Merry Christmas

Hoc praesens diecula loquitur
praelucida,
adaucta longitudine,
quod sol verus radio sui
luminis vetustas mundi
depulerit genitus tenebras.

Nec nox vacat novi
sideris luce,
quod magorum oculos
terruit scios:

Nec gregum magistris
defuit lumen,
quos praestrinxit claritas
militum dei.

Gaude, dei genetrix,
quam circumstant obstetricum vice
concinentes angeli
gloriam deo.

This present little day proclaims,
illumined,
its length increased,
that the true Sun by the ray
of its light has driven off
the ancient darknesses of the world.

Nor does this night lack
the light of the new star,
which terrified the knowing
eyes of the magi:

Nor was light lacking
for the masters of their flocks,
who were stricken by the brightness
of the soldiers of God.

Rejoice, O god-bearer,
who instead of midwives are surrounded
by angels singing in harmony
glory to God.

--Notker of St Gall, "Natus ante saecula"

Ockham Quodlibet I.6-7

Can one angel speak to another? No of course not, because they can't hear; obviously they don't have ears! [This is actually the first argument in the question.]

But seriously, folks. Angels converse with mental speech and mental hearing, in other words by pure thought. For a concept, a mental word, is nothing but the act itself of cognition. Mentally speaking, then, is nothing other than to think in such a way that oneself or someone else can understand what is being thought about, and mental hearing is nothing other than to apprehend someone else's act of thought.

Ockham gives authorities for his view that concepts are nothing other than thought-acts, but his attempts are not convincing. Before he held this view Ockham had held his so-called fictum theory, according to which concepts are mental entities "feigned" or invented by the mind to signify its objects, but obviously he's abandoned that by the time of his quodlibet.

One interesting point in this question is his claim that in the ordinary course of nature neither an angel nor a man is able to hide his thoughts from other angels. Rather angels do not access our thoughts only because God does not allow it.

The seventh question also seems motivated by Ockham's anti-concept stance. He asks whether an angel can pass on to another knowledge which he has habitually, without actually thinking it in the process. He says that hit can, so long as the object about which the receiving angel is learning is something it already has some actual knowledge about. Ockham appears to be saying something to the effect that one angel can remember something he has actually experienced by means of another angel's memories, which strikes me as odd.

About things of which the passive angel does not have direct experience, however, only the actually-thought thoughts of the teaching angel can give him knowledge, especially about singulars.

Finally, Ockham says that angels can have discursive thought.

Ockham Quodlibet I.4-5

In the next two questions Ockham discusses angels and physics. The first asks whether an angel is in a place through his substance. Ockham first defines place in Aristotelian terms as the terminus of the containing body of what is in place, and then distinguishes between being in place circumscriptively and definitively. The first is when part of the placed is in part of the place and the whole is in the whole place. The second is when the whole placed is in the whole place - as Christ is in the Eucharist.

So then, an angel can be in place definitively but not circumscriptively. Ockham doesn't say this, but the case seems to me to be basically parallel to the way the human mind is in the body: the angel can be in any place the way that my body is the place of my mind. An angel is not in place the way God is, for God is present both to this place and also to every other place at once, which is not true of an angel. Furthermore, an angel cannot have a point as his place, since points as places do not exist. If there were real indivisible points which were the terminus of a containing body, the angel could be contained by them, but there aren't. Furthermore, there is a maximum size of the place an angel can be present at, since he is finite and limited by nature, but Ockham makes no effort to determine what this size might be. There is no minimum-sized place, and angels can coexist in a single place. Although O. doesn't draw the connection, it seems that this implies there is no limit to the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin. This question, however, has been resolved elsewhere.

Question five builds on four to ask whether angels can be moved in place. First he defines local motion as "the successive coexistence, without an intervening rest, of something continually existing in place through diverse places" [motus localis est coexistentia successiva, sine quiete media, alicuius continue existentis in loco diversis locis].

