Project on the Formalitates.

 Claus Andersen (Leuven) has a website for his project on the formalites and the formalist tradition. There is a lot of useful information, including lists of manucripts and printed treatises on the formalities. 

The Discoverer of the Formalities

No one agrees about the origin of Scotus' formal distinction. Some say it is Bonaventure, others Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction, others put in the Franciscan thought after Bonaventure such as Olivi and Peter de Trabibus. One could also posit Aquinas as an origin, namely his discussion of rationes in his so-called Quaestio de attributis in  his Scriptum on the Sentences, itself influenced by Bonaventure. Finally, Bonetus in the 1340's famously attributes the origin to Aristotle.

Now we have a new contender:

While poking about in various manuscripts of Petrus Thomae's Quaestiones de modis distinctionum, I came across the following comment in the margin of question 7.

Hoc argumentum solvit egidius in de esse et essentia q. octava qui fuit inventor formalitatum (Munich, Bsb, Clm 26838, f. 34r, al. man.).

[For the Latin impaired: "Giles, who was the discoverer of the formalities, refutes this argument in his work on being and essence, question 8,"]

This is an annotation of the following argument:

Confirmatur, ista enim attributa sive formalitates ut distinctae, vel sunt aliquid et res vel nihil. Si sunt aliquid et res, propositum. Si nihil, ergo formalitates sunt nihileitates.

[It is confirmed, for those attributes or formalities as they are distinct are either something and a thing or nothing. If they are something and a thing, we have what we are trying to prove. If nothing, therefore the formalities are nothingnesses]. 

Egidius of course is Giles of Rome, who, depending on the decade, is either beloved or despised by Thomists. Thus we have a (quasi?) Thomist to add to the origin story of the formal distinction, which becomes less of a characteristically Scotist position but a tool made use of by a variety of scholastic thinkers.

More on Unitive Containment and the Formal Distinction

From the last volume of the Ordinatio, which has just arrived at my library. The segment here translated is from a question on the distinction between justice and mercy in God (the standard 12th c. examples, used, for example, by the Lombard). Here's a first stab at translation.

Ordinatio IV d. 46 q. 3 ad arg. princ. 4 (ed. Vat. XIV, 215-217):

To the second, it is said that mercy connotes something other than justice, although those two are unqualifiedly [simpliciter = realiter] the same as each other.

But against this: that connotation does not require some distinction of this kind from that as it is in itself, but only as it is understood [accipitur] and signified, because connotation is required for this. The argument, however, requires that there is some distinction between them [justice and mercy] as they are causes of distinct effects. Nor does the distinction of reason suffice for this, because a relation of reason is not that by which some effect is really made [efficitur], rather, generally, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in a cause, just as was proved in d. 13 of the first book. That distinction of effects depends essentially on a distinction in the cause, therefore that is not only one of reason.

I concede, therefore, to that argument that just as in God the intellect is not formally the will, nor contrariwise, although one is the same as the other by the truest identity of simplicity, so also justice is not formally the same as mercy or contrariwise. And according to this formal non-identity, that [= mercy] can be the proximate principle of some external [= extra] effect, of which the other [= justice] is not the principle, in the way in which just as if this and that [= mercy and justice] were two things [res] because to be a formal principle befalls each as it is formally such.

Contra: the divine esse is most actual, therefore it includes every divine perfection; but it would not include, if there were a formal distinction there, because everything distinct formally is there actually, and consequently, as distinct, it is there in act, and so the essence as distinct does not include every act. 

Again, if there are there real distinct formalities, therefore there are distinct realities there, and so distinct things [res]. Proof of the first consequence: because formality is distinct by its own reality.

To the first: the divine esse contains every actuality of the divine essence unitively. [Entities] are not contained unitively which are contained without all distinction, becuase union is not wihout all distinction; nor are they contained unitively which are contained as unqualifiedly [simpliciter] really distinct, because are contained in a multiple manner or separately [dispersim]. Therefore this term 'unitive' includes some distinction of the [entities] contained, which suffices for union, and nevertheless such a union which is repugnant toall composition and aggregation of the distinct [entities]. This can not be unless there be posited formal non-identity with real identity.

To the argument, therefore, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as formally the same, becaues then they would not be contained unitively.

To the second it can be said that as many formalities as are there, so many are there realities and things [res]; but each reality is only qualified [secundum quid], just as was shown there [Ord. I d. 13, according to the Vat. editors]. Otherwise, that consequence can be denied: 'many real formalities, therefore many realities', just as 'many divine persons, therefore many deities', is denied. But the first response is more real [realier]. 

What is a Formality IV: Franciscus de Mayronis

For the previous posts in the series, see Petrus Thomae, Antonius Andreas, Nicolaus Bonetus. Today I am translating a question from Francis of Meyronnes, the French Scotist known as the Princeps Scotistarum in later ages. I haven't looked much into his commentaries on the Sentences, but apparently there are some three versions. He initially lectured at Paris in 1320, [a bunch of stuff then happened, before, voila] a final version known as the Conflatus appeared and was later printed several times. He died ca. 1328. For more information see the "Franciscan authors" website. What follows is only a translation, as the question is too long to type out in Latin in full.

Conflatus I d. 8 q. 5 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 48vb-49ra):

...Therefore I say that some distinction between the formal rationes or formalities and realities must be posited necessarily, and not as between formality and formality but as between formality and intrinsic mode.

For the evidence of which it must be known first what a formality is, second what an intrinsic mode is.

As far as the first, 'what a formality is', some [people] say that 'formality' is said from 'form', just as materiality is said from matter. And therefore some [people] say that there cannot be many formalities without many forms, just as neither many materialities without many matters.

Against this: that is a very coarse[grossa] and asinine imagination, which is clear from two reasons. First thus: because just as formality is said from form, so 'essential' from 'essence'. We, however, posit in the divine being many essential features, and nevertheless there are not there many essences, as is clear expressly through Blessed Dionysius cap. 3 De unica et discreta theologia. Therefore neither does a multitude of forms follow upon the position of many formal rationes as you say.

Second, because in the person of the Father in the divine being are posited many personal features, namely ungenerated, paternity, active spiration, all of which are personal features and nevertheless the person of the Father is single(unica); therefore, etc.

Furthermore, many material things, according to the ones speaking commonly, are posited in one composite, namely many material accidents; and nevertheless many matters are not posited there; so in man many human features, not nevertheless unless one man.

Therefore others say that formalities are real rationes which are posited in the same simple thing.

Against this: first because formalities are not only posited in simple things but also in composites, according to the ones positing the formalities. Therefore that is not a good description. Second because not all formalities are real, for man in potency has a formality and nevertheless not a reality. Likewise beings of reason have formalities but not realities.

Therefore others say that those formalities are certain modalities.

Against this: for the ones positing them divide them against modes. Second because modes are not able to be first in beings, because a mode is always posterior to that of which it is a mode; but formalities are posited simply first in beings, for the ratio of entity is a certain formality and the ratio of deity, which  are absolutely prior to all others.

Therefore others say that formalities are definitive rationes, for the definitive ratio of each one is called formal and it is clear that it is a formality.

Against this doubly: first because the categories are not definable, becasue they are absolutely simple  and nevertheless they have formalities by which they are formally distinguished [from each other]. Second because the ratio of being and ratio of deity are posited as formalities and nevertheless they cannot be defined because every definition is given through prior [features, such as genus and difference]; but than these [categories] nothing is prior.

I say therefore that a formality is a quiddity of each thing haveing a quiddity whether it is definable or not, because the formal ratio of each thing is that which is present in [inest] it in the first mode of predicating per se; such however are all quidditative [features, aspects].

What is a Formality III: Nicolaus Bonetus

Bonetus was a French thinker who was active during the 1330s. He became a master of theology in 1333, and later organized and might have participated in an embassy to the great khan. He wrote numerous philosophical treatises, such as on natural theology and metaphysics. His Metaphysics, a selection of which is translated below, was the first systematic treatise on metaphysics ever written (unless of course you count Aristotle's as being systematic, disorganized as it is). That is, it is not a commentary on Aristotle, but an independent treatise starting with the foundations of metaphysics (for example, he starts in bk I with the discussion of what a science is and the definition of the terms 'univocity,' 'equivocity' and 'analogy'.  He is sometimes credited with being the first to articulate a distinction between general and special metaphysics (but in fact he is here following Francis of Marchia). From the following text we can conclude that he was a Scotist, even if he deviates from the verba ipsissima of the master, because he is using the basic vocabulary and distinctions devolped by Scotus.

