More on Descartes' Relation to the Scholastics

David Clemenson, Descartes' Theory of Ideas, Continuum 2007, p. 5:

The philosophy of cognition contained in these texts [Descartes' Jesuit textbooks at La Fleche] is mainstream Scholasticism, but it is not the Thomism of the great Dominican commentators Cajetan and Poinsot (John of St. Thomas). The intellectual tradition of the Franciscan order, especially Scotism, exerted an important influence on Jesuit cognitive philosophy, including that of Fonseca and the Coimbran school. Not that the Jesuits were doctrinaire Scotists. But they do reject Aquinas, in favour of Scotus or his early fourteenth-century Franciscan successors, on at least three controversial points in the philosophy of cognition: (a) the possiblity of a direct and immediate (human) intellectual perception of singular matter-form composites (and not just of universal forms, as Aquinas thought), (b) the possibility of direct intellectual cognition of non-existent objects and (c) the doctrine of objective or intentional esse as an intrinsic denomination of the perceived object. Descartes sides with the Jesuits (and thus the Franciscans) on each of these points.

See! Brad Gregory and Fr. Robert Barron were right!

A Comparison

In Reportatio I-A, Dist.2 Part I Q.1-3.11, in the Wolter-Bychkov text, we read:

Nam primum in quolibet genere praeeminet alteri posteriori illius generis, et tamen non est causa illius. Primitas enim exemplaris non distinguitur a primitate efficientiae, quia primum exemplans alia in esse intelligibli, non est nisi primum efficiens per intellectum; et sicut naturale efficiens non distinguitur contra efficiens, immo continetur sub eo, sic nec exemplaris distinguitur ab efficiente. Sunt ergo duae causalitates contra se distinctae, scilicet causae efficientis et finalis.

Judging the soundness of the Latin text is well beyond my competence; that's Faber's domain. The present edition isn't a critical one (it includes no variants), but until the critical edition is available it's what we have to go on, though it has come under some pretty severe criticism from trustworthy critics. Taking the Latin as it is, though, I want to look for a second at the English translation. This passage gives a good example for why, granted all the good he's done for Scotist scholarship, the reader should be wary of relying on Wolter's translations for a precise grasp of Scotus' thought. Wolter's translation:

For the most eminent [species] in any genus excels each less eminent [species], and yet is not its cause. Note also that the primacy of exemplarity is not distinguished from that of efficiency, for the first to model another in thought is nothing other than a first efficient cause endowed with an intellect. Now just a natural efficient cause is not distinguished from efficient cause - indeed it is a subdivision thereof - so neither is the exemplar cause. Hence, there are only two sorts of causality that are distinct from each other, namely what pertains to an efficient cause and final cause respectively.

Here is my own translation:

Now the first in any genus is preeminent over another posterior member of that genus, and yet is not its cause. For the primacy of exemplarity is not distinguished from the primacy of effectivity, for the first thing exemplating another into intelligible being is nothing but the first thing effecting another through intellect; and as a natural effecting [cause] is not distinguished against an effecting [cause], but rather is contained under it, so neither is an exemplary cause distinguished from an efficient one. There are therefore two causalities distinct over against each other, namely that of an efficient cause and that of a final one.

Some of the differences in my translation are mere quibbles. I don't like Wolter's "efficiency", since the ordinary meaning of the English word seems just too far from its meaning here. More seriously, I don't see why he twice inserts the bracketed "species", which does not seem obviously demanded or implied by the sense of the passage. Some are not quibbles, however. While in places Wolter's translation is extremely literal, "for the first to model another in thought is nothing other than a first efficient cause endowed with an intellect" seems to me intolerably loose. It's almost as though he doesn't grasp the crucial point here, and so doesn't know how to render it precisely, and thus totally glosses over the relevance of this passage to the problem of intelligible being.

When I "model something in thought," there are two ways for me to do it, depending on what exactly I am modeling. Say I am modeling in my thought some mathematical object, the five platonic solids; or say I'm a detective modeling out scenarios to match the evidence of a crime scene. In these cases the objects of thought are already intelligible before I think of them, before I form my mind so that their intelligibility is activated in my intellection. The task is to bring what is already in itself potentially intelligible by the nature of its intrinsic formal integrity to being actually thought-out.

On the other hand, when I "model in thought" something like this blog post, or the plot of a detective novel, I am in a sense creating a new intelligibility, not discovering in thought what is already out there to bring into thoughtfulness. My act of intellection causes rather than is caused by the intelligibility of the intelligible object. However, my intelligible productions are artifacts. Like material artifacts, they don't have substantiality beyond that of the material from which they are produced. I can't create intelligibility any more than I can create physical things; I can only make new things by taking intelligible content and rearranging it in new ways. I can't invent a new platonic solid, although I can produce a new mathematical proof or pedagogical technique concerning the five that are always already there.

Now, the most pressing question about intelligible being concerns, not the way we think intelligibles, but the way God does. I can't make substances, only artifacts. But the substantial, natural world is in its entirety like an artifact of God's, who makes it. Is this true for the intelligible world as well? Does God think things, "model them in thought", in the first way or in the second? Does he think thinkables because they are first thinkable or are things thinkable because he first thinks them? If the former, one has to explain why finite things don't have some kind of eternal existence apart from God, in the separate platonic heaven of forms. If the latter, one has to explain how forms can have any internal necessity or non-arbitary features, and why in this case the potential seems logically posterior to the actual. By its looseness and imprecision Wolter's translation here totally obscures the fact that Scotus thinks that God produces intelligibles into intelligible being, a position which some later Scotists found untenable and ultimately incoherent. Someone reading only the English would not only be unable to tell which position Scotus takes, but even that this passage is relevant to the question at all. The question is not whether God is "endowed with intellect", but whether intelligibles are intelligible through the activity of his intellect or prior to his intellection.

