Notes on Individuation

After I ranted a bit in a personal exchange Faber suggested that I write up a bit on individuation. First a quick recap: here of course Faber reproduced a bit of Scotus on whether a relation can individuate. "Don Paco" of the blog Ite ad Thomam linked to it here, where commenter Aquinas 3000 asked what he thought of it. Don Paco replies,

I hold the Thomistic view: "The principle of individuation, i.e., of numerical distinction of one individual from another with the same specific nature, is matter designated by quantity. Thus in pure spirits there cannot be more than individual in the same specific nature." (Thesis 11, from the 24 Thomistic Theses).

So the soul is individuated through its body. This is the case, even when the soul no longer informs its body body: even then, this soul is still the soul (form) of that body (matter) and of no other.

On Edward Feser's blog Aquinas3000 puts the position this way:

The soul still has a relation to the body as it is the soul of this particular body. It also has its own separate act of esse. The matter individuates it as this particular human being. Once it is separate from the body it is no longer a human being as such, since this refers to the composite. It is an incomplete substance that is capable of subsisting due to its spiritual character that has a relation to this particular body i.e it is the soul of this body.

Some comments later our own Lee Faber replies:

So immaterial human souls have a different principle of individuation out of the body than in the body? So really for Thomas there are lots of principles. At one time it's matter, at another time it's a relation. But a relation requires two fundamenta. How can there be a relation to a non existent (the body)? All you've got is one term and a relation to nowheresville.

First of all I want to clear up the matter of the foundations of relations. Faber's remark, and Scotus' comment reproduced in the first post just cited, "every relative form presupposes something absolute in which it is founded," needs to be qualified. There can be a real relation with one nonexistent foundation, in the case of opinion, memory, anticipation, understanding, will, etc, regarding a non-existent, no-longer-existent, or not-yet-existent object. That is, there can be a real relation between something with subsistent (subjective) being - the mind - and something with merely objective being - the object which exists only in thought and not in itself. However, that's not really relevant to the present case.

In my view, which is the Scotist view, the Thomist account of individuation is involved in insuperable difficulties, which the case of the separated soul merely highlights. Consider the fact that the human body, upon decomposition, no longer exists, while ex hypothesi the human soul continues to exist apart from the body. The matter does not cease to exist, in the sense that prime matter is never naturally created or destroyed according to the principle of the conservation of energy; but individual bodies certainly do cease to exist. This flesh, this blood, these bones, these ashes, this carbon and oxygen, these electrons etc., can all dissembled into their components, be converted to energy and dissipated, and enter into composition with other matter and assume new forms and become new individual substances. This happens all the time. So "this body," the human body that the separated human soul once informed, ceases to exist. As Faber points out, the principle of individuation for an existing concrete substance cannot be something nonexistent, since no non-being can be the real principle of a being. But upon the decomposition of the body, "this" body no longer exists. According to the Thomists, therefore, the separated soul is individuated by something non-existent. But this is impossible, ergo etc.

Perhaps, however, the Thomists do not mean that the soul is individuated by this human body, but by the "signate matter" which individuated the body. So upon the destruction of the body, the "same" matter continues to exist, and the soul is individuated by its relation to this particular bit or chunk or amount of matter which, if it were informing it, would be its body. Sadly, however, this is no better. For the same quantity of matter, when it loses the form of "this" body, takes on some new form. It then becomes a new substance, "this(2)" body, which is numerically distinct from the first "this(1)" body. (Of course what really happens, and which I think strengthens the Scotist case, is that this quantity of matter enters into composition with an indefinite number of new bodies, but talking about it this way is simpler and clearer.) Then, according to the Thomists, this signate matter "this(0)" is the principle of individuation of "this(2)" body; but the principle of individuation for this soul "this(3)" is its relation to "this(1)" body, which is grounded in "this(0)" matter as well. So "this(0)" is the principle of individuation of both "this(2)" and "this(3)", through the latter's relation to the now-nonexistent "this(1)". This sure seems to imply that "this(2)" and "this(3)" are numerically identical, since they share a numerically identical concrete constitutive principle. This is, as a good scholastic would say, inconveniens.

