Dr. Justin Sledge on Univocity

 

I came across this video on univocity recently, and I can report it is quite good. Probably the best discussion of Scotus on univocity I have ever seen from a non Scotus expert.

Naturally I had some minor complaints. One is that it is not controversial to call God being itself, given the medieval interpretation of Exodus 3:14 which ensconced being as the primary name of God. Another is that I don't think the 'being among beings' was really ever an issue, that is, that univocity rendered God just a being beings. It is true, one can find Bonaventure saying that God is not 'ens inter entia sed super entia', but the modern slogan is more an extreme platonist claim that God is rather beyond being, something most scholastics would disagree with (as per Exodus). The real issue about univocity is what Aquinas had said, that it destroys divine simplicity (I don't think the medievals would even say that God is transcendent or transcendental). If God is in a genus with creatures, then there would be an aspect in God that was held in common with creatures, and an aspect that was unique to God, and so at least two univocal parts [reality of genus and reality of specific difference]. 

Francis of Meyronnes early defense of the univocity of being

Francis of Meyronnes is probably the most influential and important Scotist of the fourteenth century. His many works survive in hundreds of manuscripts and many were printed in the early days of the printing press. His commentary on the Sentences exists in three versions, called 'ab oriente', 'summa simplicitas' and Conflatus. He became a master in 1323 by decree of the pope after lecturing at Paris.

My post is about the first of the three commentaries. In the 'ab oriente' commentary, most likely to be Francis' first discussion of the univocity of being (given the lack of editions, we cannot be sure; it does not matter much, however, for Francis tends to recycle his arguments), he establishes a series of principles, which he calls regulae, and then derives conclusions from them. basically, the regulae are topical rules or 'maximal propositions' as explained in Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's Topics. It is a fairly interesting dicussion, concluding with a series of doubts. I translate and paraphrase these rules and doubts here.

Franciscus de Mayronis, In Sent. I d. 22 'ab oriente'.

Regulae:

R1. whenever some intellect is certain about one concept and doubtful about two [concepts], the certain concept is univocal to the two doubtful ones.

R2. Whenever some intellect is certain about one concept and doubful about either of two others, that certain concept befalls both according to the same formal notion.

R3. no equivocal has a concept distinct from its equivocates.

R4. no one can have scientific knowledge of the equivocal, while its equivocates are unknown.

R5: anyone can have scientific knowledge of univocals.

R6: no proposition in which there is an equivocal term can be verified unless for some of its equivocates.

R7: some proposition in which there is a univocal term cannot be verified for some univocate.

R8: nothing befalls an equivocal that does not befall some equivocate.

R9: something can befall a univocal that does not befall some univocate.

R10: the subject of every science is univocal to everthing about which something is demonstrated in that science.

R11: no attribute primarily befalling some subject can be demonstrated unless of those of which the subject befalls univocally.

R12: nothing can be demonstrated of an equivocal.

R13: every attribute which befalls something not primarily is demonstrated of something common to itself and some other.

R14: the truth of some principle does not extend unless to the univocates of its subject.

R15: no principle extends itself unless to the univocates of its predicate.

R16: no principle can be equivocal.

R17: whenever something common is said of one thing in an unqualified way (simpliciter) and of another in a qualified way (secundum quid), it is not said of them univocally.

R18: whenever something common is said of some things in a prior and posterior way (per prius et posterious), it is not univocal to them.

R19: when [something] is said of them according to more and less, it is not univocal to them.

R20: every common which is not said univocally of some things, is said of them equivocally.

Conclusiones:

C1: being (ens) is said univocally of God and creatures (from R1, R2, R5, R7, R9, R10, R11, R13, R14, R15).

C2: being is not said equivocally of God and creatures (from R3, R4, R6, R8, R12, R16).

C3: being is not said analogically of God and creatures, insofar as analogy is taken to be a middle way between equivocity and univocity (from R20).

C4: being is said univocally of substance and accident (from R1, R2, R5, R7, R9, R10, R11, R13, R14, R15, R16).

C5: substance is not equivocal to substance and accident (from R3, R4, R6, R8, R12, R16).

C6: being is said univocally of the absolute and relative (from R1, R2).

C7: being is not said of them [=the absolute and relative] equivocally (from “the same rules as above”).

C8: being is not said equivocally but univocally of the ten categories (from “the same rules”).

C9: being is said univocally of everything contained in the ten categories (from a rule in Aristotle’s Categories).

C10: the notion of the absolute is said univocally of all absolute categories (from “the rules stated above”).

C11: ‘relative’ is said univocally of all relative categories (from R1?, “other rules”).

C12: ‘accident’ is said univocally of the nine categories (from R1, “other rules”).

C13: being is not said univocally of real being and being of reason (from R17, R18, R19).

C14: being is said equivocally of real being and being of reason (from R20).

C15: our intellect cannot form one concept that is common to real being and being of reason (no appeal to a regula).

C16: those who posit such a concept (that is, a concept univocally common to real being and being of reason) have that unity in imagination and not in the intellect (no appeal to a regula).

C17: the division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul is of an utterance (vox) into what is signified (no appeal to a regula).

C18: the ratio of being is said of being in potency and being in act (no appeal to a regula).

Difficultates:

D1: why being is not a genus, even though it is said of many things in different species.

D2: if being were a genus, whether God would be in the genus of being.

D3: why it is denied that being is a genus, since if it were, God would not be in it (from D2).

D4: if the formality of being (ratio entis) is included in something that is irreducibly simple.

D5: if the formality of being can be included in things that are primarily diverse.

D6: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some transcendental.

D7: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some transcendental that is constituted from divided and dividing being.

D8: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some category.

D9: if the formality of being is included in some pure perfection.

D10: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some genus or species.

D11: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some individual immediately corresponding to it.

D12: whether the formality of being is included universally in something other than a quiddity.

D13: if some transcendental is included quidditatively in some quiddity.

D14: why it is not the case that being is part of the quiddity of substance in the way that substance is part of the quiddity of humanity or of body.

D15: if the formality of being taken with an inferior is only accidentally one.

D16: if the formality of being taken with an inferior can make one concept.

D17: if an inferior of being can be conceived without being.

D18: if being would be part of the quiddity of something.

D19: if the attributes (passiones) of being can be conceived without being.