Note: A scholar who works on Bonetus sent me an email correcting my punctuation, translation, and bio. So thanks are in order. It's always nice to know that when I post these translations of obscure Scotist texts that someone actually reads them!

Metaphysica III c. 3 (ed. Venezia 1505, f. 19vb-20ra):

Circa hunc terminum 'formalitas' vel 'quiditas' quod sit et quod non. Et quotiens dicuntur est insistendum. Omne illud est 'formalitas' vel 'quiditas' (quod idem est) quod additum alteri variat rationem formalem ipsius, scilicet constituti ex illo et altero cum additur, vel per se est inclusum in ratione formali alicuius. 

Ex primo sequitur quod omnes differentiae superiores et mediae et specificae spectant ad quiditatem, quia additae quidditati contrahibili variant rationem formalem constitutorum per illam, ut hominis et bruti. Ex hoc sequitur quod differentiae individuales non sunt quiditates nec formalitates, cum non varient rationem formalem per illas constitutorum, immo constituta per illas sunt eiusdem rationis et speciei.

Ex secundo sequitur quod omne contrahibile per se per differentiam aliquam cum qua facit per se unum est quiditas vel formalitas, ut prima quidditas et primum contrahibile et prima omnino formalitas sit ens in quantum ens, deinde praedicamenta et sic descendendo usque ad speciem specialissimam, que est ultima quiditas per se includens omnes superiores in linea predicamentali.

Translation:

...everything is a 'formality' (or a 'quiddity', which means the same) that either: 1)  when it (a) is added to another (b), it (a) changes the formal description [ratio] of it, that is, of what is constituted from that thing (a) and that other thing (b) when (a) is added to (b); or 2) is per se included in the formal description of something.

From 1) it follows that all superior, middle and specific differences pertain to the quiddity, because when they are added to a contractible quiddity they alter the formal description of what it constitutes, such as of 'human being' or 'beast'. From this it follows that individual differences are neither quiddities nor formalities, since they do not alter the formal description of the things  they constitute, rather the things  they constitute have the same description and species.

From 2) it follows that everything that is per se contractible by some difference with which it makes a per se unity is a quiddity or formality, as the first quiddity and the first contractible and the absolutely first formality is being qua being, and then the categories, and so descending until the most specific species, which is the final quiddity including per se all the quiddities above it in the predicamental line (or sequence).

Against the Real Distinction of Essence and Existence

In what follows I post some arguments against the real distinction of the Thomists by the super-famous thinker Himbertus de Garda. They are from a fascinating article that I have been meaning to do a post on, as it is full of material to delight both loremasters and the most hard-headed of philosophers. Here's the citation: William Duba, Christopher Schabel,  "Ni chose, ni non-chose: The Sentences-Commentary of Hibertus de Garda, OFM," Bulletin de Philosophie medievale 53 (2011), 149-232

Reminder of the meanings of the terms:

A distinctio ex natura rei is any distinction obtaining apart from the activity of the intellect, including the divine intellect.

A distinctio realis (or distincta realiter) is a distinction between entities that can exist without each other. Probably a subset of the ex natura rei distinction. Sometimes, as in the case of body and soul, only one of the items can exist without the other.

A distinctio formalis obtains ex natura rei but the items so distinguished (definitions, quiddities, formalities, parts of definitions, etc.) are not separable.

Ratio: probably here means definition, or a formal nature.

From Himbertus, Rep IA d. 36 a. 2 (ed D-S, 199-200):

There is a second mode of speaking, which is of our Doctor [=Scotus], that essence and actual existence are not really distinguished. Which is proved thus: whenever some things are really distinct, and one descends from the other, if that which descends is real, then that which remains will be real, as is clear regarding whiteness in a wall; but actual existence descends from essence, and essence remains,  and nevertheless is not real; therefore they are not really distinguished.

The second argument: if essence and actual existence are really distinguished, essence will actually exist without actual existence, because whenever some things differ really, one is able to be [esse] without the other; but essence is not able to actually exist without actual existence; therefore they are really the same.

Here are two doubts. It is said that essence is distinguished from actual existence: is it distinguished formally? I say that it is not, because when some things have the same definitional and quidditative ratio, they are the same formally; but essence and actual existence have the same definitional and quidditative ratio; therefore they are the same formally. The major premise is proved, for the formal ratio is taken from the definitional and quidditative ratio. The minor premise is also clear, because neither something else nor a new quiddity is acquired through actual existence.

Second thus: that which does not vary the formal ratio of something does not differ formally from that which it does not vary; but actual existence does not vary the formal ratio of essence; therefore it does not differ formally from it.

The second doubt is if essence and actual existence are distinguished ex natura rei. I say that they are, because whenever it is the case that something befalls one which does not befall the other, those are distinguished ex natura rei, if it befalls them ex natura rei; but it befalls essence that it is not in act, but in potency, and [it befalls] actual existence that it is in act; therefore they are distinguished ex natura rei.

Again, it befalls essence that it is indifferent to being and non being; but actual existence is not indifferent, because it is in act. Whence I say that actual existence and essence are the same really.

What is a Formality II: Antonius Andreas

For Part 1, see here.

Today we are going to look at what Antonius Andreas has to say about the matter. Antonius was from Aragon-Catalonia, might have studied a Paris (though there is no evidence of this), and taught at Monzon and Lerida in Catalonia.  He wrote numerous  commentaries on Aristotle from a  scotistic point of view and was dead by the 1330's.

Oddly, the same text of the definition in Assisi 668 has "subiectalis" rather than "obiectalis".

Antonius Andreas, QQ. in Met. IV q. 2 a. 1 (ed.  ?, unfoliated)

Utrum negatio habeat distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione cui opponitur.

Quantum ad primum, primo premittam rationem ‘formalitatis’ quam describo sic: formalitas est ratio obiectalis in re apprehensa ab intellectu ex natura rei quam non oportet semper movere intellectum dummodo actum intellectus possit terminare.

Quod dico pro tanto quia licet aliquid posset terminare actum intellectus, non tamen semper potest intellectum ad sui intellectionem movere, sicut communiter dicitur quod relationes non movent intellectum ratione dependentie et quia non sunt aliquod absolutum, et tamen terminant actum intellectus. Similiter proprietates individuales ex eo quod non habent rationem quid, ideo non movent intellectum et tamen terminant actum eius. Similiter(?) negationes terminant licet non moveant intellectum quatenus non sunt entia, ita(?) per(?) tria(?) requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquod moveat intellectum: primum quod sit ens, secundum quod sit absolutum, tertium quod habeat rationem quid vel essentie. Propter primum removentur negationes, propter secundum relationes, propter tertium omnis proprietas ypostatica vel proprietas personalis in divinis et | proprietates individuales, que omnia licet actum intellectus terminent, non tamen movent intellectum.

Ex ista descriptione concludo correlarie quod quecumque possunt distincte concipi per intellectum habent distinctas formalitates ex natura rei.

Translation:

Whether a negation has a formality distinct from that to which it is opposed

As far as the first article is concerned, first I premise the definition of "formality", which I describe thus: A formality is an objective ratio in a thing apprehended by the intellect from the nature of the thing, which it is not necessary to always move the intellect, provided that it can terminate the act of the intellect.

I say this for the reason that although something could terminate the act of the intellect, nevertheless it is not always able to move the intellect to the intellection of it, just as commonly is said that relations don't move the intellect by a notion of dependence, and because they are not something absolute, and nevertheless they terminate the act of the intellect. Likewise individual properties from this that they do not have the notion of a 'what', therefore they do not move the intellect and nevertheless they terminate its act.  Likewise negations terminate [the act of the intellect], although they do not move the intellect, because they are not beings.  To clarify this, it should be known that three things are required for something to move the intellect: first that it is a being, second that it is absolute, third that it has the notion of a 'what' or an essence.  On account of the first negations are removed, relations on account of the second, on account of the third every hypostatic property or personal property in the divine and individual properties, all of which, although they terminate the act of the intellect, nevertheless do not move the intellect.

From that description I conclude as a corollary that whatever can be conceived distinctly by the intellect has distinct formalities from its nature.

[recall that for Scotus, "ex natura rei" means "prior to the operation of the intellect", so "real"].

Points of Disagreement between Scotists and Thomists

In 1320 there was a debate between two bachelors of theology at Paris, the Franciscan Francis of Meyronnes and the Cistercian Peter Roger, later Pope Clement V.  These two bachelors acted as the representatives of the nascent schools of Thomism and Scotism, and their debate was about the formal distinction and the instants/signa of origin and nature. For those interested in reading more, the dispute has been edited (mostly; at least one ms. was missed) and published by J. Vrin for a reasonable price under the title of Disputatio.  The section I translate here is from Francis of Meyronnes list of four points about the formal distinction that were commonly attacked at the time.

