Thursday, February 16, 2012
Analogy
Here is Steve Long discussing his book on analogy. I wonder what the relation of all this is to Aristotelian third-mode relations. Recall that the third mode of relations are one-way. The example is that of human knowing: one can know an object and consequently there is a relation from the knowing mind to the object but not from the object to the knowing mind. This isn't so hard to understand. My thinking about a rock isn't going to affect the rock ex natura rei but it is going to affect my thinking. So to return to Long, could one dispense with this talk of analogical analogy and univocal analogicity simply by saying that the relation of God to creatures and e converso is an Aristotelian third-mode relation? This is course what Henry and Scotus do, though they also feel the need to discuss analogy and univocity, so perhaps not.
Thursday, February 9, 2012
New From ND Press
Sorry about all the news, but here's another that really made me laugh. A dictionary of the "perennial tradition" which of course means "Thomism". But wait, there's more! Not only terms of Thomism are defined, but those movements with which Thomism has engaged. So I suppose we will get "univocalist metaphysics" and "necrophobia at the heart of the liturgical city" as well as "Scotus".
From ND press:
New dictionary offers precise and accessible definitions of over 1,000 key philosophical terms
In his encyclical Fides et ratio (1998), John Paul II called on philosophers, "to have the courage to recover, in the flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom and truth." In Words of Wisdom, John W. Carlson responds to the late pope's call for the development of this tradition--often called the "perennial tradition" or "perennial philosophy"--with a much-needed dictionary of terms. Available in paperback and e-book formats, this is a resource for students in colleges, universities, and seminaries, as well as for their teachers.
In addition to key philosophical terms, the dictionary includes:
-- significant terms from philosophical movements with which Thomism has engaged
-- a comprehensive bibliography of works by Aquinas in English
-- examples from the writings of the philosophers and theologians mentioned in dictionary entries and
-- discussions of perennial themes
"The introduction to this work shows how carefully its aim and method have been thought through. The rest of Words of Wisdom demonstrates how well the aim has been achieved and the method employed. An invaluable resource." --Aidan Nichols, O.P., University of Cambridge
368 pages
ISBN 978-0-268-02370-6 / Paper / $45.00
ISBN 978-0-268-07693-1 / E-book (Adobe PDF) / $29.00
More information and to order
Table of Contents
Read an excerpt
Established in 1949, the University of Notre Dame Press is a scholarly publisher of distinguished books in a number of academic disciplines; in poetry and fiction; and in areas of interest to general readers. The largest Catholic university press in the world, the Press currently publishes fifty to sixty books annually and maintains a robust backlist in print. Visit our website to see our full array of available titles.
University of Notre Dame Press
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Notre Dame
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Tuesday, February 7, 2012
Another Scotus Grant
From Medieval News. I don't think they reported the Opera Theologica Parisiensia grant, but they did hit the following:
University of Scranton Professor Andrew LaZella, Ph.D., received a development intercession grant from the University for a research project focused on medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus and his analysis of some of Aristotle’s major works, especially “The Categories.” The project is titled “Univocity, Equivocity, and Proper Concepts in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis.”
Dr. LaZella, an assistant professor in philosophy, said that he researched “in the general area” of this topic for his doctoral dissertation and is excited to delve further into the subject. He said that an interesting part of this project is the difference in Scotus’ ideas in his early works compared to his later writings.
“This is a very early work of (Duns Scotus),” Dr. LaZella said. “The question becomes did he change his mind, or are the early and late works compatible?
University of Scranton Professor Andrew LaZella, Ph.D., received a development intercession grant from the University for a research project focused on medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus and his analysis of some of Aristotle’s major works, especially “The Categories.” The project is titled “Univocity, Equivocity, and Proper Concepts in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis.”
Dr. LaZella, an assistant professor in philosophy, said that he researched “in the general area” of this topic for his doctoral dissertation and is excited to delve further into the subject. He said that an interesting part of this project is the difference in Scotus’ ideas in his early works compared to his later writings.
“This is a very early work of (Duns Scotus),” Dr. LaZella said. “The question becomes did he change his mind, or are the early and late works compatible?
Monday, February 6, 2012
New Book
Note: Tobias Hoffmann has updated the Scotus bibliography.
Also,
A new book is out from Brepols, the papers from the 2008 Notre Dame SIEPM conference. It is reasonably priced (for the 700+ pages) at 70 euros.
Here is the blurb and Table of Contents.
Most scholars know that the great universities were the institutional setting of Scholastic philosophical and theological activity in the later Middle Ages. Fewer realize, however, that perhaps far more Scholastic learning in the liberal arts and theology took place in the studia or study-houses of the religious orders, which out-numbered the universities and were more widely distributed across Europe. Indeed, most members of the mendicant orders received most or all of their learning in the liberal arts and theology in the studia of their order, and the most famous members of the orders (e.g., Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus) spent more time teaching in the studia than they did serving as Regent Masters in the university proper. As a consequence, the greater part of later medieval Scholastic literature was produced in the institutional context of the studia of the religious orders. Moreover, there were other significant institutional locifor Scholastic learning and discourse in the later Middle Ages besides the universities and the study-houses, namely the Papal Court—notably the Sacred Palace at Avignon—and several royal courts, for example, the courts of Robert the Wise in Naples and of the Emperor Lewis IV in Munich. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the greatest Scholastic masters at different times taught in, or were associated with, all of these venues. This volume, which originated at the XVth annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale held at the University of Notre Dame (USA) in October 2008, contains essays concerning the study and teaching of philosophy and theology in the studia of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinian Hermits, Carmelites, Benedictines and Cistercians, as well as the intellectual activity at the Papal Court in Rome and Avignon and at various royal courts (London, Naples, Munich).
Kent Emery, Jr., Introduction
I. The Dominicans
Alfonso Maierù, Dominican studia in Spain
Joseph Goering, What the Friars Really Learned at Oxford and Cambridge
Adriano Oliva, OP, L’enseignement des Sentences dans les studia dominicains italiens au XIIIe siècle : l’Alia lectura de Thomas d’Aquin et le Scriptum de Bombolognus de Bologne
Alessandro Palazzo, Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican scholae in the Late Middle Ages: The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen
Guy Guldentops, Struggling with Authority: Durand of Saint-Pourçain on the Origin of Power and on Obedience to the Pope
Fabrizio Amerini, The Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy in the Dominican studia of the Roman Province in the Fourteenth Century
Hester Goodenough Gelber, Blackfriars London: the Late Medieval studiumMaarten J.F.M. Hoenen, How the Thomists in Cologne Saved Aristotle: The Debate over the Eternity of the World in the Late-Medieval Period
II. The FranciscansNeslihan Şenocak, The Franciscan studium generale: A New Interpretation
Luca Bianchi, Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans: Some Preliminary Remarks
Alain Boureau, Enseignement et débat dans les ordres mendiants du XIIIe siècle : Le cas des Quodlibeta de Richard de Mediavilla
William O. Duba, The Legacy of the Bologna studium in Peter Auriol’s Hylomorphism
Sylvain Piron, Les studia franciscains de Provence et d’Aquitaine (1275-1335)
Christopher Schabel and Garrett R. Smith, The Franciscan studium in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century
François-Xavier Putallaz, La peine de mort est-elle légitime ? Le studium franciscain de Cologne s’interroge au XIVe siècle
III. The Augustinians and the CarmelitesGiorgio Pini, Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order
Russell L. Friedman, How ‘Aegidian’ Were Later Augustinian Hermits Regarding Intellectual Cognition? Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa and the Object of the Intellect
Stephen F. Brown, The Early Carmelite Parisian Masters
Wouter Goris, The Critique of the Doctrine of God as First Known in the Early Carmelite School
IV. The Benedictines and the CisterciansThomas Sullivan, OSB, Ut nostra religione refloreat studium: The studia of the Monastic Orders
Amos Corbini, Pierre de Ceffons et l’instruction dans l’Ordre cistercien : quelques remarques
V. The Friars, Philosophy and Theology at Papal and Royal CourtsM. Michèle Mulchahey, The Dominican Studium Romanae Curiae: The Papacy, the Magisterium and the Friars
Jacqueline Hamesse, Les instruments de travail philosophiques et théologiques, témoins de l’enseignement et de l’influence des ordres mendiants à l’époque de la papauté d’Avignon
Patrick Nold, How Influential Was Giovanni di Napoli, OP, at the Papal Court in Avignon?
Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique, question disputée à la cour pontificale d’Avignon ?
Roberto Lambertini, Political Theory in the Making: Theology, Philosophy and Politics at the Court of Lewis the Bavarian
William J. Courtenay, Concluding Remarks
Also,
A new book is out from Brepols, the papers from the 2008 Notre Dame SIEPM conference. It is reasonably priced (for the 700+ pages) at 70 euros.
Here is the blurb and Table of Contents.