A final note: in my opinion Wolter's "only" in the last sentence is neither justified in the Latin, nor correct. Scotus is not, I think, saying that efficient and final causality are the only kinds of causality; here he's talking about extrinsic causes, those which produce something into being, and not about the intrinsic causality of matter and form, which of course he recognizes. The point is that among extrinsic causes natural and exemplary causality are species of efficient causality, but that final causality is not; the point is not that there are no other kinds of causes.

So I reiterate a point I've made before: this sort of thing is not at all uncommon in Wolter's translations. Taken as a whole his work has been enormously beneficial for the study of Scotus in English; but it should never be relied on in place of the Latin for matters of detail.

John Punch on the Eternal Being of Creatures

In my efforts to determine the influence, if any, of Peter Thomae's questions on intelligible being, I have begun leafing through the voluminous pages of the baroque Scotists.  In this post I am just going to list a series of conclusions that the Irishman Punch defends (for bio, see the 'Franciscan authors' website).

Ioannes Poncius, Cursus philosophiae, disp. 2 q. 5 (p. 902ff.)

'De esse creaturarum ab aeterno'

Conclusio I: Creatures have no real being simpliciter from eternity.

Conclusio II: All creatures have some being from eternity

This can scarcely be denied, because they were understood by God from eternity and they terminate the act of divine cognition; therefore they had some being according to which they terminate that cognition, whether they terminate it primarily or secondarily.

Conclusio III: That being which they had from eternity, for example a man, does not consist in extrinsic denomination taken from the omnipotence of God, nor in non-repugnance, nor in some ratio, whether real or rational or actual or aptitudinal.

This is of the Doctor [=Scotus] above, and commonly against some Thomists, who seem to say that that being is nothing other than possibile being and that that possible being comes about from  denomination taken from divine omnipotence.

Conclusio IV: That being, which creatures have from eternity, is diminished being, a quasi medium between being of reason and being simply real.

Conclusio V: That diminished being is not produced by the act of the divine intellect. [Both Petrus Thomae and William of Alnwick would agree with this].

This is against many Scotists and it seems to be against Scotus, above, but it is not, as will be proved.

It is proved first, because an object of speculative knowledge is not made by that [divine act] but rather is presupposed to it; but the knowledge, by which God knows creatures from eternity, is speculative; therefore it does not give that being to creatures according to which it knows them.

Aufredus Gonteri on the Modes of Creaturely Being

The following is a snippet from Gonteri's commentary on the Lombard. Gonteri was a Franciscan from Brittany, and lectured on the Sentences at Barcelona and Paris in the 1320's. His commentary is a good example of the practice of reading the Sentences 'secundum alium', that is copying other scholars' commentaries into one's own.  Gonteri takes material from thinkers such as Henry of Harclay, Francis of Marchia, and Gerard Odonis.  This is illustrated by the question on modes of creaturely being; see Duba-Friedman-Schabel, "Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito,"  in Medieval Comm. on the Sent. of Peter Lombard, p. 304

Gonteri includes (at least) 15 questions from Gerard of Odonis's commentary on Book II. We have edited Odonis's Book II, dist. 1, part 1, qu. 2, which corresponds to Gonteri's Book II, dist. I, qu. 22. Again, Gonteri's choice is impressive, since this question asks "whether before its creation a creature has any being distinct from the being of its cause," and Odonis outlines nine sorts of being that a creature has before creation, in addition to the one being it receives at creation itself. Of the over 300 lines of text in this realist question, Gonteri copies verbatim about 35%, except for transitional statements where he abbreviates, saying for example, et sic de aliis. These ten modes of being are explained in the first 35% of the question, of which Gonteri copies a full 70%. In the second 35% of the question Odonis presents and responds to some objections; Gonteri omits this section entirely. Gonteri then abbreviates heavily in the last 30% of the question, incorporating only about 30% of that section.

Here are the ten modes:

Aufredus Gonteri, Ordinatio/Compilatio super II Sententiarum d. 1 q. 22 (Pamplona, Archivo de la Catedral, Ms. 5, f. 18vb):

Circa solutionem questionis est primo videndum de modis essendi creature ante sui creationem, circa quod sciendum quod creatura habet ante sui creationem 9 modos, et accipit unum per creationem et tunc* sunt X. Primus est esse producibile et potentiale, secundus esse ydeale, tertius esse intelligibile, quartus esse intellectum, quintus esse voluntabile, sextus esse volutum, septimus esse possibile, octavus esse positivum, nonus esse quidditativum, decimus quem per creationem accipit esse positum.

Concerning the solution of the question, first we must treat of the modes of being of a creature before its creation; concerning which it should be known that a creature has nine modes of being before its creation, and it receives one through creation and then there are ten. The first is producible and potential being, the second ideal being, the third intelligible being, the fourth understood being, the fifth willable being, the sixth willed being, the seventh possible being, the eighth positive being, the ninth quidditative being, the tenth which it receives through creation is posited(?) being

Walter of Bruges on Intelligible and Virtual Being

The following is a quote from Walter of Bruges, a figure so obscure he failed to make it into our co-blogger Michael’s dissertation (even though he has a fairly large question on spiritual matter that contains discussion of Avicebron’s views). But Michael will undoubtably try to convince us that 450 pages is long enough for a dissertation. I don’t know about you, but I would have read a 500 page dissertation. Anyway, Walter of Bruge was a Franciscan who lectured at Paris during the 1260’s. The quote is from the question on spiritual matter and contains some talk of intelligible being, hence my posting of it here (it turns out blogs are also a handy way to store information one might otherwise lose).

