New Volume of Studies on Scotus' Reportatio Published

A volume of studies on Scotus' Parisian Reportatio and its reception in Scotism is now available, as a part of the Recherches journal.  Available here.

Here is the table of contents:

John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis

369 - 376: Introduction
GORIS, Wouter, HONNEFELDER, Ludger


377 - 438: "John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata A Mystery Solved" 

DUMONT, Stephen D.


439 - 469: "Scotus in Paris. On Univocity and the Portions of the Soul"

GORIS, Wouter


471-492:" Problemfall Univokation. Die Univokation von ens reale und ens rationis im Kontext der Reportatio Parisiensis I-A"

MANDRELLA, Isabelle

"John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis and the Origin of the Supertranscendentals" 

SMITH, Garrett R.


539 - 560: "Die Willenslehre des Duns Scotus im Spiegel seiner Schriften und im Lichte seiner Schüler" 

MÖHLE, Hannes

Reportatio IV Now Available!

There is a new Scotus publication from Franciscan Institute Publications!

Now we have a working text of Reportatio IV from Oleg Bychkov and Trent Pomplun.

Publisher's description:

This book, gives the reader, both in Latin and in English translation, a solid working text of the Examined Report of the Paris Lecture of John Duns Scotus, known to scholars as Reportatio IV-A. 

Scotus on Whether God can be named by a Wayfarer

Rep. I d. 22 q. un. (trans. Wolter/Bychkov II, p. 11 ff., slightly modified)

I reply to the question, then, that it is possible for the pilgrim to assign some name in order to signify distinctly the essence of God in itself, even though he may not know that [essence]. Now whether this is actually the case or not, I do not doubt that he [at least] can use a name given by himself or someone else for the purpose of expressing such an essence distinctly. For we do use many names given by God or the angels, as well as by us, in order to express or signify distinctly something in itself, e.g., God or other things.

...

But if the question is understood in the senes of referring to the person to whom I address a name, I say that just as I intend to express distinctly that essence of God in itself through that name, so he intends to conceive it through that name, although neither I who use it, nor he to whom I address it, could understand distinctly that essence that I intend to express distinctly in this manner, with him [subsequently intending] to use the name thus expressed in this way. Nor is this to be wondered at. For we talk the whole day trying to distinguish the essence as it is in itself from the relations and attribute perfections, [saying] that it is an abyss and a sea of infinite substance. Now whatever, considered in itself, can be distinguished from everything else in this way can, for example, be called a, and afterwards we use this [appellation.]

But is it possible, in the case if God is expressed distinctly through some name, for a pilgrim to have or express some distinct concept about him as he is in himself, by means of which [the pilgrim] could understand or comprehend [God]?

Response: I say that it is not, because nothing moves the intellect of the pilgrim naturally in his present state to [produce] a distinct notion or concept of something, except if the latter's sense image [in the imagination], together with the agent intellect, can become the sufficient causes that move the possible intellect to [produce] such concepts, because such a concept only depends upon these [images] as its causes. But those things of which there cannot be a sense image cannot, in conjunction with the agent intellect, move the possible intellect to a distinct and perfect knowledge of them, but only to common and general concepts that apply indifferently to them and other things. Now God has no [corresponding] sense image, because he is not a body nor is informed by accidents, and therefore he cannot move the intellect of the pilgrim to have some distinct concept of him, but only to [produce] common and general concepts that apply indifferently to him and other things. Therefore, as we know him, we can have no concept distinct from [concepts of] other things to express [God ] as he is in himself.

Also, in our experience, we do not form some irreducibly simple concept of God thorugh which we could distinguish God from 'not God,' because in this way we would know him in his entirety [already] in this life. [...] if God were known bu us in his entirety, he would not be known [to us] in compound common concepts [put together by joining simple concepts] with one another, e.g. under the notion of an infinite being [or] a purest infinite act. Such concepts, which we can have about God in this life, are more specific and more proper, and nevertheless any such concept is resolvable into prior notions that are simple, common, and not proper to God. This is evident in the case of 'infinite being' [or] 'first principle', because the first is resolvable into entity and infinity, the second into primacy and origination, which are prior to the compound ones.