Most scholars know that the great universities were the institutional setting of Scholastic philosophical and theological activity in the later Middle Ages. Fewer realize, however, that perhaps far more Scholastic learning in the liberal arts and theology took place in the studia or study-houses of the religious orders, which out-numbered the universities and were more widely distributed across Europe. Indeed, most members of the mendicant orders received most or all of their learning in the liberal arts and theology in the studia of their order, and the most famous members of the orders (e.g., Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus) spent more time teaching in the studia than they did serving as Regent Masters in the university proper. As a consequence, the greater part of later medieval Scholastic literature was produced in the institutional context of the studia of the religious orders. Moreover, there were other significant institutional locifor Scholastic learning and discourse in the later Middle Ages besides the universities and the study-houses, namely the Papal Court—notably the Sacred Palace at Avignon—and several royal courts, for example, the courts of Robert the Wise in Naples and of the Emperor Lewis IV in Munich. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the greatest Scholastic masters at different times taught in, or were associated with, all of these venues. This volume, which originated at the XVth annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale held at the University of Notre Dame (USA) in October 2008, contains essays concerning the study and teaching of philosophy and theology in the studia of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinian Hermits, Carmelites, Benedictines and Cistercians, as well as the intellectual activity at the Papal Court in Rome and Avignon and at various royal courts (London, Naples, Munich).
Kent Emery, Jr., Introduction
I. The Dominicans
Alfonso Maierù, Dominican studia in Spain
Joseph Goering, What the Friars Really Learned at Oxford and Cambridge
Adriano Oliva, OP, L’enseignement des Sentences dans les studia dominicains italiens au XIIIe siècle : l’Alia lectura de Thomas d’Aquin et le Scriptum de Bombolognus de Bologne
Alessandro Palazzo, Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican scholae in the Late Middle Ages: The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen
Guy Guldentops, Struggling with Authority: Durand of Saint-Pourçain on the Origin of Power and on Obedience to the Pope
Fabrizio Amerini, The Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy in the Dominican studia of the Roman Province in the Fourteenth Century
Hester Goodenough Gelber, Blackfriars London: the Late Medieval studiumMaarten J.F.M. Hoenen, How the Thomists in Cologne Saved Aristotle: The Debate over the Eternity of the World in the Late-Medieval Period
II. The FranciscansNeslihan Şenocak, The Franciscan studium generale: A New Interpretation
Luca Bianchi, Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans: Some Preliminary Remarks
Alain Boureau, Enseignement et débat dans les ordres mendiants du XIIIe siècle : Le cas des Quodlibeta de Richard de Mediavilla
William O. Duba, The Legacy of the Bologna studium in Peter Auriol’s Hylomorphism
Sylvain Piron, Les studia franciscains de Provence et d’Aquitaine (1275-1335)
Christopher Schabel and Garrett R. Smith, The Franciscan studium in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century
François-Xavier Putallaz, La peine de mort est-elle légitime ? Le studium franciscain de Cologne s’interroge au XIVe siècle
III. The Augustinians and the CarmelitesGiorgio Pini, Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order
Russell L. Friedman, How ‘Aegidian’ Were Later Augustinian Hermits Regarding Intellectual Cognition? Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa and the Object of the Intellect
Stephen F. Brown, The Early Carmelite Parisian Masters
Wouter Goris, The Critique of the Doctrine of God as First Known in the Early Carmelite School
IV. The Benedictines and the CisterciansThomas Sullivan, OSB, Ut nostra religione refloreat studium: The studia of the Monastic Orders
Amos Corbini, Pierre de Ceffons et l’instruction dans l’Ordre cistercien : quelques remarques
V. The Friars, Philosophy and Theology at Papal and Royal CourtsM. Michèle Mulchahey, The Dominican Studium Romanae Curiae: The Papacy, the Magisterium and the Friars
Jacqueline Hamesse, Les instruments de travail philosophiques et théologiques, témoins de l’enseignement et de l’influence des ordres mendiants à l’époque de la papauté d’Avignon
Patrick Nold, How Influential Was Giovanni di Napoli, OP, at the Papal Court in Avignon?
Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique, question disputée à la cour pontificale d’Avignon ?
Roberto Lambertini, Political Theory in the Making: Theology, Philosophy and Politics at the Court of Lewis the Bavarian
William J. Courtenay, Concluding Remarks
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Maverick Philosopher, Scholastic
The Maverick Philosopher takes a turn towards the substance abusers: Here.
See for example, Franciscus de Mayronis, Quodlibet q. 9 arg. prin. 1 (ed. Venezia 1520, ff. 244va): Utrum christianus sufficienter in theologia instructus possit defenere articulum creationis contra adversarios veritatis quantumcumque peritos.
Now, most of the Scholastics, when they are wearing their philosopher's hats, deny that creation can be demonstrated, and in this part ways with the MP. But wearing their theologian's hats they would agree with the MP (indeed, he mentions Aquinas). They explain the tension between the claim that 'from nothing, nothing is made' and creation ex nihilo precisely by appealing to accounts of divine cognition, i.e. the divine ideas. For Scotus, see this post where he outlines his view of divine cognition. First, the divine intellect cognizes the divine essence, then in a series of stages it generates the essences of creatables in intelligible being, knows the essences, and reflects on them. In other passages we learn that following the production into intelligible being, these creatable quiddities are generated into possible being in a later instant of nature (only essences containing non-repugnant terms make it into this instant) and in yet a later instant of nature the divine will actualizes some of these essences in actual existence.
See for example, Franciscus de Mayronis, Quodlibet q. 9 arg. prin. 1 (ed. Venezia 1520, ff. 244va): Utrum christianus sufficienter in theologia instructus possit defenere articulum creationis contra adversarios veritatis quantumcumque peritos.
And it is argued first that one such is not able: because it was a common concept among the philosophers that from nothing nothing is made; but that article [ie. creation, an article of faith] posits that something was made from nothing by divine power; therefore that article is against a common concept of the soul. That however which is against a common concept cannot be defened since it is against reason.
But against: because Catholics firmly hold that God can create something from nothing. If however they are not able to defend this, they are not able to hold it firmly, although they can be convinced; and consequently they can be ripped away from that truth.
Now, most of the Scholastics, when they are wearing their philosopher's hats, deny that creation can be demonstrated, and in this part ways with the MP. But wearing their theologian's hats they would agree with the MP (indeed, he mentions Aquinas). They explain the tension between the claim that 'from nothing, nothing is made' and creation ex nihilo precisely by appealing to accounts of divine cognition, i.e. the divine ideas. For Scotus, see this post where he outlines his view of divine cognition. First, the divine intellect cognizes the divine essence, then in a series of stages it generates the essences of creatables in intelligible being, knows the essences, and reflects on them. In other passages we learn that following the production into intelligible being, these creatable quiddities are generated into possible being in a later instant of nature (only essences containing non-repugnant terms make it into this instant) and in yet a later instant of nature the divine will actualizes some of these essences in actual existence.
Sunday, January 22, 2012
Divine Simplicity III: Univocity
[NB: this is a first draft; I will make every effort in the future to revise by adding commentary and fixing typos, etc.]
As promised, here is the post on the topic that inspired this series of "fundamenta" posts: how can Scotus reconcile his theory of univocity with divine simplicity?
We all know what Thomas says. The terms that we predicate of God from creatures (being, wise, good, just, etc.) exist in a divided way in creatures, as distinct from their essence. But God is simple, admitting no plurality. Consequently, the terms must be predicated analogically, not univocally.
Scotus' discussion of the issue is found in Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 3, entitled "Whether to say that God, or something formally said of God, is in a genus is consonant with divine simplicity.
He is trying to avoid a model of reality in which Being is a genus and God and creatures are species of being. If this were the case, divine simplicity would be violated. This is because there would be a common reality of the genus by which God and creatures would agree, and a reality that was proper to each. God would then have composition of genus and specific difference.
For the negative position, Scotus examines the opinion of Henry of Ghent (not Aquinas), citing a number of arguments, offering arguments against the position (these are the arguments for univocity I have already posted) and replying to Henry's arguments. He also cites an opinion for the positive position, though it is probably more of a set-up than an opinion anyone actually held (i.e. that God is in a genus).
Scotus, then, holds a middle position:
Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 (ed. Vat. IV, 198):
So Scotus then argues that the concept is not going to be common like a genus is in common. He has two arguments for this, one from the notion of infinity, the other from the notion of necessary being.
1. Infinity (ed. Vat. IV 199-203):
A concept having indifference to some things to which a concept of a genus cannot be indifferent can not be a concept of a genus; but whatever is said commonly of God and creatures is indifferent to finite and infinite, speaking of essential [things], or at least to the finite and not finite, speaking of certain others, because a divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to infinite and the finite, therefore etc.
The first part of the minor is clear, because whatever essential perfection is in God, is formally infinite, in creatures finite.
I prove the second part of the minor, because a genus is taken from some reality which according to itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; no infinite is potential to something...