I Sent. d. 8 a. 5 (ed. Longpre, Archives, d'histoire doctrinale et lit.... 1932 p.272)

Ad quartum dic quod anima recipit duos modos accidentium: nam recipit accidentia intentionalia, ut similitudines vel species quibus cognoscit eas et recipit etiam accidentia realia, ut virtutes et vitia. Prima non habent contrarietatem in anima, quia sunt ibi tantum secundum intentionem, non secundum naturam suam, et ideo non distinguunt eam nec dant animae esse, sed recipiunt in ea esse intelligibile; et haec non sunt in anima ut in subiecto vel materia simpliciter, sed ut in loco, quia anima conservat ea in esse intelligibili, sicut locus conservat locatum; et sic considerantur ut media intelligendi res quarum sunt similitudines; tamen in quantum huiusmodi similitudines animam scientem reddunt et quoad hoc perficiunt, etiam possunt dici esse in anima ut in subiecto et distinguere eam ab anima ignorante et dare animae esse scientificum. Alia vero accidentia, scilicet vitia et virtutes, simpliciter sunt in anima ut in subiecto et distinguunt eam et dant ei esse virtuale, nec sunt in ea ut in loco, sed vere ut in subiecto.

To the fourth say that the soul receives two kinds of accidents: for it receives intentional accidents, as likenesses or species by which it knows them and it receives also real accidents, as the virtues and vices. The first kind do not have contrariety in the soul, because they are there only according to intention, not according to their nature, and therefore they do not distinguish it nor give being to the soul, but they receive in it intelligibile being, and these are not in the soul as in a subject or matter simply, but as in a place, because the soul conserves them in intelligible being, just as place conserves the located; and so they are considered as means of understanding the things of which they are the likenesses; nevertheless insofar as likenesses of this kind make the soul knowing and perfect it with respect to this, they also can be said to be in the soul as in a subject and to distinguish it from a soul not-knowing, and to give to the soul the ability to be scientific. But the other accidents, namely the vices and virtues, simply are in the soul as in a subject and distinguish it and give virtual being to it, nor are they in it as in a place, but truly as in a subject.

John the Canon on Objective and Subjective Being

[Update: The following text is a verbatim quote from Petrus Thomae. So the title of the post should be John the Canon secundum Petrum Thomae on Objective and Subjective being.]

John the Canon was a secular priest (not a Franciscan as is commonly assumed) who taught at Toulouse in the 1330's. He was a Catalan, as can be seen by the various examples of Catalonia he cites. His only extant work is a commentary on the Physics. In this work he quotes a great deal of material from Peter Auriol, Francis of Meyronnes, Francis of Marchia, and Petrus Thomae, and probably others as well. The following is a text in which he defines objective and subjective being, which I post out of my interest in the divine ideas and fourteenth-century debates concerning them. In a later post I will post the text that follows this definition, in which he argues in favor of a series of conclusions based on it.

Ioannes Canonicus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum II q. 3 (ed. 1520, f. 29rb): “Quantum ad secundum punctum de nobilitate esse subiectivi et obiectivi est primo sciendum quod est esse subiectivum et obiectivum, et unde dicantur ista vocabula non bene inest memorie nostre; ubi sciendum quod secundum Hylarium ‘sermo rei non est rei subiciendus et ideo non est curandum de vocabulis’, tamen secundum Philosophum necessarium est scire quod per nomen significatur ideo dico primo de subiectivo esse quod esse subiectivum venit a subiecto. Subiectum autem dicitur aliquod ut materia vel sicut in quo vel sicut de quo vel circa quod vel ipsum quod. Primo modo dicitur ‘subiectivum’ illud de quo fit aliquod ut de ipsa materia. Secundo modo in quo existit aliquod. Tertio modo circa quod versatur actio. Quarto illud quod in se subsistit vel substat, et tamen advertendum est quod licet istis quatuor modis dicatur subiectum, tamen esse subiectivum, de quo hic queritur, dicitur a subiecto quarto modo sumpto. Ad cuius evidentiam est advertendum quod omne substans vel substat a se et per se, ut ipse deus, vel per se et non a se, et sic est substantia, vel non a se nec per se sed in alio, tamen absolute ut accidens absolutum; aliud est quod non substat neque a se neque per se neque in alio absolute sed in alio ad aliud, ut omnis forma relativa. Secundum hoc potest distingui quadruplex esse subiectivum, scilicet essentie divine, esse subiectivum substantie et accidentis absoluti et accidentis respectivi.

Viso ergo quod est esse subiectivum videndum est quod est esse obiectivum, ubi dico quod esse obiectivum secundum proprietatem vocabuli nihil aliud est quam esse obiectum alicui, unde esse obiectivum potest distingui sic: quoddam enim est quod habet tantum esse in fictione, puta cum secundum communiter loquentes aliqua potentia fingit sibi aliquod quod ex se nullum habet esse nisi esse obiectivum, aliud quod vere habet esse representativum in aliquo ipsum continente modo representativo et ad hunc modum sequitur esse intelligibile et intellectivum. Secundum ergo hoc potest dici quod duplex est esse obiectivum: unum quod est simpliciter fictum et hoc habent figmenta, aliud quod est esse representativum, et hoc habent solum illa que ex natura rei in aliquo representantur non ex aliqua fictione potentie ficitive et ad istud esse sequitur intelligibile et intellectivum.

