Promotion of Francis of Meyronnes

Well, it's the anniversary we have all been waiting for, the date of the letter which promoted Francis of Meyronnes to being a master of theology. Here is a screen shot from the CUP.

Francis of Meyronnes early defense of the univocity of being

Francis of Meyronnes is probably the most influential and important Scotist of the fourteenth century. His many works survive in hundreds of manuscripts and many were printed in the early days of the printing press. His commentary on the Sentences exists in three versions, called 'ab oriente', 'summa simplicitas' and Conflatus. He became a master in 1323 by decree of the pope after lecturing at Paris.

My post is about the first of the three commentaries. In the 'ab oriente' commentary, most likely to be Francis' first discussion of the univocity of being (given the lack of editions, we cannot be sure; it does not matter much, however, for Francis tends to recycle his arguments), he establishes a series of principles, which he calls regulae, and then derives conclusions from them. basically, the regulae are topical rules or 'maximal propositions' as explained in Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's Topics. It is a fairly interesting dicussion, concluding with a series of doubts. I translate and paraphrase these rules and doubts here.

Franciscus de Mayronis, In Sent. I d. 22 'ab oriente'.

Regulae:

R1. whenever some intellect is certain about one concept and doubtful about two [concepts], the certain concept is univocal to the two doubtful ones.

R2. Whenever some intellect is certain about one concept and doubful about either of two others, that certain concept befalls both according to the same formal notion.

R3. no equivocal has a concept distinct from its equivocates.

R4. no one can have scientific knowledge of the equivocal, while its equivocates are unknown.

R5: anyone can have scientific knowledge of univocals.

R6: no proposition in which there is an equivocal term can be verified unless for some of its equivocates.

R7: some proposition in which there is a univocal term cannot be verified for some univocate.

R8: nothing befalls an equivocal that does not befall some equivocate.

R9: something can befall a univocal that does not befall some univocate.

R10: the subject of every science is univocal to everthing about which something is demonstrated in that science.

R11: no attribute primarily befalling some subject can be demonstrated unless of those of which the subject befalls univocally.

R12: nothing can be demonstrated of an equivocal.

R13: every attribute which befalls something not primarily is demonstrated of something common to itself and some other.

R14: the truth of some principle does not extend unless to the univocates of its subject.

R15: no principle extends itself unless to the univocates of its predicate.

R16: no principle can be equivocal.

R17: whenever something common is said of one thing in an unqualified way (simpliciter) and of another in a qualified way (secundum quid), it is not said of them univocally.

R18: whenever something common is said of some things in a prior and posterior way (per prius et posterious), it is not univocal to them.

R19: when [something] is said of them according to more and less, it is not univocal to them.

R20: every common which is not said univocally of some things, is said of them equivocally.

Conclusiones:

C1: being (ens) is said univocally of God and creatures (from R1, R2, R5, R7, R9, R10, R11, R13, R14, R15).

C2: being is not said equivocally of God and creatures (from R3, R4, R6, R8, R12, R16).

C3: being is not said analogically of God and creatures, insofar as analogy is taken to be a middle way between equivocity and univocity (from R20).

C4: being is said univocally of substance and accident (from R1, R2, R5, R7, R9, R10, R11, R13, R14, R15, R16).

C5: substance is not equivocal to substance and accident (from R3, R4, R6, R8, R12, R16).

C6: being is said univocally of the absolute and relative (from R1, R2).

C7: being is not said of them [=the absolute and relative] equivocally (from “the same rules as above”).

C8: being is not said equivocally but univocally of the ten categories (from “the same rules”).

C9: being is said univocally of everything contained in the ten categories (from a rule in Aristotle’s Categories).

C10: the notion of the absolute is said univocally of all absolute categories (from “the rules stated above”).

C11: ‘relative’ is said univocally of all relative categories (from R1?, “other rules”).

C12: ‘accident’ is said univocally of the nine categories (from R1, “other rules”).

C13: being is not said univocally of real being and being of reason (from R17, R18, R19).

C14: being is said equivocally of real being and being of reason (from R20).

C15: our intellect cannot form one concept that is common to real being and being of reason (no appeal to a regula).

C16: those who posit such a concept (that is, a concept univocally common to real being and being of reason) have that unity in imagination and not in the intellect (no appeal to a regula).

C17: the division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul is of an utterance (vox) into what is signified (no appeal to a regula).

C18: the ratio of being is said of being in potency and being in act (no appeal to a regula).

Difficultates:

D1: why being is not a genus, even though it is said of many things in different species.

D2: if being were a genus, whether God would be in the genus of being.

D3: why it is denied that being is a genus, since if it were, God would not be in it (from D2).

D4: if the formality of being (ratio entis) is included in something that is irreducibly simple.

D5: if the formality of being can be included in things that are primarily diverse.

D6: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some transcendental.

D7: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some transcendental that is constituted from divided and dividing being.

D8: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some category.

D9: if the formality of being is included in some pure perfection.

D10: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some genus or species.

D11: if the formality of being is included quidditatively in some individual immediately corresponding to it.

D12: whether the formality of being is included universally in something other than a quiddity.

D13: if some transcendental is included quidditatively in some quiddity.

D14: why it is not the case that being is part of the quiddity of substance in the way that substance is part of the quiddity of humanity or of body.

D15: if the formality of being taken with an inferior is only accidentally one.

D16: if the formality of being taken with an inferior can make one concept.

D17: if an inferior of being can be conceived without being.

D18: if being would be part of the quiddity of something.

D19: if the attributes (passiones) of being can be conceived without being.

D20: why the formality of being does not make a composition with its inferiors the way the formality (ratio) of a genus does with its differences.

D21: if it is necessary to posit two orders (coordinationes) of being.

D22: if those two orders are from the nature of the thing (ex natura rei)

D23: if to abstract one common concept is repugnant to everything that is primarily diverse.

D24: whether there is some common concept that embraces everything other than nothingness.

D25: if the notion of nothingness is adequate to the notion of non-being.

D26: if every non-being can said to be nothing.

D27: if there is some common attribute for everything that is separate from the notion of nothing.

D28: if there is some formality (ratio) more common than the formality of univocal being.

D29: if everything separate from the notion of nothing is contained under equivocal being.

D30: if being taken equivocally is the subject of that principle ‘affirmation or negation of whatever being’.

D31: if being univocally taken can be the subject in that principle.

D32: if that principle has some subject that is adequate and common to itself.

D33: what is that common subject that can be attributed to such a principle?

D34: if intelligibility can be an attribute of everything of which this principle is verified.

D35: if intelligibility is distinct from its subject from the nature of the thing.

D36: if that attribute, intelligibility, is absolute or relative.

D37:  if that principle ‘affirmation of whatever’ etc. can have place in that subject, nor does it prescind from this attribute of intelligibility.

D38: if that metaphysical principle is verified of beings of reason.

D39: if the predicate of that principle is ‘to be or not to be’.

D40: concerning the division of being. This difficultas is subdivided into fifteen conclusiones:

            DC 1: the division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul is not a division of univocals but rather equivocals.

            DC 2: just as entity is said equivocally and univocally, so also is reality.

            DC 3: the same is true of the other attributes of being.

            DC 4: the division of being into substance and accidents is not quidditative.

            DC 5: division is of a common notion of something divided into quidditative and non-quidditative.

            DC 6: division of being into act and potency is not quidditative.

            DC 7: division of being into the finite and infinite is not quidditative.

            DC 8:  the same is true of the division of being through the contingent and the necessary.

            DC 9: the same is true of the division of being through the existing and non-existing.

