Kinds of Memory according to James of Aesculo

James of Aesculo is one of those lesser lights of medieval philosophy, so small, in fact, that he did not merit to be included in the Noone/Gracia companion to medieval philosophy which included such candle-like figures as Berthold of Moosburg and Landulf Caracciolo. But perhaps (I haven't checked), like Petrus Thomae, James survived this snub by being included in the appendix to the recent Cambridge history of later medieval philosophy. Little is known about him. He was at the trial of Margarite de Porrette, and the council of Vienne. He wrote a Quodlibet, Ordinary Questions, and a thematic index to the works of Scotus (in which he includes references to his own works as well). Only a smattering of questions have been edited, but he does seem to have adopted Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction. As far as influence is concerned, I don't know that anyone has studied this, but I can say that he plays a role in Petrus Thomae's QQ de esse intelligibili, specificially, qq.1-4. The following is a piece of a large question; I have excerpted his preliminary distinctions.

Iacobus de Aesculo, Quaestiones ordinariae, q.2 (Cambridge, UL, Ms. FF.III.23, f. 116r)

* = lectio incerta

Update:

I am reposting this post on James of Ascoli because according to the stats it gets several hits a day. So I have added a translation, which I fear is nearly as unintelligible as the latin.

Iacobus de Aesculo, Quaestiones ordinariae, q.2 (Cambridge, UL, Ms. FF.III.23, f. 116r):

Utrum in productione Verbi divini actus memoriae praesupponatur actui suae intelligentiae

Whether in the production of the divine Word the act of the intelligence presupposes the act of memory.

In ista questione primo sciendum quod actus memorie in nobis est duplex in genere. Quaedam est actus primus ut habitus, quidam est actus secundus ut operatio. Actus primus duplex : quidam est formalis vel quasi formalis, quidam virtualis. Actum primum formale voco representativum formale obiecti formaliter et subiective existens in memoria per quod obiectum tantum intentionaliter et non realiter in ratione obiecti est sufficienter presens potentie ut possit habere actum secundum quidquid sit illud sive species sive habitus quia actum primum virtualem voco quando obiectum est presens realiter ipsi potentie immediate per seipsum sive per ipsam entitatem, non per aliquid subiective existens in memoria et hoc sive sit presens ipsi potenti per realem ydemptitatem *** secundum Augustinum 10 De trinitate, sive sit presens per quamdam assistenciam sive presentiam realem sicut essentia divina est presens intellectui creato et hic est duplex differentia inter istos duos actus. Prima differentia est quod actus primus virtualis respectu eiusdem obiecti et in eadem potentia est perfectior actu formali. Primo patet quia presentia alicuius obiecti immediate per propriam entitatem est perfectior * presentia habita de illo obiecto per aliquod representativum formaliter perficiens potentiam quia presentia habita de aliquo obiecto per aliquod representativum est diminuta et intentionalis presentia vero habita immediate de aliquo obiecto per propriam entitatem illius obiecti est presentia simplex et realis ens autem simplex et reale est nobilius ente diminuto et intentionali, ergo et actus virtualis actu primo formalis. Secunda differentia est quod actus primus formalis indifferentis est respectu cuiuslibet obiecti sive presentis sive preteriti sive futuri sive * sive similis cuius ratio est quia similitudo alicuius obiecti indifferens respicit illud sub ratione presentis, preteriti et futuri * vel * sed actus primus virtualis respicit obiectum determinate sub ratione presentis et singularis patet per hoc quia nec preteritum nec futuram potest omne presens immediate intellectui per propriam entitatem sed si presens oportet quod sit presens per aliquid aliud sicut etiam universale non potest esse presens intellectui nisi in aliquo singularis similiter actus primus formalis potest esse indifferenter respectu obiectu tam existentis quam non existentis actus primus virtualis est determinate respectu obiecti singularis actu existentis quod autem actus primus formalis respectu presentis et futuri pertineat ad memoriam et non ad intellectum patet per Augustinum 14 De trinitate et ubi dicit notitiam uniuscumque rei quo inest menti etiam quando de ipsa non cogitatis. Ad solutionem dicitur memoriam pertinere patet etiam per rationem quia retinere seu concernare dicit esse proprius actus memorie non intelligentie sed intellectus potest retinere similitudinem obiecti presentis sicut presenti et futuri, ergo etc.

