acquainted with the theology of Scotus. After his lectorate studies, he taught the Sentences in various Franciscan studia of France and Italy, and for sometime was custodian of the Sisteron custody. Went up for his theology degree course and read the Sentences pro gradu magisterii at Paris 1320-21. The lengthy Sentences commentary deriving from these baccalaureate lecture have survived in various redactions. Francis completed the obligatory post-Sentential exercises (a.o. the Disputatio Collativa with Pierre Roger OSB (the future Clement VI), andquaestiones in which he defended mendicant rights and theological positions), and finished several other works (a.o. his commentaries on Augustine). In the summer of 1323, he became master of theology in Paris (with strong support of Pope John XXII and King Robert of Naples), where he proved himself to be an able and rather independent follower of Scotus, who differed from Scotus esp. in his speculations on the potentia absoluta of God. He defended, like Scotus, the distinctio formalis, the univocity of being, the haeccitas, the absolute predestination of Christ and the immaculate conception. During his regency, Francis also assisted Elzéar of Sabran at his deathbed (27 September 1323), and gave his funerary laudation. In Spring 1324, he was elected provincial minister of the Provence province, and went to the pontifical court at Avignon. At Avignon, he was active as a preacher (witness his Sermo de Indulgentiis and his Sermo de Eucharistia), and as a counsellor in the process against William of Ockham (cf. Mayronis’ Determinatio Paupertatis, which argues along the same lines as the position expressed by preacher-king Robert of Anjou). For his friend-protector Robert of Anjou, Francis wrote in this period several commentaries on Pseudo-Dyonisius and an additional series of Quaestiones. He also wrote a verdict on the Apocalypse commentary of Peter John Olivi in the context of the process against Olivi's works (Although I do not know about the whereabouts of that verdict, a lengthy reaction to it has just surfaced, namely the newly rediscovered Sexdequiloquium by John of Rupescissa/Jean de Roquetaillade). Later, Francis was sent on an ambassadorial mission in Gascoigne by pope John XXII. Francis of Mayronis died in Piacenza, between 1326 and 1328. He left behind a large literary legacy. Aside from hisSentences commentary, and several philosophical works (Treatises on Aristotelian logical, physical, and metaphysical issues), he composedQuodlibeta, Quaestiones super Pater Noster, a Tractatus de Octo Beatitudinibus, several ‘political’ and moral treatises (some of which defended a strong interpretation of papal plenitudo potestatis), and commentaries on, or rather florilegia of Augustine and Dionysius (not unlike Kilwardby?), such as the Flores ex Libris S. Augustini super Genesim. He also produced several series of sermons, at times on meditative, ascetical and contemplative issues (some are more and some less tied up with his high-brow speculative theology, but they became at the same time very popular exemplary sermon collections that can be found in many Franciscan libraries and that later also inspired the Observant preaching revival) and several Bible commentaries (he would have produced the so-called Annotationes postillarum in totam s.Scripturam; several MSS of his Apocalypse and Genesis commentaries have survived>>to be cont.)."

As many of you know, I have been studying the development of theories of identity and distinction in scholastic thought. Many of the thirteenth century theologians contain only a few remarks in the context of other more pressing issues. In the fourteenth century this changes, and there is a more detailed discussion of these issues, by the likes of Petrus Thomae, and as we shall see below, Francis of Meyronnes, known as the "master of the formalities" and possibly is to be identified with the "master of abstractions" who haunted 14th century english thought. Here below I have typed up some of his remarks on the different kinds of distinctions. Eventually I may translate PT's similar derivation (albeit into 7 modes of identity and distinction). If any analytical experts read this blog, I would appreciate recommendations from contemporary thought on these issues.

Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, I d.8 a.2 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 43v):

"Secundo videndum est quot sunt modi distinctionum, quod fuit secundum declarandum. Ad quod dico quod sunt quatuor gradus distincionum non fabricati ab intellectu sive ab anima.

Prima est distinctio essentialis, eo modo quo distinguitur deus a creatura et ista proprie accipiendo est quando quidditas cum sua existentia est distincta ab alia quidditate cum sua existentia.

Secunda est realis eo modo quo est distinctio inter patrem et filium. Unde distinctio realis est illa que est inter rem et rem.

Tertia est formalis et ista est inter quidditatem et quidditatem; sic dicimus quod homo et asinus in potentia obiectiva distinguuntur et ista distinctio proprie est rationum distinctarum.

Quarta est distinctio non quidditatis et quidditatis sed quidditatis et modi intrinseci, sicut est inter quidditatem hominis et eius finitatem et quidditatem albedinis et eius remissionem et intensionem.