            DC 10: the same is true of the division of being through the real and the non-real, with the latter taken as in objective potency.

            DC 11: the division of being into the simple and the complex is not quidditative.

            DC 12: the division of being into the absolute and relative is quidditative.

            DC 13: only that (i.e. DC 12) division of being is quidditative.

            DC 14: that (DC 12) is the first division of being.

            DC 15: being cannot be divided immediately into the ten categories.

Mayronis on the Analogy of Being

 Just in time for Christmas I have uploaded a fresh collation of Mayronis' Conflatus q. 12, the question on analogy, to the Digital Conflatus. There is some interesting annotation identifying the opinions of the Scotists, Thomists, Artists, and Aureolists, though the content of the question is not terribly exciting. Mayronis rejects analogy at least for the purposes of philosophy and theology (whether he accepts 'real' analogy remains to be seen). The basic reason is how he classifies analogy, which he does by placing it under equivocity, like Boethius and most of the Latin tradition.

Digital Conflatus

 Here. Don't laugh. Volunteers welcome.

Scotist analogy

A new essay on the Scotist analogy of being (analogia entis) has appeared. Here is the abstract.

It is widely believed today that John Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the univocity of being ushered in various deleterious philosophical and theological consequences that resulted in the negative features of modernity. Included in this common opinion, but not examined, is the belief that by affirming univocity Scotus thereby also denied the analogy of being (analogia entis). The present essay challenges this belief by recovering Scotus’s true position on analogy, namely that it obtains in the order of the real, and that complex concepts of creatures are analogically related to complex concepts of God. Scotus’s doctrine is then compared to the later Scotist tradition. The common opinion of the Scotist school from the fourteenth century onward followed Scotus’s position on analogy and considerably expanded upon his scattered remarks.

John Foxal on the First Complex Principle

In light of this previous post on the univocity of the principle of non-contradiction, here are some remarks on the same topic from John Foxal, the fifteenth-century English Scotus who spent his career in Italy teaching at Rome and Bologna. Foxal was also part of the circle of Bessarion and became bishop of Armagh but died before taking up his see.

A possibly necessary piece of background terminology: Scotists typically refer to the principle of non contradiction as the first complex principle. The principle of non contradiction contains being as its subject, and so being is called the first incomplex principle.

The following text is from a commentary Foxal wrote at Bologna on the first question of Scotus' Ordinatio, dated to 1465.

"Contra: certum est” etc. pro hoc argumento nota quod prima quaestio prologi Conflatus Francisci de Maronis maxime valet ad confutandum hanc opinionem Henrici, quia in illa multipliciter probatur et demonstratur primum principium tenere in theologia, et ita bene formari in Deo sicut in creaturis et ita applicari ad spiritualia et insensibilia sicut ad corporalia et sensibilia vel materialia. Non adduco autem aliqua de quaestione illa, quia ubique habetur et eandem viam tenet Scotus hic, arguendo contra Henricum. Etiam pro hoc est Aristoteles in pluribus locis qui vult primum principium ita bene applicari ad conclusiones non sensibiles sicut sensibiles, nam in libris Metaphysicae agit principaliter de substantiis non sensibilbus, ut patet in pluribus locis et maxime in 2. xi. et 12, et in 4 libro agit per totum de primo principio complexo ubi ponit illas proprietates qua ponit Franciscus ubi supra in principio quaestionis. Et utique mirum esset quod in illis praedictis libris dixisset tot et tanta de primo principio complexo si voluisset quod illud excludetur a rebus insensibilibus et separatis a materia de quibus agit ibi, et principalius de ipsis tractat librosque Metaphysicae omnes propter illas principaliter ordinavit.

Et ad litteram Doctoris revertendo et probando antecedens ipsius patet quod ita bene potest sciri ab intellectu nostro quod impossibile est quod unus angelus simul sit et non sit, vel descendendo ad specialiores terminos quod idem angelus sit materialis et non materialis aut sensibilis et non sensibilis, sicut quod idem lapis simul sit et non sit, aut simul sit durus et non durus, et sic de aliis, et ita bene poterit primum principium applicari ad insensibilia sicut ad sensibilia, ergo vana est responsio illa.

Translation:

"Contra: it is certain" [this is a lemma from Scotus' Ord.] for this argument note that the first question of the prologue of the Conflatus of Francis of Meyronnes is maximally valid for refuting this opinion of Henry, because in that it is proved in many ways and demonstrated that the first principle holds in theology, and so also it can be formed in God just as in creatures and so applied to spiritual and insensible just as to corporeal and sensible or material [matters]. I do not adduce anything from that question [of Francis], because it is found everywhere and Scotus holds the same way here, arguing against Henry. Also for this is Aristotle in many places, who intended that the first principle be applied to substances and non sensibiles just as to sensibiles, for in the books of the Metaphysics he treats principally of substances and non sensibles, as is clear in many places, most of all in [books] II, XI, and XII, and in the fourth book he treats throughout about the first complex principle where he posits those properties which Francis posits above in the beginning of the question [i.e. Conflatus prol. q. 1]. And indeed it would be marvellous that in those aforesaid books he would have said to much about the first complex principle if he had intened that that be excluded from insensible things and separated from matter about which he treats there, and principally about them he treated and ordered the books of the Metaphysics principally on account of them.

And returning to the letter of the Doctor and proving his antecedent, it is clear that well indeed it can be known by our intellect that it is impossible that one angle at once is and is not, or by descending to more special terms that the same angel is material and not material or sensible and non sensible, just as the same stone at once is and is not, or at once is rough and not rough, and thus for others, and so can the first principle be applied to insensibles just as to sensibles, therefore that response [of Henry's] is vain.

Franciscus de Mayronis and Petrus Thomae: The Principle of non-contradiction is univocally common to God and creatures

The claim that the principle of non contradiction (PNC) is univocally common to God and creatures is a common one in early Scotism. I give below the summary conclusions from the prologue of Mayronis' Conflatus redaction of his commentary on the Sentences. There is a link to Latin text on the sideboard of the blog.

Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, prol. q. 1 a. 2.

Conclusio 1: "First is that that principle or its truth is found formally in creatures" [a proof follows; here I give only a little text in what follows]

Conclusio 2: "The second conclusion is that the truth of the principle is formally found and also holds in God, because where the conclusion, there the principle, just as before. In God is found the truth of that, namely that God is eternal or non eternal, which are conclusions of the first principle."

Conclusio 3: "The third conclusion is that it is found under the same ratio in God and in creatures" [several arguments follow]

Conclusion 4: "The fourth conclusion follows from the third, from which under the same formal ratio it is found in God and creatures it follows that one and the same is found in God and creatures."

perhaps if I have time, I will translate this whole section.

Update:

Here is the text from Petrus Thomae's Reportatio, d. 1 q. 1:

Tertiadecima ratio formatur ex tertiadecima maxima sic: omnis principii veritas se extendit ad univoca sui subiecti et nullo modo ad aequivoca; sed veritas huius principii ‘de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio’ vera se extendit ad ens creatum et increatum, finitum et infinitum etc. ergo creatum et increatum finitum et infinitum sunt univoca sui subiecti; sed subiectum eius est ens; ergo ens est univocum ad ens creatum et increatum, finitum et infinitum; ergo.

The thirteenth argument is formed from the thirteenth maxim thus: the truth of every principle extends itself to the univocals of its subject and in no way to equivocals; but the truth of this proposition 'affirmation or negation of whatever' truly extends itself to created and uncreated being, finite and infinite, etc.; therefore created and uncreated, finite and infinite are univocals of its subject; but the subject of it is being; therefore being is univocal to created being and uncreated being, finite and infinite; therefore,

Franciscus de Mayronis on Univocity

Here is the conclusion to a question on univocity of being probably by Francis of Meyronnes that I transcribed today.