This argument, by treating it further, I understand in this way: that in some creaures the genus and difference are taken from another and another reality (just as by positing many forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive and rational from the intellective), and then that thing, from which the genus is taken, truly is potential and perfectible by that thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there are not there thing and thing (just as in accidents), at least in one thing there is some proper reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called a and the second b: a according to itself is potential to b, so that by precisely understanding a and precisely understanding b, a as it is understood in the first instant of nature, in which it is precisely itself, it is perfectible by b (just as if it were another thing), but that it is not perfected really by b, this is because of the identity of a and b to some total [totum] thing, to which really they are primarily the same, which indeed totum first is produced and in that totum both those realities are produced: if nevetheless one of those would be produced without the other, truly it would be potential to it and truly it would be imperfect without it.
That composition of realities - potential and actual - is the smallest which suffices for the notion of genus and difference, and that does not stand with this that whatsoever reality in something is infinite: for reality, if it would be infinite of itself, however precisely taken, would not be in potency to some reality; therefore since in God whatsoever essential reality is formally infinite, there is nothing from which the notion of a genus can be formally taken.
2. From necessary being (ed. Vat. IV, 204 ff.)
I argue third from the second middle [term], namely from the notion of necessary being, and this is the argument of Avicenna, VIII Met. ch. 4. If necessary being has a genus, therefore the intention of the genus will be of itself necessary being or not. If the first, 'then [the inquiry] will not cease until there is a difference'. I understand this thus: the genus would then include a difference, because without it it is not in ultimate act and the 'necessary in itself' is in ultimate act; if however the genus includes a difference, then it is not a genus. If the second option is followed, it follows that 'necessary being will be constituted from what is not necessary being.
[there follows an addition by Scotus here] but this argument proves that necessary being has nothing in common with another, because that common intention is 'not necessary being'; hence I answer: an understood intention neither includes necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; that however in reality which corresponds to an intention, in 'this' is necessary being, in 'that' possible (this is disproved if a proper reality corresponds to the intention of a genus, and not if it corresponds to another common intention). [end of addition]
With respect to that which is added in the question 'of whatever formally said of God' [see the opening paragraph], I say that no such is in a genus, because of the same, because nothing is said formally of God which is limited; whatever is of some genus, whatever genus that might be, is necessarily limited.
But then there is a doubt about what sort are those predicates which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc.
I answer. Being is first divided into infinite and finite than into the ten categories, because one of those, namely the finite, is common to the ten genera; therefore whatever befalls being as indifferent to finite and infinite, or as it is proper to infinite being, befalls it not as determined to a genus but as prior, and consequently as it is a transcendental and is outside every genus. Whatever is common to God and creature, are such which befall being as it is indifferent to finite and infinite: for as they befall God, they are infinite, and as they befall a creature they are finite; therefore first they befall being than being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent [transcendens].
But then there is another doubt, how wisdom can be called a transcendental since it is not common to all beings.
I answer. Just as it is of the definition of 'most general' that it does not have under itself many species but not to have another genus above it (just as this category 'where', because it does not have a supervening genus it is most general, although it has few or no species), so a transcendental has no genus under which it is contained. Whence it is of the notion(ratio) of a transcendental that it does not have a predicate that supervenes, except being, but that it is common to many inferiors, this befalls it.
This is clear in another way, because being does not have passions/attributes that are simply convertible, just as one, true, and good, but has some passions where opposites are distinguished against each other, just as necessary being or possible being, act or potency, and suchlike. Just as convertible passions/attributes are transcendent because they follow upon being in so far as it is not determined to some genus, so disjunctive passions/attributes are transcendental, and each member of the disjunct is transcendental because neither determines its determinable to a certain genus: and nevertheless one member of the disjunct formally is special, not befalling unless one being, just as necessary being in that division between necessary being or possible being, and the infinite in that division of finite or infinite, and the same is true of the rest. So also wisdom can be a transcendental, and whatever other, which is common to God and creature, although some such is said of God alone, something however is also said of God and some creature. It is not necessary that a transcendental, qua transcendental, be said of every being unless it is convertible with the first transcendental, namely being.
[to the first principal argument, (ed. Vat. IV 221ff):
To the first principal argument I concede that that concept said of God and a creature in 'quid' [i.e. essentially] is contracted by some contracting concepts saying 'quale' , but neither is that concept said in 'quid' a concept of a genus, nor those concepts said in 'quale' are concepts of differences, because that 'quidditative' concept is common to finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus -- those concepts contracting mean the intrinsic mode of the contracted, and not some reality perfecting it: differences however do not mean the intrinsic mode of the reality of some genus, because in whatever grade animality is understood, not on account of this is rationality or irrationality understood to be the intrinsic mode of animality, but still animality is understood in such a grade as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.
But here there is a doubt: how can a concept common to God and creature be understood as 'real', unless by some reality of the same genus, and then it seems that it is potential to that reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, just as was argued before about the concept of a genus and a difference, and then the argument made for the first position still stands, that if there would be some reality distinguishing in re, and another distinct, it seems that a thing is composed, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs.
I answer that when some reality with its intrinsic mode is understood, that concept is not so irreducibly simple (simpliciter simplex) that that reality cannot be conceived without that mode, but then it is an imperfect concept of that thing; it is able also to be conceived under that mode, and then it is a perfect concept of that thing. Example: if there would be whiteness in the tenth grade of intensity, howsoever simple it might be in the thing, it can still be conceived under the aspect of such whiteness, and then perfectly it will be conceived by an adequate concept of that thing, or it can be conceived precisely under the aspect of whiteness, and then it would be conceived by an imperfect concept which falls from the perfection of the thing; an imperfect concept however can be common to this and that whiteness, and a perfect concept would be proper.
Therefore a distinction is required between that from which a common concept is taken and between that from which a proper concept is taken not as distinction of reality and reality but as distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, which distinction suffices for having a perfect concept or imperfect of the same, of which the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concept of genus and difference requires the distinction of realities, not only of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.
To summarize:
Scotus takes two doctrines as given, because they were proven elsewhere.
1. Divine simplicity
2. univocal predication of creaturely properties of God, with qualification.
In this question, Scotus expands this picture
3. the properties predicated of God are not in a genus, because this would require a distinction of realities: the reality of the genus is other than the reality of the difference [keep in mind, the model Scotus is trying to avoid is that Being is a genus, and creatures and God are two species of being. There would be one reality, being, by which God and creatures agree, and one reality by which they are distinct]
4. The properties are transcendentals, arranged in four grades: being, attributes of being (one, true, good, maybe thing), disjunctive attributes of being (necessary being vs. possible being, etc.), pure perfections (wisdom, justice, etc.).
5. univocal predication gives us a common concept, say of wisdom; it is common to God and creatures. As such, the common concept is imperfect. The univocal notion can be contracted to God and creatures by means of intrinsic modes. The concept of God or a creature taken with its respective intrinsic mode is imperfect, but this is not a distinction between two realities, but of one reality. Hence the problem mentioned in 3 is avoided.
As promised, here is the post on the topic that inspired this series of "fundamenta" posts: how can Scotus reconcile his theory of univocity with divine simplicity?
We all know what Thomas says. The terms that we predicate of God from creatures (being, wise, good, just, etc.) exist in a divided way in creatures, as distinct from their essence. But God is simple, admitting no plurality. Consequently, the terms must be predicated analogically, not univocally.
Scotus' discussion of the issue is found in Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 3, entitled "Whether to say that God, or something formally said of God, is in a genus is consonant with divine simplicity.
He is trying to avoid a model of reality in which Being is a genus and God and creatures are species of being. If this were the case, divine simplicity would be violated. This is because there would be a common reality of the genus by which God and creatures would agree, and a reality that was proper to each. God would then have composition of genus and specific difference.
For the negative position, Scotus examines the opinion of Henry of Ghent (not Aquinas), citing a number of arguments, offering arguments against the position (these are the arguments for univocity I have already posted) and replying to Henry's arguments. He also cites an opinion for the positive position, though it is probably more of a set-up than an opinion anyone actually held (i.e. that God is in a genus).
Scotus, then, holds a middle position:
Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 (ed. Vat. IV, 198):
I hold the middle position, that it stands with divine simplicity that some concept is common to God and to a creature, not nevertheless some concept common as of a genus, because neither a concept said in 'quid' of God, //nor by whatever kind of formal predication said of him// is per se in some genus.
The first part was proved by arguing against the first opinion [i.e. Henry]
So Scotus then argues that the concept is not going to be common like a genus is in common. He has two arguments for this, one from the notion of infinity, the other from the notion of necessary being.
1. Infinity (ed. Vat. IV 199-203):
A concept having indifference to some things to which a concept of a genus cannot be indifferent can not be a concept of a genus; but whatever is said commonly of God and creatures is indifferent to finite and infinite, speaking of essential [things], or at least to the finite and not finite, speaking of certain others, because a divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to infinite and the finite, therefore etc.
The first part of the minor is clear, because whatever essential perfection is in God, is formally infinite, in creatures finite.
I prove the second part of the minor, because a genus is taken from some reality which according to itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; no infinite is potential to something...