Scotus on Participation

It's a common claim made by contemporary intellectuals of various disciplines (I have in mind the Brad Gregorys, Fr. Barrons, the Cambridge fantasists, etc.) that Scotus denies participation. They never bother to cite a text of course, because none of these people have ever bothered to read Scotus. The claim is usually linked to univocity. To hold univocity is to automatically reject analogy and particpation. I've talked about analogy before, how Scotus holds analogical concepts but just isn't interested in talking about them. I've known for a number of years that the same is true of participation, but I never bothered to write any of the passages down. This time I did and offer for your delectation an unequivocal endorsement of participation.


Reportatio II d. 16 q. un. (Wad.-Viv. 23, 70-71):

Ad aliud alterius Doctoris dicit unus Doctor quod nihil agit per essentiam, nisi solus Deus, et ipse semper agit. Vel potest dici quod 'per essentiam' potest accipi dupliciter: aliquando ut distinguitur contra illud, quod est per participationem; aliquando ut distinguitur contra per accidens. Primo modo, dico quod nihil est per essentiam nisi Deus, quia omnis veritas, et entitas creata est talis per participationem, et isto modo agens per essentiam semper agit. Secundo modo agens per essentiam, hoc est, non per accidens, non semper agit necessario.

To the other [argument] of the other doctor, one doctor says that nothing except God alone acts through essence, and he always acts. Or it can be said that 'by essence' can be understood doubly: sometimes as it is distinguished against that which is by participation, sometimes as it is distinguished against 'per accidens'. In the first way, I say that nothing is by essence except God, because every truth and created entity is such by participation, and in that way an agent always acts through its essence. In the second way an agent by essence, this is, not per accidens, does not always act necessarily.

Not much, sure, but clear enough to show that simply because Scotus does not talk a lot about a particular feature of the philosophical tradition does not allow us to infer that he rejects it.

Scotistic Abstractions

Here's a quote I've been meaning to post for a while, on different kinds of abstractions. The most interesting bit here is probably that of "ultimate abstraction," which we encountered a year or so ago when I posted that bit on Petrus Thomae from his Quaestio de distinctione praedicamentorum. So here it is: Reportatio IA d.5 pt. I q.1 n.16-20 [ed. and tran. Wolter 264]

"I say that abstractions are multiple; for one is the abstraction of an accident from its subject, another is the abstraction of the quiddit from a supposit.

Also, abstraction is from every thing of another kind[generis].

Also in relatives there is a double abstraction, that of an accident from its subject, and secondly of a relation from its foundation.

But then the ultimate abstraction is when a formal reason is considered precisely according to itself without anything else which is not included per se in its formal notion, as humanity is only humanity itself.

Proof: an adjective is never predicated as identical[with its subject], or never can it be predicated by an identical predication, because the way an adjective signifies is as 'informing', 'added to', and 'denominating' a nature or noun. Therefore if a predicate is predicated identically and not formally, it is predicated in a manner opposed to the very way it conceptualizes, and therefore it follows that such a proposition is false, because subject and predicate are taken under opposed conceptions. But that is not the case here when it is said: 'God is generating,' because 'God' is not taken in the sense of its ultimate abstraction, and therefore something is predicated of it that is not included in its per se formal notion."

On a related note, in his quodlibetal discussion in which he attacks Scotus' formal distinction, Hervaeus Natalis takes this notion of ultimate abstraction to be purely mind dependent. I think he misses the point, which is not spelled out here in this passage, that this ultimate abstraction is singling out a common nature; while the act of singling out is indeed an act of reason, the nature itself exists as such with less than numerical unity independent of the mind.