Ideo dico quod ens dicitur secundum eandem rationem formalem de Deo et creatura, licet nullo modo secundum eandem realitatem, quia licet Deus sit in perfectione excellentissimus ut eius entitas omnia transcendit, ita est benignissimus ut sua dona quibuscumque communicet, et ideo sicut illi qui negant univocationem ipsam laudant quoad eius sublimitatem, ita isti quoad eius liberalissimam largitatem, nec tamen isti minus extollunt divinam excellentiam quia ipsam ponunt perfectum, non solum quoad excellentiam et sufficientiam sed etiam quoad redundantiam, unde Paulus eius divitias extollens Ro. 10 dicit quod Deus est dives in omnes ad quas divitias nos ipse perducat. Amen.

Therefore I say that being is said according to the same formal notion of God and creatures, although in no way according to the same reality, because, although God is most excellent in perfection so that his entity transcends all things, so also he is most kind so that he communicates his gifts to everyone, and therefore, just as those who deny univocity praise him according to his sublimity, so those [who affirm univocity praise him] according to his most liberal abundance, nor nevertheless do they [who affirm univocity] less extol the divine excellence because they posit it as perfect, not only as far as excellence and sufficiency but also as far as his overflowingness, whence Paul extolling his riches  says in Romans 10 that God is rich in all to which riches he will lead us. Amen.

New Simpson Translations

Some more news: Peter Simpson (webpage here) has recently completed a translation of Franciscus de Mayronis' Tractatus de univocatione entis, probably an excerpt from the Conflatus. He has also started translating a commentary on the Sentences attributed to Antonius Andreas. Simpson notes in the preface to the latter translation that:

The Subtle Doctor’s theology, just as such and without the scholars' qualifications and updatings, deserves to much more widely known and so needs to be made available in easier forms. Not everyone has to be a scholar or familiar with the scholars' findings to attain a basic and salutary grasp of Scotism.

Franciscus de Mayronis on Metaphysics

Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus prol. q. 14 (ed. Venezia 1520, 8vb):

...metaphysica accipitur dupliciter: uno modo ut tractat de ente ut ens est, et tunc isto modo nihil cognoscitur de Deo nisi praecise ea quae sequuntur ens in quantum ens. Alio modo ut considerat de aliis contentis sub ente, et isto modo considerat de Deo. Et quia Deus inter cetera quae continentur sub ente est quid nobilissimum, hinc est quod metaphysica quae considerat de Deo est summa et nobilissima. Unde Augustinus vocat platonicos philosophos theologos.

'Metaphysics' is understood in two ways. In one way as it treats of being qua being, and in that way the only things that are known about God are those which follow upon being qua being. In the other way as it considers other things contained under being, and in that mode it considers God. And because God is the most noble thing among those which are contained under being, hence it is that the metaphysics which treats of God is the highest and noblest. Whence Augustine calls the platonic philosophers theologians.

A step on the road to the distinction between general and special metaphysics.

Francis of Meyronnes on whether there is a transcendental notion more common than being

Now that the Philosophers have finished their work, it is time for things to go back to normal here at The Smithy. We (that is, I) shall return to the dusty stacks of the library, leaving behind the world of Things that Matter, matters of contemporary philosophical relevance, for some classic Smity latinophilic blogging: an obscure text by an obscure writer on a topic that is currently being discussed privately by my co-blogger and I (co-blogger: see esp. concl. 4).

Here are four conclusions from Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus prologus q. 13 (ed. Venezia 1520, ff. 18rb sqq.).

Utrum sit aliqua ratio transcendens communior ente

[...]

Pono igitur quattuor conclusiones:
Prima est quod licet nulla ratio intentionis primae sit communior, tamen ratio aliqua secundae intentionis est communior ente.

[...]

Secunda conclusio quod in respectibus transcendentibus aliquid est communius ente, quia quaecumque sunt distincta, distinctio est eis communis et communior quolibet illorum. Quaecumque etiam sunt ordinata, ordinatio etiam est eis communior; huiusmodi sunt ista ens, verum, bonum; omnia enim sunt distincta et ordinata; ergo etc.

Tertia conclusio quod in aptitudinalibus est aliquid communius ente, nam quod dicitur de ente et de aliis ab ente est communius ente; huiusmodi sunt istae aptitudines, scilicet intelligibilitas, volibilitas, etc.

Quarta conclusio quod in privativis est aliquid communius ente, nam privatio est communior quae dicitur de ente et de aliis ab ente; sed non solum ens, sed et alia ab entitate, scilicet passiones, quodlibet istorum est unum (veritas est una, bonitas est una, et sic de aliis); ergo etc.

Rough Translation:

I posit four conclusions:

The first is that although no ratio of first intention is more common than being, some ratio of a second intention is more common than being.

The second conclusion is that in transcendental relations something is more common than being, because whatsoever things are distinct, distinction is common to them and more common than each one of them. Whatsoever things are ordered, ordering also is more common than they are; of this sort are being, true, good, for all of them are distinct and ordered.

The third conclusion is that in aptitudinals there is something more common than being, for what is said of being and of others other than being is more common than being; of this sort are those aptitudes, namely intelligibility, volibility/willability(?), etc.

The fourth conclusion is that in privatives there is something more common than being, for privation is more common which is said of being and of others other than being; but not only being, but also other than entity, namely passions/attributes, for each one of these are one (truth is one, goodness is one, the same is true of the rest); therefore, etc.

Musings

As is well known, the two main doctrines in which the contemporary postmodern theological homogeneous hegemony faults Scotus are analogy and participation. I have responded to these charges in the "fundamental positions" series. Scotus is not interested in Thomistic analogy at all, but rather Henrician. His discussion is on the order of concepts, not reality. The Thomists, nouvelle theologists, Cambridge phantasists, Balthasarians and other hegemonists assume Scotus affirms univocity in the same sense that Aquinas rejects it. As for participation, it just never comes up. Scotus seems to just assume it's true on the "real", that is extramental, level.

Now the above-mentioned crowd (which includes Brad Gregory, who teaches at the premier American Catholic university and who - the rumor has it - has been promoted to a position of even higher prestige) generally takes Ockham as the logical development of Scotus' ideas. Which is a little strange doctrinally, as Ockham argues against Scotus all the time. Now maybe you might say, well, but he just takes things farther than Scotus was willing to go with 'potentia ordinata, absoluta' etc. Perhaps, perhaps, but then Scotus just goes farther than Aquinas is willing to go with the same distinction (this crowd never gives an explanation of how Scotus' use of potentia ordinata/absoluta is bad but Aquinas' use is good). But a far more likely guide to the "inheritance" if you will of Scotus is the (ahem) Scotist school (yes yes, debate over medieval schools is intractable, but there was a self-conscious Scotist school by 1320, the year of Pierre Roget' and Francis of Meyronnes' debate). I've started some preliminary research on F. of M.'s views on analogy and participation, and will report more on him later. (in the meantime, see this earlier post).