However, a more fundamental objection to the Thomist account arises when we consider the famous Ship of Theseus problem. Any living organic substance, like a constantly repaired ship of Theseus, is constantly excreting old and absorbing new matter. They say - I don't know with how much truth - that we replace all our cells something like every seven years. (In any case particular quantities of matter are exchanged with my environment with every breath, effort, drink, bite, and trip to the restroom.) In that case every seven years all my proximate matter is replaced, and thus of course all my signate prime matter is replaced. But I am the same individual and my body is the same body as it was when I was an infant. Therefore signate matter is not the principle of individuation for my body. Are we really supposed to accept on anyone's authority, even that of a great saint such as St Thomas, that I only remain myself because somehow my body never excretes the little initial collection of atoms making up the chromosomal strings of the sperm and the egg that joined in my conception, and that that self same core of signate matter constitutes my individuality? The notion is absurd. What if that little core were surgically extracted? Clearly I would remain myself. The truth of the matter is that the continuity of the individual existence of any body is insured not by continuous possession of any given bit of matter, or of the whole quantity of its matter, but by the identity and continuity of its form. This is the case even for inanimate bodies, so that souls need not come into it at all. A lake is not individuated by its water; it remains the same lake even though fresh water is continually trickling in and out.

If you want to read more about individuation, the best Scotus texts are in Book VII of the Quaestiones Metaphysicae and in Book II, Dist. III of the Ordinatio, in both of which he discusses a vast range of possible positions and arguments. The best and most comprehensive secondary source is Individuation in Scholasticism, edited by Jorge Gracia. I haven't read all of the latter, I have to admit, despite meaning to get to it for some years now.

Theoremata Scoti, Pars II

The second part of the Theoremata is concerned with showing the priority of quality over quantity. I note that, if we accept this, there are some interesting implications for the sciences. Mathematical physics, our paradigm modern science, is primarily concerned with what can be quantified, but for Scotus quantity and the quantifiable are not primary substantial traits.

The editors of the new edition number four main conclusions. Why these propositions are called conclusions in Part II and propositions in Part I is unclear to me. In any case:

I. Quality is naturally prior to quantity.

"Because [quality] is found in every substance, but quantity only in corporeal substances." Quantity can be attributed to separated souls, angels, and so forth, only insofar as they are numerable, i.e. insofar as we can mentally collect them into multitudes. In himself an angel has no dimensive quantity, since he has no dimensions.

"Quality is in substance by reason of form, quantity by reason of matter." Form is primary over matter, ergo, etc. Note that this would not be accepted by earlier Franciscans who would admit matter in the angels, but not dimensive quantity, which they would attribute to corporeitas.

"Again, quality is the principle of acting, quantity [is] not. Quality is that by which an agent alters [something]. But alteration precedes augment[ation]. It is impossible for quantity to be induced except through the action of quality, [but] not conversely."

II. Qualities are attributed to God as perfections, not so quantities.

That is, some quality can be seen as a pure perfection, and when existing in an infinite mode can be identified with God himself. For any quantity, however, this is simply nonsense. There cannot be an actually infinite quantity.

III. Qualities have many species in both spiritual and corporeal [things], as light, etc., by which entities attain their ends, as man [attains] beatitude through grace and charity, etc. But continuous quantity has only three species and no being attains its end through it.

This is losing the pithy aphoristic edge a bit, but is there a shorter way to say it? Since quality pertains to the form more than quantity, one can see how it helps to attain a thing's end. No thing attains its end, however, merely or primarily by being a certain size, mass, etc., even if a certain quantity is a sine qua non of its natural perfection. Quantity is of the same sort for everything; it's general, not specific. In other words:

"[Quantity] accompanies any species according to its actuality, not so quantity. According to it is the order of the universe and natural place and motion and rest. According to them as objects are distinguished the powers of the soul."

IV. A being has more perfect [quality] the more perfect it is. Not so with quantity. Neither an angel nor a man has as much quantity as the earth does.