The reason it seems that angels cannot be moved is their impartibility and indivisibility. Wouldn't any change of place for an indivisible substance have to be instantaneous? Ockham replies that when Aristotle states that in motion you always have a part of the moved in one place and part in another, he is only speaking about things which exist in place circumscriptively; but as we just saw, angels are not in place this way, but definitively. The angel's change in place happens in accordance with the manner in which he occupies a place even at rest.

Finally, in replying to an obscure objection based on a comment by Walter Chatton, Ockham gives an interesting counterfactual argument that sounds like modern possible-worlds talk. The discussion in this section is about how many things have to exist in order to verify a proposition. The Chatton-inspired objection states that in order to verify that an angel is created by God a period of time, or at least an instant, must exist for the verification to take place. I translate the counter-argument:

Assume that first of all God creates an angel together with a book, in which the proposition ["this angel is created by God"] is written, without [creating] the world; afterwards he creates the world, along with motion and time; afterwards he destroys the world and motion and time, [so that the state of things is] as before. Then this proposition "this angel is created by God" is true before the creation of the world, and after the destruction of the world it is false; and nevertheless as many things exist after the destruction of the world as there were before creation, and nevertheless it was then true and now is false. From which it is manifestly clear that sometimes three things are sufficient to verify this proposition, and sometimes they are not sufficient.

Since this is absurd, Ockham denies that time is a necessary condition for the truth of any proposition. What does this have to do with local motion? I have to admit that's rather obscure to me.

God and Other Intelligent Designers

Here I would like to discuss whether or not J. R. R. Tolkien's account of Creation in the first chapter of his Silmarilion is compatible with St. Thomas' in ST I, q. 65, aa. 3-4. This will help to elucidate certain principles about the work of God and creatures in the making of things.

First, we can establish the conclusions of St. Thomas in these articles.

Art. 3

1. Respondeo “All bodies were created immediately by God [ex nihilo].”

2. No creature can create anything from nothing; angels did not create anything in the strict sense.

Art. 4

3. Respondeo: Matter obeys God’s bidding as its only proper cause.

4. “The corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God.”

5. “Even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not as emanating from them, but by movement (as the term of their movement).”

6. R. Obj. 2. Therefore, if things have their forms from angels through movement, it is because the idea of the thing was first in God, then in angels, and finally implanted in corporeal things like a seed.

Second, we can see if these conclusions are respected at least implicitly in Tolkien’s text, Ainulindale.

(I assume the identity of Illuvatar with God and the Ainur with angels.)

In regard to the first conclusion, “All bodies were created immediately by God [ex nihilo].” :

Illuvatar said, “EA! Let these things be! And I will send into the void the Flame Imperishable, and it shall be at the heart of the World and the World shall Be.” (p.9)

The second conclusion, that no creature can create anything from nothing; angels did not create anything, is respected because only Illuvatar made the world be, and “He made first the Ainur, the Holy Ones, that were the offspring of his thought” that is, the angels. (p.1)

The third and fourth conclusions:

Matter alone obeys God’s bidding as its proper cause.

“The corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God.”

Illuvatar said to the Ainur, “I know the desire of your minds that what ye have seen may verily be, not only in your thought, but even as ye yourselves are, but other. Therefore I say EA! Let these things be!” (p.9)

Comments: The Ainur were powerless to cause their thoughts to have real, as opposed to merely mental, existence; only Illuvatar could order formalized matter to come into being. These new things came immediately from Him as their primary efficient cause. They also came from Him directly as their formal cause, because the Ainur affected the forms only by “adorning” the theme already set for them by Illuvatar (cf. next section).

The fifth conclusion, “Even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not as emanating from them, but by movement (as the term of their movement).”:

“Of the theme that I have declared to you, I will now that ye make in harmony together a Great Music…ye shall show forth your powers in adorning this theme, each with his own thoughts and devices, if he will.” (p.1)

Comments: The forms of things are a product of the movement of the Ainur’s thoughts and will, an exercise of their power, not emanations of their substance.