Francois de Meyronnes - Pierre Roger, Disputio (1320-1321), ed. J. Barbet, p. 102:

From those statements follow four conclusions in which our school is accustomed to be attacked.

The first is that one must grant some middle distinction between a real distinction and a distinction of reason fabricated by the soul, because that is a medium between some things that is related by the denial of each extreme; that distinction, however, is not posited as being real nor fabricated by the soul.

The second conclusion: that not every distinction outside the soul is real, since those distinctions are posited, with every act of the intellect circumscribed, and nevertheless they are called real. [Perhaps the "those" is a reference to the distinction between essence and relation in God].

The third conclusion: that in one reality can be found many formal rationes, because a formal ratio and a definitive [ratio] are the same and from this part, although there is only one thing [res], there are many formal or definitive rationes.

The fourth conclusion is that formal rationes are able to agree in one distinctly without any composition, because that one [Petrus Rogerius] concedes that a [combination of] likeness with whiteness causes no composition, although they have distinct quidditative rationes.

Divine Simplicity II: Divine Attributes

This post covers another aspect of divine simplicity, namely, how it can be reconciled with a plurality of divine attributes. This problem itself is an expression of the more general problem of the relation between divine transcendence and human language. Divine simplicity is one way to ensure that God is unlike everything in the created world, for it is, after all, a negative doctrine: God is not composed, does not have parts, etc.

The scholastics came up with three solutions to the problem. The first was largely semantic. God is so transcendent and ineffable that he cannot be grasped by human thought or captured by human language. Divine attributes, such as wisdom and justice, are all one in God; when these are predicated of God, they signify primarily the divine essence as one. But there is also a secondary sense of these terms, which connotes the created realm as an effect of God. Only in the second sense are they considered distinct. Most of the twelfth-century thinkers held this view, and it was revived by Ockham and Auriol in the fourteenth century.

The second solution was primarily concerned with elaborating the role of the human intellect. Divine attributes are distinct only as a result of the operation of the intellect (that there are divine attributes is generally assumed based on the Dionysian via eminentiae). The intellect is too weak on its own in its present state to directly grasp God, so it requires a plurality of concepts. This plurality of concepts corresponds to the plurality of attributes. This second solution was authored by Bonaventure and Aquinas; or, more accurately, Bonaventure sketched it out and Aquinas developed it more fully. But he could never make up his mind about it, and one of his students that held one of his views was secretly investigated, and in general, Aquinas' changing views caused lots of problems for his would-be followers (such as, what "causes" the attributes, how can the divine essence be the fundamentum in re, is a "ratio" just a concept in the human mind or does it have an objective correlate in God?). So we will omit any further discussion of Aquinas. And in any case, Aquinas is irrelevant for understanding Scotus on this issue.

The relevant thinkers are Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines (and, to a lesser extent, Thomas of Sutton). Henry has very complicated views on attributes, and they probably do a lot more work in his system than any other medieval thinker I know. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that Henry had a view regarding the origin of the attributes similar to Scotus' theory of instants of nature (see all the posts labeled "intelligible being"). Henry basically applies the three acts of the intellect from the Aristotelian commentary tradition to God. So we have an instant of simple apprehension in which the divine intellect apprehends the divine essence as one simple thing or one simple nature. But "then" it starts to reason about the essence, and by doing this it generates the attributes (attribute=divine essence+ratio from the intellect). However, and this is important, it does not generate the will, even though it is a sine qua non cause of volitional acts. So in the third instant the will is actualized and begins to go through its own series of movements. In the end we have then two fundamental attributes that cannot be reduced to each other, and all other divine attributes are ordered to one of these primary attributes (incidentally, intellect and will serve as the principles for the emanation of the divine persons, but visit the "Henry of Ghent" blog for more on this).

Godfrey of Fontaines thought all this was bullcrap, and instead extended Aquinas' views on divine ideas to help out the problem of attributes. Basically, ignoring his arguments against Henry, Godfrey thinks that God can compare the divine essence to any creature, and since he is omniscient, and because creatures imitate the divine essence in various ways (hence the multiplicity of perfections that are attributed to God), God can compare his essence to the contents of the human mind and see that the human mind, because of its weakness, sees a plurality of attributes in God. So the distinction of attributes is not really in God at all, just the human mind, but God does know that in a derivative sense he has attributes. So in the end, Godfrey cannot avoid positing some movement in divinis either. [this is not entirely accurate, but I don't want to reread either Godfrey or that chapter of my diss.]

We turn now to Scotus. As is probably well known now to all readers of this blog, Scotus has two commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a Lectura and an Ordinatio, as well as a series of student reports, Reportationes, the most trusty of which seems to be the one labeled I-A. In the first two commentaries, Scotus’ discussion of divine attributes is in d. 8 q. 4 in Reportatio I-A, although the doctrine is the same (save more possible variations regarding the formal distinction), the discussion of it has migrated to d. 45, which is about the divine will. Consequently, I will focus here on the Ordinatio. I do recommend reading the Reportatio, however, for it adds the notion of the propositio famosa, which holds that whatever is distinct in reason can be treated as if it were really distinct; Scotus uses this principle to help him escape from objections to his views based on the identity of indiscernables (as Scotus puts it, if a is the same as c and b is the same as c, then a is the same as b).

The basic point that Scotus argues is that the attributes are distinct prior to or apart from any operation of the intellect, whether the intellect in question is divine, human, or angelic. To start off, in the solution of d.8 q.4 Scotus accepts that there are distinctions of reason in God, as well as distinct formal objects, that is, between different modes of conceiving the same object. This suffices for distinctions between say ‘wise’ and ‘wisdom’, but not between entities like wisdom and truth. This is because God knows the divine essence intuitively (see here for intuitive cognition), and can only find these entities in the essence; he does not cause them by means of his intellect. Here is the argument to this effect:

Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 257):

“Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto – sive sit distinctiorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus – sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia ‘ut relationem rationis’, ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.”

Translation:
"Furthermore, an intuitive understanding has no distinction in an object except according as it is existing, because just as it does not know some object save as existing, so it does not know something to be formally distinct in the object unless as it is existing. Since therefore the divine intellect does not know its essence except by an intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether it is of distinct formal objects or as definitions caused by the act of the intellect – it follows that that distinction will be in the object as it is existing in act; and so if that is of formally distinct objects in the object, they will be formally distinct (and then the matter at hand follows, that such a distinction of formal objets precedes the act of the intellect), if however it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, therefore the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence, as a relation of reason, as it is existing, which seems absurd."

The result of this is that there is a distinction preceding the operation of an intellect, such that wisdom is in God and goodness is in God, but wisdom in God is not formally goodness in God. Scotus thinks he has an argument that proves this.

Ord. I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 n. 192 (ed. Vat. IV, 261)
Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi. Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen ‘gradus’ est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter ‘ut in communi, in communi’, nec ‘ut infinitum, infinitum’.

Translation:
"This is proved: because if infinite wisdom would be formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common. For infinity does not destroy the formal ratio of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which grade, nevertheless, is a grade of that perfection), the formal ratio of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, so if it [wisdom], as in common, does not formally include [goodness] in common, neither [will wisdom] as infinite [include goodness] as infinite."

This is a pretty compressed argument, and I’m not at all sure what’s going on at the end. This is the clear part:

If infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be formally goodness in common.

The likely interpretation of this is that Scotus has in mind his doctrine of ultimate abstraction from Lec./Ord. I d. 5. According to this notion, the mind can perform a series of abstractions from a material object and ultimately arrive at a pure quiddity or definition. With this in mind, the argument means that if wisdom and justice, qua infinite, are the same, then at the level of pure abstraction (that is, with infinity having been abstracted) wisdom and justice must also be the same. Scotus takes this to be false, and the remainder of the quoted passage supports the claim that infinity does not alter the definition of something, in this case, a pure perfection.

Scotus follows this argument with further considerations on what if means to be formally included in the definition of something:

Ordinatio I d. 8 pt. 1 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 261-62)

Hoc declaro, quia ‘includere formaliter’ est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaretur, inclusum esset definitio vel pars definitionis; sicut autem definitio bonitatis in communi non habet in se sapientiam, ita nec infinita infinitam: est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles. Definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatum ab intellectu, sed quiditatem rei: est ergo non-identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens istam ‘sapientia non est formaliter bonitas’, non causat actu suo collativo veritatem hiuius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione fit actus verus.