But another character springs to mind, the inestimable Petrus Thomae. I have been laboriously editing his QQ. de ente for the past three years (there are hundreds of isolated accidents per ms. per question). This work is probably the first independent treatise on the transcendentals ever written (depending on how one balances the relative chronologies of Peter thomae and Francis of Meyronnes, who also wrote a Tractatus de transcendentibus). Whether or not it was the first, it certainly is the longest. Francis of Meyronnes and John de Prato both weigh in at under 100 pages, while Petrus thomae's work is ca. 600. And what are the contents? Lengthy discussion of early 14th century critics of Scotus, massive quotations and discussion of the entire previous tradition concerning univocity and analogy, from Aristotle, Boethius and their commentators up through arabic philosophy to early 13th century authors such as Grosseteste, and yes, Aquinas.  Significantly for my present musings, Peter is all for the analogy of being (he has ten or twelve grades of analogy) as well as participation.

So perhaps Scotus' legacy consists in more rigorous versions of analogy and participation?

What is a Formality IV: Franciscus de Mayronis

For the previous posts in the series, see Petrus Thomae, Antonius Andreas, Nicolaus Bonetus. Today I am translating a question from Francis of Meyronnes, the French Scotist known as the Princeps Scotistarum in later ages. I haven't looked much into his commentaries on the Sentences, but apparently there are some three versions. He initially lectured at Paris in 1320, [a bunch of stuff then happened, before, voila] a final version known as the Conflatus appeared and was later printed several times. He died ca. 1328. For more information see the "Franciscan authors" website. What follows is only a translation, as the question is too long to type out in Latin in full.

Conflatus I d. 8 q. 5 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 48vb-49ra):

...Therefore I say that some distinction between the formal rationes or formalities and realities must be posited necessarily, and not as between formality and formality but as between formality and intrinsic mode.

For the evidence of which it must be known first what a formality is, second what an intrinsic mode is.

As far as the first, 'what a formality is', some [people] say that 'formality' is said from 'form', just as materiality is said from matter. And therefore some [people] say that there cannot be many formalities without many forms, just as neither many materialities without many matters.

Against this: that is a very coarse[grossa] and asinine imagination, which is clear from two reasons. First thus: because just as formality is said from form, so 'essential' from 'essence'. We, however, posit in the divine being many essential features, and nevertheless there are not there many essences, as is clear expressly through Blessed Dionysius cap. 3 De unica et discreta theologia. Therefore neither does a multitude of forms follow upon the position of many formal rationes as you say.

Second, because in the person of the Father in the divine being are posited many personal features, namely ungenerated, paternity, active spiration, all of which are personal features and nevertheless the person of the Father is single(unica); therefore, etc.

Furthermore, many material things, according to the ones speaking commonly, are posited in one composite, namely many material accidents; and nevertheless many matters are not posited there; so in man many human features, not nevertheless unless one man.

Therefore others say that formalities are real rationes which are posited in the same simple thing.

Against this: first because formalities are not only posited in simple things but also in composites, according to the ones positing the formalities. Therefore that is not a good description. Second because not all formalities are real, for man in potency has a formality and nevertheless not a reality. Likewise beings of reason have formalities but not realities.

Therefore others say that those formalities are certain modalities.

Against this: for the ones positing them divide them against modes. Second because modes are not able to be first in beings, because a mode is always posterior to that of which it is a mode; but formalities are posited simply first in beings, for the ratio of entity is a certain formality and the ratio of deity, which  are absolutely prior to all others.

Therefore others say that formalities are definitive rationes, for the definitive ratio of each one is called formal and it is clear that it is a formality.

Against this doubly: first because the categories are not definable, becasue they are absolutely simple  and nevertheless they have formalities by which they are formally distinguished [from each other]. Second because the ratio of being and ratio of deity are posited as formalities and nevertheless they cannot be defined because every definition is given through prior [features, such as genus and difference]; but than these [categories] nothing is prior.

I say therefore that a formality is a quiddity of each thing haveing a quiddity whether it is definable or not, because the formal ratio of each thing is that which is present in [inest] it in the first mode of predicating per se; such however are all quidditative [features, aspects].

Franciscus de Mayronis on Analogy

Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, Prologus q. 12 (ed. Venezia f. 8rb):

Whether being is said analogically of those things of which it is said.

I say that there are four ways of speaking. Some [people] say that it is said univocally because according to one notion [rationem]. Others say that equivocally because according to diverse notions. Others say that analogically because per prius of one and per posterius of others. Others say that [it is said] ambiguously. They distinguish this, however, from analogy because a certain thing is something according to one notion is said of two, nevertheless more perfectly of one than the other. For the other kind of analogy is what is said of one proprerly and of others by attribution to it. And that is reduced to equivocal.

With this premised, it is said that every term either is equivocal or univocal because when the definitions of some things are given by immediate contraries, they are immediately contrary; but equivocals and univocals are of this kind; therefore, etc.  But this is one definition, if being is said equally or unequally of its inferiors.

To this [argument] [we answer/respondetur] with four conclusiones. The first is that being is not predicated according to more and less. The second is that it is not predicated according to prior and posterior. Third that it is not predicated inequally. Fourth that it is not predicated dissimilarly.

They prove all those conclusions with one argument:  because when there is some essential predication, it cannot be varied per posterius; but quantitity of power is attended to according to more and less, prior and posterior, equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar.  All these are posterior to being and also those of which being is predicated; therefore they do not vary the predication of being which is essential. When therefore something is said to be more perfect than being, it is by something posterior to being and consequently in that prior in which the predication of being is made, it will be uniform.

[that's all, folks. It turned out to be less exciting than I had hoped when I initially saw the question title.]

Maverick Philosopher, Scholastic

The Maverick Philosopher takes a turn towards the substance abusers: Here.
See for example, Franciscus de Mayronis, Quodlibet q. 9 arg. prin. 1 (ed. Venezia 1520, ff. 244va): Utrum christianus sufficienter in theologia instructus possit defenere articulum creationis contra adversarios veritatis quantumcumque peritos.

And it is argued first that one such is not able: because it was a common concept among the philosophers that from nothing nothing is made; but that article [ie. creation, an article of faith] posits that something was made from nothing by divine power; therefore that article is against a common concept of the soul. That however which is against a common concept cannot be defened since it is against reason. 

But against: because Catholics firmly hold that God can create something from nothing. If however they are not able to defend this, they are not able to hold it firmly, although they can be convinced; and consequently they can be ripped away from that truth.

Now, most of the Scholastics, when they are wearing their philosopher's hats, deny that creation can be demonstrated, and in this part ways with the MP.  But wearing their theologian's hats they would agree with the MP (indeed, he mentions Aquinas). They explain the tension between the claim that 'from nothing, nothing is made' and creation ex nihilo precisely by appealing to accounts of divine cognition, i.e. the divine ideas.  For Scotus, see this post where he outlines his view of divine cognition. First, the divine intellect cognizes the divine essence, then in a series of stages it generates the essences of creatables in intelligible being, knows the essences, and reflects on them.  In other passages we learn that following the production into intelligible being, these creatable quiddities are generated into possible being in a later instant of nature (only essences containing non-repugnant terms make it into this instant) and in yet a later instant of nature the divine will actualizes some of these essences in actual existence.

Points of Disagreement between Scotists and Thomists

In 1320 there was a debate between two bachelors of theology at Paris, the Franciscan Francis of Meyronnes and the Cistercian Peter Roger, later Pope Clement V.  These two bachelors acted as the representatives of the nascent schools of Thomism and Scotism, and their debate was about the formal distinction and the instants/signa of origin and nature. For those interested in reading more, the dispute has been edited (mostly; at least one ms. was missed) and published by J. Vrin for a reasonable price under the title of Disputatio.  The section I translate here is from Francis of Meyronnes list of four points about the formal distinction that were commonly attacked at the time.