Conditions for Distinction

Here's an interesting bit from Reportatio IA (well, probably the Additiones magnae) d.33, the distinction on the formal distinction. I'm still digesting the rest (he doesn't bring up the question of whether one can say that things formally non-identical are also formally distinct, the subject of the <Quaestio de formalitatibus> which I am currently editing, but casts the formal distinction as a type of secundum quid distinction, and relates it to Bonaventure's middle distinction). This part is specifically from the second question, where Scotus discusses whether there is a real distinction between the Trinitarian persons:

"Ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distinguantur, requiruntur quatuor conditiones. Prima est, quod sit aliquorum in actu, et non in potentia tantum, quia non distinguuntur ea, quae sunt in potentia in materia, et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu. Secunda est, quod sit eorum, quae habent esse formale, non tantum virtuale, ut effectus sunt in causa virtualiter, et non formaliter. Tertia est, quod sit eorum, quae non habent esse confusum, ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto, sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualitatibus. Quarta, quae sola est completiva distinctionis perfectae, est non identitas, ut patet per Philosophum...ubi dicit diversum et distinctum esse idem."

To this that somethings are distinguished absolutely [simpliciter. one could also say "without qualification"], four conditions are required. The first is that it is of some things in act, and not only in potency, because those things are not distinguished which are in potency in matter, and not absolutely, because they are not in act. The second is, that it is of those which have formal being, and not only virtual, as the effect is in the cause virtually and not formally. The third is that it is of those which do not have confused being, as the extreme in the medium and the mixable in the mixed, but is of those which have distinct being with their proper actualities. The fourth, which is only completive of perfect distinction, is non-identity, as is clear through the Philosopher, where he says that the diverse and the distinct are the same.

Quaestio

So I"ve got a little problem. In reading this material from the Parisian Reportatio on theology, I have encountered a difficulty I can't solve. Basically, Scotus says that for theologia in se (he seems to have abandoned the distinction between God's theology, the theology of the Blessed, and our theology), the object of the science is the divine essence. Now this is problematic for us in the wayfaring state, because it would seem to entail that we have some beatific knowledge of God, rather than the certain cognition that Scotus wants to set up between faith and the beatific vision. Scotus' own way out is by having recourse to his distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. For those in the wayfaring state, God's essence is conceived abstractively, that is, one conceives the divine essence without it being present here and now. But my understanding (which I get from Richard Cross's recent class) is that abstractive cognition still requires intelligible species. But these intelligible species are all abstracted (in the Thomistic/arabic/"Aristotelian" sense) from phantasms derived from creatures. Scotus is quite emphatic in many other passages, however, that God is not formally or eminently contained in any concept derived from a creature (univocity, you recall, yields a confused concept; theology requires a distinct one). So where the &*@! do we get the species used in theology that represents the divine essence? It may be an unsolvable question, as in the appendix to his article on theology as a science, Dumont lists a number of questions about intuitive and abstractive cogntion, of which several of the Scotists seem to be trying to answer this very problem. Dumont himself calls attention to the fact that the Additiones magnae say that God infuses a species, but the Reportatio itself does not say this, though it does distinguish five or so grades of cognition in which this abstractive one is in the middle, next to the cognition of the prophets and ordinary lay folk. So its unclear.

***UPDATE!

I came across the following, in Rep. IA d.3 n.196, which makes things pretty clear. This sort of knowledge is not natural, but comes about by direct infusion from God.

"Sic Deus cognosci quadrupliciter: uno modo secundum suam rationem quiditativam ut secundum rationem deitatis, et isto modo non est naturaliter cognoscibilis a nobis quia licet Deus posset creare in intellectu nostro repraesentativum sui sub ratione deitatis, non tamen potest hoc aliqua creatura causare repraesentativum tale, quia sicut argutum est prius, impossibile est aliquod obiectum causare in nobis perfectius repraesentativum suo proprio repraesentativo quo repraesentat se ipsum."