Translation:
I declare this, because ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential definition, so that if a definition of the including could be assigned, the included would be a definition or part of a definition; just as the definition of goodness in common does not contain wisdom, so neither [does the definition of] infinite [goodness contain the definition of] infinite [wisdom]. Therefore there is some formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness, insofar as they would have distinct definitions, if they were definable. A definition, however, does not only indicate the notion/definition caused by the intellect, but the quiddity of the thing. Therefore there is formal non-identity form the side of the thing, and I understand this in such a way that the intellect composing that proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not cause the truth of the proposition by its own comparative act, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the composition of which the act is made true."

The basic idea here is that none of the divine attributes include each other in their definitions or parts of definitions, and this is true apart from any operation of the intellect.

So there you have it. The attributes are distinct ex natura rei (which means they are distinct prior to the operation of any intellect, human or divine), a distinction that is formal (the formal distinction is doing most of the work here, so see the relevant post). In God the attributes all exist under the extrinsic mode of infinity, which safeguards divine simplicity (for more on infinity see the ‘natural knowledge of God’ post in this series). When ultimate abstraction is performed, the intellect discovers that these attributes are distinct because none of them fall into the definitions of the others.

Formal Distinction

The Formal Distinction, of course, is not a “fundamental position” in the sense employed by the other posts in this series. It is a tool rather than a doctrine, though it does have its own set of arguments designed to show its necessity. It is fundamental in the sense that it is part of Scotus’ solution to a variety of problems in both theology (relation of personal properties, divine attributes, and so on, to the divine essence) and philosophy (the relation of being to the other transcendentals, discussions of universals and particulars). Consequently, prior to examining these issues we must lay out what Scotus thinks the formal distinction is.

It is well-known that there were three sorts of distinctions developed by the scholastics. The first is the distinction of reason, or logical distinction; this is a distinction generated by the intellect, is not based on anything outside the intellect in the world; though the scholastics use it a great deal, they don’t have much to say on its nature. It posits the least degree of distinction in the entities to be distinguished, a difference only in thought. In later scholasticism, in reaction to Scotus, it was differentiated into a distinction of reason-reasoning and reason-reasoned but this desperate Thomist move need not concern us here.

There is also the real distinction, which was also used by everyone but very little was done to define it. Aquinas posited this between essence and existence, for example, though he arrived at it by arguing from a distinction concepts (see De ente), and never bothered to define it. After Aquinas, it became common to distinguish this distinction from the rational distinction by what is today called the “separability criterion”; according to this, two things are really distinct if they are separable and one can exist without the other (for example, the body and soul). I don’t know who first used this criterion; generally Giles of Rome is blamed by those Thomists particularly obsessed with detailing the precise stages of decline away from Aquinas. It is also found in Godfrey of Fontaines, Scotus and later fourteenth-century philosophy (note that I have made no great search for it). This is not the only version of the real distinction, however, for Thomas of Sutton interprets it as having distinct beings (res) in act, as well as any distinction not caused by the intellect.

There were also various versions of what is often called a “middle distinction” a distinction supposed to be half-way between the mind and reality. Generally, most theologians in the thirteenth-century used them, and often attacked other versions of them for violating the principle of excluded middle. A classic example can be found in Bonaventure, and Aquinas employed one early in his career as well. For Aquinas, this was the celebrated distinction in the mind with a fundamentum in re, in which entities were potentially distinct in the world but rendered actually distinct by the “completive” action of the intellect (ratio completiva). This distinction was somewhat popular, adopted by even non-thomists such as Henry of Ghent, who also authored a “middle-distinction” which he called an “intentional distinction” .

Anyway, the point of all this is to make it clear that while there are “general” notions or theories of distinction with common terms to describe them, often individual authors have their own ideosynchratic theories. So one has to be careful not to simply quote Scotus and then view him refuted by Thomas of Sutton simply because the latter rejects a “real distinction”

Turning to Scotus, we find that he also employes the rational and real distinctions, as well as the formal. It is a matter of dispute whether the formal distinction is a middle distinction or a real distinction. I myself am on the real distinction side, as will become clear, but the topic was disputed during the medieval period, and still disputed today. The contemporary form of the dispute is whether Scotus changed his mind at Paris and mitigated the reality of the distinction, or did not. However, a great deal seems to hang not on what Scotus actually said but in what order he is thought to have said it. That is, different conclusions about the distinction are often reached by holding a different chronology of Scotus’ works. Most of the “Scotus changed his mind” crowd hold to Balic’s (the father of the modern Vatican critical edition) claim that the Ordinatio is the last work of Scotus, and should be the ultimate and final arbiter of any apparent contradictions, and is equivalent to the Summa of Aquinas. This then leaves the chronology as Lectura-Reportatio-Ordinatio. The opposition has a different view, which runs Lectura-Ordinatio-Reportatio+further additions to primative text of Ordinatio. I will say no more about this controversy, and the interested reader can consult Hoffmann’s bibliography (see the sidebar) under the names: Hester Gelber, Marilyn Adams, Michael Jordan, Richard Cross, Stephen D. Dumont.

The obvious division based on differences in terminology is between the Ordinatio/Lectura and the Reportatio. A common observation that appears to be true is that at Oxford Scotus spoke of entities, formalitates that were distinct, while at Paris he focused rather on the distinction itself rather than on what was being distinguished (though, as is apparent from the Quaestio de formalitatibus and other passages of the Reportatio, the formalitates are still present).

The basic division of distinctions for Scotus is between those caused by the mind and those independent of the mind. Distinctions independent of the mind he calls distinctions ex natura rei. This includes the real distinction, which he calls a distinctio realis-actualis and devotes little space to the examination of it, and the formal distinction. The real distinction is distinguished from the formal distinction by real separability. Items distinguished by a real distinction can exist independently of each other, while for the formal distinction this is not the case; they are inseparably united.

Texts:

Ordinatio II d. 1 q. 4-5 (ed. Vat. VII, 101-103):
“...nihil est idem realiter alicui, sine quo potest esse realiter absque contradictione... Hanc etiam propositionem ‘illa sunt distincta realiter quorum unum potest manere sine altero’, negaret protervus. Ista autem negata, perit tota doctrina Philosophi VII Topicorum...”	... nothing is really the same as something, without which it can really be without contradiction... a reckless person might deny this proposition also, ‘those things are really distinct of which one can remain without the other’. With that denied, however, the doctrine of Aristotle in VII Topics is destroyed.
Ordinatio II d. 3 pars 1 q. 2 (ed. Vat. VII, 198):
“Accipio igitur quod nihil potest concludi ‘distinctum ab alio’ nisi vel propter separationem actualem, vel potentialem, vel propter proportionem istorum ad aliqua alia quorum alterum est ab alterio separabile.”	I hold therefore that nothing can be distinct from another unless either because of actual separation, or potential, or because of the proportion of those things to some other of each one is separable from the other.
Ordinatio I d. 2 pars 2 q. 1-4 (ed. Vat. II, 355):
“Sed numquid haec distinctio dicetur realis? Respondeo: non est realis actualis, intelligendo sicut communiter dicitur, ‘differentia realis actualis’ illa quae est differentia rerum et in actu... et sicut non est realis actualis, ita non est realis potentialis...”	But should this distinction be called real? I answer: it is not real-actual, meaning by this as is commonly held a real-actual difference, that which is a difference of things and in act... and just as it is not real-actual, so it is not real-potential.
ibid. (350):
“Et intelligo sic ‘realiter’, quod nullo modo per actum intellectus considerantis, immo quod talis entitas esset ibi si nullus intellectus esset considerans; et sic esse ibi, si nullus intellectus consideraret, dico ‘esse ante omnem actum intellectus’.”	And I interpret the term ‘really’ as in no way by the act of the intellect considering, indeed that such an entity would be there if no intellect would be considering. And so to be there, if no intellect would consider I call ‘to be before every act of the intellect’.
Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IV q. 2, edited by Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), 354-355:
Ideo quaelibet potest dici pars perfectionis, non tamen realiter differens quod sit alia natura, sed alia perfectio realis – alietate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantum intelligimus cum dicimus ‘diversae res’; sed differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu... Exemplum huius aliquale in continuo, in quo sunt multae partes; ista multitudo est realis, sic quod non causata a ratione. Non tamen tanta quantam hic intelligimus ‘diversae res’, sed minor realis, quia multitudo non simpliciter diversorum in uno tamen toto contentorum.”	Therefore whatever can be called a part of perfection, nevertheless no really differens as it is another nature, but another real perfection – by an otherness, I say, not caused by the intellect, nor of the kind that we understand when we say ‘diverse things’; but by a real-minor difference, if a real difference be called every difference not caused by the intellect... An example of this is of the continuum, in which there are many parts; that multitude is real, such that it is not caused by reason. Nevertheless we do not here understand ‘diverse things’ but a minor-real, because a multitude not simply of diverse things contained in one total.
Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII q. 19 (Opera Philosophica IV, 370):
“Alia est opinio... Sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum; media naturarum in uno supposito; minima diversarum perfectionum sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum in una natura.”	There is another opinion... but a real difference is posited to have grades. For it is most of all of natures and supposits; medium of natures in one supposit; least of all of diverse perfections or perfectinal definitions unitively contained in one nature.