This argument, by treating it further, I understand in this way: that in some creaures the genus and difference are taken from another and another reality (just as by positing many forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive and rational from the intellective), and then that thing, from which the genus is taken, truly is potential and perfectible by that thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there are not there thing and thing (just as in accidents), at least in one thing there is some proper reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called a and the second b: a according to itself is potential to b, so that by precisely understanding a and precisely understanding b, a as it is understood in the first instant of nature, in which it is precisely itself, it is perfectible by b (just as if it were another thing), but that it is not perfected really by b, this is because of the identity of a and b to some total [totum] thing, to which really they are primarily the same, which indeed totum first is produced and in that totum both those realities are produced: if nevetheless one of those would be produced without the other, truly it would be potential to it and truly it would be imperfect without it.
That composition of realities - potential and actual - is the smallest which suffices for the notion of genus and difference, and that does not stand with this that whatsoever reality in something is infinite: for reality, if it would be infinite of itself, however precisely taken, would not be in potency to some reality; therefore since in God whatsoever essential reality is formally infinite, there is nothing from which the notion of a genus can be formally taken.
2. From necessary being (ed. Vat. IV, 204 ff.)
I argue third from the second middle [term], namely from the notion of necessary being, and this is the argument of Avicenna, VIII Met. ch. 4. If necessary being has a genus, therefore the intention of the genus will be of itself necessary being or not. If the first, 'then [the inquiry] will not cease until there is a difference'. I understand this thus: the genus would then include a difference, because without it it is not in ultimate act and the 'necessary in itself' is in ultimate act; if however the genus includes a difference, then it is not a genus. If the second option is followed, it follows that 'necessary being will be constituted from what is not necessary being.
[there follows an addition by Scotus here] but this argument proves that necessary being has nothing in common with another, because that common intention is 'not necessary being'; hence I answer: an understood intention neither includes necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; that however in reality which corresponds to an intention, in 'this' is necessary being, in 'that' possible (this is disproved if a proper reality corresponds to the intention of a genus, and not if it corresponds to another common intention). [end of addition]
With respect to that which is added in the question 'of whatever formally said of God' [see the opening paragraph], I say that no such is in a genus, because of the same, because nothing is said formally of God which is limited; whatever is of some genus, whatever genus that might be, is necessarily limited.
But then there is a doubt about what sort are those predicates which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc.
I answer. Being is first divided into infinite and finite than into the ten categories, because one of those, namely the finite, is common to the ten genera; therefore whatever befalls being as indifferent to finite and infinite, or as it is proper to infinite being, befalls it not as determined to a genus but as prior, and consequently as it is a transcendental and is outside every genus. Whatever is common to God and creature, are such which befall being as it is indifferent to finite and infinite: for as they befall God, they are infinite, and as they befall a creature they are finite; therefore first they befall being than being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent [transcendens].
But then there is another doubt, how wisdom can be called a transcendental since it is not common to all beings.
I answer. Just as it is of the definition of 'most general' that it does not have under itself many species but not to have another genus above it (just as this category 'where', because it does not have a supervening genus it is most general, although it has few or no species), so a transcendental has no genus under which it is contained. Whence it is of the notion(ratio) of a transcendental that it does not have a predicate that supervenes, except being, but that it is common to many inferiors, this befalls it.
This is clear in another way, because being does not have passions/attributes that are simply convertible, just as one, true, and good, but has some passions where opposites are distinguished against each other, just as necessary being or possible being, act or potency, and suchlike. Just as convertible passions/attributes are transcendent because they follow upon being in so far as it is not determined to some genus, so disjunctive passions/attributes are transcendental, and each member of the disjunct is transcendental because neither determines its determinable to a certain genus: and nevertheless one member of the disjunct formally is special, not befalling unless one being, just as necessary being in that division between necessary being or possible being, and the infinite in that division of finite or infinite, and the same is true of the rest. So also wisdom can be a transcendental, and whatever other, which is common to God and creature, although some such is said of God alone, something however is also said of God and some creature. It is not necessary that a transcendental, qua transcendental, be said of every being unless it is convertible with the first transcendental, namely being.
[to the first principal argument, (ed. Vat. IV 221ff):
To the first principal argument I concede that that concept said of God and a creature in 'quid' [i.e. essentially] is contracted by some contracting concepts saying 'quale' , but neither is that concept said in 'quid' a concept of a genus, nor those concepts said in 'quale' are concepts of differences, because that 'quidditative' concept is common to finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus -- those concepts contracting mean the intrinsic mode of the contracted, and not some reality perfecting it: differences however do not mean the intrinsic mode of the reality of some genus, because in whatever grade animality is understood, not on account of this is rationality or irrationality understood to be the intrinsic mode of animality, but still animality is understood in such a grade as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.
But here there is a doubt: how can a concept common to God and creature be understood as 'real', unless by some reality of the same genus, and then it seems that it is potential to that reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, just as was argued before about the concept of a genus and a difference, and then the argument made for the first position still stands, that if there would be some reality distinguishing in re, and another distinct, it seems that a thing is composed, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs.
I answer that when some reality with its intrinsic mode is understood, that concept is not so irreducibly simple (simpliciter simplex) that that reality cannot be conceived without that mode, but then it is an imperfect concept of that thing; it is able also to be conceived under that mode, and then it is a perfect concept of that thing. Example: if there would be whiteness in the tenth grade of intensity, howsoever simple it might be in the thing, it can still be conceived under the aspect of such whiteness, and then perfectly it will be conceived by an adequate concept of that thing, or it can be conceived precisely under the aspect of whiteness, and then it would be conceived by an imperfect concept which falls from the perfection of the thing; an imperfect concept however can be common to this and that whiteness, and a perfect concept would be proper.
Therefore a distinction is required between that from which a common concept is taken and between that from which a proper concept is taken not as distinction of reality and reality but as distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, which distinction suffices for having a perfect concept or imperfect of the same, of which the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concept of genus and difference requires the distinction of realities, not only of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.
To summarize:
Scotus takes two doctrines as given, because they were proven elsewhere.
1. Divine simplicity
2. univocal predication of creaturely properties of God, with qualification.
In this question, Scotus expands this picture
3. the properties predicated of God are not in a genus, because this would require a distinction of realities: the reality of the genus is other than the reality of the difference [keep in mind, the model Scotus is trying to avoid is that Being is a genus, and creatures and God are two species of being. There would be one reality, being, by which God and creatures agree, and one reality by which they are distinct]
4. The properties are transcendentals, arranged in four grades: being, attributes of being (one, true, good, maybe thing), disjunctive attributes of being (necessary being vs. possible being, etc.), pure perfections (wisdom, justice, etc.).
5. univocal predication gives us a common concept, say of wisdom; it is common to God and creatures. As such, the common concept is imperfect. The univocal notion can be contracted to God and creatures by means of intrinsic modes. The concept of God or a creature taken with its respective intrinsic mode is imperfect, but this is not a distinction between two realities, but of one reality. Hence the problem mentioned in 3 is avoided.
Thursday, January 19, 2012
Scotus on the Scandal of Philosophy
We've all read statements by early modern philosophers complaining about the diversity of opinions held by philosophers and how this is a bad thing.
But Scotus disagrees. The following text is from the 1517 John Major printing of the Reportatio (free for download at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek). Eventually, this will be labeled Rep. IB, prol. q. 2 (ed. Major 2va):
Dicitur primo pro quaestione prima, quia utilis est diversitas opinionum propter nostri intellectus imbecillitatem, et scientie profunditatem, et propter studentium profectum, et propter veritatis elucidationem.
It is said to the first question that a diversity of opinions is useful on account of the weakness of our intellect, and the profundity of knowledge, and because of the progress of the ones studying, and on account of the elucidation of truth.
Monday, January 16, 2012
Review of Brad Gregory's New Book
Here. The beginning of it is like a bad game of telephone. The reviewer seems to misunderstand Gregory's explanation of univocity, and Gregory himself misunderstood Scotus.
Some snippets:
[...]
Some snippets:
The book's first chapter, "Excluding God," begins with what I regard as an accurate portrayal of the modern intellectual's arbitrary and illogical refusal to countenance any explanation of the world's origins, no matter how cogent that explanation may be, if it happens to include God. The roots of this mindset reach back centuries, Mr. Gregory says, to the late-medieval theologian John Duns Scotus, who argued that God and man both exist in the same essence of things and that therefore man may speak of God with "univocal" as opposed to "analogical" language. In Scotus's thinking, the word "wise," for example, might apply to God in the same sense in which it applies to man. This had the effect, says Mr. Gregory, of defining God as if He were bound by the material world rather than transcendent over it. And when this view combined with William of Occam's "razor"—the principle that the best argument is the one with the fewest unnecessary parts—philosophers eventually felt emboldened to exclude God from any explanation of natural phenomena: and, in time, from any argument at all.