D20: why the formality of being does not make a composition with its inferiors the way the formality (ratio) of a genus does with its differences.

D21: if it is necessary to posit two orders (coordinationes) of being.

D22: if those two orders are from the nature of the thing (ex natura rei)

D23: if to abstract one common concept is repugnant to everything that is primarily diverse.

D24: whether there is some common concept that embraces everything other than nothingness.

D25: if the notion of nothingness is adequate to the notion of non-being.

D26: if every non-being can said to be nothing.

D27: if there is some common attribute for everything that is separate from the notion of nothing.

D28: if there is some formality (ratio) more common than the formality of univocal being.

D29: if everything separate from the notion of nothing is contained under equivocal being.

D30: if being taken equivocally is the subject of that principle ‘affirmation or negation of whatever being’.

D31: if being univocally taken can be the subject in that principle.

D32: if that principle has some subject that is adequate and common to itself.

D33: what is that common subject that can be attributed to such a principle?

D34: if intelligibility can be an attribute of everything of which this principle is verified.

D35: if intelligibility is distinct from its subject from the nature of the thing.

D36: if that attribute, intelligibility, is absolute or relative.

D37:  if that principle ‘affirmation of whatever’ etc. can have place in that subject, nor does it prescind from this attribute of intelligibility.

D38: if that metaphysical principle is verified of beings of reason.

D39: if the predicate of that principle is ‘to be or not to be’.

D40: concerning the division of being. This difficultas is subdivided into fifteen conclusiones:

            DC 1: the division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul is not a division of univocals but rather equivocals.

            DC 2: just as entity is said equivocally and univocally, so also is reality.

            DC 3: the same is true of the other attributes of being.

            DC 4: the division of being into substance and accidents is not quidditative.

            DC 5: division is of a common notion of something divided into quidditative and non-quidditative.

            DC 6: division of being into act and potency is not quidditative.

            DC 7: division of being into the finite and infinite is not quidditative.

            DC 8:  the same is true of the division of being through the contingent and the necessary.

            DC 9: the same is true of the division of being through the existing and non-existing.

            DC 10: the same is true of the division of being through the real and the non-real, with the latter taken as in objective potency.

            DC 11: the division of being into the simple and the complex is not quidditative.

            DC 12: the division of being into the absolute and relative is quidditative.

            DC 13: only that (i.e. DC 12) division of being is quidditative.

            DC 14: that (DC 12) is the first division of being.

            DC 15: being cannot be divided immediately into the ten categories.

The Poetics of the Equivocity of Being

 Here are some poetical remarks on the equivocity of being by William Desmond. Enjoy!

Desmond, Being and the Between, 87

The war of philosophers against unintelligibility has made them generally hostile to the equivocal. This is manifest in the oscillation with the univocal we examined in the last chapter. It is no less true that this war is never finished, and many victories turn out pyrrhic, indeed brief lulls before the hydra of the equivocal sprouts another head to replace the one just chopped. The equivocal is a hydra that cannot be completely killed by univocity; for to kill its many heads demands many hands, and univocity has only one hand at a time. Indeed, I think equivocity is not to be killed but charmed from being a mythic monster into a fabling of the plurivocity of being. We must come to terms with the beautfy of the beast. Logical murder, murder repeated methodically, will not do.

William Desmond, Being and the Between

 The title above is a book I have been reading lately. usually I will be excited for a month with a new acquisition and then the taedium sets in and I abandon the book. My shelf of "current books" grows ever longer. Surprisingly, I have stuck with Przywara's Analogia entis, though it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me in either German or English.

Desmond is a scholar of continental philosophy, mainly of Hegel it seems, with little to no interest in medieval philosophy. The book listed in the title of the post is loosely based on Aristotle, Plato, and the moderns. The auther seems rather adverse to scholastic thought; consider the following, from p. 12:

But were there no happening of astonishment, metaphysics would be a mere scholastic juggling of empty abstractions, perhaps with great virtuosity in the formal mastery of argumentation, but ontologically barren nonetheless.

The author, though not possessing knowledge of Scotus' position on univocity, effectively rules out Scotus' position at the very beginning. p. 3:

Hence, the question of being is not first one for philosophers, understood as an elite of thinkers. It transcends the difference of the few and the many, for it strikes our humanity simply in virtue of its being, as mindful of itself and what is other to itself. Of course, this matter may degenerate into platitude. Then being will be said to be the emptiest of abstractions--a vacuous generality, indifferently applicable to everything and anything, and hence not applicable with illuminating power to anything in particular. Against this degrading of being we must fight strenuously. There may be a sense of the universal, and the community of being that transcends any abstract universal.

As nice a short summary of Scotus as was every written. But we might fight against it.

Finally, a word of warning: be careful when buying academic books! I bought my copy from Amazon, which sells it, I found, as a print on demand volume. But alas, every page of the text, as well as the front and back cover, contains the stamp "copyrighted Material". One would think this could have been dispensed with, given that there is a copyright page, but no. The stamp even covers page numbers and sometimes obscures the last line of the text on a page. So find a used copy, if you want to read this book.

Byzantine Univocity

 I recently came across an essay on univocity among the Byzantine theologians that might be of interest to our readers. Essay is here.

Johnathan Bieler, "Christ: the mystery of God truly made manifest? Leontius of Byzantium and the Univocity of Being."

From the conclusion:

After reading this long passage we cannot go into all the details but we will summarily say that Leontius opposes univocity and equivocity. He accuses his opponents of adhering to a pure equivocity of terms in Christology and Trinitarian Theology by separating the terms from their definitions. Thus, equivocity negates the true manifestation of the divine in the manifest mystery of Christ. Naturally, for Leontius as well as for the Severian interlocutor, God in himself is hidden and beyond word, intellect and nature. However, for Leontius this God has truly revealed himself in Christ and thus we must speak in univocal terms of the Trinity and Christ. He achieves the univocity of God and the world by subsuming all beings (God, angels, human beings etc.) under one single definition of existence as such, which ousia stands for when defined simply.