As for their correlatives, real and formal identity, Scotus sees the highest form of identity as being formal identity. This the identity of sharing the same definition. The second highest is real identity.

Texts:

Ordinatio I d. 2 pars 2 q. 1-4 (ed. Vat. II, 356):

“...possumus invenire in unitate multos gradus – primo, minima est aggregationis; in secundo gradu est unitas ordinis, quae aliquid addit supra aggregationem; in tertio est unitas per accidens, ubi ultra ordinem est informatio, licet accidentalis, unius ab altero eorum quae sunt sic unum; in quarto est per se unitas compositi ex principiis essentialibus per se actu et per se potentia; in quinto est unitas simplicitatis, quae est vere identitas (quidquid enim est ibi, est realiter idem cuilibet, et non tantum est unum illi unitate unionis, sicut in aliis modis) – ita, adhuc ultra, non omnis identitas est formalis. Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditativa et per se primo modo.”

We can find many grades in unity: first, the least is that of aggregation. In the second grade is unity of order, which adds [order] over aggregation. The third is accidental unity, where beyond order there is [an] informing, although it is accidental, of one from another which are thus one. In the fourth is the per se unity of a composite [composed] from essential principles per se in act and per se in potency. In the fifth is unity of simplicity, which is truly identity (for whatever is there is really the same to any other, and not only is it one by the unity of that union, as is the case in the other modes); so still beyond this [real unity of simplicity], not every identity is formal. I call however formal identity where that which is said to be the same includes that to which it is the same in its formal-quidditative definition per say in the first mode [of per se predication; this means to predicate a definition or part of a definition].

Here we find that real identity is equivalent to simplicity, which is “true”identity. Beyond this however is formal identity. consequently, simplicity/real identity is compatibile with formal non identity (= formal distinction).

An argument based on intuitive cognition that was to prove influential shows how Scotus arrives at the formal distinction; this also illustrates his practice of referring to entities that are formally distinct:

Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 4 (ed. Vat. IV, 257):

“Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto – sive sit distinctiorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus – sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia ‘ut relationem rationis’, ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.”

Furthermore, an intuitive understanding has no distinction in an object except according as it is existning, because just as it does not know some object save as existing, so it does not know something to be formally distinct in the object unless as it is existing. Since therefore the divine intellect does not know its essence except by an intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether it is of distinct formal objects or as definitions caused by the act of the intellect – it follows that that distinction will be in the object as it is existing in act; and so if that is of formally distinct objects in the object, they will be formally distinct (and then the matter at hand follows, that such a distinction of formal objets precedes the act of the intellect), if however it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, therefore the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence, as a relation of reason, as it is existing, which seems absurd.

To boil this down:

1.intuitive cognition, which is cognition of the object as present, causes no distinction in the object being cognized.

2. Since the divine intellect knows the divine essence by intuitive cognition, any distinction (whether of diverse formal objects or definitions caused by the intellect) posited in the divine essence will be in the essence as it is existing in act.

3. If the distinction is of distinct formal objects, then Scotus has what he is trying to prove, a formal distinction.

4. If it is of definitions caused by the act of understanding, then the divine intellect will cause intellection in the essence, which is absurd.

At Paris the basic organization of distinctions is into distinctions that are simpliciter, that is, absolute or unqualified, or secundum quid. Under the secundum quid distinction falls both the formal distinction and another distinction called adequate non-identity (for situations in which one of the distinguenda exceeds the other). The difference between the two classes of distinctions is in a series of four conditions. All four are required for a distinctio simpliciter, while only the first three are required for a distinction secundum quid.

Reportatio I-A d. 33 q. 2 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov II, 328):

“...ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distinguantur, quattuor requiruntur condiciones. Prima est quod sit aliquorum in actu et non in potentia tantum, — quomodo distinguuntur ea quae sunt in potentia in materia et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu. Secunda est quod est eorum quae habent esse formale et non tantum virtuale, — ut effectus sunt in sua causa virtualiter et non formaliter. Tertia condicio est quod est eorum quae non habent esse confusum (ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto), sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualibus. Quarta condicio, quae sola est completiva distinctionis perfectae, est non-identitas...”

For this that something is distinguished simpliciter, for conditions are required. The first is that it is of things in act and not in potentcy only, in the way in which those things are distinguished which are in potency in matter and not simpliciter, because they are not in act. The second is that it is of those which have formal being and not only virtual, as an effect is in its cause virtually and not formally. The third condition is that it is of those which do not have confused beng, as the extremes in a medium and mixable in the mixted, but of those which have distinct being by their own actuals(?). The fourth condition, which alone completes perfect distinction, is non identity.

The terminology of this distinction appears to come from discussions of fallacies, especially the fallacious move from secundum quid to simpliciter. This is a common fallacy treated by numerous medieval logicians. The ‘secundum quid’ is a determinatio deminuens, a determination that once applied diminishes the reality of what it is applied to.

To sum up:

There are basically two versions of the formal distinction, corresponding to Scotus’ Oxford and Parisian periods. In the Oxford version entities are formally distinct if they are found in a third thing inseparably united but really identical. This distinction obtains apart from any cognitive activity on the part of God or creatures, even when the subject of the distinction is God. At Paris Scotus is more interested in discussing the reality of the distinction itself, which he says is a diminished distinction, not a fully distinct or fully actual distinction. He sets out a series of conditions for an unqualified distinction, and if the last is not met there is only a qualified distinction present (the other features of the Oxford account, such as obtaining prior to the operation of the intellect, hold true of Paris as well).

Hugo de Novo Castro on the Threefold Distinction

Hugo was another Parisian Scotist, who got his degree sometime in the 1310's. He also took a doctorite in law. Enjoy the following quote, which I mostly post to keep somewhere for when I need it 15 years down the road.

Hugo de Novo Castro, I Sent. d. 9 q. 1 ad 4 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15864, f. 14vb)

Ad quartam dico quod relatio ex se non est infinita ex propria ratione set si est infinita, hoc est propter ydemptitatem cum essentia. In creaturis enim videmus triplicem distinctionem. Una est rei et rei et voco hec rem sive suppositum individuum sive partes reales individuum ut facit(?) materia et forma sive substantialis sive accidentalis. Alia est distintio in eadem re realitatis et realitatis parcialis. Voco autem hic realitatem parcialem perfectionem formalem limitatam extra intellectum in eadem re simplici ut in albedine ubi extra omnem intellectum perfectio coloris et albedinis distinguitur et hoc vocatur(?) ab aliis distinctio perfectionis intentionis et illa distinctio est in omni re citra primum quia in omni re citra primum est distinctio generis et differentie sicut patet de sensitivo et intellectivo in homine que quantumcumque essent in eadem re simplici cum dicunt perfectiones distinctas realiter. Tertia distinctio est non rei et rei nec realitatis et realitatis sed modi et modi realis quam quidem aliqui vocant distinctionem rationis realis. In Deo autem numquam est prima distinctio nec secunda propter infinitatem omnium perfectionum...

To the fourth I say that a relation is not of itself infinite from its definition, but if it is infinite, this is because of its identity with the essence. For in creatures there is a triple distinction. One is of thing and thing, and I cal this thing or individual supposit or real individual parts, such as mater and form, or substantial and accidental (parts). Another is a distinction in the same thing of reality and partial reality. I here call a partial reality a formal, limited, perfection outside the intellect in the same simple thing as is the case with whiteness, where outside of all intellectual operation the perfection of color and whiteness is distinguished. And this is called by others a distinction of perfection-intention, and that distinction is in every thing beneath the first, because in everything beneath the first there is a distinction of genus and difference, just as is clear concerning the sensitive and intellective (parts) in man, howsoever they are found in the same simple thing since they are really distinct perfections. The third distinction is not of thing and thing nor of reality and reality but of mode and real mode, which some call the distinction of real reason. In God however are found neither the first nor the second distinction, on account of the infinity of all perfections...