Very interesting, one might think—except that the book presents no evidence that any Protestant reformer actually espoused "univocal metaphysics," in the author's phrase. Nothing from Luther or Calvin on the subject, nothing from William Farel or Martin Bucer. Mr. Gregory does mention the Swiss Reformation leader Ulrich Zwingli and his disavowal of Christ's real presence in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper, but that position is hardly the "logical corollary" to univocal metaphysics that the author claims. Transubstantiation is a far more "univocal" reading of the words "This is my body" than Zwingli's interpretation. But never mind. When Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche and, more recently, Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris formulated their skeptical views of religion, Mr. Gregory says, they thought of God in reductive, univocal terms, and this was somehow a long-term consequence of the Protestant Reformation.
[...]
Leaving aside Mr. Gregory's preposterously overwrought characterization of modern Western societies, especially America—he sees little beyond depredation, exploitation, consumerism and global warming—his complaint that modern Western morality elevates acquisitiveness to the status of a virtue is justified. But blaming this state of affairs on events that occurred and people who lived five centuries ago is a sort of rearview-mirror utopianism: If only the right social order had been left in place—if only the Protestant reformers hadn't shattered medieval Catholicism's "institutionalized worldview"—life today would be so much better.
Saturday, January 14, 2012
New Henry edition
Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet IV is now available, for a cool 89 euros.
From the website:
From the website:
Henry of Ghent, the most influential philosopher/theologian of the last quarter of the 13th century at Paris, delivered his fourth Quodlibet during 1279. This Quodlibet was written at the beginning of what could be called the height of his career.
In total there are 37 questions, which cover a wide range of topics, including theories in theology, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical anthropology, ethics, and canon law. In these questions Henry presents his mature thought concerning the number of human substantial forms in which he counters the claims of the defenders of Thomas Aquinas, particularly those in Giles of Lessines’s De unitate formae, but also those found in Giles of Rome’s Contra Gradus. He is critical of Thomas Aquinas’s theories concerning human knowledge, the ‘more’ and the ‘less,’ and virtue. He also is critical of Bonaventure’s analysis of Augustine’s notion of rationes seminales.
There are 33 known manuscripts which contain the text of Quodlibet IV, and the critical text is reconstructed based upon manuscripts known to have been in Henry’s school, as well as manuscripts copied from two successive university exemplars in Paris.
Table of contents
Foreword
Critical Study
The Editions and Manuscripts
The Editions
The Manuscripts
Quodlibet IV: Authorship and Date
§1. The Authorship of Quodlibet IV§2. The Date of Quodlibet IV
§1. The Authorship of Quodlibet IV§2. The Date of Quodlibet IV
The Text Examined Exteriorly: Historical and Codicological Elements Used for the Establishment of the Text
§1. Quodlibet IV: Distributed by Means of Two Successive Exemplars by the University in Paris
A. The First University Exemplar
B. A Second Parisian University Exemplar
§1. Quodlibet IV: Distributed by Means of Two Successive Exemplars by the University in Paris
A. The First University Exemplar
B. A Second Parisian University Exemplar
The Text Examined Interiorly: The Relationships among the Manuscripts, Established by a General Test Collation
§1. The Common Accidents
A. The Groups of Manuscripts Characterized by the Number of Common Accidents
B. The Groups of Manuscripts Characterized Individually
1. Manuscript A
2. The Group of Manuscripts Dependent upon the First Parisian University Exemplar
a. The sub-group of mss. 8 and 27
b. The sub-group of mss. 4 and 5
c. The sub-group of mss. 22 and 33
d. A Possible English Family of Manuscripts
3. The Group of Manuscripts Dependent upon the Second Parisian University Exemplar
§2. The Isolated Accidents
An Earlier Redaction of QQ. 7 & 8
§1. The Common Accidents
A. The Groups of Manuscripts Characterized by the Number of Common Accidents
B. The Groups of Manuscripts Characterized Individually
1. Manuscript A
2. The Group of Manuscripts Dependent upon the First Parisian University Exemplar
a. The sub-group of mss. 8 and 27
b. The sub-group of mss. 4 and 5
c. The sub-group of mss. 22 and 33
d. A Possible English Family of Manuscripts
3. The Group of Manuscripts Dependent upon the Second Parisian University Exemplar
§2. The Isolated Accidents
An Earlier Redaction of QQ. 7 & 8
Manuscript 25 (Paris, BNF, Lat. 15848) and the University Examplars
§1. Manuscript 25 and the First Parisian University Exemplar
§2. Manuscript 25 and the Second Parisian University Exemplar
§1. Manuscript 25 and the First Parisian University Exemplar
§2. Manuscript 25 and the Second Parisian University Exemplar
The First Parisian Exemplar
The Second Parisian University Exemplar
The Reconstruction of the Critical Text
The References and Sources in Quodlibet IV
The Edition of Badius
The Genesis of the Exemplars, Represented by a Diagram
Technique of the Edition
Symbols
1. In the Text Itself
2. In the Critical Apparatus
1. In the Text Itself
2. In the Critical Apparatus
Abbreviations
1. In the Critical Apparatus
2. In the Apparatus of Citations
1. In the Critical Apparatus
2. In the Apparatus of Citations
Sigla of the Manuscripts
Quodlibet IV
1. Utrum relatio prius sit in divina essentia quam in persona
2. Utrum imago conveniat Spiritui Sancto sicut et Filio
3. Utrum in Christo sint duae reales filiationes, una ad Patrem, alia ad matrem
4. Utrum sint idem re natura et suppositum
5. Utrum unum principium numeri quantitatis discretae sit alterius naturae quam unitas rerum substantialis
6. Utrum forma numeri denarii sit aliquid extra intellectum
7. Utrum intellectus creatus se ipsum et ea quae per essentiam eorum sunt in ipso intelligat per se absque omni specie rei intellectae vel per aliquam speciem eius qua informatur
8. Utrum beatus videns seu intelligens Deum nude per essentiam suam formet in se verbum de Deo
9. Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus ex puris naturalibus possit videre seu intelligere nude divinam essentiam
10. Utrum caritas re differat a gratia
11. Utrum Deus a creatura intellectuali dilectione pura naturali possit diligi super omnia alia
12. Utrum post resurrectionem erunt aliqua individua composita in isto mundo inferiori
13. Utrum in quidditate rerum sensibilium materialium cadunt plures formae substantiales re differentes
14. Utrum in materia sit ratio seminalis, quae est formae inchoatio
15. Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus
16. Utrum in angelis sit materia, ut debeat dici compositus ex materia et forma
17. Utrum angelus moveatur de loco ad locum
18. Utrum beatus Paulus potuit occidi ante suam conversionem
19. Utrum in isto singulari praedestinato, demonstrato quocumque, sit ratio sive causa suae praedestinationis
20. Utrum bonum sit omnia esse communia in civitate
21. Utrum intellectus coniunctus possit aliquid intelligere
22. Utrum morales virtutes sint in voluntate
23. Utrum iidem habitus sint virtutes, dona, beatitudines et fructus
24. Utrum bona mortificata reviviscant recuperata
25. Utrum caritas aliqua viatoris possit adaequari caritati contemplatoris
26. Utrum liceat mendicantibus petere ultra necessitatem
27. Utrum pro servitio in filio usurarii instruendo liceat sumere pecuniam quam serviens novit acquisitam per usuram
28. Utrum bona communia sint de iure evangelii
29. Utrum alicui liceat repetere debitum cum scandalo
30. Utrum adeptus beneficium per simulationem debeat illud resignare
31. Utrum homo possit esse non risibilis
32. Utrum, in aequali facilitate exsequendi utrumque, homo semper tenetur ad melius faciendum
33. Utrum doctoribus contrariantibus circa aliquod agibilium et agere secundum unam opinionem est sine omni periculo peccati, agere vero secundum aliam est in dubio peccati mortalis, mortaliter peccet ille qui agit illud de quo est dubium an sit peccatum mortale, puta in emendo redditus ad vitam vel accipiendo ultra sortem
34. Utrum peccator paenitens statim tenetur confiteri
35. Utrum religiosus per abbatem suum episcopo praesentatus ad curam et ab episcopo institutus plus debet oboedire abbati revocanti ipsum a cura ad claustrum, an episcopo praecipienti quod in cura sua persistat
36. Utrum species sacramenti Eucharistae nutriant
37. Utrum in sacramentis Novae Legis sit virtus creativa gratiae
1. Utrum relatio prius sit in divina essentia quam in persona
2. Utrum imago conveniat Spiritui Sancto sicut et Filio
3. Utrum in Christo sint duae reales filiationes, una ad Patrem, alia ad matrem
4. Utrum sint idem re natura et suppositum
5. Utrum unum principium numeri quantitatis discretae sit alterius naturae quam unitas rerum substantialis
6. Utrum forma numeri denarii sit aliquid extra intellectum
7. Utrum intellectus creatus se ipsum et ea quae per essentiam eorum sunt in ipso intelligat per se absque omni specie rei intellectae vel per aliquam speciem eius qua informatur
8. Utrum beatus videns seu intelligens Deum nude per essentiam suam formet in se verbum de Deo
9. Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus ex puris naturalibus possit videre seu intelligere nude divinam essentiam
10. Utrum caritas re differat a gratia
11. Utrum Deus a creatura intellectuali dilectione pura naturali possit diligi super omnia alia
12. Utrum post resurrectionem erunt aliqua individua composita in isto mundo inferiori
13. Utrum in quidditate rerum sensibilium materialium cadunt plures formae substantiales re differentes
14. Utrum in materia sit ratio seminalis, quae est formae inchoatio
15. Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus
16. Utrum in angelis sit materia, ut debeat dici compositus ex materia et forma
17. Utrum angelus moveatur de loco ad locum
18. Utrum beatus Paulus potuit occidi ante suam conversionem
19. Utrum in isto singulari praedestinato, demonstrato quocumque, sit ratio sive causa suae praedestinationis
20. Utrum bonum sit omnia esse communia in civitate
21. Utrum intellectus coniunctus possit aliquid intelligere
22. Utrum morales virtutes sint in voluntate
23. Utrum iidem habitus sint virtutes, dona, beatitudines et fructus
24. Utrum bona mortificata reviviscant recuperata