Francois de Meyronnes - Pierre Roger, Disputio (1320-1321), ed. J. Barbet, p. 102:

From those statements follow four conclusions in which our school is accustomed to be attacked.

The first is that one must grant some middle distinction between a real distinction and a distinction of reason fabricated by the soul, because that is a medium between some things that is related by the denial of each extreme; that distinction, however, is not posited as being real nor fabricated by the soul.

The second conclusion: that not every distinction outside the soul is real, since those distinctions are posited, with every act of the intellect circumscribed, and nevertheless they are called real. [Perhaps the "those" is a reference to the distinction between essence and relation in God].

The third conclusion: that in one reality can be found many formal rationes, because a formal ratio and a definitive [ratio] are the same and from this part, although there is only one thing [res], there are many formal or definitive rationes.

The fourth conclusion is that formal rationes are able to agree in one distinctly without any composition, because that one [Petrus Rogerius] concedes that a [combination of] likeness with whiteness causes no composition, although they have distinct quidditative rationes.

What are Intrinsic Modes?

Instrinsic modes are another of Duns Scotus' controversial contributions to philosophy, and are perhaps as obscure a feature as one can find in his system.  For Scotus these modes operate sort of like differences, in the Porphyrian sense of the term (Porphyry's differences contract a genus into species, Scotus' modes separate different degrees of intensity). I will save further discussion of Scotus' idea of intrinsic modes for a later post.  In this post I am giving a handy summary from the pseudo-Franciscus de Mayronis' Tractatus Formalitatum.  This treatise has long been known to be by pseudo-Francis; generally, medieval thinkers don't mention themselves by name in their own works, as does this tractate.  It is also described as being 'ad mentem Francisci', another clue.  This treatise is distinct from the genuine Formalitates of Francis, which appears to be an extract from his Conflatus. Not to give away too much from a certain forthcoming article, but the theory of distinction found in this treatise is not even Francis', who holds to a four-fold division of identity and distinction, but that of Petrus Thomae (seven kinds of identity and corresponding distinction).  I have some fantasies ('theories' would imply there was some facts at work) about how this fusion took place, but I'll keep them to myself. Pseudo-Francis' description of an intrinsic mode is that which advenes on a quiddity or forme without altering the definition. He thinks that there are nine kinds of modes, and given what these are, it is clear that multiple modes can befall the same quiddity.

pseudo-Franciscus de Mayronis, Tractatus formalitatum, a.2 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 263vb):

Quantum ad primum punctum, videlicet quid sit modus intrinsecus, dico talem conclusionem affirmativam: 'modus intrinsecus est ille que adveniens alicui forme seu quidditati non variat eius formalem rationem'. Verbi gratia: signetur albedo, tunc certum est quod aliqius modus competit secundum magis et aliquis secundum minus. Dato quod Sorti competat albedo ut trium graduum, Plato ut quatuor, ibi esset diversa participatio albedinis; non tamen esset variatio in ista ratione formali, quoniam Sortes est vere albus et Plato est vere albus, licet Plato albior sit Sorte.

Hanc etiam conclusionem probo sic: nullum posterius potest variare esse sui prioris; sed modus intrinsecus est posterior eo cuius est modus, scilicet quidditate; igitur modus intrinsecus non potest variare esse sui prioris. Consequentia tenet. Maior nota et minor patet, quia modus est adiecens rei determinatio.

[...]

Quantum ad secundum punctum sciendum quod novem sunt genera modorum intrinsecorum, videlicet finitum et infinitum, actus et potentia, necessarium et contingens, existentia, realitas et hecceitas...

Translation:

As far as the first point is concerned, namely what is an intrinsic mode, I give an affirmative proposition: 'an intrinsic mode is that which supervening on some form or quiddity does not alter the formal definition of that form or quiddity'. For example, let whiteness be designated/signified[?]. Then it is certain that some mode befalls it according to more and some mode which befalls it less. For with it given that whiteness befalls Socrates in the third grade, Plato in the fourth, there would be there diverse participations of whiteness; nevertheless there would not be any variation in its formal definition, since Socrates is truly white, although Plato is whiter than Socrates.

I also prove this conclusion thus: nothing posterior can alter the the being of its prior; but an intrinsic mode is posterior to that of which it is a mode, namely a quiddity; therefore an intrinsic mode is not able to alter the being of its prior.  The consequence holds. The major [premise] is known, the minor is clear because a mode is an adjacent determination of a thing.

[...]

According to the second point it should be known that there are nine genera of intrinsic modes, namely finite and infinite, act and potency, necessary and contingent, existence, reality and haecceity.

Franciscus de Mayronis, De quatuor signis naturae

This post will be continually updated as I transcribe this treatise of Francis of Meyronnes and as Michael translates it. In this particular redaction it is followed by an abbreviation of Petrus Thomae's De distinctione praedicamentorum redaction A. In the Krakow ms. it is attributed to Petrus Thomae, though this is clearly incorrect.

The treatise is also contained in the following mss. according to O. Weijers ["le travail intellectuel... textes et maitries" vol. 2 p. 98] and various others such as the Hannes Mohle and the Scotist commission:

Bologna, Archig. lat. 96 f. 80v

Erfurt, Amploniana, F 94 ff. 236-238

Krakow, BJ, Cod. 2130, ff. 1ra-4vb(?)

Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, I 148 inf.

Oxford, Bodleian library, Canon. Misc. 371 f. 236

Oxford, Merton College Library, Ms. 260, ff. 60r-61v

Praha, KMK, Ms. 1439, ff. 1-10

[Franciscus de Mayronis, De quatuor signis naturae]

K= Krakow, Bib. Jag., Ms. 2130

In creatura sunt quatuor signa principalia. Primum signum est quidditas.
Quidditas enim habet 7 signa que per ordinem hic assignantur: primum est ens, secundum absolutum, tertium est substantia, quartum corpus, quintum corpus animatum, sextum animal, septimum homo.

Secundum signum creature est modus intrinsecus qui distinguitur tam a formalitate cuius est modus quam a formalitate eius que non variat rationem formalem. Modus intrinsecus habet septem signa: primum est realitas, secundum est existentia, tertium est actualitas, quartum est contingentia, quintum est finitas, 6 est vita, 7 est heceitas.

Tertium signum principale creature est per se passionum et corrucorrespondet(?) primo signo nature, ideo tot habet signa quia de quolibet est aliqua passio ut patet intuenti. Passio habet 7 signa. In primo signo sunt passiones entis. In secundo signo sunt passiones modorum intrinsecorum. In tertio gna^o4(?). In quarto passiones subiectorum. In sexto passiones mediorum proximorum vel propinquorum. In alio passiones specialissimorum.

Quartum signum principale nature est eorum que accidentaliter insunt rei. Et istud distinguitur in novem signa secundum quod sunt novem predicamenta accidentium eorum que accidentaliter insunt rei. Primum est relatio, secundum quantitas, tertium ubi, quartum quando, quintum situs, 6 actio, septima passio, 8 qualitas, nonum habitus.

Primum signum est entitas que habet passiones quarum alique sunt modi intrinseci. Alie sunt divisiones et passiones sunt quidem(?) scilicet veritas, bonitas, unitas, realitas, aliqualitas; realitas est passio et modus intrinsecus entis. Divisiones autem sunt iste: prima est per respectivum et absolutum. Secunda est per potenciam et actum. Tertia est per dependens et independens. Quarta est per creatum et increatum. Quinta est per finitum et infinitum. 6 est per decem predicamenta. | [K 1rb]

Iste sunt distinctiones quia arguunt distinctas seu diversas realitates et inter diversas realitates oritur distinctio realis.