In this respect, Leontius falls short of Ps-Dionysius’ strong language for the transcendence of God as beyond ousia or being, even though he knows his writings and quotes him even by name.7 Leontius seems to make a bit of a desperate move here and puts all beings and God under the same category of existence as such. In this, Leontius even found a successor in Duns Scotus, who also holds a univocal concept of being, ens, for God and the world. A few questions are in order to point to the problems of Leontius’ view: Is the transcendence of God not corrupted if he is put in the same genus of existence as the world? Does not the world then somehow share in God’s uncreated and eternal being, as both share the same sort of existence? This would remind us of the Origenist doctrine of the fall of beings from some sort of unity with God. Can Leontius’ univocal use of the term ousia still fully affirm the distinction of the created and the uncreated existence, which was so important for example to Athanasius as well as Ps-Dionysius and in turn, Maximus the Confessor? Part of an answer to these questions has to be given by an analysis of the relation between predicative logic and ontology in Leontius which I cannot serve with here. At any rate, we have a sense now for the task of later authors so diverse as John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor to reject PsDionysius or integrate him into a Theology that holds together both transcendence and true manifestation of God without falling into the simple alternative between univocity and equivocity. Maximus, in my view, will come forward with a solution that resembles more Aquinas’ analogy of being than Duns Scotus’ univocity of being.

Norris Clarke on Univocity

 W. Norris Clarke was a Jesuit philosopher who taught at Fordam, dying in 2008. His books are still used as textbooks, so I thought it useful to comment on his characterization of Scotistic univocity. The following text is from his book The One and the Many, p. 45. For some discussion of Clarke's views, see this.

The Analogy of Being vs. the Univocity of Being. Some metaphysicians in St. Thomas’s own time, e.g., Duns Scotus (d. 1308), and William of Ockham (d. 1347), with their followers to this day, defended the univocity of the concept of being against Thomas. Both were leaders in the strong development of logic at the end of the Middle Ages (anticipating many of the developments of modern symbolic logic), and logicians tend to be uncomfortable with flexible ideas, “systematically vague concepts” like the Thomistic analogy of proper proportionality, especially as applied to being in God and creatures. And since their metaphysics were “essentialist,” i.e., focussed on being as essence (not including the act of existence as part of its content), it was hard for them to see how the concept of being could be applied to different essences without breaking up into several distinct concepts ceasing to have the same meaning at all, hence useless as a valid term in any syllogism or other logical argument, where all the terms must remain strictly fixed in the same meaning. Therefore, to retain any unity at all, being always had to be a univocal concept, even applied to God and creatures with their immense diversity as finite and infinite. But they had to pay a heavy price for this apparent logical clarity: they had to make the concept of being so extremely abstract as to empty it of practically all content and make it merely an empty linguistic marker standing for both God and creatures but, as Ockham explicitly admitted, expressing nothing common at all between God and creatures! The result was to render God considerably more remote and inaccessible to human reason than St. Thomas’s God, with important repercussions for the philosophy, theology, and finally spirituality of the late Middle Ages.

Comments:

1.The first thing to note here is that Clarke reads Scotus and Ockham (though he does not distinguish between them) though the lens of Thomism, specifically the real distinction of essence and existence. Hence the label "essentialist", inherited from Gilson. The claim here is that Scotus and Ockham ignore existence and are talking about being as a purely non-existential essence. Wolter, way back in his transcendentals book, commented on this claim of Gilson to the effect that it was an ingenious account of what Scotus would have said if he were a Thomist. But of course, Scotus is not a Thomist. Scotus denies the real distinction of essence and existence.

2. Clarke does grasp that part of the concern of univocity is to have valid syllogisms. He, Clarke, seems to think that being does not have a distinct concept, however, given that he thinks Scotus was also motivated by discomfort with vague ideas. This is a matter of debate among Thomists themselves, historically and today. Some agree with Scotus that there is a distinct concept of being that includes nothing else, some, like Clarke, think you can't separate the concept of being from the concept of God or of something in the categories. One then has to "stretch" created being to get a notion of the divine. Scotus, as we know, did think being had a distinct concept. 

3. The heavy price of univocity. Here I think Clarke's explanation goes awry. He claims that Scotus and Ockham make the concept of being abstract and empty, just a linguistic marker, but also that it stands for God and creatures. Of course, the concept of being, as such, does not stand for God and creatures. As it is included in the concept of God and the concept of a creature it is univocal, but of itself the concept of being is neither the concept of God nor the concept of a creature.  Clarke does not give a reference to the remark of Ockham's that he claims is explicit, to wit, that there is nothing common to God and creatures. This seems to clinch matters for Clarke, we arrive at basically a contradiction, being is univocal, but there is nothing common (which equals univocal, anyway). This appears to be a garbled awareness on the part of Clarke to the problem of the reality of the concept of being. This is the problem that the concept of being, qua abstract and univocal, signifies no corresponding reality outside the mind. This runs against the common notion from the Aristotelian commentary tradition that concepts map directly onto things. Normally, Scotus would agree; but to get to concepts of the transcendentals, you have to abstract from the concept you have derived from the actually existing thing. That abstraction does not correspond to the reality outside the soul. And note, this is a different sense of the word 'abstraction' than you get in Aquinas or even when you are talking about the three acts of the Aristotelian intellect. There is abstraction from the phantasm, that gets you the concept of a nature, say catness. To get being, you abstract from this nature, present in the intellect as an intelligible species, by stripping off the modes of finitude and so on. So in the end, considering God and creatures as they exist outside the soul, there is nothing in common. But one can abstract from the concept of a creature to the concept of being, which can also be applied to God.

4.  The alleged result is to make God more remote and unknowable. But since we have now seen that Scotus does not hold that the concept of being is both pure and contains the concept of God and creatures, the result doesn't follow either. Scotus himself, interestingly, defends the univocity of being not in metaphysics, but in the context of describing the natural knowledge of God. Not only being is univocal, but all the transcendentals, general divine attributes, are as well. So a lot more is known, both by an intellect trying to have a general cognition of the divine nature, as well as scientifically by means of forming valid demonstrations. Indeed, it has always seemed to me that Scotus is the affirmative theologian par excellence, who ought rather than Aquinas to be paired with Dante. But that can wait for another day.

5. Repurcussions. The alleged effect of rendering God more remote has repurcussions many later areas of life. The usual Thomist claim from the 20th century, disagreement with our man leads to societal decay. I've always been rather struck that the ones who trumpet this the loudest, the RO crowd, are by practice theologians who supposedly believe in sin, or at least weakness of will. sin seems to me to be a far better explanation than that of univocity for the apparently inevitable march from Scotus to whatever modern thing you don't like. If I were to have lived during the reformation period and watched christians killing each other over the proper definition of the eucharist I would probably try to set up a non christian secular state of skepticism as well. To be fair to Clarke, this is not the focus of the discussion, just a throwaway line at the end.