25. Utrum caritas aliqua viatoris possit adaequari caritati contemplatoris
26. Utrum liceat mendicantibus petere ultra necessitatem
27. Utrum pro servitio in filio usurarii instruendo liceat sumere pecuniam quam serviens novit acquisitam per usuram
28. Utrum bona communia sint de iure evangelii
29. Utrum alicui liceat repetere debitum cum scandalo
30. Utrum adeptus beneficium per simulationem debeat illud resignare
31. Utrum homo possit esse non risibilis
32. Utrum, in aequali facilitate exsequendi utrumque, homo semper tenetur ad melius faciendum
33. Utrum doctoribus contrariantibus circa aliquod agibilium et agere secundum unam opinionem est sine omni periculo peccati, agere vero secundum aliam est in dubio peccati mortalis, mortaliter peccet ille qui agit illud de quo est dubium an sit peccatum mortale, puta in emendo redditus ad vitam vel accipiendo ultra sortem
34. Utrum peccator paenitens statim tenetur confiteri
35. Utrum religiosus per abbatem suum episcopo praesentatus ad curam et ab episcopo institutus plus debet oboedire abbati revocanti ipsum a cura ad claustrum, an episcopo praecipienti quod in cura sua persistat
36. Utrum species sacramenti Eucharistae nutriant
37. Utrum in sacramentis Novae Legis sit virtus creativa gratiae
Tables
I. Works cited by Henry (and by the editors in the apparatus)
II. Onomastic table
III. Manuscripts cited
IV. Quoted publications
V. Table of contents
I. Works cited by Henry (and by the editors in the apparatus)
II. Onomastic table
III. Manuscripts cited
IV. Quoted publications
V. Table of contents
Saturday, January 7, 2012
Ockham and Scotus and Natural Theology
Throughout his criticism of Scotus' doctrine of the existence and oneness of God, Ockham remains faithful to his basic philosophical notions, which are radically different from those of the Subtle Doctor. The two theologians do not differ in what they believe about the Christian God, but they diverge on what human reason left to its own resources can prove about him. Ockham finds only "adequate reasons" for affirming his existence - reasons that fall short of strict demonstration. Philosophy assures us of an ultimate ground of the universe: a primary conserving cause or causes, but these might be the heavenly bodies whose causality we experience in our world. Scotus can go further in his rational pursuit of the Christian God because he makes use of a different philosophy, according to which there is real community among beings along with individuality. Ockham fragments the universe into myriad individuals, from which all real community has been eliminated. This leads him to an empirical notion of causality, according to which a cause shares nothing with its effect (except perhaps some of its matter), their bond being simply the recognized presence of effect to cause. As Léon Baudry perceptively remarks, Scotism and Ockhamism are not just two doctrines but two different styles of thinking.
- Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles, 182-183.
I still plan on posting some longer excerpts, but I've been busy over the Christmas season with travels and getting ready for the new semester.
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
On Unitive Containment
I came across the following quote in the Reportatio the other day while trying to tease out the intricacies of Scotus' theory of divine ydeas. It is quoted in QQ. in Met. IV q. 2 (OPh IV 355-6) by the editors (though they make transcription and emendation errors).
The title of the question is Utrum imago Trinitatis in anima rationali subsistat in tribus potentiis realiter distinctis is Rep. II d. 16 q. un. (Oxford, Merton College Library, Ms. 61, not foliated/ff. 179v-180r according to the Scotus editors. The following transcription is mine):
De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius V De divinis nominibus quia continentia unitiva non est omnino eiusdem ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive nec esse omnino manentium distincte; requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem. Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo sicut inferius continet superiora essentialia et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis sicut eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine et a qua genus proximum ut color et qualitas sensibilis et qualitas et quamquam essent res alie, unitive continentur in albedine. Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet alia que sunt quasi passiones sicut passiones entis non sunt res alia ab ente quia quecumque detur ipsa, res est ens, vera et bona; ergo ut oportet dicere quod non sunt res alie ab ente vel quod ens non habet passiones reales, quod est contra Aristotelem IV Metaphysice expresse, nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de essentia nec idem quidditatem quam si essent res alia, ideo non sunt potentie idem formaliter vel quidditative nec inter se nec esse[etiam?] essentie anime nec tamen sunt res alie, sed idem identice. Ideo talia habent talem distinctionem secundum rationes formales qualem haberent realem distinctionem si essent res alie realiter distincte. Principium ergo volendi et intelligendi immediatum est in secundo instanti nature et ista principia sunt unitive in essentia anime que est in primo instanti nature quasi pasiones unitive contente.
[...]
In divinis enim quamquam in supposito sint essentia et relatio et essentia continet relationem, non tamen e contra in proposito; nec intellectus continet voluntatem nec e contra, ideo ista sunt idem idemptice, quia in contente solum, non quia ipsa inter se sunt idem sicut sunt attributa divina non solum idem idemptice sed inter se. Similiter quia quelibet persona in divinis est intrinsece infinita ideo perfecte continet intrinsece quamlibet perfectionem simpliciter que est in alia non sic continet intelligentia memoriam, sed solum concomitantur.
Translation:
Dionysius, V On Divine Names, speaks about unitive containment, that unitive containment is not entirely of the same [thing] so that entirely the same [thing] contains itself unitively, nor is it of things remaining entirely distinct; it requires, therefore, but unity and distinction.
Unitive containment is twofold. In one way, as the inferior contains its essential superiors and there the containment is of the essence of the containing just as it is the same reality from which the difference in whiteness is taken and from which the proximate genus, as color and sensible quality and quality, and although there might be other things unitively contained in whiteness. The other unitive containment is when when a subject unitively contains other things which are quasi attributions/passions just as the attributes of being are not other things than being because whichever one is granted, the thing is being, true and good; therefore either it is necessary to say that they are not other things than being or that being does not have real attributes which is expressly contrary to Aristotle, IV Metaphysics; nevertheless such attributes are not more of the essence nor the same quiddity than if they would be other things. Therefore [the intellect and will] are not formally the same powers or quidditatively, nor between each other nor are they of the essence of the soul nor are they other things [than the soul]; but [they are] the same identically. Therefore such have such a distinction according to their formal definitions of the sort that would have a real distinction if they would be other things really distinct.
[...]
In the divine, although the essence and the relation are in the supposit and the essence contains the relation, nevertheless it is not to be taken contrariwise in the matter at hand; neeither does the intellect contain the will nor contrariwise, therefore they are identically the same, because they are in the containing along, not becuse between them they are the same just as are the divine attributes, not only identically but among each other. Likewise, because whichever of the divine persons is intrinsically infinite therefore perfectly contains every absolute perfection found in another [person]; not so does the intelligence contain the memory, but only accompanies it.
Summary:
Unitive containment is a tool at times employed by Scotus derived directly from pseudo-Dionysius. It is not of the same thing containing itself, nor is it of distinct things remaining completely distinct. Consequently, it requires recourse to both unity and distinction. There are two kinds of unitive containment: one in which an inferior (in the categorical/predicamental line) contains its superior. On this kind, there is a similarity of essence. The second is when the things contained have different essences, and these essences remain formally distinct from each other and from whatever does the containing.
The title of the question is Utrum imago Trinitatis in anima rationali subsistat in tribus potentiis realiter distinctis is Rep. II d. 16 q. un. (Oxford, Merton College Library, Ms. 61, not foliated/ff. 179v-180r according to the Scotus editors. The following transcription is mine):
De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius V De divinis nominibus quia continentia unitiva non est omnino eiusdem ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive nec esse omnino manentium distincte; requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem. Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo sicut inferius continet superiora essentialia et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis sicut eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine et a qua genus proximum ut color et qualitas sensibilis et qualitas et quamquam essent res alie, unitive continentur in albedine. Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet alia que sunt quasi passiones sicut passiones entis non sunt res alia ab ente quia quecumque detur ipsa, res est ens, vera et bona; ergo ut oportet dicere quod non sunt res alie ab ente vel quod ens non habet passiones reales, quod est contra Aristotelem IV Metaphysice expresse, nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de essentia nec idem quidditatem quam si essent res alia, ideo non sunt potentie idem formaliter vel quidditative nec inter se nec esse[etiam?] essentie anime nec tamen sunt res alie, sed idem identice. Ideo talia habent talem distinctionem secundum rationes formales qualem haberent realem distinctionem si essent res alie realiter distincte. Principium ergo volendi et intelligendi immediatum est in secundo instanti nature et ista principia sunt unitive in essentia anime que est in primo instanti nature quasi pasiones unitive contente.