Secunda est quidditas sci3(?) absolutum habet suas passiones que de ipsa concluduntur demonstrative nam omnes entitates absolute(iter. K) concluduntur de suo subiecto passio autem absoluti est esse a se passio respectivi est esse ad aliud passio autem concluditur de suo subiecto sicut omnis entitas absoluta est ad se absolutum autem est quedam entitas absoluta ergo absolutum est a se idem dico per contrarium(?) de relativo.

Tertia quidditas sci3(?) substantia habet passiones suas que de se ipsa cooncluduntur demonstrative per conceptum superiorem si subiectum non habet diffinitionem ideo passio primo concluditur de ipsa per conceptum superiorem.

Quarta quidditas est corpus de quo passio eius concluditur eodem modo sicut dictum est de aliis quidditatibus et ceteris inferioribus.

Quinta quidditas est corpus animatum et habet passiones suas que de ipso concluduntur demonstrative nam omnis passio concluditur de suo subiecto demonstrative.

Sexta quidditas est animatis et habet passiones suas que de ipso concluduntur demonstrative

[7 quidditas i.m. K]

Secundum signum principale est modorum intrinsecorum qui(?) in septem signa distinguitur. In primo est realitas de quo primo est notandum quod realitas est fundamentum immediatum realis distinctionis nam inter duas formalitates semper cadit distinctio formalis sicut inter duas realtates distinctio realis. Nota quod inter modos intrinsecos creature realitas est communior quia in pluribus reperitur. In secundo est existentia. Circa quam notandum est quod realitas et existentia non causant distinctionem realem nec formalem set modalem solum, verbi gratia anima rationalis alium modum existendi habet extra corpus | [K 1va] et alium(sup. lin. K) in corpore et nichilominus(e. n. sup. lin. K). Iste modus non causat diversitatem in anima cum sit una realitas anime in corpore et extra corpus. Est autem modalis distinctio que oritur inter duos modos intrinsecos eiusdem vel alterius rationis sicut inter existentiam et realitatem. Nota quod existentia non distinguitur a realitate realiter nec formaliter set sicut modus intrinsecus ab alio modo alterius rationis.

In tertio est actualias. Circa quod notandum quod actualitas prout est modus intrinsecus non est actualitas forme set actus essendi cuiuscumque rei in esse reali et actuali. Nota quod actualitas ut actualitas est non causat cum alia actualitate distinctionem realem nec utique actualitati assit alia realitas verbi gratia actualitas forme et actualitas materie non causant distinctionem realem nec pro tanto materie et forme assunt diverse realitates.

In quarto contingentia. circa quod est notandum quod continegentia ut est modus intrinsecus modus est modus accidentis(accit’) vel contingentia possibilis ad esse vel ad non esse set illud quo res contingenter ponitur in esse et non necessario ideo contingentia universi est modus intrinsecus ipsius Dei. Nota etiam quod contingentia creature non distinguitur realiter a creatura set distinguitur ab ea ex natura reisicut modus intrinsecus a formalitate.

In quinto est finitas creata. Circa quod(sup. lin. K) notandum quod finitas et infinitas ut sunt modi intrinseci creatorum vel creature non sunt finitas vel infinitas extensiva quia secundum Philosophum primo Phisicorum quantitati congruunt set ut sunt intrinseci sunt quantitates virtuales(i.m. K) que essentialiter rei conveniunt. Nota etiam quod quantitas virtutis non distinguitur realiter ab esse cuius est modus intrinsecus set disitnguitur ex natura rei sicut est de aliis modis intrinsecis.

In sexto vita. Circa quod est notandum quod vivere est modus intrinsecus non est actus secundus set est actus primus rei viventis quia vivere ut actus secundus realiter | [K 1vb] distinctus a vivente ut autem est actus prmus sive modus intrinsecus non distinguitur realiter a vivente.

In septimo est heceitas ubi notandum est quod heceitas non est quiditas individua quia si esset quidditas individua que distinguuntur per heceitatem distinguerentur quidditative et tunc etiam individua possent diffiniri quod est contra Philosophum. Ex quo relinquitur quod heceitas sit modus intrinsecus cum non variet rationem formalem seu quidditatem.

Tertium signum principale est passio et corvudet(?) primo signo nature etiam tot habet signa quot primum signum quidditatum quia de qualibet quidditate est demonstrabilis aliqua passio ut patet intuenti. Illud ergo signum dividitur seu distinguitur in septem. In primo sunt passiones entis que superius sunt generalissimorum(? i.m. K) posite. In secundo sunt passiones modorum intrinsecorum sive diversorum. In tertio passiones generalissimorum(?) . In quarto sunt passiones subalnatorum(!) positorum remotorum. In quinto sunt passiones subalternorum mediorum. In sexto sunt passiones subalternatorum propinquorum. In alio sunt passiones specialissimorum unde quod cuilibet quidditati corvundet(?) aliqua passio per se et est demonstrabilis demonstratione propter quid. Nota etiam quod secundus modus passionis quidditatum convenit mathematice(?) non distinguitur a suis subicibibus(? sup. lin.) realiter quia maioris abstractionis sunt quam materialies que etiam realiter distinguuntur a suis subiectis sole enim passiones materiales secundum doctorem nostrum scilicet Scotum realiter distinguuntur a suis subiectis. Sunt enim predicte passiones idem realiter cum suis subiectis set distincte ab eis formaliter.

Quartum signum principale est eorum que accidentaliter insunt rei qualia sunt predicamenta accidentis. Et illud distinguitur in novem signa set quod sunt novem predicamenta | [K 2ra] accidentis. In primo est relatio quia relatio creature ad deum immediate fundatur in substantia et relatio idemptitatis secundum Philosophum fundatur super unum in substantia sicut est relatio quantitatis super unum in quantitate. In secundo est quantitas. Circa quod est notandum quod quantitas secundum suas species per accidens inest substantie et idem dico de quolibet predicamento accidentis. Et ideo omnia predicamenta realiter distinguuntur a substantia etiam contra se invicem quia que per accidens insunt alicui distinguuntur ab eo. In tertio est predicamentum ubi quod est ordo parcium in toto ubi vero est circumscrptio corporis locati a loci circumscriptione procedens. Item ex alio differunt quia ubi est secundus modus extrinsecus adveniens potentia autem est in predicamento quantitatis ut est species. In quarto signo est quando. Circa quod est notandum quod quando est illud quod derelinquitur ex adiacencia temporum(i.m. K) et habet habitudinem ad tempus sicut passio quantitatis ad quantitatem. Nota etiam quod predicamentum ubi precedit quando quia ubi est(sup.lin. K) respectus extrinsecus qui innascitur(?) ex habitudinem permanentis ad permanens quando est respectus qui innascitur ex habitudine successivi. In quinto est situs. Circa quod est notandum quod situs est respectus extrinsecus qui innascitur ex habitudine corporis situantis ad situatum. Et differt situs a poe(?) quia situs est habitudo tocius ad totum secundum omnes suas partes. Po(?) est habitudo parcium secundum partes secundum habitudinem tocius ad totum. In sexto est actio que est respectus extrinsecus causatus ex habitudine activi ad passum facta debita approximatione quia agens phisicum(?) non agit nisi in debite approximatum. In septimo est passio qui est respectus extrinsecus causatus ex habitudini activi ad passum et habet se modo opposito quo effectus ad causam. Nam passio est effectus illatio(?) que actionis. In octavo est qualitas que est predicamentum absolutum. Qualitas oritur a substantia. Post istos omnes respectus | [K 2rb] In nono est habitus qui est respectus extrinsecus ex habitudine habentis ad habitum quia habitus alienum predicamentum est et maxime extrinsecum.