Hall on Scotus

Alexander Hall has an entry in the internet encyclopedia of philosophy on Scotus' on natural knowledge of God. A good intro  to the topic by a specialist currently working in the field. It had escaped my notice before, so  I call your attention to it now. Here it is.

Scotist analogy

A new essay on the Scotist analogy of being (analogia entis) has appeared. Here is the abstract.

It is widely believed today that John Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the univocity of being ushered in various deleterious philosophical and theological consequences that resulted in the negative features of modernity. Included in this common opinion, but not examined, is the belief that by affirming univocity Scotus thereby also denied the analogy of being (analogia entis). The present essay challenges this belief by recovering Scotus’s true position on analogy, namely that it obtains in the order of the real, and that complex concepts of creatures are analogically related to complex concepts of God. Scotus’s doctrine is then compared to the later Scotist tradition. The common opinion of the Scotist school from the fourteenth century onward followed Scotus’s position on analogy and considerably expanded upon his scattered remarks.

Eric Perl on Neoplatonism

Eric Perl is a prominent neoplatonist author. He has some Plotinus translations with commentary out there that look interesting. But he doesn't like Scotus.  I give some quotes below that might be of interest to or foster discussion by our readers.


Quote 1:
From Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, p. 6:

In this perspective, we must concur with those who hold that the principal break in the continuity of western philosophy comes not between ancient and medieval, nor between pagan and Christian, nor even in early modernity with figures such as Galileo and Descartes, but rather between the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition up to and including Aquinas, on the one hand, and the modes of thought represented by Duns Scotus and William of Ockham on the other. It is here, not in the sixteenth or seventeenth but in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, that modernity in a philosophical rather than a merely chronological sense truly begins. With Scotistic univocity, the first principle becomes a being, subject to a conceptual grasp and included within the whole of reality as a member of it, as is not the case for the One of Plotinus or the God of Aquinas. Between Scotus' God who is an infinite being (ens infinitum) and Aquinas' God who is infinite existence (esse infinitum), the difference is of world-shattering proportions. it is precisely here that 'metaphysics' in the pejorative, postmodern sense begins, with the reduction of the first principle to a conceptually representabile being and the fading from view of the very question 'Why are there beings, rather than nothing?' And the Ockhamist denial that things really have 'whatnesses' in virtue of which they are what they are, a repudiation of the very foundation of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, already carries with it the divorce of thought from being, the loss of intelligibility, the move toward consciousness as 'subject' and being as 'object' and the failing of the vision of all things as the presence and manifestation of the divine.

He gives a single reference to Scotus, shockingly a quote, though he doesn't cite an edition or translator:

Duns Scotus, Opus oxoniense, I, 3, 1: "I say, then, first, that not only can a concept naturally be had in which God is conceived as it were accidentally, for instance, with regard to some attribute, but also a certain concept in which God is conceived by himself and quidditatively".

Comment: as is usual with modern philosophers who are non specialists, it is univocity that ruined good traditional philosophy. For these people, it is more important that philosophy be a tradition than that it be an activity in any way related to arguments. Scotus' arguments are not quoted nor shown to be false, it is just taken to be obvious since the author disagrees with the conclusions of Scotus' arguments. The quote also has some ambiguities. "reality" is not defined. If by "reality" you mean creation, then Scotus would deny that God is part of reality or within the horizon of reality if you prefer to talk in that fashion. But if by "reality" you mean the totality of existing things, then Scotus would agree, even if he would qualify it and say that God and creatures agree in no reality. 

Perl does not provide exegesis of the quote. It is clear that he interprets it as implying that since we can grasp God by a concept that we totally and completely grasp God in a concept, and that there can thus be no divine transcendence. But Scotus would deny this as well, saying instead that even if we grasp God quidditatively we do not have full comprehension of the divine essence, which, since it is infinite, always exceeds our finite minds. Also, the concept that we form of God, infinite being, only imperfectly represents the divine reality, since 'infinite being' is a complex concept and God is simple. This too does not warrant a mention.

Perl's central thesis is that thought and being are parallel, and Scotus, or at least Ockham are a threat to this. Univocity might seem a threat to this, since, in Richard Cross' words, the concept of being is a "vicious abstraction", ie. it does not correspond to any extra mental reality. But the concept of being is the result of an operation (abstraction) performed on the complex concept of a creature, which itself is based on an extramental thing. So Scotus also believes in the parallel of thought and being, but this doesn't mean that we can't perform mental operations the products of which might not themselves be directly parallel. At least, perl would need another argument to show this. Maybe he has one and I will find it as I read his book. We will see.

I am always somewhat bemused by the intense hatred of Scotus by modern neoplatonists, especially in theology. naturally, it is univocity they focus on, which is opposed to the de facto hero of theology, Thomas aquinas. But for centuries Scotus has himself been seen as part of the neoplatonist movement, given the extreme platonism of his doctrine of the Ideas. Renaissance platonists, such as Ficino, numbered him among their own school. But all such niceties have been forgotten these days.

Here's a quote from a different book that caught my eye, and though it is implicitly directed against Scotus, it seems to implicitly embrace univocity of being.

Quote 2 (copied from the David Bentley Hart discussion group on Facebook)

The disjunctive presupposition that 𝘦𝘪𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 God chooses between possible alternatives 𝘰𝘳 he is necessitated to create situates God within a total framework of possibilities, as though the logical conditions of possibility and impossibility were prior to and more universal than God, conditions to which even he is subject. This presupposition envisions God either as confronted with a multiplicity of logical possibilities among which he can choose, or as subject to a logical law such that there is only one possibility open to him.

This is precisely the "ontic" conception of God that Plotinus, and Dionysius, are concerned to avoid by declaring him, "beyond being." God is not a being, subject, as are all beings, to the conditions of logical possibility such as the principle of non-contradiction. This is not to say that God can violate that principle; on the contrary, it would be more accurate to say that for the Neoplatonists, God or the One 𝘪𝘴 the principle of non-contradiction. For what is that principle but the very condition of intelligibility and therefore of being?