[...]
In divinis enim quamquam in supposito sint essentia et relatio et essentia continet relationem, non tamen e contra in proposito; nec intellectus continet voluntatem nec e contra, ideo ista sunt idem idemptice, quia in contente solum, non quia ipsa inter se sunt idem sicut sunt attributa divina non solum idem idemptice sed inter se. Similiter quia quelibet persona in divinis est intrinsece infinita ideo perfecte continet intrinsece quamlibet perfectionem simpliciter que est in alia non sic continet intelligentia memoriam, sed solum concomitantur.
Translation:
Dionysius, V On Divine Names, speaks about unitive containment, that unitive containment is not entirely of the same [thing] so that entirely the same [thing] contains itself unitively, nor is it of things remaining entirely distinct; it requires, therefore, but unity and distinction.
Unitive containment is twofold. In one way, as the inferior contains its essential superiors and there the containment is of the essence of the containing just as it is the same reality from which the difference in whiteness is taken and from which the proximate genus, as color and sensible quality and quality, and although there might be other things unitively contained in whiteness. The other unitive containment is when when a subject unitively contains other things which are quasi attributions/passions just as the attributes of being are not other things than being because whichever one is granted, the thing is being, true and good; therefore either it is necessary to say that they are not other things than being or that being does not have real attributes which is expressly contrary to Aristotle, IV Metaphysics; nevertheless such attributes are not more of the essence nor the same quiddity than if they would be other things. Therefore [the intellect and will] are not formally the same powers or quidditatively, nor between each other nor are they of the essence of the soul nor are they other things [than the soul]; but [they are] the same identically. Therefore such have such a distinction according to their formal definitions of the sort that would have a real distinction if they would be other things really distinct.
[...]
In the divine, although the essence and the relation are in the supposit and the essence contains the relation, nevertheless it is not to be taken contrariwise in the matter at hand; neeither does the intellect contain the will nor contrariwise, therefore they are identically the same, because they are in the containing along, not becuse between them they are the same just as are the divine attributes, not only identically but among each other. Likewise, because whichever of the divine persons is intrinsically infinite therefore perfectly contains every absolute perfection found in another [person]; not so does the intelligence contain the memory, but only accompanies it.
Summary:
Unitive containment is a tool at times employed by Scotus derived directly from pseudo-Dionysius. It is not of the same thing containing itself, nor is it of distinct things remaining completely distinct. Consequently, it requires recourse to both unity and distinction. There are two kinds of unitive containment: one in which an inferior (in the categorical/predicamental line) contains its superior. On this kind, there is a similarity of essence. The second is when the things contained have different essences, and these essences remain formally distinct from each other and from whatever does the containing.
Monday, January 2, 2012
A Definition of Scholasticism
From L. M. de Rijk. Scholasticism is an
“approach, which is characterized by the use, in both study and teaching, of a constantly recurring system of concepts, distinctions, proposition analyses, argumentative techniques and disputational methods.”[i]
“approach, which is characterized by the use, in both study and teaching, of a constantly recurring system of concepts, distinctions, proposition analyses, argumentative techniques and disputational methods.”[i]
Hauerwas on Univocity
A fascinating quote from Tracy Rowland's article in the Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, p. 590.
This from a god of this age. I suppose such comments aren't worth responding to, as this just more of the same drivel we've seen many times from the pomo crowd. So just one brief comment: Scotus did not argue for univocity in order to guarantee the unmediated knowledge of God. "Unmediated" knowledge would be the direct vision of the divine essence had by the blessed in the next life. Univocity is a property of terms or concepts used in syllogistic discourse. What Scotus was actually trying to do was to avoid fallacies of equivocation when making theological arguments in this life.
Modernity, drawing on the metaphysics of a transcendent god, was the attempt to be historical without Christ. Postmodernity, facing the agony of living in history with no end, is the denial of history. In the wake of such a denial, the only remaining comfort is the shopping mall, which gives us the illusion of creating histories through choice, thus hiding from us the reality that none of us can avoid having our lives determined by money. Money, in modernity, is the institutionalization of the univocity of being that Scotus thought necessary to ensure the unmediated knowledge of God.
This from a god of this age. I suppose such comments aren't worth responding to, as this just more of the same drivel we've seen many times from the pomo crowd. So just one brief comment: Scotus did not argue for univocity in order to guarantee the unmediated knowledge of God. "Unmediated" knowledge would be the direct vision of the divine essence had by the blessed in the next life. Univocity is a property of terms or concepts used in syllogistic discourse. What Scotus was actually trying to do was to avoid fallacies of equivocation when making theological arguments in this life.
Friday, December 30, 2011
Marilyn Adams on History of Philosophy
From the Dewey lecture, "God and Evil among the Philosophers", in the APA proceedings and Addresses vol. 85 issue 2. Emphases are in the original
Certainly, medieval scholastics were analytic philosophers: they were distinction-drawers and argument-inventers par excellence. But they were not only generalists (ranging over all of the major sub-fields of philosophy) in the way Pike recommended; they were systematic philosophers. To get a grip on what they were saying about omniscience or omnipotence or perfect goodness required a wider understanding of their metaphysics and epistemology, their conceptions of agency and normative grounds, and of how they fitted these together.
Working on my Ockham book, I became convinced that their theological disagreements were rooted in philosophical differences, which were at bottom contentious. Most of their arguments for their own and against their opponent's positions involved premises to which the other would not consent. Although they were as interested as Pike was in analyzing whether Divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will, they did not see themselves engaged in a meta-discipline, but in theory construction. They were beginning with doctrinal givens and philosophical commitments and working in different ways to integrate these into a philosophically coherent system. Their debates forced refinements in their own theories. Together they furnished detailed maps of theoretical alternatives.
Throughout my studies of medieval philosophical theology, I have remained a metaphysical realist about philosophical claims: there is such a thing as Reality with a capital "R" and well-formed theories either do or do not correspond with it. But refereeing their philosophical disputes, I became a sceptical realist, holding that it is impossible for us to prove in a way convincing to every rational person, which theory is true and which false. The philosophical task ought to concentrate on theoretical development and understanding.
It also struck me that scholastic method was an antidote for dogmatism. True, there were theological givens that medieval scholastics had to number among the phenomena to be saved. But questioning and disputing required each to get inside the other's theory enough to understand its strengths and weaknesses, the better to appreciate the plusses and minuses of their own. Such exercises foster intellectual flexibility and imagination that is able to do comparative anatomy and cost-benefit analyses on philosophical competitors and to recognize that the same problem can be solved in different ways. When, over the years, colleagues and graduate students have murmured that history of philosophy isn't really philosophy, my contrary reply has become that history of philosophy is a way of doing philosophy and wholesome medicine against the dogmatism that sometimes plagues our field.
In my generation, we by and large changed the way history of philosophy is done by philosophers trained in the analytic tradition. There is a spectrum of practice. Some do philology and edit texts. More spend time on the institutional settings and wider intellectual milieu in which past philosophers worked. There are those who focus more on the interpretive and philosophical problems found in the texts themselves, while others move on from this to build bridges to contemporary thought. All of these are important. Whatever one's specialty, one has to learn from them all. My own work on Ockham benefitted enormously from the generosity of the editorial team at the Franciscan Institute, where critical texts of Ockham's works, discoveries and perspectives, and hospitality were shared. Anachronism and mis-readings are to some extent inevitable. My own advice is to resist attempts to take the weirdness out of great past philosophers. Letting them be as weird as they are is the way to guarantee that we learn something that we didn't know before.
Anglo-American analytic philosophy borrowed its sense of the philosophical canon from Oxbridge: ancient and modern classical, at least Plato and Aristotle, at least Descartes, maybe Leibniz, certainly Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. During the seventies and eighties, Kant was re-entering the mainstream. Medieval philosophy has been central to the canon of philosophy in Roman Catholic schools since 1880 when Pope Leo XIII declared Aquinas the patron of the Catholic schools. Fortunately for me, a tradition of covering medieval philosophy had begun at UCLA when Ernest Moody, the famous pioneer in the study of medieval logic, joined the philosophy faculty in the late fifties and helped launch the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies. In leading analytic graduate departments, however, medievalists were and still are rare.
