News

1. There is a fairly new blog that treats the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition, in particular Scotus and Bonaventure, with some political commentary thrown in for good measure. See The Socratic Catholic for your Scotist reflections, now that we here at the Smithy are nearly inactive.

2. Thomas Williams has published a book of translations from Scotus, which is much needed now that many of the Wolter translations seem to be going out of print (including that of the Tractatus de primo principio). It looks like a must-have for every enthusiast and hater of Scotus.

From the website:

• A new anthology of one of the most important thinkers of the Middle Ages
• Translated from the most reliable critical editions of Scotus' texts
• Presents Scotus's full treatment of the issues, including his engagement with other thinkers
• Contains many texts never before translated into English

Thomas Williams presents the most extensive collection of John Duns Scotus's work on ethics and moral psychology available in English. John Duns Scotus: Selected Writings on Ethics includes extended discussions-and as far as possible, complete questions-on divine and human freedom, the moral attributes of God, the relationship between will and intellect, moral and intellectual virtue, practical reasoning, charity, the metaphysics of goodness and rightness, the various acts, affections, and passions of the will, justice, the natural law, sin, marriage and divorce, the justification for private property, and lying and perjury. 

Relying on the recently completed critical edition of the Ordinatio and other critically edited texts, this collection presents the most reliable and up-to-date versions of Scotus's work in an accessible and philosophically informed translation.

Introduction
Topical guide to the translations
1: Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, q. 15
2: Ordinatio prologue, part 5, qq. 1 and 2 (omitting nn. 270-313)
3: Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 1, q. 1
4: Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 1, nn. 65-73
5: Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 2 (omitting nn. 100-133)
6: Ordinatio I, d. 8, part 2, q. un., nn. 223-225, 269-274, 281-301
7: Ordinatio I, d. 17, part 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 55-67, 92-100
8: Ordinatio I, d. 38, q. un.
9: Reportatio IA, dd. 39-40, qq. 1-3, nn. 24-59
10: Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un.
11: Ordinatio I, d. 47, q. un.
12: Ordinatio I, d. 48, q. un.
13: Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 1
14: Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2
15: Ordinatio II, d. 7, q. un., nn. 28-39
16: Ordinatio II, dd. 34-37, q. 2
17: Ordinatio II, d. 38, q. un.
18: Ordinatio II, d. 39, qq. 1-2
19: Ordinatio II, d. 40, q. un.
20: Ordinatio II, d. 41, q. un.
21: Ordinatio II, d. 42, q. un.
22: Ordinatio II, d. 43, q. un.
23: Ordinatio II, d. 44, q. un.
24: Ordinatio III, d. 17, q. un
25: Ordinatio III, d. 27, q. un.
26: Ordinatio III, d. 28, q. un.
27: Ordinatio III, d. 29, q. un.
28: Ordinatio III, d. 32, q. un. (omitting nn. 12-18)
29: Ordinatio III, d. 33, q. un.
30: Ordinatio III, d. 34, q. un., nn. 1-5, 24-38, 45-83
31: Ordinatio III, d. 36, q. un.
32: Ordinatio III, d. 37, q. un.
33: Ordinatio III, d. 38, q. un.
34: Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 2, nn. 78-101
35: Ordinatio IV, d. 17, q. un., nn. 1-2, 17-33
36: Ordinatio IV, d. 21, q. 2
37: Ordinatio IV, d. 26, q. un., nn. 12-31
38: Ordinatio IV, d. 29, q. un., nn. 11-28
39: Ordinatio IV, d. 33, q. 1
40: Ordinatio IV, d. 33, q. 3
41: Ordinatio IV, d. 46, qq. 1-3
42: Quodlibetal Questions q. 18

Scotism and Phenomenology

A snippet from an article the abstract of which I posted some time ago.

William E. Tullius, "Haecceitas as Value and as Moral Horizon: A Scotist Contribution to the Project of a Phenomenological Ethics", ACPQ 87 (2013), p. 462.

In this paper, I will argue that a phenomenological elucidation of the Scotist notion of haecceitas can further contribute to the development of the phenomenological ethical project, particularly in the way in which the individuality of one's personal essence can become thematic for us as a unique being representing a unique moral calling to each individual...

It is my hope that, through a phenomenological investigation of haecceitas, phenomenology might obtain a more complete articulation of its ethical insights,which are based so heavily in the problems of individuality. Scotus, having paved the way in philosophy for a cogent discussion of this theme, might be able to provide certain insights into the primal data of the phenomenon of individuality by reenacting the Scotist insight into the originary basis for the individuality of the person. At the same time, it is my hope that phenomenology will provide something of an expansion of the Scotist project into new fields of investigation, particularly the field of moral vocation.To that extent, this paper is attempting to make a concrete contribution to a growing body of literature that recognizes in Scotist thought a peculiar openness to phenomenological modes of investigation that would make of phenomenology itself a method of doing philosophy within which the Scotist tradition can readily find a home for the continuation of its philosophical research within a contemporary setting.

Bonaventure, Bernard, and the Last Man on Earth

St Bonaventure attributes his position on the portions of the natural law which can be suspended, which I alluded to yesterday, to St Bernard. Here's what he says in IV Dist. XXXVIII Art. II Q. III:

Item, Bernardus dicit: quaedam sunt praecepta moralia primae tabulae ordinantia ad Deum; quaedam secundae ordinantia ad proximum; quaedam superaddita, ut canonicae sanctiones et Patrum instituta. In primis non potest despensare nec homo nec Deus; in secundis non homo, sed Deus; in tertiis et homo et Deus. Ratio autem huius est, quia praecepta primae tabulae immediate ordinant ad Deum.

