Voluntarism is especially associated by moderns with Scotus, and with the Franciscan tradition in general. It's often taken to mean that moral laws are assigned by God arbitrarily, so that voluntarism is in opposition to natural law theory. The truth is much more nuanced; Scotus accepts the notion of natural law, in that moral laws are fitting and congruent with the natures of the things involved. On the other hand he holds that God can suspend the natural moral law for precepts which have to do with creatures, although not those which have to do with Himself; it is altogether impossible for God to command idolatry, or hatred of God, or blasphemy. Such actions are absolutely immoral by their very natures. Laws having to do with creatures, however, can be suspended in certain circumstances, for instance, when God commands the Israelites to despoil the Egyptians, or Hosea to cohabitate with a prostitute. There can be circumstances in which the thing that would normally bad can be commanded as good, subject to the divine prudence.
I've been finding this same same account in Bonaventure as I've read through his commentary on the Sentences. It's come up several times, most recently for me in IV Dist. XXXII Art. I Q. III, where St B. discusses why God allowed a dispensation from the law of nature so that the Patriarchs could have many wives.
2 comments:
Dr. Sullivan:
You wrote, "On the other hand he holds that God can suspend the natural moral law for precepts which have to do with creatures, although not those which have to do with Himself; it is altogether impossible for God to command idolatry, or hatred of God, or blasphemy. Such actions are absolutely immoral by their very natures. Laws having to do with creatures, however, can be suspended in certain circumstances, for instance, when God commands the Israelites to despoil the Egyptians, or Hosea to cohabitate with a prostitute. There can be circumstances in which the thing that would normally bad can be commanded as good, subject to the divine prudence."
Would genocide and the sheer killing of the innocent (even babies) be one of those moral law precepts that can be suspended in certain circumstances?
Kyle Cupp had written a post concerning 1 Samuel 15:3 'Now go and strike Amalek and utterly destroy all that he has, and do not spare him; but put to death both man and woman, child and infant', where it seems to have been the case (at least, according to some commenters):
http://vox-nova.com/2010/04/28/is-the-bible-a-perverse-book/
The original post was subsequently followed up by one dealing a hypothetical concerning genocide:
http://vox-nova.com/2010/05/05/the-significance-of-saying-that-god-commanded-genocide/
o.p.
Thank you for linking to those very interesting debates. I'm reluctant to stick more oar into them because of how highly charged the discussions are - I spent quite a while reading them all the way through - especially as a layman non-theologian, where I'm not sure it's my place. I certainly don't intend to get into a debate about scriptural hermeneutics and how the Vatican II and later documents should be read as reflecting upon earlier magisterial statements, etc. I don't have time, for one thing, and such matters fall outside the sphere of my professional competence, so to speak, for another.
I will say that I believe the mediaeval scholastics would have and did say that God could and did will the death of innocent babies in some circumstances. God sent his angel of death to smite the firstborn of Egypt, not to punish the babies themselves, but as a judgment on the nation as a whole. From there to the obliteration of depraved and wicked nations is not such a jump.
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