The sixth conclusion, "if things have their forms from angels through movement, it is because the idea of the thing was first in God, then in angels, and finally implanted in corporeal things like a seed.":

“And [Illuvatar] spoke to them, propounding to them themes of music; and they sang before him.” (p.1) Illuvatar said to the Ainur, “Behold your music! This is your minstrelsy; and each of you shall find contained herein, amid the design that I set before you, all those things which it may seem that he himself devised or added.” (p.6)

Comments: The content of the Ainur’s song is their development of Illuvatar’s theme: their originality is only secondary and subordinate. Complete originality, apart from the theme of Illuvatar, is portrayed as corruption: “It came into the heart of Melkor to interweave matters of his own imagining that were not in accord with the theme of Illuvatar…some of these thoughts he now wove into his music, and straight-way discord arose about him.” (p.4) This implies that apart from Illuvatar’s theme there is no harmony, because He is the source of harmony. Thus, the forms of things were passed from Illuvatar to the Ainur and finally into reality; at each stage, Illuvatar was the primary mover.

In sum: yes, Tolkein's account of creation in the Silmarilion, at lest the part we discussed here, seems compatible with Thomas' account in ST I, q. 65, aa. 3-4

On Natural Wonders and the Miraculous

This might seem to be a non-sequitur, but there are principles here which involve the discussion below regarding Intelligent Design.

"An 83-year-old Indian holy man who says he has spent seven decades without food or water has astounded a team of military doctors who studied him during a two-week observation period," says a recent news report. It explains that the man neither ate nor drank during the time of observation, except for occasionally swishing his mouth with a little water.

"We still do not know how he survives," neurologist Sudhir Shah told reporters after the end of the experiment. "It is still a mystery what kind of phenomenon this is."

The yogi offers an explanation: "He says that he was blessed by a goddess at a young age, which gave him special powers."

Is this a miracle?

The Angelic Doctor offers a helpful distinction:

"Miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi, si aliqid fiat praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis quia sic, cum aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit praeter ordinem naturae lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse miraculum quod fit prater ordinem totius naturae creatae" (ST I, q. 110, a. 4)

A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not a sufficient ratio for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; since otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature.

It may be outside of the order of man's particular nature to survive without food and water -- but it might not be outside of the entire order of the universe.

St. Thomas goes on to say that even if an angel performed what is unexplainable according to the natural order of a particular being, its power is limited according to its nature and the laws of the universe. Thus, a person can benefit from the power of a demon -- or a "goddess" -- which is supernatural to our perspective but natural from the perspective of angelic natures. But this is not a miracle absolutely speaking, for only God can perform an act which is outside all natural laws, such as raising the dead.

One sign of a true miracle, the Angelic Doctor notes, is that the supernatural happens on account of the invocation of Christ's name. For an example of this we can turn to St. Catherine of Siena, who, according to Bl. Raymund of Capua her biographer, practiced what St. Thomas taught. He writes (ch. 12, no. 311):

All who knew Catherine were well aware of her profound and characteristic reverence and devotion towards the Blessed Sacrament of the Body of our Lord. She received the Sacrament so frequently that it was popularly reported that "the maiden Catherine receives Holy Communion every day," and that she lived and kept up her strength on it without taking any other food.

Raymund, always careful to dispel mere rumor, finds the report inaccurate: "In saying this, they were not quite correct, still I believe they spoke in good faith."

The truth is, he says, Catherine did not receive communion every day. Just most days. As for surviving on the Holy Eucharist alone ... if that seems astounding, he offers something else to ponder. Once he celebrated Holy Mass with only Catherine present and when communion time came:

Her face appeared to me like the face of an angel, radiating rays of light and somehow transfigured, so that I said to myself, "That face is not Catherine's"; and judging by what I saw I went on to say, in my own mind, "Truly, Lord, she is your spouse, faithful and pleasing in your sight." With this thought in mind I turned back to the altar, and still speaking only mentally I said, "Come, Lord, to your spouse." I do not know how this thought came to my mind; but as soon as I had formed it the Sacred Host moved of itself before ever I touched it. I saw it plainly moving towards me for the space of three finger-breadths and more, until it reached the paten which I had in my hand. But I was so stupefied, first by the light that shone on Catherine's face, and secondly by this marvel, that I am not certain whether or not I actually placed the Host on the paten or not. My belief is rather that it moved on to it of itself though I do not venture to vouch for this.