A more perfect tree has more perfect flourishing. A more perfect man has more perfect intelligence. But if my quantity were to increase much I would get less perfect, not more!

This covers about the first third of Part II. The rest is devoted to what I called in my last post one of Scotus' frequent rabbit-trails. Not because they're pointless, but because they lead you down into a hole. Like the rabbit-hole in Alice in Wonderland, Scotus' digressions can sometimes wander into a wonderland of argumentation, in which everything is brilliant and stuffed to the rafters with things to consider, but you never know quite where you are, who's talking, how things got so tangled up, or what's at stake. So here. After the discussion of quality and quantity Scotus starts thinking about accidental inherence in general and asks, "What can be the subject of an accident?" Not God, since he is completely perfect and so not in potentiality to receive new forms. Only things with some perfection--i.e. per se actual existence--and some imperfection can be the subject of accidents. He then considers arguments that 1) substantial form, 2) accidental form, 3) matter, and 4) angels don't meet these criteria, before opposing them.

On the Intelligibility of Matter

Back to our regular programming. Here is a passage from the Parisian Reportatio on the intelligibility of matter. The context (since I care about such matters) is a series of arguments against Aquinas' position in the Summa that higher degrees of immateriality include higher degrees of intellectuality. Perhaps one could also put it by saying that intellectuality is rooted in immateriality. Scotus makes some interesting arguments against the Thomistic view that the human soul is the lowest type of knower, that it stands midway on the continuum from material things to God in its intellective capabilities. And finally the passage about matter:

Reportatio IA d.35 q.1 a.1 n. 22 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov 356-7):

Contra hoc quod dicitur quod ratio intelligibilis in actu est immaterialitas, arguo sic: si ens in quantum ens et secundum se acceptum sit per se intelligibile et primum obiectum intellectus, impossibile est quod sit aliqua condicio entis per se, quin habens illam sit secundum illam per se intelligibile quantum est ex se. Materialitas autem est una per se condicio ipsius entis, aliter ens materiale non esset per se ens. Ergo ens materiale in quantum materiale est ens per se intelligibile quantum est ex se et per se cognoscibile. Unde materialia et singularia sensibilia ab intellectu omnia intelligente secundum gradum suae entitatis ita perfecte cognoscuntur sicut immaterialia quantum est de perfectione actus, sed non ab intellectu nostro nisi per abstractionem a phantamatibus et singularibus. Sed hoc non est ex incognoscibilitate eorum, sed ex imperfectione intellectus nostri qui nec suprema nec infima cognoscit secundum modum cognosiciblitatis eorum.

Translation by the same:

Against the statement that the nature of the intelligible in its actualized state is immateriality I argue as follows: if one accepts that being qua being is of itself intelligible and the first object of the intellect, it is impossible that there be some condition of being qua being, which, if it were present, would prevent it from being intelligible of itself. Now materiality is one of such very own conditions of being itself: otherwise material being would not of itself be being. Therefore, material being, [even] insofar as it is material, is being that is of itself intelligible and knowable, [precisely] by its own very nature. Whence material things and singular sensibles are as perfectly known by an intellect that understands all things according to the degree of their entity as are immaterial things, if one speaks of a perfect act [of understanding]. However, [they are] not [understood] by the human intellect except by abstraction from the images in the imagination and from singular things. This is however, not because they cannot be known, but bccause of the imperfection of our intellect, which is able to cognize neither highest nor lowest realities according to their mode of intelligibility.

Pini on Kilwardby on Categories

[T]here can be a causal science of categories, inasmuch as there can be a causal science of things belonging to the categories. Kilwardby remarks, however, that the real philosopher, and not the logician, studies categories as composed of matter and form, for it is the real philosopher who deals with the principles of material things. Studying the principles of sensible substances, the real philosopher can first ascend from material to immaterial substances, then he can further ascend from the multiplicity of immaterial substances to the highest immaterial substance, i.e. God.

--Geogio Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, Chapter One.