Iste distinctiones sunt essentialiter ordinate quia maxima est essentialis et ideo que essentialiter distinguuntur omnibus aliis distinctionibus distnguuntur. Secunda post essentialem maior est realis. Post illam est tertia, scilicet quidditativa vel formalis. Quarta est minor omnibus, scilicet quidditatis et modi intrinseci. Nam minor est distinctio ubi statur intra eadem rationem specificam et formalem quam ubi est exitus. Non est autem exitus a ratione formali per modum eius, quia ad rationem formalem et non ad aliam reducitur quia modus adveniens non variat rationem formalem."

Translation:

Second we must ask how many kinds of distinctions there are, which was the second thing to be discussed. To which I say there are four grades of distinctions not fabricated by the intellect or the soul. The first is an essential distinction, in the way in which God is distinguished from a creature, and that taken properly is when a quiddity with its existence is distinct from another quiddity and its existence. The second is real, in the way in which there is a distinction between a father and a son. Whence a real distinction is that which is between thing and thing. The third is formal, and that is between a quiddity and a quiddity. So we say that man and ass are distinguished in objective potency, and that distinction is properly of distinct definitions (rationes). The fourth is a distinction not of quiddity and quiddity but of quiddity and intrinsic mode, just as there between the quiddity of a man and his finitude, and the quiddity of whiteness and its intention and remission [ie. degrees of intensity]. These distinctions are essentially ordered, because the essential distinction is maximal, and therefore those things which are essentially distinguished are distinguished in all modes of distinctions. The second greatest after the essential distinction is the real distinction. After that is the third, namely the quidditative or formal distinction. The fourth is less than all, namely of quiddity and intrinsic mode. For a distinction is less when one remains within the same specific and formal definition than when one is outside it. But there is no departure from the formal definition through its mode, because it is reduced to the formal definition and not to another[?], because an advening[adveniens] mode does not vary the formal definition.

Scotus contra Henry's Negotiating Intellect

Here is a follow-up on my previous quote of Henry on movement of the divine intellect as it knows itself and distinguishes the divine attributes. Scotus exploits the feature of Henry's explanation that allowed a "quasi" potency to precede the operation the divine intellect to posit a formal non-identity. The following text is from the section of the question on the formal distinction in which Scotus quotes Henry's arguments and objects against the general position (as opposed to citing arguments and criticizing them directly).

A bit of background: Scotus has two types of cognition, abstractive and intuitive. The commonly accepted way of distinguishing them is that intuitive cognition is of the thing qua existing and present, while abstractive cognition prescinds from the existence or non existence and pertains to the essence of the thing. This latter kind of cognition was the more controversial, for Scotus allowed that there could be abstractive cognition of the divine essence in this life.

Ordinatio I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 n.187 (ed. Vat. 257):

"Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto -- sive sit distinctorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus -- sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum peractum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divnus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia 'ut relationem rationis', ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum."

Furthermore, the intellect understanding intuitively has no distinction in the object except according as it is existing, because just as it does not know some object unless as existing, so it does not know things formally distinct in the object unless as it is existing. Since therefore the divine intellect does not know its own essence save by intuitive cognition, whatever distinction is posited there in the object -- whether it is of distinct formal objects or as notions caused by the act of the intellect -- it follows that that distinction will be in the object as it is existing in act: and so if that is of distinct formal objects in the object, they will be formally distinct (and then follows what is being argued, that such a distinction of formal objects precedes the act of the intellect). If however it is of notions caused by the act of understanding, therefore the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence as a relation of reason, as it is existing, which is false."

Henry of Ghent on Instants of Nature

Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet V q.1 (ed. Badius, f. 153r):

"...primo et simplici intelligentia concipit ipsam essentiam sub ratione essentiae, et deinde negotiando circa essentiam conceptam concipit eam ut intellecta est, et ut intelligens est, et ut ratio intelligendi et quia in cognoscendo et intelligendo seipsam complacet ei in seipsa, deinde concipit eam ut volitum, volens et ratio volendi."

"First, by simple understanding he (God) conceives his essence under the aspect of essence, and then by engaging with the essence as conceived he conceives it as it is understood, and as it is understanding and as it is a means of understanding. And because in knowing and understanding himself he is pleased in himself, then he conceives his essence as willed, willing, and as a means of willing."

Here we have yet another example of Henry's profound influence on Duns Scotus. Scotus, as you may well recall, uses this type of language which posits quasi-temporal stages in the divine nature in his discussion of the production of created essences in intelligible being as well as his treatment of predestination. This became quite common after Scotus and Henry, as we saw from the Alnwick quote I posted several months ago, and was even adopted by some Thomists such as Hervaeus Natalis (whom I posted on earlier this month), one of the instrumental figures in Aquinas' canonization process. I am not sure if Henry originated this conceptual tool or not. It can, I think, like Scotus' version, be distinguished into four instants:

(1) God conceives the divine essence qua essence

(2) The divine intellect "moves" over the essence, knows it as known, knowing, and a means of understanding.