In that question it should first be known that the act of memory in us is twofold. For there is a first act which is a habit, and a second act which is an operation. The first act is twofold: some are formal or quasi formal, some virtual. By “first formal act” I mean a formal representative formally of an object and existing subjectively in the memory, through which an object is sufficiently present to a power only intentionally and not really, so that it can have a second act, whether that is a species or habit, because I call something a “first virtual act” when an object is really present to the power immediately by itself or through its entity, not by something existing subjectively in the memory, and this either is present to the power through a real identity (according to Augustine, 10 De trinitate), or it is present through a certain assistance or real presence, just as the divine essence is present to a created intellect, and here there is a double difference between those two acts. The first difference is that a first virtual act with respect to the same object and in the same power is more perfect than a formal act. The first is clear because the prsence of some object is immediately more prseent through its own entity than a presence had from that object through something formally representative of it formally perfecting the power, because a presence had from some object through some representative est a diminished and intentional presence; but had immediately from some object through its own entity of that object there is a simple and real presence, more noble than a diminished and intentional being, therefore also a virtual act is more noble than a first formal act. The second difference is that a formal first act is indifferent with respect to any object whether present or past or future or (different?) or similar, the reason being because an indifferent likeness of some looks to that under the aspect of present, past, and future... but a first virtual act looks to the object determinately under the aspect of present and singular. This is clear because neither past nor future can be entirely present immediately to an intellect through its own entity, but if present, it is necessary that it is present through something other, just as even a universal cannot be present to an intellect except in some singular; likewise a first formal act can be indifferently in respect to an object both existing and non existing. A first virtual act is determinately in respect of a singular object by the act of existing. That however a first formal act in respect of the present and future pertains to memory and not the intellect is clear from Augustine, 14 De trinitate, where he says that the knowledge of each thing is in the mind even when you do not think about it. For the solution it is said that it pertains to memory. This is also clear by reason, because to retain or contract means to be more properly the act of memory, not intelligence, but the intellect can retain the likeness of a present object just as the present and the future, therefore etc.

James of Ascoli on Consecutive causality

Consecutive causality, a rough, probably highly inaccurate translation of "consecutive" appears to mean only the causal dependence something has on something else. I hesitate to use the word "cause", however, as the only locus I have seen it come up is in the discussing the divine ideas. In this context, it refers to the essences of creatures as are eternally related to the divine essence. They are also logically prior to the divine act of thinking. This theory was held by few scholastics, though the more I study the issue, the more the number grows. Peter Thomae holds it as an alternative to Scotus' view, and he appears to have derived it from James of Ascoli. The carmelite John Baconthorpe discusses it and attributes it to his confrere Gerard of Bologna, though I haven't tracked this down yet. Avicenna latinus appears to be the ultimate origin of the idea, though since he is dependent on Alfarabi it may be in the latter's works as well. In any case, the passage below attempts a definition of the term, which I found somewhat interesting and useful, perhaps even worth sharing.

Iacobus de Aesculo, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 4 (Cambridge, UL, Ms. FF.3.23, f. 126ra): Utrum notitia actualis creaturae praesupponatur in Deo notitiae habituali eiusdem.

Secundo sciendum quod aliquid potest habere esse intelligibile sub alio dupliciter: vel effective vel consecutive. Effective, sicut quidditates rerum creabilium habent esse intelligibile effective ab intellectu agente in quantum intellectus agens causat eas effective in esse intelligibile, secundum ymaginem Philosophi et Commentatoris(p hi et 9iiieris) Consecutive vero habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa specie causata ab intellectu cognoscente. Posita enim specie intelligibili ipsius lapidis in intellectu, consequitur naturaliter esse intelligible lapidis, sicut oppositum corellarium ipsius speciei sine omni causatione effectiva. Species enim lapidis non causat effective proprie lapidem in esse intelligibili, sed solum esse intelligibili lapidis consequitur ipsam spieciem per motum cuiusdam coreins necessarie.

Ad propositum dico quod quidditates in illo priori in quo habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa essentia divina antequam sunt actu immediate non habent esse intelligibile effective ab ipsa essentia quasi ipsa esset eas effectivas in esse intelligibili, quia posita essentia ipsa necessario resultant in esse intelligibli sicut obiecta coreva ipsius essentie, non ad que ipsa essentia referatur, sed magis que ad ipsam referantur sicut posita specie lapidis s ap resultat in specie intelligibili.

Translation:

Second, it should be known that something can have intelligible being from another in two ways, either effectively or consecutively. Effectively, as the quiddities of creatable things have intelligible being effectively from the agent intellect, insofar as the agent intellect causes them effectively in intelligible being, according to the image of the Philosopher and the Commentator. But consecutively they have intelligible being from the species caused by the knowing intellect. For if it be posited that there is an intelligible species of a stone in the intellect, there naturally follows the intelligible being of the stone, just as the opposed ...? of the species without all effective causation. For a species of a stone does not cause effectively the stone in intelligible being, but rather the intelligible being of the stone follows the spcies by a necessary motion.

To the question at hand I say that the quiddities in that prior [instant] in which they have intelligible being from the divine essence, before they are immediately in act, they do not have intelligible being effectively from the essence as if it would [cause] them effectively in intelligible being, because with the essence posited, necessarily they result in intelligible being, just as objects correlative of the essence, not to which the essence is referred, but more rather they are referred to it [the divine essence], just as with a species of a stone being posited [in the intellect immediately the stone results in intelligible being...?]