"To be is to be intelligible" means that to be is to conform to the laws of thought, which necessarily apprehends its object as determined by certain attributes and (therefore) as excluding the contradictory ones. The unity, the identity, and therefore the being of any thing consists in its uniformity to this law. That law, therefore, is an expression of God as the unity, the identity, the being of beings.

God is not a being, contained within a framework of possibilities determined by an abstract logic independent of himself. Rather, he is that framework within which all beings are contained, and hence he cannot be considered 𝘦𝘪𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 as a being who chooses among a multiplicity of logical possibilities, 𝘰𝘳 as a being confined by principles more universal than himself to a single possibility.

—Eric D. Perl, 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘺: 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘕𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘪𝘤 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘰𝘱𝘩𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘋𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘺𝘴𝘪𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘳𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘢𝘨𝘪𝘵𝘦, Ch. 3, "Goodness, Beauty, and Love"

On this quote, see the various posts from the past few months (Foxal, Mayronis, Petrus Thomae) on the principle of non-contradiction. To make God the principle itself, or make it somehow apply to God, is to concede the field to univocity. The reason is that the PNC is the first complex principle; it can be broken down into the first incomplex principle, the notion of being. To posit the PNC as applying to God and creatures is to posit being as common to God and creatures. Unless you want to destroy the PNC by making it apply in a different,unknowable way in God, it must be univocal.

John Foxal on the First Complex Principle

In light of this previous post on the univocity of the principle of non-contradiction, here are some remarks on the same topic from John Foxal, the fifteenth-century English Scotus who spent his career in Italy teaching at Rome and Bologna. Foxal was also part of the circle of Bessarion and became bishop of Armagh but died before taking up his see.

A possibly necessary piece of background terminology: Scotists typically refer to the principle of non contradiction as the first complex principle. The principle of non contradiction contains being as its subject, and so being is called the first incomplex principle.

The following text is from a commentary Foxal wrote at Bologna on the first question of Scotus' Ordinatio, dated to 1465.

"Contra: certum est” etc. pro hoc argumento nota quod prima quaestio prologi Conflatus Francisci de Maronis maxime valet ad confutandum hanc opinionem Henrici, quia in illa multipliciter probatur et demonstratur primum principium tenere in theologia, et ita bene formari in Deo sicut in creaturis et ita applicari ad spiritualia et insensibilia sicut ad corporalia et sensibilia vel materialia. Non adduco autem aliqua de quaestione illa, quia ubique habetur et eandem viam tenet Scotus hic, arguendo contra Henricum. Etiam pro hoc est Aristoteles in pluribus locis qui vult primum principium ita bene applicari ad conclusiones non sensibiles sicut sensibiles, nam in libris Metaphysicae agit principaliter de substantiis non sensibilbus, ut patet in pluribus locis et maxime in 2. xi. et 12, et in 4 libro agit per totum de primo principio complexo ubi ponit illas proprietates qua ponit Franciscus ubi supra in principio quaestionis. Et utique mirum esset quod in illis praedictis libris dixisset tot et tanta de primo principio complexo si voluisset quod illud excludetur a rebus insensibilibus et separatis a materia de quibus agit ibi, et principalius de ipsis tractat librosque Metaphysicae omnes propter illas principaliter ordinavit.

Et ad litteram Doctoris revertendo et probando antecedens ipsius patet quod ita bene potest sciri ab intellectu nostro quod impossibile est quod unus angelus simul sit et non sit, vel descendendo ad specialiores terminos quod idem angelus sit materialis et non materialis aut sensibilis et non sensibilis, sicut quod idem lapis simul sit et non sit, aut simul sit durus et non durus, et sic de aliis, et ita bene poterit primum principium applicari ad insensibilia sicut ad sensibilia, ergo vana est responsio illa.

Translation:

"Contra: it is certain" [this is a lemma from Scotus' Ord.] for this argument note that the first question of the prologue of the Conflatus of Francis of Meyronnes is maximally valid for refuting this opinion of Henry, because in that it is proved in many ways and demonstrated that the first principle holds in theology, and so also it can be formed in God just as in creatures and so applied to spiritual and insensible just as to corporeal and sensible or material [matters]. I do not adduce anything from that question [of Francis], because it is found everywhere and Scotus holds the same way here, arguing against Henry. Also for this is Aristotle in many places, who intended that the first principle be applied to substances and non sensibiles just as to sensibiles, for in the books of the Metaphysics he treats principally of substances and non sensibles, as is clear in many places, most of all in [books] II, XI, and XII, and in the fourth book he treats throughout about the first complex principle where he posits those properties which Francis posits above in the beginning of the question [i.e. Conflatus prol. q. 1]. And indeed it would be marvellous that in those aforesaid books he would have said to much about the first complex principle if he had intened that that be excluded from insensible things and separated from matter about which he treats there, and principally about them he treated and ordered the books of the Metaphysics principally on account of them.

And returning to the letter of the Doctor and proving his antecedent, it is clear that well indeed it can be known by our intellect that it is impossible that one angle at once is and is not, or by descending to more special terms that the same angel is material and not material or sensible and non sensible, just as the same stone at once is and is not, or at once is rough and not rough, and thus for others, and so can the first principle be applied to insensibles just as to sensibles, therefore that response [of Henry's] is vain.

Franciscus de Mayronis and Petrus Thomae: The Principle of non-contradiction is univocally common to God and creatures

The claim that the principle of non contradiction (PNC) is univocally common to God and creatures is a common one in early Scotism. I give below the summary conclusions from the prologue of Mayronis' Conflatus redaction of his commentary on the Sentences. There is a link to Latin text on the sideboard of the blog.

Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, prol. q. 1 a. 2.

Conclusio 1: "First is that that principle or its truth is found formally in creatures" [a proof follows; here I give only a little text in what follows]

Conclusio 2: "The second conclusion is that the truth of the principle is formally found and also holds in God, because where the conclusion, there the principle, just as before. In God is found the truth of that, namely that God is eternal or non eternal, which are conclusions of the first principle."

Conclusio 3: "The third conclusion is that it is found under the same ratio in God and in creatures" [several arguments follow]

Conclusion 4: "The fourth conclusion follows from the third, from which under the same formal ratio it is found in God and creatures it follows that one and the same is found in God and creatures."

perhaps if I have time, I will translate this whole section.