Pini's excellent book nevertheless contains a mistake here. The Kilwardby passage from which the above remarks are taken is as follows:

Et hec cognicio est propria primo philosopho; considerat enim in principiis substancie sensibilis, et consequenter in principiis substancie insensibilis, reducens omnes substancias sensibiles ad insensibiles, et insensibiles omnes ad unam . . ."

Note that Pini begins talking about sensible substances and then speaks of ascending to immaterial substances, up to the highest immaterial substance. Kilwardby, in contrast, speaks of sensible and insensible substances throughout. Pini shares here the extremely common prejudice that insensible substances are obviously also immaterial, and thinks nothing of conflating the two terms. This is dangerous, however, when Kilwardby is speaking of matter and form as the foundation for understanding things belonging to categories, for if insensible substances are themselves composed of matter and form, they can be included under (at least some of) the same categories as sensible substances. Now Kilwardby, although a Dominican, does in fact accept spiritual matter, as Pini might have learned from Kleineidam. The point doesn't seem to have occurred to him, though.

This is not a jab at Pini. I'm 1/3 through the book and it is otherwise very good.

Additio auctoris incerti

The following 'addition of uncertain authorship' on the essential unity of spiritual and corporeal matter is appended to Distinction III in some manuscripts of St Bonaventure's Sentences commentary and is printed there in the Quaracchi edition. The editors are not sure whether it is an addition of Bonaventure's own long after the composition of the original work or whether it was added by a later reader. I incline to the latter view, in light of the author's uncertainty about fully embracing Bonaventure's doctrine, and in light of the reference to Avicebron, whose name never appears in Bonaventure's works. Here is the passage, followed by a pretty literal translation:

Haec autem dicta sunt de unitate materiae spiritualium et corporalium secundum essentiam ipsius nudam et absolutam; quoniam secundum esse diversificari habet in diversis non tantum secundum esse accidentale, sed etiam secundum esse substantiale. Unde in diversis secundum substantiam diversificatur substantialiter, sicut patebit in sequenti articulo quaestionis. Licet autem non contingat in natura reperire essentiam materiae ab omnibus formis et dispositionibus denidatam, contingit tamen vere intelligere et aliquid ei vere attribuere, sicut Augustinus, in XII Confessionum docet satis aperte, et in libro De vera Religione, dicit quod est quasi medium inter aliquod et nihil, et Philosophus, in I libro De generatione, dicit quod est ita simplex sicut punctus. Quemadmodum igitur rerum corporearum compositarum et extensarum contingit vere intelligere materiam esse per essentiam simplicem, et hoc per privationem omnis compositionis et extensionis, quamvis secundum esse naturae impossibile sit rerum corporearum materiam ab extensione separari, ut in pluribus locis dicit Augustinus, maxime in libro De immortalitate animae, et Super Genesim ad litteram: sic rerum diversarum et distinctarum et numeratarum vere contingit intelligere materiam per suam essentiam indistinctam et non numeratam, et ita quodammodo numero unam per privationem omnis numerationis et distinctionis, ut praedictum est. Et hoc expresse dicit Commentor, Super I Metaphysicae, in illo capitulo: ‘Quoniam autem in fundamento’, ubi assignat differentiam inter unitatem generis et materiae; id ipsum expressissime dicit, Super XII, ubi etiam dat modum, qualiter hoc possit intelligi, quod diversorum sit materia numero una, ostendens quod hoc potius privitave dicitur quam positive. Hoc ipsum dicit auctor Fons vitae in prima parte sui libri et expresse probat in [X]IV, quod corporalium et spiritualium est materia per essentiam una. Et hoc probat per hoc, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et per hoc, quod, si spiritualia et corporalia non haberent materiam per essentiam unam, impossibile esset quod aliquid esset eis univocum, quia diversitas radicum prohibet convenientiam in ramis. Aliorum autem auctoritates causa brevitatis omitto. –Et propter haec et his similia dictum fuit a principio, hunc modum dicendi esse philosophicum, quamvis nihil prohibeat, ipsum esse catholicum et theologicum, dum tamen recte intelligatur. In nullo enim modus iste dicendi repugnat dignitati substantiae spiritualis, nec distantiae inter ipsam et corporalem, nec creationi spirituum. Non enim propter hoc oportet ponere, spiritus fieri de materia praeiacente, quia materia, induta forma corporali, non potest illa exspoliari; nec Deus facit contra ea quae stabilivit a principio, et ideo cum creatur substantia spiritualis, necesse est cum ea suam materiam concreari. Et quemadmodum creatio spirituum non tollit eis convenientiam essentialem in unitate formae specificae, sic etiam non tollit unitatem materiae per essentiam nudam et absolutam, quoniam, sicut dictum fuit, maioris amplitudinis est haec unitas quam unitas generis vel speciei; et praeterea nunquam creatur nec creata fuit materia sine aliqua forma, sub qua habet diversificari, sicut dictum est supra. Si quis igitur essentiam materiae nudae potest intelligere, videbit quod satis probabiliter potest dici una numero privative. Et haec sufficit de ista positione.
Est autem et alius hic dicendi modus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia per essentiam una, quantumcumque intelligatur denudari a formis et dispositionibus superadditis, immo adhuc essentialiter distinguuntur se ipsis. Sicut enim prima rerum genera se ipsis distinguuntur, et essentia formae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae, et essentia materiae a Deo propter simplicitatem; sic essentia materiae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae. Et secundum hanc positionem, si Deus per infinitatem suae potentiae de corpore faceret spiritum, nihil maneret commune, sed totum transiret in totum. –Et si obiciatur contra hanc positionem, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et quod solus actus dividit, et consimilia; breviter secundum hanc positionem respondetur quod illum verum est de distinctione et diversitate completa. Sicut enim essentia materiae, omni forma abstracta, est incompleta respectu distinctionis. Et per hoc possunt quasi omnes rationes ad oppositum determinari, sicut patet pertractanti. Et ideo non oportet in hoc diutius immorari. –Utraque igitur harum positionum in hoc concordar, quod spiritualium et corporalium est materia una unitate analogiae. Sed utrum istud sufficiat dicere ad sustinendam unitatem generis—cum substantiarum et accidentium sint principia eadem per analogiam, sicut vult Philosophus, nec tamen habeant unum genus commune—utrum etiam oporteat ad indistinctionem; diu consideranti et bene intelligenti difficile est videre. Et ideo sanius est uni istarum positionum cum formidine partis alterius adhaerere, quam in alteram omnino praecipitare sententiam; maxime cum magistri et probati clerici utrumque dicant.