Franciscus de Mayronis, De quatuor signis naturae

This post will be continually updated as I transcribe this treatise of Francis of Meyronnes and as Michael translates it. In this particular redaction it is followed by an abbreviation of Petrus Thomae's De distinctione praedicamentorum redaction A. In the Krakow ms. it is attributed to Petrus Thomae, though this is clearly incorrect.

The treatise is also contained in the following mss. according to O. Weijers ["le travail intellectuel... textes et maitries" vol. 2 p. 98] and various others such as the Hannes Mohle and the Scotist commission:

Bologna, Archig. lat. 96 f. 80v

Erfurt, Amploniana, F 94 ff. 236-238

Krakow, BJ, Cod. 2130, ff. 1ra-4vb(?)

Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, I 148 inf.

Oxford, Bodleian library, Canon. Misc. 371 f. 236

Oxford, Merton College Library, Ms. 260, ff. 60r-61v

Praha, KMK, Ms. 1439, ff. 1-10

[Franciscus de Mayronis, De quatuor signis naturae]

K= Krakow, Bib. Jag., Ms. 2130

In creatura sunt quatuor signa principalia. Primum signum est quidditas.
Quidditas enim habet 7 signa que per ordinem hic assignantur: primum est ens, secundum absolutum, tertium est substantia, quartum corpus, quintum corpus animatum, sextum animal, septimum homo.

Secundum signum creature est modus intrinsecus qui distinguitur tam a formalitate cuius est modus quam a formalitate eius que non variat rationem formalem. Modus intrinsecus habet septem signa: primum est realitas, secundum est existentia, tertium est actualitas, quartum est contingentia, quintum est finitas, 6 est vita, 7 est heceitas.

Tertium signum principale creature est per se passionum et corrucorrespondet(?) primo signo nature, ideo tot habet signa quia de quolibet est aliqua passio ut patet intuenti. Passio habet 7 signa. In primo signo sunt passiones entis. In secundo signo sunt passiones modorum intrinsecorum. In tertio gna^o4(?). In quarto passiones subiectorum. In sexto passiones mediorum proximorum vel propinquorum. In alio passiones specialissimorum.

Quartum signum principale nature est eorum que accidentaliter insunt rei. Et istud distinguitur in novem signa secundum quod sunt novem predicamenta accidentium eorum que accidentaliter insunt rei. Primum est relatio, secundum quantitas, tertium ubi, quartum quando, quintum situs, 6 actio, septima passio, 8 qualitas, nonum habitus.

Primum signum est entitas que habet passiones quarum alique sunt modi intrinseci. Alie sunt divisiones et passiones sunt quidem(?) scilicet veritas, bonitas, unitas, realitas, aliqualitas; realitas est passio et modus intrinsecus entis. Divisiones autem sunt iste: prima est per respectivum et absolutum. Secunda est per potenciam et actum. Tertia est per dependens et independens. Quarta est per creatum et increatum. Quinta est per finitum et infinitum. 6 est per decem predicamenta. | [K 1rb]

Iste sunt distinctiones quia arguunt distinctas seu diversas realitates et inter diversas realitates oritur distinctio realis.

Secunda est quidditas sci3(?) absolutum habet suas passiones que de ipsa concluduntur demonstrative nam omnes entitates absolute(iter. K) concluduntur de suo subiecto passio autem absoluti est esse a se passio respectivi est esse ad aliud passio autem concluditur de suo subiecto sicut omnis entitas absoluta est ad se absolutum autem est quedam entitas absoluta ergo absolutum est a se idem dico per contrarium(?) de relativo.

Tertia quidditas sci3(?) substantia habet passiones suas que de se ipsa cooncluduntur demonstrative per conceptum superiorem si subiectum non habet diffinitionem ideo passio primo concluditur de ipsa per conceptum superiorem.

Quarta quidditas est corpus de quo passio eius concluditur eodem modo sicut dictum est de aliis quidditatibus et ceteris inferioribus.

Quinta quidditas est corpus animatum et habet passiones suas que de ipso concluduntur demonstrative nam omnis passio concluditur de suo subiecto demonstrative.

Sexta quidditas est animatis et habet passiones suas que de ipso concluduntur demonstrative

[7 quidditas i.m. K]

Secundum signum principale est modorum intrinsecorum qui(?) in septem signa distinguitur. In primo est realitas de quo primo est notandum quod realitas est fundamentum immediatum realis distinctionis nam inter duas formalitates semper cadit distinctio formalis sicut inter duas realtates distinctio realis. Nota quod inter modos intrinsecos creature realitas est communior quia in pluribus reperitur. In secundo est existentia. Circa quam notandum est quod realitas et existentia non causant distinctionem realem nec formalem set modalem solum, verbi gratia anima rationalis alium modum existendi habet extra corpus | [K 1va] et alium(sup. lin. K) in corpore et nichilominus(e. n. sup. lin. K). Iste modus non causat diversitatem in anima cum sit una realitas anime in corpore et extra corpus. Est autem modalis distinctio que oritur inter duos modos intrinsecos eiusdem vel alterius rationis sicut inter existentiam et realitatem. Nota quod existentia non distinguitur a realitate realiter nec formaliter set sicut modus intrinsecus ab alio modo alterius rationis.

In tertio est actualias. Circa quod notandum quod actualitas prout est modus intrinsecus non est actualitas forme set actus essendi cuiuscumque rei in esse reali et actuali. Nota quod actualitas ut actualitas est non causat cum alia actualitate distinctionem realem nec utique actualitati assit alia realitas verbi gratia actualitas forme et actualitas materie non causant distinctionem realem nec pro tanto materie et forme assunt diverse realitates.

In quarto contingentia. circa quod est notandum quod continegentia ut est modus intrinsecus modus est modus accidentis(accit’) vel contingentia possibilis ad esse vel ad non esse set illud quo res contingenter ponitur in esse et non necessario ideo contingentia universi est modus intrinsecus ipsius Dei. Nota etiam quod contingentia creature non distinguitur realiter a creatura set distinguitur ab ea ex natura reisicut modus intrinsecus a formalitate.

In quinto est finitas creata. Circa quod(sup. lin. K) notandum quod finitas et infinitas ut sunt modi intrinseci creatorum vel creature non sunt finitas vel infinitas extensiva quia secundum Philosophum primo Phisicorum quantitati congruunt set ut sunt intrinseci sunt quantitates virtuales(i.m. K) que essentialiter rei conveniunt. Nota etiam quod quantitas virtutis non distinguitur realiter ab esse cuius est modus intrinsecus set disitnguitur ex natura rei sicut est de aliis modis intrinsecis.

In sexto vita. Circa quod est notandum quod vivere est modus intrinsecus non est actus secundus set est actus primus rei viventis quia vivere ut actus secundus realiter | [K 1vb] distinctus a vivente ut autem est actus prmus sive modus intrinsecus non distinguitur realiter a vivente.

In septimo est heceitas ubi notandum est quod heceitas non est quiditas individua quia si esset quidditas individua que distinguuntur per heceitatem distinguerentur quidditative et tunc etiam individua possent diffiniri quod est contra Philosophum. Ex quo relinquitur quod heceitas sit modus intrinsecus cum non variet rationem formalem seu quidditatem.

Tertium signum principale est passio et corvudet(?) primo signo nature etiam tot habet signa quot primum signum quidditatum quia de qualibet quidditate est demonstrabilis aliqua passio ut patet intuenti. Illud ergo signum dividitur seu distinguitur in septem. In primo sunt passiones entis que superius sunt generalissimorum(? i.m. K) posite. In secundo sunt passiones modorum intrinsecorum sive diversorum. In tertio passiones generalissimorum(?) . In quarto sunt passiones subalnatorum(!) positorum remotorum. In quinto sunt passiones subalternorum mediorum. In sexto sunt passiones subalternatorum propinquorum. In alio sunt passiones specialissimorum unde quod cuilibet quidditati corvundet(?) aliqua passio per se et est demonstrabilis demonstratione propter quid. Nota etiam quod secundus modus passionis quidditatum convenit mathematice(?) non distinguitur a suis subicibibus(? sup. lin.) realiter quia maioris abstractionis sunt quam materialies que etiam realiter distinguuntur a suis subiectis sole enim passiones materiales secundum doctorem nostrum scilicet Scotum realiter distinguuntur a suis subiectis. Sunt enim predicte passiones idem realiter cum suis subiectis set distincte ab eis formaliter.