I suppose the question must be then who is it who has such a species, and how is it we know we have such a species representing the divine essence. Is this something that is included in divine revelation, that is, comes along with grace, baptism or reading Scripture, etc., or is only found in among theologians (somehow I have a hard time believing the likes of Catherine Pickstock or Rosemary Radford Ruether may have abstractive cognition of the divine essence that I don't have, in virtue of their professional status of theologian).

Scotus on Knowing Principles and Subalternation

I'm still busy at my other, realtime, life and haven't had time to post much lately, but here's a first stab at fulfilling "e"'s request of some time ago that I post on Scotus' criticism of Thomas' views on the nature of theology and subalternation. This quote comes from the end of this section where he attacks Thomas. One should bear in mind that Scotus in the prologue to the Reportatio maintains a notion of theology which he labels "theologia in se", which denies traditional distinctions between divine science, the knowledge of the blessed, and our theology. On Scotus' view ther is only one theology, which is the quidditative knowledge of the divine essence. Other things, such as the divine attributes, ideas, notions, etc. are virtually contained in the knowledge of the essence, and are "quasi-derivative" from it. Scotus comes up with the idea that one can consider things that are distinct in reason as if they were really distinct, an idea which he gets from an "ancient" argument about the Anselmian pure perfections, that for something in which something is distinct in reason there corresponds something really distinct in something else. This is a bit scattered, but you get the idea. If you really care, I could email you my Kalamazoo paper on the subject after I get done writing it. The following quote is about they way we know principles, and ends with the nifty claim that by knowing metaphysics we are better prepared for knowing other sciences.

Reportatio IA, prologus, q. 2 n. 157: "To the authority of the Philosopher I say that principles can be known in two ways. In one way by a confused knowledge, as if the terms are apprehended confusedly by sense and experience, and this suffices for scientific knowledge of terms in any special science, as that a line is length while being ignorant of whether the quiddity of it is substance, quantity or quality, etc. In another mode distinct knowledge can be known, by knowing to which genus their quiddity pertains, when the definitions of terms are known distinctly from the evidence of the terms, and this happens in metaphysical science by dividing and composing. And so all sciences can be said to be subalternated to it, namely metaphysics. And therefore with the science of metaphysics possessed, the principles of any other science are known in it by their own proper principles. Consequently, another science is known more perfectly if metaphysics is known.

Note on Identity

Here's a brief passage I came across only a page over from the bit on the plurality of forms.

Here Scotus is responding to an argument (n.196) that there are not only three divine persons. Here I'm just going to quote from the Wolter/Bychkov translation:

"It seems not to be the case: "all things whatsoeve that are identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other [Euclid, Elementa I]". The divine persons are such; therefore etc. The major is proved: because otherwise every form of the syullogism is perferted, which concludes from teh unity [of the middle term] that one is identical with the otehr because they have the same middle term.

And the reply (n.224):

"To the first argument, it must be said that never from the identity of two to a third is the identityof them among themselves inferred, unless the identity to a third is of such a sort as exists in the case of the extremes, and then inconguity [inconveniens] does not follow."

Natural Reason and Theology

Reportatio IA Prologus q.2 a.2-3 n.221 ff.:

Some random quotes...

I argue against that and make a threefold major. All our natural cognition which we have of God is caused in us by an equivocal effect. Also, all our natural cognition of God is indistinct. Also, it is obscure, which is clear because it is not of an object evident to the intellect according to intellectual existence.

From the first proposition I argue so: all our cognition of God which we have naturally is caused in us by an equivocal effect and is imperfect. But some other cognition, intuitive, which is of him as he exists presently, is possible for us. Therefore from purely natural powers we are not able to arrive at all possible cognition about God.

[...]

Again, from the third proposition it is argued so: what is of perfection in an inferior power is not repugnant to a superior power of the same genus. But it is of perfection in the lower power, sensitive apprehension, to know its object clearly and intuitively in its existence, just as is clear about sight. Therefore this is not repugnant to the intellect with respect to its per se object. God is of this sort, as was shown. Therefore the obscure cognition of him is not the most perfect possible about him.