My generation failed to secure a place for medieval philosophy within the canon of analytic philosophy, but not for want of trying. In the late seventies, the quality of medieval sessions at the APA had sunk so low, that we specialists formed the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, which has since mounted its own double sessions (one on the Latin west and the other on Jewish and Arabic philosophy) at divisional meetings. This was good advertising: the Middle Ages was too a period during which real philosophy was done! The Society also built bridges between secular non-catholic and Roman Catholic schools and widened the circle around which work was shared. These were significant fruits. Certainly, I have learned a lot about Aquinas from Catholic Neo-Thomists, who have spent their adult lives steeping themselves in his works. Over the course of my career, more and more works have been edited and translated with the result that most professionals now know: Augustine and Aquinas were not the only philosophers between Aristotle and Descartes! But medieval philosophy is every bit as technical as contemporary metaphysics is. I suspect many think it would be too much trouble to master it. More's the pity, because medieval philosophy is full of distinctive insights and theories in metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophical theology, overall a fascinating diet of contrasting ideas.
Analytic Philosophy Reconceived: Studying medieval philosophy not only acquainted me with content to analyze; it gradually brought about an imitative shift in my own method. Medieval philosophical theologians were not practicing a meta-discipline; they were involved in theory-construction. By the early to mid-seventies, however, analytic philosophy was recovering its sense of vocation to theorize as well. Hilary Putnam revived talk of natural kinds. Saul Kripke made de re necessities and mind-body dualism respectable. David Lewis' clear and penetrating discussions lent further credibility to the enterprise of metaphysics. Philosophy of mind went inter-disciplinary with the rise of cognitive psychology, and diversified with many and various materialist theories of the mind. Philosophy of language forged ties with linguistics. Enriched conceptual machinery from the present and retrievals from the past made it increasingly natural for me to see the project of philosophy of religion in terms of theory-construction, of articulating theological claims using philosophical conceptuality, of arguing for them--at least in part--on philosophical grounds, of adjusting concepts and theses to achieve theoretical coherence. Such a shift blurs the boundaries between philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. In fact, my own methodological turns were part of a trend that spawned a significant movement: the Society of Christian Philosophers.
Certainly, medieval scholastics were analytic philosophers: they were distinction-drawers and argument-inventers par excellence. But they were not only generalists (ranging over all of the major sub-fields of philosophy) in the way Pike recommended; they were systematic philosophers. To get a grip on what they were saying about omniscience or omnipotence or perfect goodness required a wider understanding of their metaphysics and epistemology, their conceptions of agency and normative grounds, and of how they fitted these together.
Working on my Ockham book, I became convinced that their theological disagreements were rooted in philosophical differences, which were at bottom contentious. Most of their arguments for their own and against their opponent's positions involved premises to which the other would not consent. Although they were as interested as Pike was in analyzing whether Divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will, they did not see themselves engaged in a meta-discipline, but in theory construction. They were beginning with doctrinal givens and philosophical commitments and working in different ways to integrate these into a philosophically coherent system. Their debates forced refinements in their own theories. Together they furnished detailed maps of theoretical alternatives.
Throughout my studies of medieval philosophical theology, I have remained a metaphysical realist about philosophical claims: there is such a thing as Reality with a capital "R" and well-formed theories either do or do not correspond with it. But refereeing their philosophical disputes, I became a sceptical realist, holding that it is impossible for us to prove in a way convincing to every rational person, which theory is true and which false. The philosophical task ought to concentrate on theoretical development and understanding.
It also struck me that scholastic method was an antidote for dogmatism. True, there were theological givens that medieval scholastics had to number among the phenomena to be saved. But questioning and disputing required each to get inside the other's theory enough to understand its strengths and weaknesses, the better to appreciate the plusses and minuses of their own. Such exercises foster intellectual flexibility and imagination that is able to do comparative anatomy and cost-benefit analyses on philosophical competitors and to recognize that the same problem can be solved in different ways. When, over the years, colleagues and graduate students have murmured that history of philosophy isn't really philosophy, my contrary reply has become that history of philosophy is a way of doing philosophy and wholesome medicine against the dogmatism that sometimes plagues our field.
In my generation, we by and large changed the way history of philosophy is done by philosophers trained in the analytic tradition. There is a spectrum of practice. Some do philology and edit texts. More spend time on the institutional settings and wider intellectual milieu in which past philosophers worked. There are those who focus more on the interpretive and philosophical problems found in the texts themselves, while others move on from this to build bridges to contemporary thought. All of these are important. Whatever one's specialty, one has to learn from them all. My own work on Ockham benefitted enormously from the generosity of the editorial team at the Franciscan Institute, where critical texts of Ockham's works, discoveries and perspectives, and hospitality were shared. Anachronism and mis-readings are to some extent inevitable. My own advice is to resist attempts to take the weirdness out of great past philosophers. Letting them be as weird as they are is the way to guarantee that we learn something that we didn't know before.
Anglo-American analytic philosophy borrowed its sense of the philosophical canon from Oxbridge: ancient and modern classical, at least Plato and Aristotle, at least Descartes, maybe Leibniz, certainly Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. During the seventies and eighties, Kant was re-entering the mainstream. Medieval philosophy has been central to the canon of philosophy in Roman Catholic schools since 1880 when Pope Leo XIII declared Aquinas the patron of the Catholic schools. Fortunately for me, a tradition of covering medieval philosophy had begun at UCLA when Ernest Moody, the famous pioneer in the study of medieval logic, joined the philosophy faculty in the late fifties and helped launch the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies. In leading analytic graduate departments, however, medievalists were and still are rare.
My generation failed to secure a place for medieval philosophy within the canon of analytic philosophy, but not for want of trying. In the late seventies, the quality of medieval sessions at the APA had sunk so low, that we specialists formed the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, which has since mounted its own double sessions (one on the Latin west and the other on Jewish and Arabic philosophy) at divisional meetings. This was good advertising: the Middle Ages was too a period during which real philosophy was done! The Society also built bridges between secular non-catholic and Roman Catholic schools and widened the circle around which work was shared. These were significant fruits. Certainly, I have learned a lot about Aquinas from Catholic Neo-Thomists, who have spent their adult lives steeping themselves in his works. Over the course of my career, more and more works have been edited and translated with the result that most professionals now know: Augustine and Aquinas were not the only philosophers between Aristotle and Descartes! But medieval philosophy is every bit as technical as contemporary metaphysics is. I suspect many think it would be too much trouble to master it. More's the pity, because medieval philosophy is full of distinctive insights and theories in metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophical theology, overall a fascinating diet of contrasting ideas.
Analytic Philosophy Reconceived: Studying medieval philosophy not only acquainted me with content to analyze; it gradually brought about an imitative shift in my own method. Medieval philosophical theologians were not practicing a meta-discipline; they were involved in theory-construction. By the early to mid-seventies, however, analytic philosophy was recovering its sense of vocation to theorize as well. Hilary Putnam revived talk of natural kinds. Saul Kripke made de re necessities and mind-body dualism respectable. David Lewis' clear and penetrating discussions lent further credibility to the enterprise of metaphysics. Philosophy of mind went inter-disciplinary with the rise of cognitive psychology, and diversified with many and various materialist theories of the mind. Philosophy of language forged ties with linguistics. Enriched conceptual machinery from the present and retrievals from the past made it increasingly natural for me to see the project of philosophy of religion in terms of theory-construction, of articulating theological claims using philosophical conceptuality, of arguing for them--at least in part--on philosophical grounds, of adjusting concepts and theses to achieve theoretical coherence. Such a shift blurs the boundaries between philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. In fact, my own methodological turns were part of a trend that spawned a significant movement: the Society of Christian Philosophers.
Tuesday, December 27, 2011
Read the Original - If You Can
Translated sources attract errors just as translated scriptures foment heresies, and when the inexperienced attempt their own translations, the results can be even worse.
Although it is off the topic of this blog, the review from which the quotation above was taken may be of interest. It exposes recent amateurish histories of Columbus, Vasco da Gama, and John Cabot--all explorers of the New World. The critique has distinct similarities to critiques found here of amateurish theologians who attempt a coherent historical narrative of "how we got here" without bothering to read the original sources. The problem is similar for both groups: pastry-makers posing as scholars convince others by the tastiness of their concoctions. The author concludes his book review:
I could multiply the dispiriting litany of errors, but it is more interesting to try to understand what drives these writers to parade their inadequacies in the marketplace. It is tempting to blame postmodernism, which has blurred the difference between drivel and truth; or the popularity of television-history, where no standards of veracity or scholarship apply; or the temptations aroused by vulgar sensationalists, who have made fortunes by proclaiming the peripeties of the Holy Grail and "proving" that the medieval Chinese discovered Rhode Island. I suspect, however, that the very virtues of my discipline are responsible for the vices of the writers who abuse it. Because history is the people's discipline, books about it are relatively salable—invitingly so, to indolent cupidity. History's accessibility to non-specialists makes it seem dangerously, delusively easy.
Academic historians tend to welcome recruits from other ranks, like owls nurturing cuckoos, and applaud the intrusions of neophytes with a glee that physicians, say, would never show for faith-healers or snake-oil salesmen. I am afraid it is time for historians to wipe the smiles from our jaws and start biting back. If escape from the poverty of your own imagination is your reason for exploiting the stories history offers, or if you are taking refuge from another discipline in the belief that history is easy, without bothering to do the basic work, you will deserve to fail.
--Felipe Fernández-Armesto
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