(3) God is pleased in or delights in his essence

(4) God conceives his essence as will, willed and a means of willing.

The divine attributes are distinguished by the divine intellect at (2); and attribute, on Henry's view, is the essence known under a specific ratio; the essence as the foundation of the attribute keeps the divine intellects concepts from being vain, while the differing rationes keep the divine attributes from being synonymous. Henry is quite clear that he thinks all of this goes on in the divine intellect, not the divine essence. All the attributes are relations of reason. However, in another passage, he admits there is a "quasi" potency prior to the act of divine understanding, which I think would have to be a real quasi potency, as Henry accepts the dictum that being is divided primarily into being inside the mind and outside the mind, and this potency is prior to the operation of the intellect. It is but a small step from here to Scotus' position that the divine attributes are distinct ex natura rei prior to the operation of the divine intellect, even in God's intuitive cognition of the divine essence. But more on this another time.

varia

Ord. III d.1 pars 2 q. unica n. 210:

“...nihil, quod non est expresse articulus fidei, tenendum est tamquam simpliciter credendum, nisi sequatur ex aliquo simpliciter credendo.”

"...nothing, which is not expressly an article of faith, should be held as to be believed absolutely, unless it follows from something that must be believed absolutely."

I rather like that one. The editors refer to several other passages where he says something similar. The context is the question in book III (obviously) where he is asking what it is that terminates the relation of dependence of the assumed nature..is it the divine essence, the word, etc. It is rather an interesting question as Scotus takes it as an opportunity to revisit the question from book I about whether the persons are consituted by something absolute. He ultimately opts for the authority of tradition, even though he thinks the arguments are not very good; they do not 'conclude'. So he still thinks his theory is better, and can be held as the constitution of divine persons is not an article of faith nor follows directly from one.

It is somewhat surprising to read something like this, as we tend to think of the medievals as being rather unsophisiticated in most areas. Scotus in general, however, as I have tried to show in other posts, has a very developed sense of the uses of theology, quite apart from the whole faith-reason thing for which he is often maligned (by Thomists, and their bastard children Radical Orthodoxy). The statement seems true to me, however. It is one of those unexpressed and unknown truths in the background of my conversion to the Church, I suspect. The doctrinal chaos of much of protestantism has nothing to compare. Some things really are fundamental and settled, leaving whole new vistas of theology open for investigation and private opinion (bracketing, of course, the whole problem of making past dogma relevant in the present...to me medieval theology is probably more present and alive than is that of Rahner, von Balthasar, or the latest pomo trend). It is also a justification for my denial of most Thomist doctrines (mainly philosophical...the theological ones I object to are the explanations, not the articuli fidei themselves) as well as the arguments of those Thomists of the Strict Observance who claim on the basis of papal opinions and encyclicals dating from the days of the Neo-thomistic revival (1879-1965 are contentious dates I would assign for the institutional side of things) that the faithful are obligated to give religious assent to things like the 25 Thomistic theses. I've read some pretty crazy stuff on that topic (such as, Pelzer or Pelster's article from the early days of Franciscan Studies responding to Spanish Dominicans claiming that one is obligated to hold with religious assent everything Thomas said except in an area where the commentary tradition itself is in doubt as to the mentem Thomae. But I could go on all day about such things, and would probably get less charitable as I went due to the fact that I am in a fell mood today (sept. 14 has come and gone, and the promised tlm chapel was cold and dark).

To return to the 14th s., here is a bit on relations and will, from the same question as above.

ord. III d. 1 pars 2 q. unica n.241
“I say that every real relation is between extremes really distinct, but sometimes by a distinction preceding the relations, sometimes not, but only formally caused by those relations; and this not only among the divine persons but among creatures and also in accidental relations. For the will moves itself and is moved by itself, and not only is there a real relation of the will to volition, but also the will as active to itself as passive.... And nevertheless the will, which is the foundation of those opposed relations ‘of moving and moved’, and is denominated (denominatur) by each of them, itself is not distinguished by a distinction of those relations, but only by the distinction made by them.”

Relations

Today's post isn't terribly exciting; I'm in the middle of a two week intensive course on Augustine, so probably will not have much time to read any scholastic works. I was in the middle of translating Scotus's Collatio 24, which is on univocity. It won't solve any of the disputes on the subject as it is so short, but it does contain most of the typical features of his thought on this issue. Unfortunately, there is no modern critical edition of the collationes, and the one on univocity is not in wadding; it was edited by both Balic and Harris in the 1920's, but the text is almost unintelligible. Harris makes a lot of transcription errors, Balic omits a lot. So that will have to wait. In the meantime, here's Scotus on the requirements for a real relation. Take it with the caveat that this probably represents his revised oxford teaching, not necessarily his final views on the matter, etc. It is vaguely relevant to his views on the formal distinction.