[Petrus Thomae, Parve formalitates = abbreviatio questionis de distinctione predicamentorum redactionis A]

In presenti materia declaranda servabitur sequens ordo: in primo tractabitur quot sunt modi distinctionum a doctoribus, secundo qui sit unaqueque illarum distinctionum, tertio ad evidenciam formalitatum plura dicta declarabuntur, quarto ad quesitum principale respondebitur.

Quantum ad primum articulum primo ponam tria dicta, secundo de qualibet distinctione in speciali videbitur.

De primo sit primum istud dictum quod septem sunt modi distinctionum. Prima est distinctio rationis, secunda est ex natura rei, tertia formalis, quarta realis, quinta essencialis, sexta se totum subiective, septima se totum obiective quod omnia que distinguuntur in mundo distinguuntur aliqua istarum distinctionum.

Tertium dictum est quod tot modis dicitur unum oppositorum quot modis et reliquum ut habetur per Philosophum primo Thopicorum. Idem et distinctio sunt opposita ideo quot modis dicitur distinctio sive diversitas tot modis dicitur idemptitas et ergo sicut septem sunt modi distinctionum per oppositum septem sunt ideptitates.

Tertium dictum est quod predicti modi aliter se inferunt cum idemptitate et aliter cum distinctione aliter autem affirmative aliter negative. Ubi est sciendum quod quecumque distinguuntur distinctione(i.m. K) sex precedentibus vel quecumque distinguitur aliis quecumque set non oportet de septima et sic de aliis eodem modo procedendo. Cum idemptitate vero est per oppositum.

Quantum ad secundum dictum principale est sciendum quid sit distinctio rationis, secundo quid sit distinctio ex natura rei, tertio quid sit distinctio formalis | [K 2va] quarto realis quinto essentialis sexto se totum subiective septimo se totum obiective iuxta primum dico quod distinctio rationis est illa que habet esse per actum comparativuum vel collativuum quod idem ipsius intellectus ita quod non habet ex se actum intellectus circumscriptus ideo dependet precise ab opere rationis verbi gratia dicendo sic Petrus est petrus una entitas et una realitas est in subiecto et co(?) et predicato. Ipsa auatem in subiecto ut subiectum est existens. Ubi est notandum quod actus est duplex: primus est rectus seu primus alius est comparativus seu collativus actus primus seu rectus est vel dicitur esse quo fertur intellectus in obiectum non alterum comparando nec etiam componendo et est actus ille qui appellatur ab Aristotele simplicium intelligentia. Actus secundarius sedu collativus vel comparativus est ille quo intellectus fertitur in subiectum ad alterum comparando. Tunc ergo dicitur distinctio rationis quando aliquid disitnguitur ab alio non quidam primo modo sive directo actu intellectus set tantum secundo modo videlicet actu reflexivo ipsius intellectus. Sciendum tamen quod ut dicit quidam doctor distinctio rationis non solum causatur ab actu intelllectus set eciam ab actu collativo cuiuslibet potentie collative cuiusmodi sive(?) voluntas ymago et fantasia utraque enim illarum ponit aliquid aliud comparare.

Sequitur secunda distinctio que est ex natura rei et dicitur quod est quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum contradictionis extremorum competit uni et non alteri ex qua distinctione infero aliqua correlaria. Primum est quod genus et differentia differunt ex natura rei. Hoc correlarium primo probo quia genus et | [K 2vb] differentia sic se habent quod unum extremum contradictionis competit uni et non alteri ergo differunt ex natura rei. Consequentia est formalis quia arguitur a diffinitione ad diffinitum. Antecedens probatur quia(?) differentia ex natura rei competit quod sit determinans quia determinat genus et contrahit ipsum et cum termino est deterimnans. Tum etiam generi competit ex natura rei quod sit determinabile et non est semper determinans et sic competutnt extrema contradictionis quia determinans et non determinans determinabile et non determinabile que sunt contradictoria et unum extremorum dicitur de uno et non de alio. Et si aliquis diceret ergo distinguuntur ex natura rei formaliter ex natura ut iam probatum est set formaliter quia diffinitiones sunt diverse etiam etiam quod non valet consequentia quia diffinitiones sunt quid nominis et quod non differant formaliter sic probatur illa distinguuntur formaliter que constituunt unam rationem formalem set genus et differentia sunt huiusmodi ergo etc. Maior est nota set minor probatur quia animal et rationale constituunt rationem formalem hominis. Secundum correlarium est est quod partes diffinitionis et diffinitum differunt ex natura rei. Consequentia est formalis quia arguitur sicut in preterdicti. Et antecedens prbo quia competit partibus diffinitionis quod constituunt diffinitum quia ex animali et rationali constituitur homo et sic competit partibus quod sunt constituentes et quod quelibet sit constituens et non constituta nec constitute et diffinitionem quod sit constitutum et non constituens set constituens et non constituens constitutum et non constitutum sunt contradictoria et unum extremorum de uno sequitur et on dicitur de alio ergo differunt ex natura rei.

Nunc restat declare quid sit distincito formalis. Distinctio formalis est distinctio formalium | [K 3ra] rationum distinctarum ita quod illa que habent distinctas rationes formales dicuntur distincta formaliter set oportet videre quot modis investigatur presens distinctio. Et dicitur quod tripliciter primo modo per viam diffinitionis quia quando aliquid ponitur in diffinitione alicuius quod ponitur in diffinitione alterius talia distinguuntur formaliter ex quo infero aliqua correlaria primo quod homo et asinus distinguuntur formaliter quia aliquid ponitur in diffinitione hominis quod non ponitur in diffinitione asini et sic de aliis speciebus. Secundum corellarium quod attributa in divinis disitnguuntur formaliter quia aliquid ponitur in diffinitione unius quod non ponitur in diffinitione alterius. Secundo modo investigatur per viam divisionis per aliquas differentias et unum cadit sub una et aliud sub alia distinguuntur formaliter sicut animal dividitur per rationale et irrationale et ideo dicit illud quod cadit sub rationali distinguitur formaliter ab illo quod cadit sub irrationali sicut etiam de omnibus predicabilibus et predicamentis et consequentia formali et materiali et ens dividitur per absolutum et respectivum et illud quod cadit sub absoluto distinguitur formaliter ab illo quod cadit sub respectivo et ideo dicamus quod differentia que est absoluta distinguitur formaliter a proprietate que est ad aliud. 3^o investigatur per viam reduplicationis ut si aliquid conveniat alicui cum reduplicatione quod quod non convenit alteri illa distinguuntur formaliter ut homo inquantum homo est rationalis ex quo squitur quod homo et lapis distinguuntur formaliter.