“As far as the second point, concerning the nobility of subjective and objective being, it should first be known what subjective and objective being are, and why this terminology is used, which is hard to remember. It should be known that according to Hilary, ‘speech about a thing is not subjected to the thing, and therefore we should not worry about terms’ nevertheless, according to the Philosopher it is necessary to know that is signified by a name and therefore first I say about subjective being that it comes from ‘subject’. Something is called a subject, however, as matter, or as ‘in which’ or as ‘from which’ or ‘around which’ or just the thing itself. In the first way something is called ‘subjective’ from which something is made, as from its matter. In the second way, in which something exists. In the third way concerning which an action is directed. Fourth, that which subsits or stands under itself. And it must be noted that although ‘subject’ is said in those four modes, subjective being, about which it is asked here, is said from subject in the fourth way. As evidence of this, it should b entoed that every thing standing under does so either from itself and through itself, as God, or not from itself but through itself, as substance, or not from itself nor through itself but in another, absolutely as an absolute accident, another which does not stand under neither from itself nor through itself neither in another absolutely, but in another and to another, as every relative form. According to this we must distinguish four kinds of subjective being, namely of the divine essence, of substance, and of absolute and relative accidents.

Now that we have seen what subjective being is, we must see what objective being is. I say that objective being according to the meaning of its term is nothing other than to be an object of something, whence objective being can be distinuished thus: for there is a certain kind which has being only as a fiction, for example, according to the common way of expressing it, when a power is able to attain something which of itself has no being other than objective being, another [kind of objective being] which truly has representative being in the manner in which it is contained in a representative way, and this is intelligible and intellective being. According to this it can be said that there are two kinds of objective being: one which is simply a fiction and this is the kind of being that figments have, and another, which is representative being, which only those things have which from their own nature are represented, and not falsely as a result of being a fiction of a power, and this is intelligible and intellective being.”

A Strange Remark of William of Varouillon

The following comes from the commentary on the Sentences by William of Varouillon, a fifteenth-century Franciscan theologian. Scotist, maybe, probably with Bonaventurian modifications. In his discussion of the divine ideas he makes the following weird comment, which I shall not bother to translate.

Guillelmus de Varouillon, I Sent. d.36 q. 1 (ed. 1502 f. 61ra)

"Et si obicitur quod sic dicetur est doctori subtili contradicere qui posuit quidditates rerum et essentie esse distinctas ab esse essentie et ab eterno, quantum mihi dicens intelligere doctorem subtilem dedit.

Dico quod non est opinio sua imo in presenti distinctione ex intentione oppositum dicit inveniendo quod totum quod est in creatura est ex tempore bene tamen est ibi distinctio formalis sicut inter humanitatem et animalitatem et ceteras quidditates non enim videt quomodo posset esse creatio aut annihilatio si istud poneretur. Unde rerum ante suum existere solum ponit esse ydeale quod est ens rationis in mente divina nec apparet de qua serviret istud esse essentie unde patet quod ista opinio est aut gandista a Gandavo aut provincialis a Francisco de mayronis qui fuit de provincia provincie aut turonica a Boneto non scotica a doctora subtili sicut eroum quidam somniando dicit quod iste quidditates ortum habuerunt non in scotia aut francia verum dicit sic accipiendo sed locis predicti.

Gilson on Voluntarism

From Gilson's History of Christian Philosophy, reprinted in A Gilson Reader, p. 134-136:

"Having thus posited a necessary being as the first cause of all that is, Duns Scotus finds himself at the same starting point as Avicenna, but when it comes to explaining the relation of finite beings to the infinite being, he separates from the Arabian philosopher. For Avicenna, the possible emanated from the necessary by way of necessity; for Duns Scotus, whose doctrine in this case becomes a radical anti-Avicennism, the possible comes from the necessary by way of liberty. The God of Duns Scotus is a necessary being because he is infinite being. Now, between infinite being and finite beings, all ontological relations are radically contingent. In a doctrine which is based on univocal being and not upon analogical acts of being, a dividing line other than the act of being must be drawn between God and creatures. The role played in Thomism by the existential purity of the divine act-of-being is played in Scotism by the divine will. The infinite essence of God is the necessary object of God's will. There is, in the God of Duns Scotus, no voluntarism with respect to God. There is no trace of voluntarism in him even with respect to the essences of creatable beings. Even in the moral domain God s in some way bound by the first two commandments of the Decalogue, which are the expression of the natural law and correspond to an absolute necessity. In Scotism, divine liberty is emphatically not the enlightened despotism of the Cartesian Lawgiver whose will freely promulgates even necessary and eternal truth. In Scotism, the will of God intervenes to bridge the ontological gap there is between the necessary existence of Infinite Being and the possible existence of finite beings. In the universe of Avicenna, because the First was necessary, all the rest enjoyed a conditional necessity; in the universe of Duns Scotus, because the First is infinite, all the rest is contingent. Between the necessary and the contingent the only conceivable link is a Will.

In a curious text wherein Duns Scotus describes a hypothetical generating of essences in God, we see that, at the first moment, God knows his own essence in itself and absolutely; in the second moment the divine intellect produces the stone, conferring upon it an intelligible being, and God knows the stone (in secundo instanti producit lapidem in esse intelligibili, et intelligit lapidem); in the third instant, God is compared to this intelligible and a relation is thus established between them; in the fourth moment, God in some way reflects on that relation and knows it. It is therefore clearly a posteriority of finite essences in relation to the infinite essence of God which is here at stake. Since God's essence is the only necessary object of God's will, there is not one of these finite essences whose existence should be necessarily willed by God. God creates if he wills to do so, and only because he so wills. To ask the reason why God willed or did not will such-and-such a thing is to ask the reason for something for which there is no reason. The sole cause for which the necessary being willed contingent things is his will, and the sole cause for the choice he made is that his will is his will; there is no getting beyond that. The only conditions this liberty observes are to will essences such as they are, to chose only compossible essences among those that are to be produced, and to preserve unchangingly the laws which have once been decreed. With the exception of the principle of contradiction and of the intrinsic necessity of the intelligible forms taken in themselves, the will of God is therefore absolute master of the decision to create or not to create, as well as of the choice and combination of essences to be created. With respect to what is not God, the divine will is not necessarily ruled by the good; it is on the contrary the choice of the good that is subject to the will of God. If God wills a thing, that thing will be good; and if he had willed other moral laws than the ones he established, these other laws would have been just, because righteousness is within his very will, and no law is upright except in so far as it is accepted by the will of God. One could not go any further without ending in Cartesianism; but in order to go further, one should first reject the very essence of Scotism, which lies here in the formal distinction there is between the intellect of God and his will."