"But these things are said of the unity of spiritual and corporeal matter according to its naked and absolute essence; for according to its being it has to be diversified in diverse things, not only according to accidental being, but also according to substantial being. Whence things which are diverse according to substance are diversified substantially, as will be clear in the following article of the question. But although it may not happen that one finds in nature the essence of matter denuded of all forms and dispositions, nevertheless one can truly understand it and truly attribute something to it, as Augusine teaches clearly enough in XII Confessionum, and in his book De vera religione he says that [matter] is as it were a medium between something and nothing, and the Philosopher, the first book of De generatione, says that it is as simple as a point. Just as, therefore, one can truly understand matter through its simple essence to be [present] in composite and extended corporeal things, although according to the being of nature it is impossible for the matter of coporeal things to be separated from extension, as Augustine says in many places, especially in his book De immortalitate animae, and Super Genesim ad litteram: so one can also understand matter through its indistinct and unnumbered essence [to be present] in diverse and and distinct and numbered things, and so [one may understand it to be], by a certain kind of number, one through the privation of all enumeration and distinction, as was said before. And the Commentor expressly says this, in Super I Metaphysicae, in the chapter ‘Quoniam autem in fundamento’, where he assigns the difference between the unity of genus and [the unity of] matter; he expressly says the same thing in Super XII, where he gives the way how it can be understood that there can be numerically one matter for diverse things, showing that this is said privatively rather than positively. The author of the Fons vitae says the same thing in the first part of his book and expressly proves in [X]IV that the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is essentially one. And he proves it this way: every diversity is from form; and this way: if spiritual and corporeal things did not have matter which was essentially one, it would be impossible for them to have anything univocal, for diversity in the roots prevents in the branches. I omit the authorities of others for the sake of brevity. –And on account of these and similar considerations it was said from the beginning that this way of speaking is philosophical, although nothing prohibits it from also being catholic and theological, so long as it is rightly understood. For this way of speaking in no way detracts from the dignity of a spiritual substance, nor from the distance between it and a corporeal [substance], nor from the creation of spirits. For one need not because of this [doctrine] posit that a spirit is made from previously-existing matter, because matter, clothed in corporeal form, cannot be robbed of it; nor does God act against what he has established from the beginning, and therefore when a spiritual substance is created, it is necessary for its matter to be cocreated with it. And just as the creation of spirits does not take from them [their] essential agreement in the unity of [their] specific form, neither also does the unity of matter through its naked and absolute essence take [it from them], because, as was said, this unity is of a greater extent than the unity of genus or species; and furthermore matter is not created nor was ever created without some form under which it is diversified, as was said above. If therefore anyone is able to understand the essence of naked matter, he will see that it can with sufficient probability be called privatively numerically one. And these [words] suffice about this position.
But there is another way of speaking here, [by saying namely that] the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is not essentially one, howsoever it may be understood to be stripped of form and superadded dispositions, but rather [that the two matters are] still essentially distinguished from one another. For as the primary genera of things are distinguished from one another, and [as] the essence of form is by itself distinguished from the essence of matter, and the essence of matter from God on account of simplicity; so the essence of matter by itself is distinguished from the essence of [the other kind of] matter. And according to this position, if God through the infinity of his power were to make a spirit out of a body, nothing common would remain [between them], but the whole would pass into the whole. –And if it were objected against this position, that all diversity is from form, and that act alone divides, and similar [things were said]; briefly according to this position one would respond that this is true of complete distinction and diversity. For as the essence of matter, abstracted from all form, is incomplete with respect to distinction . . . [lacuna?] And in this way all the arguments for the opposite [side] can be determined, as is clear to anyone who works through it. And therefore one need not be delayed by this matter any longer. –But both of these positions can be harmonized in this one, that the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is one with the unity of analogy. But whether this is sufficient to preserve the unity of genus—since the principles of substances and of accidents are the same by analogy, as the Philosopher has it, nor nevertheless do they have one common genus—and also whether [this position would seem] sufficient for indistinction, is difficult to see [even] for one who considers and understands [the matter] well. And therefore it is saner to stick to one of these positions together with due respect for the other side, rather than to throw oneself headlong altogether into one opinion; especially since masters and esteemed clerics say each."