Sequitur quarta distinctio scilicet realis. Est ergo notandum quod illa distinguuntur realiter que sic se habent quod quodlibet est aliqua entitas positiva et | [K 3rb] realis et unum ab alio non potest de eo predicari nec ipsum includit propter hoc quod dicitur quod quodlibet sit entitas positiva excludunt negationes et privationes quia cum non dicant aliquam entitatem positive non distinguuntur realiter quanvis connotant aliquid positivuum et aliquam entitatem realem positivam proprie non distinguuntur realiter per hoc quod dicit realis excluduntur encia rationis que tamen non sint encia realia nec inter se nec ab aliquo alio realiter distinguuntur ut sumatur res communiter et transcendenter et dicitur in diffinitione unum aba lio ultimate abstrahunt. Pro evidentia huius partis abstrahitur notandum quid sit ultima abstractio dicitur quod ultima abstractio est secundum quam aliquid abstrahitur in omni eo quod in eius ratione quidditativa nullo modo includitur. Et est sciendum quod quatuor modis investagatur huius abstractionis. Distinctio primo modo via originis quia quandocumque aliquid originatur ab aliquo illud realiter distinguuntur ab illo quia per beatum augustinum primo de trinitate idem non gignit seipsum et sic investigatur ista distinctio inter personas divinas. Secundo via generationis quia quecumque sic se habent quod uno generato reliquum non generatur talia distinguuntur realiter et isto modo investigatur inter materiam et formam forma autem generatur materia autem minime. Tertio modo investigatur via corruptionis quia quando aliquid corrumpitur alio non corrupto taliam realiter distinguujntur quia idem non potest simul esse et non esse ideo quodlibet individuum realiter distinguitur ab alio et fundamentum et relatio quia corrupta relatione fundamentum non corrumpitur quarto modo via separationis quia quandocumque | [K 3va] aliquid separatur vel potest separari ab alio realiter distinguuntur et quod separatur realiter distinguitur ab illo a quo separatur quia idem non separatur a seipso ideo ratio quare accidentia separatur a substantia in sacramento altaris est quia distinguitur a subiecto realiter. Sequitur quinta distinctio que dicitur essencialis et est quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod actuali existentia per aloiquam potentiam possunt separari sicut accidens et substantia materia et forma et sic de aliis. Et est sciendum quod quatuoru modis investigatur predicta distinctio primo modo ex predicamentali coordinatione quia quandocumque aliqua predicantur in diversis predicamentis talia distinguuntur essncialiter quia ut habetur per Philosophum primo Posteriorum essencie predicamentorum sunt impermixte. Secundo investigatur ex diversitate specifica nam diverse species essentialiter distinguuntur illo modo investigatur diversitas essentialis essenciali dependencia etiam isto modo dicimus quod causa distinguitur essencialiter a suo effectu saltem de causis extrinsecis etiam deus a creatura quarto modo investigatur via existencie quia quando aliqua sic se habent quod unum existit in rerum natura et aliud non talia distinguuntur essencialiter. Et isto modo investigatur et diversitas essencialis inter creaturas creatorum ordine essenciali sequitur distinctio que dicitur se totum subiective et sunt ista que sic se habent quod eorum realitates sunt distincti numeri vel indistincti vel eciam actuali existencia vel quando realiter sunt divisa vel particularizata a realitate alterius sic Plato, sortes et alia individua eisudem speciei. Sequitur septima distinctio que est se totum obiective et dicitur quod illa distinguuntur se totis obiective que non conveniunt in aliqua realitate vel | [K 3vb] quidditativa ratio vel a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus realis et unus [inser. ? i.m. K] cuius seu prime intentionis sicut dicere ultime individuales. Unde secundum mentem Scoti differe ultime sunt heceitas que sunt distincte se totis obiective quia in nullo conceptu quidditativo conveniunt conceptus enim earum sunt simplices ex quibus concludo tale corellarium quod deus et creatura se totis subiective distinguuntur non autem obiective hec omnia patent ex 6 et septima et hec de secundo principali.

Nunc autem ponitur tertius modus principalis ubi sunt aliqua dicta declaranda ad evidenciam formalitatum. Primo est sciendum quod omnis distinctio aut est rationis aut ex natura ex natura rei tamquam universale quod dividitur in distinctionem formalem realem se totis subiective et se totis obiective. Secuno notandum quod forma dicitur multis modis uno modo dicitur forma prout est altera pars compositi et sic vocatur forma principalis. Secundo modo dicitur forma pro forma tocius puta pro tota ipsa natura ut humanitas dicitur forma tocius non pro informacione ipsius materie set ex qua ext suppositum ipsius quidditative tertio modo dicitur forma omnis substantia immaterialis sicut deus et intelligencie dicuntur forme quarto modo pro ratione contractum(?) quidditativam et ab ista forma ultimo dicta sumitur formalitas de qua intendimus hic. Tertio est notandum quod una et eadem res civersimodi potest movere intellectum spacium quod inter sursum et deorsum potest movere intellectum diversimode uno modo ut est deorsum in sursum alio modo ut est assu(?) deorsum et iste sunt diverse rationes tenentes se | [K 4ra] ex parte obiecti cum eadem res possit apprehendi diversimodi ab intellectu convenit consequenter eadem quidditas per diversas rationes dico ergo quod licet una et eadem et res habeat diversas rationes non tamen habet diversas quidditates sermo eadem quidditas potest assignari per diversas rationes que quidem quidditas diversimode apprehensa ab intellectu et hec de tertio articulo.

Nota quod aliquid potest esse magis notum alio dupliciter uno modo simpliciter et secundum suam essenciam et hoc modo simplicissimus et principia sunt nociora et magis nota compositis et posterioribus et quanto sunt simpliciora et priora tantum secundum se sunt nociora et quia deus est simplicissimus et primus omnium ideo de se est maxime notus alio modo potest aliquid esse magis notum eciam quo ad nos et isto modo composita sunt nociora simplicibus et prioribus et quanto sunt magis composita posteriora tanto nobis nociora sicut ait Aristotiles in primo phisicorum innata est nobis via a nocioribus nobis ad ignociora nature procedere.

Expliciun formalitates parve petri thome provincie sancti iacobi

Nota quod in fia sequenti quando discendimus cum distinctione dicimus quod omnia illa que distinguuntur se totis obiective si fas est dicere disitnguuntur se totis obiective essencialiter realiter formaliter ex natura rei et ratione | [K 4rb] nota quod quando ascendimus cum ideptitate sunt omnibus aliis ydeptitatibus idem scilicet rationis etiam ex natura rei et sic de aliis.

Translation

In creatures there are four principle signs. The first sign is quiddity.

For quiddity has seven signs which are are assigned here.

The first is being; the second is the absolute; the third is substance; the fourth, body; the fifth, animate body; the sixth, animal; the seventh, man.

The second sign of a creature is the intrinsic mode, which is distinguished both from the formality of which it is the mode and from the formality which does not vary its formal ratio. The intrinsic mode has seven signs. The first is reality; the second is existence; the third is actuality; the fourth is contingency; the fifth is finitude; the sixth is life; the seventh is haecceity.

The third principle sign of a creature is the per se property, and it corresponds to the firth sign of nature; therefore it has the same number of signs, because everything has some property, as is clear if you look. The property has seven signs. In the first sign are the properties of being. In the second sign are the properties of intrinsic modes. In the third is [. . . ?] In the fourth, the properties of the subject. In the sixth, the properties of the proximate or neighboring means. In the other [seventh] the properties of the most special species.

The fourth principle sign of nature is that of those things which are in a thing accidentally. And this is distinguished in nine signs, according to the fact that there are nine predicaments of accidents of those things which are in a thing accidentally. The first is relation; the second, quantity; the third, place; the fourth, time; the fifth, position; the sixth, action; the seventh, passion; the eighth, quality; the ninth, habit.

The first sign is entity, which has properties, some of which are intrinsic modes. There are [also] some other divisions and properties, namely, truth, goodness, unity, reality, precision [? aliqualitas ?], reality. And these are the divisions of the intrinsic modes of being. The first is by relative and absolute; the second is by potency and act; the third is by dependent and independent; the fourth is by created and uncreated; the fifth is by finite and infinite; the sixth is by the ten predicaments.