Comment:

Here we have classic Gilson: Avicennism, comparisons to Descartes (the subject of Gilson's dissertation, as everyone already knows), and the act of being. I posted this because of his remarks about how there is no voluntarism in God, which I found surprising from a Thomist. But Gilson always was fair (save when he berates later Scotists for saying existence is an accident in Being and Some Philosophers). There are a few things that aren't quite right, however. Such as the bit about the will serving for Scotus what essence-existence/act of being does for Thomas. For Scotus the principle that distinguishes God and creatures is the intrinsic modes of infinity and finitude. And some of the later comments on the will are rather overstated; that is, they are more Gilson's interpretation than anything Scotus ever said. Scotus does say that the second table of the ten commandments is contingent, but he is mainly trying to reconcile believed contradictions to the table carried out by God himself. This is a little different than claiming the divine will is not ruled by the good. This may follow, but I don't think Scotus thought of it that way; he is more interested in enumerating the kinds of acts the will has and how they are elicited. Regarding the "hypothetical" production of creatures into intelligible being, well, he should drop the hypothetical bit. This scandalized plenty of 14th century Scotists (the subject of a forthcoming article), but Scotus appears to have meant it. Caveat: Petrus Thomae claims that Scotus only meant it metaphorically, and proceeds to exegete a passage in Scotus he claims proves this. But he doesn't bother to say where this passage is, and I have yet to find it.

James of Ascoli on Consecutive causality

Consecutive causality, a rough, probably highly inaccurate translation of "consecutive" appears to mean only the causal dependence something has on something else. I hesitate to use the word "cause", however, as the only locus I have seen it come up is in the discussing the divine ideas. In this context, it refers to the essences of creatures as are eternally related to the divine essence. They are also logically prior to the divine act of thinking. This theory was held by few scholastics, though the more I study the issue, the more the number grows. Peter Thomae holds it as an alternative to Scotus' view, and he appears to have derived it from James of Ascoli. The carmelite John Baconthorpe discusses it and attributes it to his confrere Gerard of Bologna, though I haven't tracked this down yet. Avicenna latinus appears to be the ultimate origin of the idea, though since he is dependent on Alfarabi it may be in the latter's works as well. In any case, the passage below attempts a definition of the term, which I found somewhat interesting and useful, perhaps even worth sharing.

Iacobus de Aesculo, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 4 (Cambridge, UL, Ms. FF.3.23, f. 126ra): Utrum notitia actualis creaturae praesupponatur in Deo notitiae habituali eiusdem.

Secundo sciendum quod aliquid potest habere esse intelligibile sub alio dupliciter: vel effective vel consecutive. Effective, sicut quidditates rerum creabilium habent esse intelligibile effective ab intellectu agente in quantum intellectus agens causat eas effective in esse intelligibile, secundum ymaginem Philosophi et Commentatoris(p hi et 9iiieris) Consecutive vero habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa specie causata ab intellectu cognoscente. Posita enim specie intelligibili ipsius lapidis in intellectu, consequitur naturaliter esse intelligible lapidis, sicut oppositum corellarium ipsius speciei sine omni causatione effectiva. Species enim lapidis non causat effective proprie lapidem in esse intelligibili, sed solum esse intelligibili lapidis consequitur ipsam spieciem per motum cuiusdam coreins necessarie.

Ad propositum dico quod quidditates in illo priori in quo habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa essentia divina antequam sunt actu immediate non habent esse intelligibile effective ab ipsa essentia quasi ipsa esset eas effectivas in esse intelligibili, quia posita essentia ipsa necessario resultant in esse intelligibli sicut obiecta coreva ipsius essentie, non ad que ipsa essentia referatur, sed magis que ad ipsam referantur sicut posita specie lapidis s ap resultat in specie intelligibili.

Translation:

Second, it should be known that something can have intelligible being from another in two ways, either effectively or consecutively. Effectively, as the quiddities of creatable things have intelligible being effectively from the agent intellect, insofar as the agent intellect causes them effectively in intelligible being, according to the image of the Philosopher and the Commentator. But consecutively they have intelligible being from the species caused by the knowing intellect. For if it be posited that there is an intelligible species of a stone in the intellect, there naturally follows the intelligible being of the stone, just as the opposed ...? of the species without all effective causation. For a species of a stone does not cause effectively the stone in intelligible being, but rather the intelligible being of the stone follows the spcies by a necessary motion.

To the question at hand I say that the quiddities in that prior [instant] in which they have intelligible being from the divine essence, before they are immediately in act, they do not have intelligible being effectively from the essence as if it would [cause] them effectively in intelligible being, because with the essence posited, necessarily they result in intelligible being, just as objects correlative of the essence, not to which the essence is referred, but more rather they are referred to it [the divine essence], just as with a species of a stone being posited [in the intellect immediately the stone results in intelligible being...?]

Scotus on Intentionality

Intentionality is a Big Deal in contemporary analytic and continental philosophy, and this was also true of medieval. In the following passage Scotus picks out four different senses of the word intention, only one of which is the "directedness" we today associate with the term.