Additio auctoris incerti

The following 'addition of uncertain authorship' on the essential unity of spiritual and corporeal matter is appended to Distinction III in some manuscripts of St Bonaventure's Sentences commentary and is printed there in the Quaracchi edition. The editors are not sure whether it is an addition of Bonaventure's own long after the composition of the original work or whether it was added by a later reader. I incline to the latter view, in light of the author's uncertainty about fully embracing Bonaventure's doctrine, and in light of the reference to Avicebron, whose name never appears in Bonaventure's works. Here is the passage, followed by a pretty literal translation:

Haec autem dicta sunt de unitate materiae spiritualium et corporalium secundum essentiam ipsius nudam et absolutam; quoniam secundum esse diversificari habet in diversis non tantum secundum esse accidentale, sed etiam secundum esse substantiale. Unde in diversis secundum substantiam diversificatur substantialiter, sicut patebit in sequenti articulo quaestionis. Licet autem non contingat in natura reperire essentiam materiae ab omnibus formis et dispositionibus denidatam, contingit tamen vere intelligere et aliquid ei vere attribuere, sicut Augustinus, in XII Confessionum docet satis aperte, et in libro De vera Religione, dicit quod est quasi medium inter aliquod et nihil, et Philosophus, in I libro De generatione, dicit quod est ita simplex sicut punctus. Quemadmodum igitur rerum corporearum compositarum et extensarum contingit vere intelligere materiam esse per essentiam simplicem, et hoc per privationem omnis compositionis et extensionis, quamvis secundum esse naturae impossibile sit rerum corporearum materiam ab extensione separari, ut in pluribus locis dicit Augustinus, maxime in libro De immortalitate animae, et Super Genesim ad litteram: sic rerum diversarum et distinctarum et numeratarum vere contingit intelligere materiam per suam essentiam indistinctam et non numeratam, et ita quodammodo numero unam per privationem omnis numerationis et distinctionis, ut praedictum est. Et hoc expresse dicit Commentor, Super I Metaphysicae, in illo capitulo: ‘Quoniam autem in fundamento’, ubi assignat differentiam inter unitatem generis et materiae; id ipsum expressissime dicit, Super XII, ubi etiam dat modum, qualiter hoc possit intelligi, quod diversorum sit materia numero una, ostendens quod hoc potius privitave dicitur quam positive. Hoc ipsum dicit auctor Fons vitae in prima parte sui libri et expresse probat in [X]IV, quod corporalium et spiritualium est materia per essentiam una. Et hoc probat per hoc, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et per hoc, quod, si spiritualia et corporalia non haberent materiam per essentiam unam, impossibile esset quod aliquid esset eis univocum, quia diversitas radicum prohibet convenientiam in ramis. Aliorum autem auctoritates causa brevitatis omitto. –Et propter haec et his similia dictum fuit a principio, hunc modum dicendi esse philosophicum, quamvis nihil prohibeat, ipsum esse catholicum et theologicum, dum tamen recte intelligatur. In nullo enim modus iste dicendi repugnat dignitati substantiae spiritualis, nec distantiae inter ipsam et corporalem, nec creationi spirituum. Non enim propter hoc oportet ponere, spiritus fieri de materia praeiacente, quia materia, induta forma corporali, non potest illa exspoliari; nec Deus facit contra ea quae stabilivit a principio, et ideo cum creatur substantia spiritualis, necesse est cum ea suam materiam concreari. Et quemadmodum creatio spirituum non tollit eis convenientiam essentialem in unitate formae specificae, sic etiam non tollit unitatem materiae per essentiam nudam et absolutam, quoniam, sicut dictum fuit, maioris amplitudinis est haec unitas quam unitas generis vel speciei; et praeterea nunquam creatur nec creata fuit materia sine aliqua forma, sub qua habet diversificari, sicut dictum est supra. Si quis igitur essentiam materiae nudae potest intelligere, videbit quod satis probabiliter potest dici una numero privative. Et haec sufficit de ista positione.
Est autem et alius hic dicendi modus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia per essentiam una, quantumcumque intelligatur denudari a formis et dispositionibus superadditis, immo adhuc essentialiter distinguuntur se ipsis. Sicut enim prima rerum genera se ipsis distinguuntur, et essentia formae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae, et essentia materiae a Deo propter simplicitatem; sic essentia materiae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae. Et secundum hanc positionem, si Deus per infinitatem suae potentiae de corpore faceret spiritum, nihil maneret commune, sed totum transiret in totum. –Et si obiciatur contra hanc positionem, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et quod solus actus dividit, et consimilia; breviter secundum hanc positionem respondetur quod illum verum est de distinctione et diversitate completa. Sicut enim essentia materiae, omni forma abstracta, est incompleta respectu distinctionis. Et per hoc possunt quasi omnes rationes ad oppositum determinari, sicut patet pertractanti. Et ideo non oportet in hoc diutius immorari. –Utraque igitur harum positionum in hoc concordar, quod spiritualium et corporalium est materia una unitate analogiae. Sed utrum istud sufficiat dicere ad sustinendam unitatem generis—cum substantiarum et accidentium sint principia eadem per analogiam, sicut vult Philosophus, nec tamen habeant unum genus commune—utrum etiam oporteat ad indistinctionem; diu consideranti et bene intelligenti difficile est videre. Et ideo sanius est uni istarum positionum cum formidine partis alterius adhaerere, quam in alteram omnino praecipitare sententiam; maxime cum magistri et probati clerici utrumque dicant.