Ord. I d. 31 q. un n. 6:

videtur dicendum quod ad relationem realem tria sufficiunt. primo, quod fundamentum sit reale et terminus realis; et secundo, quod extremorum sit distinctio realis; et tertio, quod ex natura extremorum sequatur ipsa talis relatio absque opere alterius potentiae, comparantis unum extremum alteri.

"It seems that it should be said that three things suffice for a real relation. First, that the foundation and the term of the relation is real. Second, that there is a real distinction of extremes. Third, that such a relation follows from the nature of the extremes without any operation of another power, comparing one extreme to another."

On the distinction between processions

As mentioned before, Scotus holds that generation and spiration are distinct from each other insofar as each one is not the formal ratio of the other. Basically, they're formally distinct. However, he still has a problem as he had previously criticized some of his contemporaries who held that the divine attributes are only distinct by reason, or else that there is only one divine attribute, albeit an indisdinct one. According to Scotus, they are explaining a greater distinction by a lesser (indistinct divine attribute as foundation for generation and spiration, resulting in really distinct persons). But Scotus himself thinks that the persons are really distinct, and that the processions are formally distinct, seemingly falling prey to his own critique. The following text is his reply, though this summary is slightly oversimplified. He's not responding to this criticism directly (indeed it never comes up), but to a different one.

Ord. I d.13 q. unica (Vat. ed. 5 113-14):

Et si obicis, saltem primi termini, videlicet termini formales, erunt non univoci, ex quo productiones non sunt univocae, et ita personae-quae sunt primi termini- erunt non univocae inter se, et ita nec erunt univocae in tertio, - respondeo:

Productio non includit formaliter essentiam divinam, persona autem includit eam formaliter, quia persona non tantum est proprietas sive relatio, sed est hypostatis subsistens in natura divina, - sicut Socrates non tantum includit proprietatem individualem, sed etiam naturam humanam. Licet ergo primi termini sint eiusdem rationis cum productionibus quantum ad hoc quod primi termini includunt relationes (quia productiones sunt relationes), non tamen sunt eiusdem rationis quasi-adaequate, quia primi termini non tantum includunt relationes, sed etiam absolutum; et tunc non oportet eas tantum distingui sicut productiones distinguuntur, quia quae includunt aliqua distinctiva, non oportet tantum distingui sicut illa (sicut dictum est supra distinctione 8 quaestione illa 'Utrum Deus sit in genere'), quia differentiae sunt primo diversae, non tamen primo includentia eas sunt primo diversa.

Ad aliud, de potentiis, dico quod ut sunt potentiae operativae, non requirunt distinctum obiectum formale. Immo illud idem quod est primum obiectum intellectus divini, est etiam obiectum primum et formale voluntatis divinae, ita quod utraque potentia beatificatur in eodem obiecto primo, secundum eandem rationem formalem primi obiecti. Nulla enim perfectio quasi-radicata in ipsa essentia divina, est primo beatificativa intellectus vel voluntatis divinae, sed essentia, sub omnimoda prima ratione (ut scilicet est fundamentum omnis perfectionis in divinis), ita quod argumentum est ad oppositum, quia sicut non requiritur etiam distinctio formalis in oiectis ut sunt potentiae operativae, ita nec in productis ut sunt productivae.

At least I think it answers the objection.

At last

I finally figured out something yesterday that has been bugging me for several months, to wit, why Scotus says there is a real distinction between trinitarian persons (especially given his separability criterion for real distinctions). Surprisingly, I found that it is not all that controversial, as Thomas of Sutton, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and I think Thomas as well, all say the same thing. The trick is how to explain it with respect to the intellect and will, which are the principles of processions. For some scholastics (definitely Ockham, but I think he's close to Godfrey and Thomas of Sutton) the divine attributes (here we're interested in the will and intellect) are only distinct by a distinction of reason. Or, there's only one divine attribute that itself is indistinct. But they all want to say that the persons are really distinct, because they all think that real relations are present in the Trinity, and these real relations are opposed (this serves to differentiate the persons from each other). But they also all want to explain the real distinction between relations by means of their initial indistinct or distinct by reason divine attributes of will and intellect. And here they fall under Scotus's criticism, that all this amounts to explaining some more distinct by something less distinct, which he thinks is fallacious (I'm still trying to figure out why).

There are naturally other factors playing in as well, for they all tend to place priority in either the principles of procession or the persons as terms, but neither both together, and so, according to Scotus, they run into problems such as being required to admit an infinity of divine persons. More later. I still haven't gotten to Scotus's own solution.