Duns Scotus, Reportatio II d. 13 q. un (ed. Wadding-Vives vol. 23 p.44):

"...tamen hoc nomen intentio aequivocum uno modo dicitur actus voluntatis; secundo, ratio formalis in re, sicut intentio rei, a qua accipitur genus, differt ab intentione, a qua accipitur differentia; terio modo dicitur conceptus; quarto, ratio tendendi in obiectum, sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est..."

Nevertheless this term 'intention' is equivocal. In one way it is called the act of the will. In the second, the formal ratio in a thing, just as an intention of the thing, from which the genus is taken, differs by intention, from which is taken the difference. In the third way it is called a concept. In the fourth, the means of tending into an object, as a likeness is called a means of tending into that of which it is a likeness.

Panaccio on Mental Representation

The following is fromf Claude Panaccio's article "Mental Representation" in the new Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. It took a while, but my local library finally got a copy. Shockinly, Petrus Thomae actually made it into the lengthy bio section at the end of volume 2, as did Antonius Andreae, a definite improvement on the Noone-Gracia volume (though, since we already have the Noone-Gracia volume, I am not convinced we needed another set of bio-bibliographical summaries). But, no Peter of Navarre or Anfredus Gonteri (unless they used a different spelling), and indeed, there seems to be very little on early scotism in the volume, and nothing at all on the neoplatonist rhineland dominicans. But what can one do, when the main inspiration is still the analytic style of studying medieval philosophy. At least there was some interesting material on early ockhamism/terminism. There was even a brief paragraph on intelligible being, which I reproduce below. Oddly, however, the author does not mention esse subiectivum, without which no discussion of esse obiectivum is complete. Nor does he refer to more than the first question of Alnwick's treatise (these volumes go out of their way to point out translations...Alnwick's q.1 has been translated by Pasnau), nor does he refer to Petrus Thomae's treatise on the topic, perhaps unsurprisingly as neither do Dominik Perler nor L.M. De Rijk both of whom have written on intelligible being.

p. 352: "...the conformality thesis: the reduction of intentionality to some identity of form between the knower and the known."

[...]

p. 354: "Another medieval idea that is sometimes connected with the conformality thesis is that of "objective being" (esse objectivum), as it is found, saliently, in the work of Scotus. Scotus's writings on this topic are notoriously difficult, yet on one plausible reading - suggested, for instance, by Scotus's close disciple William of Alnwick - the idea of objective being neither depends upon nor favors the conformality thesis. An object x, on this terminology, is said to be objectively in a mind y if and only if x is the object of a cognitive state of y - if and only if, in other words, x is represented in y somehow. Think of a book about Julius Caesar. It could be correctly said, in the relevant sense, that Caesar is objectively in the book, not because he is hidden in the pages in some ghostly way, but simply because he is referred to in the book. Thus understood, the idea of 'objective being' presupposes that of being an object for a cognitive state, and can hardly serve, consequently, as the basis for a satisfactory account of intentionality."

Duns Scotus on the Universal

The following snippets are from Scotus' QQ. super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Bk. VII q. 18 (opera philosophica IV, p. 348-49, 351). They are of interest to me at the moment because they have an obvious bearing on the issues related to intelligible being; indeed, Petrus Thomae paraphrases the first quotation in his QQ. de esse intelligibli q.1.

"...universale restat videre primo an sit in intellectu. Et distinguo quod dupliciter potest aliquid esse in intellectu obiective, sicut modo loquimur de 'esse in'. Uno modo habitualiter, et alio modo actualiter; sive in actu primo et secundo. Primo modo est ibi quando est ibi ut immediate motivum ad intellectionem, secundo modo quando actualiter intelligitur. Ista esse secundum positionem Avicennae, simul sunt tempore, licet primum prius natura.

...

Ergo cum experiamur quod est aliquis intellectus in nobis quo est universale fieri, hoc est, cui insit aliquid per quod obiectum est praesens ut universale, necesse est aliquid esse activum illius. Et non extra, ut argutum est, ergo intra. Intellectus igitur agens, concurrens cum natura aliquo modo indeterminata ex se, est causa integra factiva obiecti in intellectu possibili secundum esse primum, et hoc secundum completam indeterminationem universalis. Nec est alia causa quare intellectus agens cum natura facit obiectum sic esse nisi quia est talis potentia, sicut nec quare calidum calefacit. Est ergo natura in potentia remota ad determinationem singularitatis et ad indeterminationem universalis; et sicut a producente coniungitur singularitati, ita a re agente et simul ab intellectu agente coniungitur universalitati."

Translation:

...it remains to see whether the univesal is first in the intellect. And I distinguish that something can be in the intellect objectively [ie., is an object of thought] in two ways, just as we speak now of 'being in'. In one way habitually, and in the other actually, whether in first act or second. The first way is there when it is there as immediately moving to intellection, the second way when it is actually understood. Those kinds of being, according to Avicenna, are simultaneous in time, although the first is prior in nature.

...

Therefore when we experience that there is some intellect in us by which the universal is made, that is, something present inside through which the object is present and universal, it is necessary that there be something that activates it. And not from outside, as has been argued, therefore from within. Therefore the agent intellect, concurring with a nature in some way indeterminate of itself, is the complete, "making" cause of the object in the possible intellect according to first being, and this according to the complete indetermination of the universal. Nor is there another cause whereby the agent intellect with a nature makes an object to be so unless because there is such a power/potency, as neither is there a reason why heat heats. The nature is therefore in remote potency to the determination of singularity and to the indetermination of the universal; and as by the producer it is joined to singularity, so from the agency of the thing and with the agent intellect it is joined to universality.