"But these things are said of the unity of spiritual and corporeal matter according to its naked and absolute essence; for according to its being it has to be diversified in diverse things, not only according to accidental being, but also according to substantial being. Whence things which are diverse according to substance are diversified substantially, as will be clear in the following article of the question. But although it may not happen that one finds in nature the essence of matter denuded of all forms and dispositions, nevertheless one can truly understand it and truly attribute something to it, as Augusine teaches clearly enough in XII Confessionum, and in his book De vera religione he says that [matter] is as it were a medium between something and nothing, and the Philosopher, the first book of De generatione, says that it is as simple as a point. Just as, therefore, one can truly understand matter through its simple essence to be [present] in composite and extended corporeal things, although according to the being of nature it is impossible for the matter of coporeal things to be separated from extension, as Augustine says in many places, especially in his book De immortalitate animae, and Super Genesim ad litteram: so one can also understand matter through its indistinct and unnumbered essence [to be present] in diverse and and distinct and numbered things, and so [one may understand it to be], by a certain kind of number, one through the privation of all enumeration and distinction, as was said before. And the Commentor expressly says this, in Super I Metaphysicae, in the chapter ‘Quoniam autem in fundamento’, where he assigns the difference between the unity of genus and [the unity of] matter; he expressly says the same thing in Super XII, where he gives the way how it can be understood that there can be numerically one matter for diverse things, showing that this is said privatively rather than positively. The author of the Fons vitae says the same thing in the first part of his book and expressly proves in [X]IV that the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is essentially one. And he proves it this way: every diversity is from form; and this way: if spiritual and corporeal things did not have matter which was essentially one, it would be impossible for them to have anything univocal, for diversity in the roots prevents in the branches. I omit the authorities of others for the sake of brevity. –And on account of these and similar considerations it was said from the beginning that this way of speaking is philosophical, although nothing prohibits it from also being catholic and theological, so long as it is rightly understood. For this way of speaking in no way detracts from the dignity of a spiritual substance, nor from the distance between it and a corporeal [substance], nor from the creation of spirits. For one need not because of this [doctrine] posit that a spirit is made from previously-existing matter, because matter, clothed in corporeal form, cannot be robbed of it; nor does God act against what he has established from the beginning, and therefore when a spiritual substance is created, it is necessary for its matter to be cocreated with it. And just as the creation of spirits does not take from them [their] essential agreement in the unity of [their] specific form, neither also does the unity of matter through its naked and absolute essence take [it from them], because, as was said, this unity is of a greater extent than the unity of genus or species; and furthermore matter is not created nor was ever created without some form under which it is diversified, as was said above. If therefore anyone is able to understand the essence of naked matter, he will see that it can with sufficient probability be called privatively numerically one. And these [words] suffice about this position.
But there is another way of speaking here, [by saying namely that] the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is not essentially one, howsoever it may be understood to be stripped of form and superadded dispositions, but rather [that the two matters are] still essentially distinguished from one another. For as the primary genera of things are distinguished from one another, and [as] the essence of form is by itself distinguished from the essence of matter, and the essence of matter from God on account of simplicity; so the essence of matter by itself is distinguished from the essence of [the other kind of] matter. And according to this position, if God through the infinity of his power were to make a spirit out of a body, nothing common would remain [between them], but the whole would pass into the whole. –And if it were objected against this position, that all diversity is from form, and that act alone divides, and similar [things were said]; briefly according to this position one would respond that this is true of complete distinction and diversity. For as the essence of matter, abstracted from all form, is incomplete with respect to distinction . . . [lacuna?] And in this way all the arguments for the opposite [side] can be determined, as is clear to anyone who works through it. And therefore one need not be delayed by this matter any longer. –But both of these positions can be harmonized in this one, that the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is one with the unity of analogy. But whether this is sufficient to preserve the unity of genus—since the principles of substances and of accidents are the same by analogy, as the Philosopher has it, nor nevertheless do they have one common genus—and also whether [this position would seem] sufficient for indistinction, is difficult to see [even] for one who considers and understands [the matter] well. And therefore it is saner to stick to one of these positions together with due respect for the other side, rather than to throw oneself headlong altogether into one opinion; especially since masters and esteemed clerics say each."