Update:

Here is the text from Petrus Thomae's Reportatio, d. 1 q. 1:

Tertiadecima ratio formatur ex tertiadecima maxima sic: omnis principii veritas se extendit ad univoca sui subiecti et nullo modo ad aequivoca; sed veritas huius principii ‘de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio’ vera se extendit ad ens creatum et increatum, finitum et infinitum etc. ergo creatum et increatum finitum et infinitum sunt univoca sui subiecti; sed subiectum eius est ens; ergo ens est univocum ad ens creatum et increatum, finitum et infinitum; ergo.

The thirteenth argument is formed from the thirteenth maxim thus: the truth of every principle extends itself to the univocals of its subject and in no way to equivocals; but the truth of this proposition 'affirmation or negation of whatever' truly extends itself to created and uncreated being, finite and infinite, etc.; therefore created and uncreated, finite and infinite are univocals of its subject; but the subject of it is being; therefore being is univocal to created being and uncreated being, finite and infinite; therefore,

Franciscus de Mayronis on Univocity

Here is the conclusion to a question on univocity of being probably by Francis of Meyronnes that I transcribed today.

Ideo dico quod ens dicitur secundum eandem rationem formalem de Deo et creatura, licet nullo modo secundum eandem realitatem, quia licet Deus sit in perfectione excellentissimus ut eius entitas omnia transcendit, ita est benignissimus ut sua dona quibuscumque communicet, et ideo sicut illi qui negant univocationem ipsam laudant quoad eius sublimitatem, ita isti quoad eius liberalissimam largitatem, nec tamen isti minus extollunt divinam excellentiam quia ipsam ponunt perfectum, non solum quoad excellentiam et sufficientiam sed etiam quoad redundantiam, unde Paulus eius divitias extollens Ro. 10 dicit quod Deus est dives in omnes ad quas divitias nos ipse perducat. Amen.

Therefore I say that being is said according to the same formal notion of God and creatures, although in no way according to the same reality, because, although God is most excellent in perfection so that his entity transcends all things, so also he is most kind so that he communicates his gifts to everyone, and therefore, just as those who deny univocity praise him according to his sublimity, so those [who affirm univocity praise him] according to his most liberal abundance, nor nevertheless do they [who affirm univocity] less extol the divine excellence because they posit it as perfect, not only as far as excellence and sufficiency but also as far as his overflowingness, whence Paul extolling his riches  says in Romans 10 that God is rich in all to which riches he will lead us. Amen.

New Volume of Studies on Scotus' Reportatio Published

A volume of studies on Scotus' Parisian Reportatio and its reception in Scotism is now available, as a part of the Recherches journal.  Available here.

Here is the table of contents:

John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis

369 - 376: Introduction
GORIS, Wouter, HONNEFELDER, Ludger


377 - 438: "John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata A Mystery Solved" 

DUMONT, Stephen D.


439 - 469: "Scotus in Paris. On Univocity and the Portions of the Soul"

GORIS, Wouter


471-492:" Problemfall Univokation. Die Univokation von ens reale und ens rationis im Kontext der Reportatio Parisiensis I-A"

MANDRELLA, Isabelle

"John Duns Scotus's Reportatio Parisiensis and the Origin of the Supertranscendentals" 

SMITH, Garrett R.


539 - 560: "Die Willenslehre des Duns Scotus im Spiegel seiner Schriften und im Lichte seiner Schüler" 

MÖHLE, Hannes

The Anonymous Scotist of Vat lat 869 on Analogy of Being

Here is some undigested Latin text on the analogy of being from the anonymous Scotist of Vat. lat. 869. This author wrote a collection of texts to be found in this manuscript such as some questions on the De anima, the Quaestiones ordinariae de conceptibus transcendentibus, and some spare questions on various topics. The manuscript has been variously studied by Longpre, Stella, and most recently Dumont.

Utrum materia per quodcumque agens possit separari a forma (Vat. lat. 869, f. 74ra-b):

“Secundum quod praemitto est quod ‘esse’ multipliciter dicitur, et est alterius rationis ut dicitur de forma et de materia. Et principalius et perfectius dicitur de forma quam de [d. f. q. iter.] materia, et hoc [sequitur exp.] habetur a philosopho II De anima secundum antiquam translationem, ubi dicitur sic: cum unum et esse multipliciter dicatur, quod proprie actus est. Sed quia ex isto secundo dicto posset inferri oppositum eius quod teneo, scilicet quod materia non dicat aliquam entitatem formaliter, sic arguendo: quando aliqua analogantur in aliquo et illud primo et formaliter reperitur in uno et in aliis non nisi per quandam attributionem, sicut patet de sanitate, quae realiter et formaliter est in animali, in aliis autem, puta in potione vel urina, non est formaliter. Si ergo esse analogice dicitur de materia et forma, cum proprie et formaliter dicatur de forma, non dicetur de materia nisi in quadam attributione ad formam, et ita, circumscripta forma, materia non habebit aliquod esse.

Ideo sciendum est quod etsi secundum aliquod genus analogiae sic fit quod illud in quo aliqua analogantur non habeat esse realiter et formaliter nisi in uno et in aliis non nisi per quandam attributionem, sicut patet in exemplo adducto, tamen non est hoc verum universaliter, sicut patet, nam non obstante quod ens analogice inveniatur in Deo et in creatura, esse tamen formaliter reperitur in creatura. Simile etiam est de bonitate et sapientia et aliis perfectionibus quae licet analogice dicantur de Deo et creatura formaliter et principaliter reperiantur in Deo, nihilominus tamen formaliter dicuntur de creatura. Idem etiam apparet de substantia et accidente, de quibus etsi analogice dicatur ens et principaliter dicatur de substantia, non tamen substantia est tota entitas formaliter sed etiam accidens formaliter dicitur ens.