Matter is a Slut

A while back I posted the following excerpt from Chaucer, with comment:

To Colcos comen is this duc Jasoun,
That is of love devourer and dragoun.
As mater apetiteth form alwey
And from forme into forme it passen may,
Or as a welle that were botomles,
Right so can false Jason have no pes.
For to desyren thourgh his apetit
To don with gentil women his delyt,
This is his lust and his felicite.

--Chaucer, The Legend of Good Women, "The Legend of Medea"

It turns out that Chaucer was being less imaginative and more learned than I suspected. Today I came across much the same metaphor in none other than John Quidort:

Unde nullus antiquorum ponentium materiam in omnibus creaturis, posuit materiam diversarum specierum vel rationum, sed diversimode se habentem in istis inferioribus et in spiritibus. Quae diversitas non provenit ex diversitate materiae absolutae, sed ex diversitate formae inferiorum et superiorum, quia forma non terminat vel capit totum ambitum materiae, quae est ad formas naturales. Ideo materia informata actu inferioris formae, quasi meretrix viro suo non satiatur actu formae quam habet, sed appetit supponi alii formae. Forma vero corporis caelestis vel intelligentiae, qua movet universum, virtute continet omnem formam, ad quam materia prima est in potentia. Ideo terminat totum appetitum materiae et ideo materia actu informata forma superiorum, non est in potentia ad aliud extra. Ideo non machinatur in maleficium corruptionis per appetitum alterius formae et corruptionem formae habitae. Ideo mulieri castae comparatur.