Alexander of Hales on the Angels and the Growth of Metaphysics

“What we have seen as the most salient weakness of William of Auxerre’s angelology emerges as the most noteworthy strength of the angelology of Alexander of Hales. His focus on the metaphysical status of angels is what gives his teaching its special character. In addition, that teaching makes it clear that, by the time Alexander had written his Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1220-25), Aristotelian metaphysics has settled in for the duration and was informing the thought of scholastic theologicans not hitherto regarded as hospitable to this new philosophy. . . . Given their nature as purely spiritual beings, he asks, how can angels be understood as created substances? How can such beings be distinguished from the deity? And how can they have location? In answering these questions, Alexander shows his awareness of the fact that the term substantia is defined differently by different schools of philosophy. At the same time, the definition that clearly sets the terms of the debate, for him, is the Aristotelian one. He acknowledges the fact that angels, understood as simple and spiritual beings, simply do not square with the Aristotelian notion of creatures as substances made up of matter and form. He sees, and poses, this problem quite clearly. Given the philosophy of Aristotle, which he refuses to fudge, angels are a metaphysical anomaly; from an Aristotelian perspective, simplicity and pure spirituality would appear to be attributable to the deity alone. Alexander’s solution to this dilemma—and it is a solution that forecasts the essence-existence distinction applied to angels later in the century by Thomas Aquinas—is to invoke the distinction made by Boethius between the quo est, or essential character of being, and its quod est, or current manifestation of its being, which can differ in actuality from its quo est. This possibility extends to angels, and to all other creatures, while it does not apply to God . . .”

--Colish, M. “Early Scholastic Angelology,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 62 (1995), 106-107.