Ad cognoscendum autem quando illud in quo plura analogantur sic se habeat quod tantum in uno reperiatur formaliter, sive tantum de uno dicatur formaliter, et puta de illo de quo dicitur principaliter et de aliis non dicatur formaliter sed per quandam attributionem, et quando dicatur de illis pluribus formaliter quae analogantur in eo licet principalius de uno quam de alio, do talem regulam: quandocumque illud in quo plura analogatur est tale quod, non obstante tali analogia eius, tamen conceptus dictus de pluribus dicitur secundum unam rationem de eis, ita quod tali analogiae est compossibilis univocatio universaliter omne tale in quo plura analogantur. Hoc modo etsi principalius dicatur de uno quam de aliis, nihilominus tamen formaliter dicitur de utroque, et hoc modo se habet genus respectu specierum et ens respectu substantiae et accidentis et etiam respectu Dei creaturae, sicut diffuse declaratum est in prima Quaestione ordinaria. Quando autem illud in quo plura analogantur est tale quod eius conceptus non est eiusdem rationis in illis quae analogantur in eo, sic dicitur principaliter de uno quod solum de illo dicitur formaliter, de aliis autem non nisi per quandam attributionem, et ita est in exemplo quod adducebatur; sic non dicitur analogice sanitas de animali et potione quod conceptus sanitatis non est eiusdem rationis, ut dicitur de animali et potione et urina, nam sanitas ut dicitur de animali accipitur pro aequalitate humorum, ut autem dicitur sanitas de urina accipitur pro quadam significativo sanitatis ut dicitur de potione accipitur pro quodam causatio sanitatis constat autem quod isti tres conceptus sunt diversi et non sunt eiusdem rationis et ideo sanitas ut dicit aequalitatem humorum inon reperitur formaliter nisi in animali in aliis autem non nisi per attributionem ad istam sanitatem.”

Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de ente, q. 3

Another translation, made originally for a class I taught last fall.

[Quaestio 3: Whether the concept of being is maximally first]

To the third we proceed thus:

And it seems that the concept of being is not maximally first, ecause according to Porphyry, the ten categories are the ten first genera of things; therefore the concepts of the ten categories are maximally first; therefore the concept of being is not maximally first.

Furthermore, if the concept of being is maximally first, therefore the most general is not the most general. The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. Proof the consquence, because the most general is called that which does not have a supervening or superior genus according to Porphyry; but if the concept of being were maximally first, something would be superior to the most general; therefore, etc.

Furthermore, in I Posterior Analytics chapter on the position[status] of the categories it was proved that the resolution of all quidditative concepts stops at the highest point at the concepts of the ten categories; but resolution does not stop unless at the maximally first; therefore the concepts of the ten categories are maximally first.

Furthermore, in VII Metaphysics chapter 1 it is said thus: “something is said to be first in many ways, but substance is first of all with respecto reason [ratio], knowledge and time; therefore the concept of substance is maximally first.

This is confirmed, first by this which is said in the same place “first being and not some being,” that is not through some being, “but being indeed will be unqualifiedly [simpliciter] substance.” Second because in I De generatione chapter 7 it is said that being “unqualifiedly singifies the first according to each category,” that is, substance.

Contra: being is impressed [on the intellect] by a first impression, from [the] first [book] of Avicenna’s Metaphysics chapter 5, therefore the concept of being is unqualifiedly first.

[Response to the Question]

I respond: in that question I will first declare three conclusions, second I will exclude certain objections.

[Article 1]

Concerning the first [article], I show first that the quidditative concept of being is most common, second that only the concept of being is the most common among quidditative concepts, third that only the concept of being is maximally first.

[Conclusion 1: the quidditative concept of being is most common]

I show the first conclusion thus: that concept is most common whose extent [ambitus] nothing positive can escape; but nothing positive can escape the concept of being; therefore the concept of being is most common. And briefly, all philosophers and doctors agree in this conclusion.

{Whence Richard the Englisman [argues thus]: just as the first complex concept is founded in being by comparing it to its contradictory, namely, of every being or non-being, so it is necessary that the first incomplex concept be said of all most commonly, for a concept whic is includited in every concept and none of those [is included] in it is maximally first; but the quidditative concept of being according as it is being is of this kind; therefore etc.

Alexander [de Alessandria] in I sentences proves it to be thus: “that which contains infinite being by its primary division seems to be the widest concept.[1]}

[Conclusion 2: the concept of being alone is the most common quidditative concept]

I deduce the second conclusion thus: there is no special being which is predicated of everything (this is clear); but being is predicated of everything; therefore only the concept of being is the most common.

And this is to argue thus: the highest community cannot befall a concept determined to a certain genus or to a special mode of being; but ever concept other than the concept of being is of this kind; therefore the highest community is able to befall non other concept than the concept of being.

[Conclusion 3: only the concept of being is maximally first]

I deduce the third conclusion thus: a grade of primacy in concepts is attained according to a grade of communit; but only the concept of being has the highest grade of community, from the preceding; therefore among all concepts only the concept of being has the highest grade of primacy, and consequently is maximally first. The major is clear from that common [vulgata] proposition ‘how much more common, so much prior’.

Furthermore, ‘it is impossible for the same at the same time to be and not to be’ is unqualifiedl first in complex [concepts], as all say, therefore the proper concept of being is unqualifiedly first in incomplex [concepts]. The consequence is clear, because the order of complex concepts est according to the order of incomplex concepts, whence just as complex concepts depend on incomplex [concepts] for truth and knowability, so they depend for communit and primacy.

Furthermore, a concept to which only the first negation is opposed is alone unqualifeidly maximally first; but the first negation is opposed in the first place only to the concept fo being; therefore only the concept of being is unqualifiedly maximally first. The major is clear, because the order of negations is according to the order of affirmations. The minor is clear, because the first negation is non-being [non-esse], and that is opposed in the first place only to being [esse].

Furthermore, what “is said through superabundance befalls only one alone” according to the Philosoher in the book of the Topics, therefore in incomplex concepts the highest primacy befalls one alone; but this cannot befall any other concept than the concept of bieng, to which befalls the highest community; therefore the highest primacy befalls only the concept of being.

Furthermore, a concept that is ultimate by the ultimate ultimacy and first by the first primacy is unqualifiedly first; but the concept of being is of this kind; therefore only the concpet of being is unqualifiedly first. The major is clear, for, as it was said in the second question of the prologue of the Sentences,[2] there are grades in primacies and ultimacies, so that the ultimate in resolving and the first in composing est unqualifiedly first. The minor is clear, because the concept of being is most common.

[Article 2]

[Objections]

Concerning the second [article,] it can be objected against the aforesaid. First, thus: that in which something agree is more commmen than them; but the concept of being and the the quidditative special concepts agree in a quidditative concept; therefore a quidditative concept is more common than the concept of being and the other special concepts. The minor is clear, because the concept of being is quidditative and the other special concepts are quidditative.