A.3

From what has been said, the response to the question is clear, namely that some truths can be known about God naturally and some not. For whatever from those things which are nown about God in effects can be known by us by a demonstration "quia" and a posteriori, namley by effect. But many are such which can be known about God from effects, as is clear from the sciences of the philosophers. Many truths are knowable about God which we are not able to know about God by natural reason. Because whatever in a cause cannot be known from those things which are known in effect, cannot be known by us by natural reason. There are many truths knowable about God which are of this sort, as the Trinity of persons and unity of essence and the articles of this sort pertaining to deity, therefore etc. Nevertheless, we can known them supernaturally, as was shown.

[...]

If it is asked further whether theology is maximally one, it is clear that it is because its subject is maximally one. For the subject of the sciences of the philosophers is only one according to reason and apprehension of the intellect, but the subject of this science is maximally singular, indeed it is singularity itself as this deity as this, or this essence as this.

Science and Theology

Ha! Here you thought this would be a post relevent to the world of Today and not about Scotus. Too bad. While researching Scotus's views on the nature of theology and how it is a science in Reportatio I-A, I came across the f0llowing question (and a particularly interesting quotation I shall share below): Utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione deitatis possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris (As Wolter translates it, "Can truths that are knowable per se of God as deity be kown by the intellect of the pilgrim?"). Scotus begins the question with a discussion of Thomas' view that our theology is subalternated to the theology of the blessed in the beatific vision. The principles of the science of theology are not known in the science itself, but are had by the blessed; in this life, they are only believed, not known. Scotus makes five or six arguments against this position which I won't go into here, though they are interesting. Scotus also runs through the debate between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines about Henry's view that theologians have a certain lumen medium by which they know theological truths. As Godfrey (according to Scotus) had used one argument of Averroes against the Christians against Henry's list of saints, Scotus says he ought to be more derided than Henry, even though Henry's position is a bit crazy too. So, Scotus thinks they're both wrong.

His own view is that many truths knowable per se by the wayfarer can be known, not only a posteriori but also a priori, "under the aspect of deity by a form of cognition that is superior and more noble than any knowledge by faith". He proves one part of this by saying that an intellect able to understand a subject under the aspect of a subject [ie the subject of a science] can understand a principle virtually included in the subject, and further conclusions contained in a principle, because as the term of the subject is the cause of the principle so is the principle the cause of a conclusion. The object of the science of theolgy Scotus thinks can be known by means of abstractive cognition (as distinguished against intuitive).

The second part of his position, that the cognition the wayfarer has of God under the aspect of deity is more perfect and more certain than all cognition of faith, Scotus supports with the claim that whatever God can do by means of a second cause, he can do per se efficiently without it. But God by the mediation of some object can cause certain knowledge and certain assent so that the will is not able to dissent. Therefore God can do this per se without a medium (Scotus is thinking of the prophets here, who couldn't dissent from what was revealed to them. apparently).

Now comes the interesting part, and our quote for the evening:

"From this I infer two conclusions. The first is that in the cognition of God there are five grades. The first is to know truths intuitively, truths which are knowable about God and knowable distinctly by the notion of the subject known intuitively and distinctly, and that grade is not commonly possible to the wayfarer. The second grade is to know something certitudinally in something representatively distinctly known, and that grade is possible for a wayfarer. The third grade is to know something with certitude so that its certitude is not subject ot an actof the will, and that grade was in the prophets. The fourth grade is to know explicitly those things which are contained in the Scriptures by which brings pious aid and defends agains the impious by knowing how the solve the doubts of others and to fortify them with good arguments, and that grade is of the great ones in the church ['maiorum':Wolter translates this as elders]. The fifth grade is to know those things which are necessary for salvation, which is of the simple ones, because they are not able to search through all things contained in scripture."

The second conclusion he derives is that the light Henry talks about is not something that comes with extended study, but is there by a supernatural infusion who possesses it as a free gift to the intellect. Which is about as much as I've seen Scotus ever grant to the notion of divine illumination.