Hervaeus Natalis on the Order of Divine Cognition

This is from (the Thomist) Hervaeus Natalis O.P.'s discussion of the divine ideas. Apparently William of Alnwick was right; the common opinion after Scotus did follow some version of his application of instants of nature to the order of divine understanding and the production of intelligilible being. Note however, that Hervaeus claims there are five stages, as opposed to Scotus' four.

Hervaus Natalis, I Sent. (Lectura, ca. 1303) d. 34 q. 1 a. 3 (ed. Paris 1647, p. 143):

"Secundo sciendum est quod talis videtur esse ordo in agnitione divina secundum quod procedit a cognitione sui, ad cognitionem creaturarum scilicet, quod primo intelligitur essentia divina ut obiectum primum, natum movere intellectum divinum quasi possibilem. Secundo intelligitur actus intelligendi causatus a tali obiecto movente. Tertio intelligitur dictus actus terminati ad essentiam divinam sicut ad primum obiectum et quia in essentia divina intellecta relucent omnia alia ab ea, intelligitur essentia divina, ut idea et exemplar ad cognitionem creaturae. Quarto accipitur ipsa creatura intellecta. Quinto est ipsum intelligi ideae ut idea est, ita quod intelligamus Deum prius idealitate sua, ut medio cognoscendi quo cognoscit creaturam, quam habeat ut obiectum cognitum, licet illud quod est idea sit prius cognitum quam creatura, sicut patuit in exemplo de cognitoine fumi, et de cognitione ignis per fumum, et de cognitione illius mediationis secundum quam fumus est causa cognoscendi ignem."

Translation:

Second, is should be known that there is such an order in the divine recognition, which proceeds from the cognition of itself to the cognition of creatures. First, the divine essence is understood as first object, naturally suited to move the quasi divine possible intellect. Second, the act of understanding caused a such a moving object is understood. Third, the act terminating at the divine essence as to first object is understood, and because all other things than the divine essence shine forth from it, the divine essence is understood as idea and exemplar for the cognition of creatures. Fourth, the creatures themselves are received as understood. Fifth, the understanding of an idea as it is an idea, so that we understand God prior to his ideality, as a means of knowing by which he knows a creature, which he has as object known, although that which is the idea is known first than is the creature, as appears in the example of the cognition of smoke, and of the cognition of fire through smoke, and of the cognition of that means according to which smoke is the cause of knowing fire.

Duns Scotus on Intelligible Being

Intellectus divinus in quantum aliquo modo prior est actu voluntatis divinae producit ista obiecta in 'esse intelligibili', et ita respectu istorum videtur esse causa mere naturalis, quia Deus non est causa libera respectu alicuius nisi quod praesupponit ante se aliquo modo voluntatem secundum actum voluntatis. Et sicut intellectus ut prior actu voluntatis producit obiecta in 'esse intelligibili', ita ut prior-causa videtur cooperari illis intelligibilibus ad effectum eorum naturalem, scilicet ut apprehensa et composita causent apprehensionis conformitatem ad se. Videtur ergo quod contradictionem includit, intellectum aliquem talem compositionem formare et compositionem non esse conformem terminis, licet possibile sit illos terminos non componere, quia licet Deus voluntarie coagat ad hoc quod intellectus terminos componat vel non componat, tamen cum composuerit, ut illa compositio sit conformis terminis hoc videtur necessario sequi rationem terminorum quam habent ex intellectu Dei, causante illos terminos in 'esse intelligibili' naturaliter.

--John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I Dist. 3 Pars 1 Q.4.268

"The divine intellect insofar as it is in some way prior to the act of the divine will produces these objects in 'intelligible being', and so with respect to these things it seems to be a merely natural cause, since God is not a free cause with respect to anything except what presupposes the will before itself in some way according to an act of will. And as the intellect as prior to an act of will produces objects in 'intelligible being', so as a prior-cause it seems to cooperate with these intelligibles for their natural effect, namely that as apprehended and composed they cause the conformity of apprehensions to themselves. It seems therefore that it includes a contradiction for the intellect to form some such composition and for the composition not to be conformed to the terms, although it is possible for those terms not to be composed, because although God voluntarily co-acts to this end, that the intellect composes or does not compose terms, nevertheless, when it composes, so that that composition may be conformed with the terms this seems necessary, that they follow the ratio of the terms which they have from the intellect of God, naturally causing those terms in 'intelligible being'."

The take-home message is that the platonic heaven of forms in the mind of God is a necessary feature of the divine intellect rather than a contingent one. God does not decide what is possible, or that a triangle has three sides; rather he understands that a triangle has three sides, should one ever exist, and then contingently and freely decides whether to create one.

Francis of Meyronnes on Intelligible Being

Franciscus Mayronis, Quodlibet q.14/2 (Venezia 1520), ff. 260r-v

"Secunda questio est utrum producat beatissima trinitas creaturas in esse secundum quid antequam producat eas in esse reali simpliciter.

Et videtur quod non...

Circa istam questionem est preintelligendum quod doctor subtilis ponit duplicem productionem creaturarum a deo. Unam que est per modum voluntatis qua producit creaturas in esse reali et illa est ex tempore. Alia est qua producit eas per intellectum suum in quodam esse intelligibili, intelligendo ipsas ab eterno. Et de illo secundo modo est difficultas presens. Circa quam ocurrunt quatuor puncta inquirenda.

Quorum primum est si divinus intellectus producit quidditates creabilium per suum actum intelligendi ab eterno in esse essentie.

Secundum est si producit tales quidditates in esse intelligibili.

Tertium est si producit tales quidditates in esse intellecto.

Quartum est si per talem actum producit eas in esse existentie.