Furthermore, second thus: just as being is formally distinguished from non-being, so non-being from being; therefore a formality is common to being and to non-being, and consequently it is more common than being.

Futhermore, third thus: when something befalls many, it is necessary that something common is found in them; but to be predicated befalls being and non-being; therefore the concept of a name is more common than the concept of being. The minor is clear because a negation is non-being and a privation is non-being and nothing is non-being. The major is clear from [book] I of the Posterior Analytics.

Furthermore, fourth thus: to be signified by a name is common to being and non-being; but the concept of being is not common to non-being; therefore the concept of a name is more common than the concept of being.

Furthermore, fifth thus: what are of equal extent [ambitus] are of equal community; but the one, the true and the good are of equal extent with being, for they are convertible with it; theerefore they are of equal community, and consequently non solum conceptus entis est communissimus.

[Response to the Objections]

As evidence of the foregoing I say first that community in concepts can be understood in four ways: first in the order of the categories, secund in the order of the concepts of real beings, third in the order of howsoever[qualitercumque] beings, fourth in the order of the transcendentals. In teh first order the concepts of the most general are the most common and unqualifiedly first, in the second the transcendental concepts common to God and creatures, and substance and accident, in teh third the concept of being common to real being and being of reason, or to being in the soul and to being outside the soul, which is the same, and this community is treated in VI Metaphysics, in the fourth [order] the proper concept of being which indeed is common to the one the true and the good and the other proper passions [of being], not by a community of formal predication, but of denominative predication and virtual containment, as has to be explained below. From the forgoing it is clear that simply speaking only the proper concept of being is most common and maximally first.

To the first [objection]: against this should be said that perhaps [the term] ‘concept’, as some say, is not a name of first intention. It is not, however, unsuitable for many second intentions to agree in something of this kind, just as noting of first intention is common to the categories according to some and nevertheless they [i.e. the categories] agree in this intention which is ‘category’, and the ten most general [categories] in the intention which is ‘most general’ and the same, it seems, can be said about [the term] ‘quidditative’.

To the second [objection]: it is clear through the same, for ‘formality’ as some say, seems to be a second intention.

Against this: a second intention is founded in a first [intention] and consequently presupposes it; but non-being is not a first intention; therefore a second intention cannot be founded in non-being, and consequently neither ‘formality’.

It is confirmed, because what is founded in nothing is nothing; but the formality of non-being, if it is posted, is founded in nothing; therefore the formality of non-being is nothing. The major is evident. The minor is clear, because either something positive is subject to it or nothing. If nothing, I have what is proposed. If something positive, therefore it is not non-being which is posited non-being.

Therefore I say otherwise that just as no intelligibility per se befalls non-being or nothing, so no formality befalls it per se.

To the form [of the objection]: I deny the consequence, because it fails by a fallacy of the consequent. For ‘this is distinguished form that’ can be understood in two ways: in one way that ‘this’ means one formality and ‘that’ another formality, of which neither is the other; in another way because ‘this’ means a formality and the other means a mere negation of a formality. Therefore to infer determinately commits the fallacy of the consequent. To the antecedent I concede that being is formally distinguished from non-being and non-being from being, but not in a similar way, because being is distinguished from non-being through its own formal character[rationem], but non-being is not formally distinguished from from being through its formal character[rationem], because it does not have one, but because it is a formal negation of the character [ratio] of being.

To the third [objection]: I say that that to which is nothing, neither in reality nor in the intellect, it does not befall to be predicated, and therefore I deny the minor, if non-being is taken thus. To the proof I say that just as the intellect grasps within itself the predication ‘nothing is nothing’, so it grasps each extreme, and so each extreme is something in the fiction of the intellect.

To the contrary: with every act of the intellect circumscribed, this predication ‘nothing is nothing’ is true, therefore from its own terms it has truth and not from the intellect.

I respond: predication is an act of reason [ratio], therefore with every act of reason circumscribed there is no predication, and so that predication, with the act of the intellect circumscribed, is neither true nor false, because under such a hypothesis it can in no way be made.

You might say, therefore whence does it have truth?

I respond: from this that the intellectus conceives those negations in the mode of positives and imposes names to them, from which [names] it composes an enunciation.

To the contrary: a negation cannot be a cause of truth, for “from this that a thing is or is not, speech is called true or false,” from the book of the Categories.

I respond: a negation is not per se the cause of some truth unless negatively. Therefore propositions of this kind have truth from the terms being conceived, but nevertheless this ‘conceived’ or ‘understood’ being is granted them only through the act of the intellect.

To the fourth [objection] I concede that the concept of a name is more common than the concept of being as it is taken in the second of the aforenamed orders, nevertheless it is below the community of being as it is taken in the tird order. Through this mode the aforegoing objections can be solved.

To the fifth [objection] I say that her he speaks about quidditative concepts, not about qualitative [concepts]. But the concepts of unity and truth and goodness are qualitative concepts, as will be shown later.[3] And therefore only the concept of being is the most common and maximmaly first among quidditative concepts. To the form [of the objection] therefore it should be said that concepts of this kind are of equal extent as far as their supposits are concerned, not nevertheless are they of the same formal character [ratio], because that one is quidditative, those are qualitative.[4]

[To the principal arguments]

To the first principal [argument] I concede that the concepts of the most general are first only in the first order, and therefore the consequence does not proceed.

To the second: I deny the consequence. To the proof it should be said that although the do not have a supervening genus, as that one says, nevertheless they have some superior concept, as has been proven.

To the third I say that he does not speak unless about quidditative categorical predicates, and in their order there is a state [status], as he proves for the ten highest [categories].

To the fourth it should be said that he speaks about substance in comparison to accidents, not in comparison to whatever concept, whence only the proper concept of being is unqualifiedly first, al least by primacy of adequation.

To each confirmation it is clear through the same [argument].

---

[1] The text in curly brackets is present in only two manuscripts and seems to have been added in the margin of the De ente by Petrus Thomae after manuscripts of the work had begun to circulate.

[2] That is, in the second question of the prologue of Petrus Thomae’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum. I have not identified the passage.

[3] In Quaestiones de ente q. 12.

[4] That is, the concept of being is quidditative, the concepts of the coextensive attributes [passiones] of being are qualitative.