--John of Paris (Quidort). Le Correctorium corruptorii “Circa”, ed. J.P. Muller (Studio Anselma, 12-13), Rome, 1941. p.56

Rather than translate verbatim, I'll just include the note I wrote on this passage for my dissertation this afternoon:

"None of the ancients positing matter in all creatures went so far as to posit matters of different kinds or characters [specierum vel rationum]. The diversity of things comes not from a diversity of matters but from a diversity of superior and inferior forms, since no one form exhausts or expresses [terminat vel capit] the whole extent of matter’s potency to natural forms. Like a slut who is never satisfied with her husband, matter informed with with an inferior form is never satisfied with it, but always desires to replace it with another. On the other hand, John claims, the form of a heavenly body or of one of the Intelligences which moves the universe virtually contains every form to which prime matter is in potency (he does not explain in what sense this is true). Therefore such a form exhausts the whole desire of matter for form, and so matter informed with a superior form in not in potency to something else. These sorts of substances, then, are not entangled in the offense of corruption through the desire of some other form and the corruption of the form possessed, and so the matter of these higher substances is like a chaste woman."

Scotus and Universal Hylomorphism

This topic is somewhat enigmatic; the twentieth century historical-critical scholarship on the topic is agreed that Scotus denies spiritual matter, while nineteenth-century, based on the false attribution of the De rerum principio, assumed he held to it. The usual contemporary claim, example below (from the online Standford encyclopedia article on Scotus by Thomas Williams), is that the doctrine is denied in Lectura II d. 12; when I read this passage I found it not to be the case. But it is a sort of dogma in the scholarship at the moment. What I have seen is that Scotus generally refers to it when it comes up as "alia opinio" and may mention strengths/weaknesses it has, but doesn't definitively reject or hold it.

Second, Scotus denies "universal hylemorphism," the view that all created substances are composites of form and matter (Lectura 2, d. 12, q. un., n. 55). Universal hylemorphism (from the Greek hyle, meaning ‘matter’, and morphe, meaning ‘form’) had been the predominant view among Franciscans before Scotus. Saint Bonaventure, for example, had argued that even angels could not be altogether immaterial; they must be compounds of form and "spiritual matter." For matter is potentiality and form is actuality, so if the angels were altogether immaterial, they would be pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality. But only God is pure actuality. But as we have already seen in his affirmation of the existence of prime matter, Scotus simply denies the unqualified equation of matter with potentiality and form with actuality. Prime matter, though entirely without form, is actual; and a purely immaterial being is not automatically bereft of potentiality.

Fr. Emery on Thomas on Spiritual Matter

Here's one for Michael, from Gilles Emery, OP, "Trinity, Church, and the Human Person". A collection of essays we are reading through the ethics and culture center (all translations, often awkward, from Emery's original french).

"By definition, form is act. This definition excludes the possibility of any matter entering into the composition of the soul itself, as was suggested by St. Bonaventure, among others. Following the Jewish philosopher Avicebron, and more distantly, St. Augustine, the Franciscan master effectively taught that the soul contains some kind of matter, a spiritual matter (materia spiritualis) that bears witness to its creataurely status. St. Thomas criticizes this conception of the soul for its metaphysical inconsistency. Since the soul is created, it includes composition: a composition not of matter and form, but of essence and participated existence. Like every creature, its essence (what it is) is not identical with its exiwtence, which it receives from God at the moment of creation."