Quartum signum principale est eorum que accidentaliter insunt rei qualia sunt predicamenta accidentis. Et illud distinguitur in novem signa set quod sunt novem predicamenta | [K 2ra] accidentis. In primo est relatio quia relatio creature ad deum immediate fundatur in substantia et relatio idemptitatis secundum Philosophum fundatur super unum in substantia sicut est relatio quantitatis super unum in quantitate. In secundo est quantitas. Circa quod est notandum quod quantitas secundum suas species per accidens inest substantie et idem dico de quolibet predicamento accidentis. Et ideo omnia predicamenta realiter distinguuntur a substantia etiam contra se invicem quia que per accidens insunt alicui distinguuntur ab eo. In tertio est predicamentum ubi quod est ordo parcium in toto ubi vero est circumscrptio corporis locati a loci circumscriptione procedens. Item ex alio differunt quia ubi est secundus modus extrinsecus adveniens potentia autem est in predicamento quantitatis ut est species. In quarto signo est quando. Circa quod est notandum quod quando est illud quod derelinquitur ex adiacencia temporum(i.m. K) et habet habitudinem ad tempus sicut passio quantitatis ad quantitatem. Nota etiam quod predicamentum ubi precedit quando quia ubi est(sup.lin. K) respectus extrinsecus qui innascitur(?) ex habitudinem permanentis ad permanens quando est respectus qui innascitur ex habitudine successivi. In quinto est situs. Circa quod est notandum quod situs est respectus extrinsecus qui innascitur ex habitudine corporis situantis ad situatum. Et differt situs a poe(?) quia situs est habitudo tocius ad totum secundum omnes suas partes. Po(?) est habitudo parcium secundum partes secundum habitudinem tocius ad totum. In sexto est actio que est respectus extrinsecus causatus ex habitudine activi ad passum facta debita approximatione quia agens phisicum(?) non agit nisi in debite approximatum. In septimo est passio qui est respectus extrinsecus causatus ex habitudini activi ad passum et habet se modo opposito quo effectus ad causam. Nam passio est effectus illatio(?) que actionis. In octavo est qualitas que est predicamentum absolutum. Qualitas oritur a substantia. Post istos omnes respectus | [K 2rb] In nono est habitus qui est respectus extrinsecus ex habitudine habentis ad habitum quia habitus alienum predicamentum est et maxime extrinsecum.

[Petrus Thomae, Parve formalitates = abbreviatio questionis de distinctione predicamentorum redactionis A]

In presenti materia declaranda servabitur sequens ordo: in primo tractabitur quot sunt modi distinctionum a doctoribus, secundo qui sit unaqueque illarum distinctionum, tertio ad evidenciam formalitatum plura dicta declarabuntur, quarto ad quesitum principale respondebitur.

Quantum ad primum articulum primo ponam tria dicta, secundo de qualibet distinctione in speciali videbitur.

De primo sit primum istud dictum quod septem sunt modi distinctionum. Prima est distinctio rationis, secunda est ex natura rei, tertia formalis, quarta realis, quinta essencialis, sexta se totum subiective, septima se totum obiective quod omnia que distinguuntur in mundo distinguuntur aliqua istarum distinctionum.

Tertium dictum est quod tot modis dicitur unum oppositorum quot modis et reliquum ut habetur per Philosophum primo Thopicorum. Idem et distinctio sunt opposita ideo quot modis dicitur distinctio sive diversitas tot modis dicitur idemptitas et ergo sicut septem sunt modi distinctionum per oppositum septem sunt ideptitates.

Tertium dictum est quod predicti modi aliter se inferunt cum idemptitate et aliter cum distinctione aliter autem affirmative aliter negative. Ubi est sciendum quod quecumque distinguuntur distinctione(i.m. K) sex precedentibus vel quecumque distinguitur aliis quecumque set non oportet de septima et sic de aliis eodem modo procedendo. Cum idemptitate vero est per oppositum.

Quantum ad secundum dictum principale est sciendum quid sit distinctio rationis, secundo quid sit distinctio ex natura rei, tertio quid sit distinctio formalis | [K 2va] quarto realis quinto essentialis sexto se totum subiective septimo se totum obiective iuxta primum dico quod distinctio rationis est illa que habet esse per actum comparativuum vel collativuum quod idem ipsius intellectus ita quod non habet ex se actum intellectus circumscriptus ideo dependet precise ab opere rationis verbi gratia dicendo sic Petrus est petrus una entitas et una realitas est in subiecto et co(?) et predicato. Ipsa auatem in subiecto ut subiectum est existens. Ubi est notandum quod actus est duplex: primus est rectus seu primus alius est comparativus seu collativus actus primus seu rectus est vel dicitur esse quo fertur intellectus in obiectum non alterum comparando nec etiam componendo et est actus ille qui appellatur ab Aristotele simplicium intelligentia. Actus secundarius sedu collativus vel comparativus est ille quo intellectus fertitur in subiectum ad alterum comparando. Tunc ergo dicitur distinctio rationis quando aliquid disitnguitur ab alio non quidam primo modo sive directo actu intellectus set tantum secundo modo videlicet actu reflexivo ipsius intellectus. Sciendum tamen quod ut dicit quidam doctor distinctio rationis non solum causatur ab actu intelllectus set eciam ab actu collativo cuiuslibet potentie collative cuiusmodi sive(?) voluntas ymago et fantasia utraque enim illarum ponit aliquid aliud comparare.

Sequitur secunda distinctio que est ex natura rei et dicitur quod est quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum contradictionis extremorum competit uni et non alteri ex qua distinctione infero aliqua correlaria. Primum est quod genus et differentia differunt ex natura rei. Hoc correlarium primo probo quia genus et | [K 2vb] differentia sic se habent quod unum extremum contradictionis competit uni et non alteri ergo differunt ex natura rei. Consequentia est formalis quia arguitur a diffinitione ad diffinitum. Antecedens probatur quia(?) differentia ex natura rei competit quod sit determinans quia determinat genus et contrahit ipsum et cum termino est deterimnans. Tum etiam generi competit ex natura rei quod sit determinabile et non est semper determinans et sic competutnt extrema contradictionis quia determinans et non determinans determinabile et non determinabile que sunt contradictoria et unum extremorum dicitur de uno et non de alio. Et si aliquis diceret ergo distinguuntur ex natura rei formaliter ex natura ut iam probatum est set formaliter quia diffinitiones sunt diverse etiam etiam quod non valet consequentia quia diffinitiones sunt quid nominis et quod non differant formaliter sic probatur illa distinguuntur formaliter que constituunt unam rationem formalem set genus et differentia sunt huiusmodi ergo etc. Maior est nota set minor probatur quia animal et rationale constituunt rationem formalem hominis. Secundum correlarium est est quod partes diffinitionis et diffinitum differunt ex natura rei. Consequentia est formalis quia arguitur sicut in preterdicti. Et antecedens prbo quia competit partibus diffinitionis quod constituunt diffinitum quia ex animali et rationali constituitur homo et sic competit partibus quod sunt constituentes et quod quelibet sit constituens et non constituta nec constitute et diffinitionem quod sit constitutum et non constituens set constituens et non constituens constitutum et non constitutum sunt contradictoria et unum extremorum de uno sequitur et on dicitur de alio ergo differunt ex natura rei.

Nunc restat declare quid sit distincito formalis. Distinctio formalis est distinctio formalium | [K 3ra] rationum distinctarum ita quod illa que habent distinctas rationes formales dicuntur distincta formaliter set oportet videre quot modis investigatur presens distinctio. Et dicitur quod tripliciter primo modo per viam diffinitionis quia quando aliquid ponitur in diffinitione alicuius quod ponitur in diffinitione alterius talia distinguuntur formaliter ex quo infero aliqua correlaria primo quod homo et asinus distinguuntur formaliter quia aliquid ponitur in diffinitione hominis quod non ponitur in diffinitione asini et sic de aliis speciebus. Secundum corellarium quod attributa in divinis disitnguuntur formaliter quia aliquid ponitur in diffinitione unius quod non ponitur in diffinitione alterius. Secundo modo investigatur per viam divisionis per aliquas differentias et unum cadit sub una et aliud sub alia distinguuntur formaliter sicut animal dividitur per rationale et irrationale et ideo dicit illud quod cadit sub rationali distinguitur formaliter ab illo quod cadit sub irrationali sicut etiam de omnibus predicabilibus et predicamentis et consequentia formali et materiali et ens dividitur per absolutum et respectivum et illud quod cadit sub absoluto distinguitur formaliter ab illo quod cadit sub respectivo et ideo dicamus quod differentia que est absoluta distinguitur formaliter a proprietate que est ad aliud. 3^o investigatur per viam reduplicationis ut si aliquid conveniat alicui cum reduplicatione quod quod non convenit alteri illa distinguuntur formaliter ut homo inquantum homo est rationalis ex quo squitur quod homo et lapis distinguuntur formaliter.