"Bernard says that there are some moral precepts which belong to the first tablet [of the Ten Commandments], ordered to God; some which belong to the second [tablet of the Ten Commandments], ordered to one's neighbor; and some superadded precepts, such as the sanctions of canon law or [monastic and religious rules] instituted by the holy fathers. The first [set] neither man nor God can dispense from; the second man cannot, but God can; the third both man and God can. The reason for this is that the precepts of the first tablet are immediately ordered to God."

The relevant passage is in St Bernard's De praeceptio et dispensatione [c. 2-3], where he says pretty much what St Bonaventure says. Those precepts pertaining to charity, that is, to the good of our relationship to God, are necessary and inviolable. But:

Necessarium deinde, quod inviolabile nominavi, illud intelligo, quod non ab homine traditum, sed divinitus promulgatum, nisi a Deo qui tradidit, mutari omnino non patitur, ut, exempli causa: NON OCCIDES, NON MOECHABERIS, NON FURTUM FACIES, et reliqua illius tabulae legisscita, quae, etsi nullam prorsus humanam dispensationem admittunt, nec cuiquam hominum ex his aliquid aliquo modo solvere aut licuit, aut licebit, Deus tamen horum quod voluit, quando voluit solvit, sive cum ab Hebraeis Aegyptios spoliari, sive quando rophetam cum muliere fornicaria misceri praecepit.

And so forth. This is just what Bonaventure said, and it should be clear that this position is not therefore the first bad fruits of Scotism, nominalism, or some imaginary hybrid of the two.

Moving on: in the same question St Bonaventure asks the hilarious question: say there's only three people left alive on the Earth: myself, one woman, and the pope, and say I've taken a vow of perpetual continence. Can the pope dispense me from my vow for the sake of the conservation of the species?

No! For one thing, this would never happen. For another, even if the case would arise, there would be no way to know that the species could be preserved by breaking my vow. If I did the deed with the woman it very well might be that no children result anyway. So I would certainly break my vow for the uncertain possibility of some good not under my control.

A Salutary Warning

Mos partium et factionum ac deinde omnium malarum artium Romae ortus est otio atque abundantia earum rerum quae prima mortales ducunt. Nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rem publicam tractabant. Neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter cives erat; metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi illa formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea quae res resundae amant, lascivia atque superbia, incessere. Ita quod in adversis rebus optaverant otium postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbiusque fuit.

--Sallust

De peccato actuali

I'm deep in fall semester now, but am trying to finish up vol. 8. At the moment I am wending my way through the discussion of actual sin, one of the most complicated questions, textually speaking, that I have encountered in the subtle doctor's writings; five interlaced questions. There is a lot of Anselm, Augustine, with ocassional references to arguements of Aquinas and Bonaventure, though it may not be direct "contra Thomam" argumentation, but borrowing arguments for a position from their writings. The editors give quotes from Aquinas, and point out a dual influence from Anselm and Augustine; Scotus discusses Augustine, but is much closer to Anselm's position, and even adopts it explicitly in the matter of original sin. It is a very different account of sin than what I have heard before, and I think I made some errors in my post on penance. Not that I think it falls afoul of Trent or anything. Even Ott points out a few places where Trent specifically left the scholastic dispute unresolved. Anyway, I will put up a few quotes.

Ord. II d. 34-37 qq.1-5, n. 46-47:

"Concedo ergo ... quod peccatum est corruptio rectitudinis in actu secundo... non autem naturalis, nec cuiuscumque habitualis, sed moralis actualis. Sed non intelligo de corruptione quae est mutatio ab esse ad non-esse (potest enim peccatum manere post talem mutationem iustitae ab esse ad non-esse, potest etiam inesse absque tali mutatione ab esse ad non-esse), sed intelligo corruptionem formaliter, sicut privatio dicitur formaliter corruptio sui habitus; hoc enim modo ratio peccati est formaliter corruptio rectitudinis in actu secundo, quia opponitur illi rectitudini ut privatio habitui: non quidem rectitudini quae inest (quia tunc duo opposita simul inessent), nec quae prius infuit isti actui (quia actus non manet ut alteretur ab opposito in oppositum), sed quae deberet inesse."

I grant, therefore, that sin is corruption of rectitude in second act [think of Aristotle's first and second acts here]; not however of a natural act, nor of any habitual one, but of a moral act. But I do not mean by 'corruption' a change from being to non-being (for sin can remain after such a change of justice from being to non-being, it is able also to inhere without such a change from being to non-being), but I use 'corruption' formally, just as a privation is called formally a corruption of its habit; for in this way the definition of sin is formally the corruption of rectitude in second act, because it is opposed to that rectitude as privation is opposed to its habit: not indeed to the rectitude which inheres (because then two opposites would inhere simultaneously), nor what first was present to that act (because act does not reman so that it might be changed from opposite into opposite), but what ought to inhere.

"Voluntas enim libera debitrix est ut omnem actum suum eliciat conformiter regulae superiori, videlicet secundum praeceptum divinum; et ideo quando agit difformiter ab ista regula, caret iustitia actuali debita (hoc est, iustitia quae deberet inesse actui et non inest): haec carentia, in quantum est actus voluntatis deficientis (sicut dicetur in aliqua solutione), est formaliter peccatum actuale."

Free will is a debtor, so that it elicits its every act in conformity to superior rules, namely, according to the divine commands. And therefore when it acts in a manner opposed to those rules, it lacks the actual requried justice (that is, the justice which ought to inhere or be present to the act and does not inhere). This lack, insofar as it as an act of the will turning aside is formally actual sin."

Bad, I know, but "debita" and "deficio" are always a nightmare to translate, almost as bad as "natum."