This is in an essay on the unicity of the substantial form in Thomas. Like all of Fr. Emery's essays, its framed within contemporary debate; the point is that Thomas doesn't fall prey to contemporary claims that posit a dichotomy between dualism and biblical wholism (ie, various protestants). Once again, we learn that Thomas really is relevant in today's world. Emery is better than most Thomist scholars, despite the criticisms (far more extensive than what i've whined about before), in that he at least mentions the fact that there were other theologians than st. Thomas, and sometimes even quotes them in latin. But there're ultimately just the frame for Thomas's greatness. The usual tedious historiographical tale. I'm still reading the essay, and so far Emery hasn't mentioned the Eucharist, one of the fault lines in which the unicity thesis is shown to be implausible. One also wonders what St. Thomas would have made of organ transplants; the organ is still alive, but removed from the body which is actualized by the single substantial form. I am tempted to say that the only options are substantial form and form of the corpse. Presumably the latter, as it is a form and therefore has some actuality that might continue on in an organ separated from its original body, though being taken into a second body seems problematic. All in all, the Scotist line seems easier to maintain, with various bodily organs, bones, CNS, being separate forms of some kind, all ordered in potency-act relations to higher forms until you reach the rational soul at the top. An organ removed from this setup would have its own actuality once separated from the chain.

separate question: does Thomas think that the intellect is active, functioning (ie, are we thinking) at all times?

De materia

One of the facets of Scotistic philosophy that the uniniated gawk at and find shocking are his views on matter. He is often presented (no references will be supplied; just take my word for it-besides, its just a blog!) as claiming that matter can exist without form. Now, in Lectura II.12 (a locus-possibly erroneous- for what little modern discussion there is on the potentially embarassing question of Scotus and spiritual matter) there is some indication on this, as Scotus says that matter has some positive entity, enabling it to act as a substrate for change, to subsist beneath a succession of forms. The other day, while studying for exams, I came across the following interesting passage from Ord. IV d.11 q.3, the place where Scotus analyzes the merits of transubstantiation, consubstantiation, annihilation. Here he is more explicit than in the Lectura, and analyzes matter in terms of potency as a disjunctive transcendental (transcendental pairs that between them divide being: another example would be the necessary and contingent) and matter as potency to form. The second paragraph is pretty strange; either reflective of ms. problems or just a long run-on sentence.

By the way, when I get back into town I intend to look into the penance issue, and consult the wadding ed. with its accompanying post-Tridentine commentaries to see Scotus's relation to the doctrinal formulations and the analysis by Richard Cross.

Here's the passage on matter (the context is eucharistic conversion):

"And when it is argued against the first, because then matter would be without form, and so in act, and not in act, there is an equivocation regarding 'act', because in one mode act is a difference of being opposed to potency, inasmuch as every being is divided, that is, into act or into potency. In another mode act means that relation [habitudinem: At one point in Book one Scotus says that the terms respectivum, relatio, and habitudo all mean the same thing], which is that of form to the informable, and is to the totality of it. And in the same way there is an equivocation about 'potency', because as it is opposed to act in the first mode, it means diminished being [ens diminutum], to which namely, it is not repugnant to be outside its own cause. Being however in act opposted to that potency, is being complete in its own being [esse] outside its own cause, whatsoever that may be. In another mode potency means a receptive principle of act in the second of the aforesaid modes, just as matter is called potency and form act. [there follows an omitted paragraph reciting passages of Aristotle in support].

"To the question at hand [propositum], matter without form is in act in the first mode, and not in potency, which is proved by the Confessions of Augustine. Note his words: 'matter itself receives from God its imperfect being, which it has, namely in potency,' And it is necessary for him to say this, because he grants that matter is created by God, but before it was created, it was in potency in the first mode. This is proved, because otherwise it would be created, which is impossible to be created, therefore after creation it was in potency, not by that mode, because then by creation there would not have been some entity of produced matter, only therefore after creation was in potency in the second mode, because it was receptive of act in the aforesaid second mode. but then there is ignorance of dialectics [elenchi?], when it is said, matter is in act in the first mode, and not in act in the second mode; therefore it is in act, and not in act. In the same way there is an equivocation about potency here as there."

There's a gloss in the margin here by Wadding or Antonius Hiquaeus Hibernus (the commentary printed in this volume) that refers this matter prior to creation to be first in objective potency and then in subjective potency, which to my mind squares with what Scotus says elsewhere. Basically, what he seems to be saying in the second paragraph here (no latin today) that matter had to be created, but before it was it was in potency; it was potency as disjunctive transcendental/ens diminutum (though I think this latter term is sometimes synonymous with esse cognitum). after creation it was in potency in the second way, as related to form. weird.