Sequitur quarta distinctio scilicet realis. Est ergo notandum quod illa distinguuntur realiter que sic se habent quod quodlibet est aliqua entitas positiva et | [K 3rb] realis et unum ab alio non potest de eo predicari nec ipsum includit propter hoc quod dicitur quod quodlibet sit entitas positiva excludunt negationes et privationes quia cum non dicant aliquam entitatem positive non distinguuntur realiter quanvis connotant aliquid positivuum et aliquam entitatem realem positivam proprie non distinguuntur realiter per hoc quod dicit realis excluduntur encia rationis que tamen non sint encia realia nec inter se nec ab aliquo alio realiter distinguuntur ut sumatur res communiter et transcendenter et dicitur in diffinitione unum aba lio ultimate abstrahunt. Pro evidentia huius partis abstrahitur notandum quid sit ultima abstractio dicitur quod ultima abstractio est secundum quam aliquid abstrahitur in omni eo quod in eius ratione quidditativa nullo modo includitur. Et est sciendum quod quatuor modis investagatur huius abstractionis. Distinctio primo modo via originis quia quandocumque aliquid originatur ab aliquo illud realiter distinguuntur ab illo quia per beatum augustinum primo de trinitate idem non gignit seipsum et sic investigatur ista distinctio inter personas divinas. Secundo via generationis quia quecumque sic se habent quod uno generato reliquum non generatur talia distinguuntur realiter et isto modo investigatur inter materiam et formam forma autem generatur materia autem minime. Tertio modo investigatur via corruptionis quia quando aliquid corrumpitur alio non corrupto taliam realiter distinguujntur quia idem non potest simul esse et non esse ideo quodlibet individuum realiter distinguitur ab alio et fundamentum et relatio quia corrupta relatione fundamentum non corrumpitur quarto modo via separationis quia quandocumque | [K 3va] aliquid separatur vel potest separari ab alio realiter distinguuntur et quod separatur realiter distinguitur ab illo a quo separatur quia idem non separatur a seipso ideo ratio quare accidentia separatur a substantia in sacramento altaris est quia distinguitur a subiecto realiter. Sequitur quinta distinctio que dicitur essencialis et est quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod actuali existentia per aloiquam potentiam possunt separari sicut accidens et substantia materia et forma et sic de aliis. Et est sciendum quod quatuoru modis investigatur predicta distinctio primo modo ex predicamentali coordinatione quia quandocumque aliqua predicantur in diversis predicamentis talia distinguuntur essncialiter quia ut habetur per Philosophum primo Posteriorum essencie predicamentorum sunt impermixte. Secundo investigatur ex diversitate specifica nam diverse species essentialiter distinguuntur illo modo investigatur diversitas essentialis essenciali dependencia etiam isto modo dicimus quod causa distinguitur essencialiter a suo effectu saltem de causis extrinsecis etiam deus a creatura quarto modo investigatur via existencie quia quando aliqua sic se habent quod unum existit in rerum natura et aliud non talia distinguuntur essencialiter. Et isto modo investigatur et diversitas essencialis inter creaturas creatorum ordine essenciali sequitur distinctio que dicitur se totum subiective et sunt ista que sic se habent quod eorum realitates sunt distincti numeri vel indistincti vel eciam actuali existencia vel quando realiter sunt divisa vel particularizata a realitate alterius sic Plato, sortes et alia individua eisudem speciei. Sequitur septima distinctio que est se totum obiective et dicitur quod illa distinguuntur se totis obiective que non conveniunt in aliqua realitate vel | [K 3vb] quidditativa ratio vel a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus realis et unus [inser. ? i.m. K] cuius seu prime intentionis sicut dicere ultime individuales. Unde secundum mentem Scoti differe ultime sunt heceitas que sunt distincte se totis obiective quia in nullo conceptu quidditativo conveniunt conceptus enim earum sunt simplices ex quibus concludo tale corellarium quod deus et creatura se totis subiective distinguuntur non autem obiective hec omnia patent ex 6 et septima et hec de secundo principali.

Nunc autem ponitur tertius modus principalis ubi sunt aliqua dicta declaranda ad evidenciam formalitatum. Primo est sciendum quod omnis distinctio aut est rationis aut ex natura ex natura rei tamquam universale quod dividitur in distinctionem formalem realem se totis subiective et se totis obiective. Secuno notandum quod forma dicitur multis modis uno modo dicitur forma prout est altera pars compositi et sic vocatur forma principalis. Secundo modo dicitur forma pro forma tocius puta pro tota ipsa natura ut humanitas dicitur forma tocius non pro informacione ipsius materie set ex qua ext suppositum ipsius quidditative tertio modo dicitur forma omnis substantia immaterialis sicut deus et intelligencie dicuntur forme quarto modo pro ratione contractum(?) quidditativam et ab ista forma ultimo dicta sumitur formalitas de qua intendimus hic. Tertio est notandum quod una et eadem res civersimodi potest movere intellectum spacium quod inter sursum et deorsum potest movere intellectum diversimode uno modo ut est deorsum in sursum alio modo ut est assu(?) deorsum et iste sunt diverse rationes tenentes se | [K 4ra] ex parte obiecti cum eadem res possit apprehendi diversimodi ab intellectu convenit consequenter eadem quidditas per diversas rationes dico ergo quod licet una et eadem et res habeat diversas rationes non tamen habet diversas quidditates sermo eadem quidditas potest assignari per diversas rationes que quidem quidditas diversimode apprehensa ab intellectu et hec de tertio articulo.

Nota quod aliquid potest esse magis notum alio dupliciter uno modo simpliciter et secundum suam essenciam et hoc modo simplicissimus et principia sunt nociora et magis nota compositis et posterioribus et quanto sunt simpliciora et priora tantum secundum se sunt nociora et quia deus est simplicissimus et primus omnium ideo de se est maxime notus alio modo potest aliquid esse magis notum eciam quo ad nos et isto modo composita sunt nociora simplicibus et prioribus et quanto sunt magis composita posteriora tanto nobis nociora sicut ait Aristotiles in primo phisicorum innata est nobis via a nocioribus nobis ad ignociora nature procedere.

Expliciun formalitates parve petri thome provincie sancti iacobi

Nota quod in fia sequenti quando discendimus cum distinctione dicimus quod omnia illa que distinguuntur se totis obiective si fas est dicere disitnguuntur se totis obiective essencialiter realiter formaliter ex natura rei et ratione | [K 4rb] nota quod quando ascendimus cum ideptitate sunt omnibus aliis ydeptitatibus idem scilicet rationis etiam ex natura rei et sic de aliis.

Translation

In creatures there are four principle signs. The first sign is quiddity.

For quiddity has seven signs which are are assigned here.

The first is being; the second is the absolute; the third is substance; the fourth, body; the fifth, animate body; the sixth, animal; the seventh, man.

The second sign of a creature is the intrinsic mode, which is distinguished both from the formality of which it is the mode and from the formality which does not vary its formal ratio. The intrinsic mode has seven signs. The first is reality; the second is existence; the third is actuality; the fourth is contingency; the fifth is finitude; the sixth is life; the seventh is haecceity.

The third principle sign of a creature is the per se property, and it corresponds to the firth sign of nature; therefore it has the same number of signs, because everything has some property, as is clear if you look. The property has seven signs. In the first sign are the properties of being. In the second sign are the properties of intrinsic modes. In the third is [. . . ?] In the fourth, the properties of the subject. In the sixth, the properties of the proximate or neighboring means. In the other [seventh] the properties of the most special species.

The fourth principle sign of nature is that of those things which are in a thing accidentally. And this is distinguished in nine signs, according to the fact that there are nine predicaments of accidents of those things which are in a thing accidentally. The first is relation; the second, quantity; the third, place; the fourth, time; the fifth, position; the sixth, action; the seventh, passion; the eighth, quality; the ninth, habit.

The first sign is entity, which has properties, some of which are intrinsic modes. There are [also] some other divisions and properties, namely, truth, goodness, unity, reality, precision [? aliqualitas ?], reality. And these are the divisions of the intrinsic modes of being. The first is by relative and absolute; the second is by potency and act; the third is by dependent and independent; the fourth is by created and uncreated; the fifth is by finite and infinite; the sixth is by the ten predicaments.