Quantum ad primum... Ideo dico quod divinus intellectus per suum actum intelligendi non dat esse quidditativum creaturis de quo hic loquimur; sed illud esse quidditativum abstrahit ab omni intellectione et comparatione quacumque quia per se notum est lapidem esse lapidem et tamen non est per se notum lapidem intelligi a deo; sed forte demonstrabile et ideo sicut per se nota in essse quidditativo preveniunt demonstrabilia ita illud esse hanc operationem... Sed oritur difficultas quid intelligimus per illud esse quidditativum; dicitur autem quod esse abstractum quod non est fabricatum ab animo nec est in rerum natura sicut dicit quoddam quod equinitas est tantum equinitas; nec universalis nec particularis.

Circa secundum punctum videndum est si divinus intellectus producit quidditates illas in esse intelligibili... Ideo dico quod ante concipimus quidditates esse a deo intelligibiles quam actualiter intelligantur quia illud quod convenit alicui per se et ex sua ratione formali convenit ei antequam illa que insunt ab extrinseco. Intelligibilitas autem sicut et veritas est passio demonstrabilis ex ratione formali subiecti et quod sit intellecta inest ei ab extrinseco scilicet a divino intellectu actualiter intelligente. Sed oritur difficultas quod diciter illud esse intelligibile in obiecto. Dicatur autem quod est respectus fundamentalis consequens quidditatem obiecti in habitudine ad divinum intellectum sicut mobilitas consequitur quidditatem mobilis in habitudine ad movens.

Circa tertium punctum ingreditum est si divinus intellectus producit illas quidditates in esse intellecto.... Ideo dico quod quidditates creabilium producuntur in esse cognito a divino intellectu ab eterno, sicut divinus intellectus ab eterno tales quidditates cognovit quia omne quod accipit esse aliquod post non esse videtur esse productum in illo esse; sed quidditates tales, cum sint intellecte postquam sunt intelligibiles, accipiunt tale esse in secundo signo post non esse in primo, ergo in tali esse videntur esse producte.... Sed oritur difficultas quid intelligitur per illud esse cognitum. Dicitur autem quod esse intellectum a divino intellectu dicit in quidditate cognita respectum rationes ad eius actum intelligendi derelictum ab ipso actu sicut esse productum realiter dicit respectum realem.

Circa quartum punctum videndum est si divinus intellectus per suum actum intelligendi producti quidditates in esse actualis existentie, ita quod producat ipsas existentias eternaliter in esse cognito sicut essentias ipsas.... ideo dico quod esse actualis existentie non fuit productum ab eterno in esse secundum quod tali quia per hoc quod creatura habet existentiam habet esse simpliciter et nulla creatura in esse tantum intellecto ab eterno habuit esse simpliciter. Sed remanet difficultas gravissima: qualiter deus preintellexit ab eterno existentias futuras creaturarum et non produxit eas in esse intellecto cum fuerunt ab eterno intellecte. Dicitur autem quod deus non precognovit existentias secundum proprium modum tamquam per se obiecta, sicut quidditates sed sicut per se obiectorum conditiones et non oportet produci in esse tali omne intellectum, sicut obiecti conditio. Istud tamen non sufficit quia si ideo producitur in tali esse quia cognoscitur eo modo quo intellligitur in tali esse producitur cum sit illo modo intellectum. Ideo dicitur quod deus non precognoscit quidditates ut iam existentes, sed ut futuras existentia autem ut futura non est existentia simpliciter; tunc enim simpliciter existeret futurum qualiter autem illa precognito fiat: habet declarari in primo."

Note that this is just the Quodlibet. For a FREE article on divine ideas in Francis' Conflatus, see the following link to an article by E. Bos, containing some remarks on Francis' view that Aristotle was the "pessimus metaphysicus": Here.

Eustacius a Sancto Paulo on Intelligible Being

More from Ariew's Descartes and the Last Scholastics, p. 44. Perhaps there might one day be interest in Petrus Thomae after all. This is from Ariew's chapter on Descartes and Scotism, in which he takes Gilson to task for glossing over differences in 17th century scholasticism (ie assuming they were all Thomists). But the following is some pretty clear Scotism, albeit of the Petrus Thomae and Alnwick kind, as I am not sure Scotus used this distinction much himself, if at all.

"To understand what is meant by objective being in the intellect, one must note the distinction between objective and subjective being in the intellect. To be objectively in the intellect is nothing else than to be actually present as an object to the knowing intellect, whether what is present as an object of knowledge has true being within our outside the intellect, or not. To be subjectively in the intellect is to be in it as in a subject, as dispositions and intellectual acts are understood to be in it. But since those things which are in the intellect subjectively can be known by the intellect, it can happen that the same thing can at the same time be both objectively and subjectively in the intellect. Other things which really exist outside the intellect, though they are not subjectively in the intellect can be in it objectively, as we have noted. But since all these things are real, they have some real being in themselves apart from the objective being in the intellect. There are certain items which have no other being apart from objective being, or being known by the intellect: these are called entities of reason."

Ockham contra Auriol

Here's a bit I've been meaning to post for a while, Ockham's comments prior to criticizing Auriol's theory of apparent being (also, as I am sure you recall, criticized by Petrus Thomae).

William of Ockham, Ordinatio I d. 27 q.3 (trans. Pasnau p. 226):

"This view seems to me false as regards the conclusion for which the above arguments are advanced. But because I have seen little of what this Doctor says - for if all the time I have had to look at what he says were put together, it would not take up the space of a single natural day - I do not intend to argue much against the one who holds this view. For from ignorance of what he says, I might facilely argue against his words rather than against his meaning. But since his conclusion appears to me false, based on what he says, I will argue against it, regardless of whether the arguments run contrary to his meaning. The arguments that I made in distinction 36 of this book, against one view of cognized being, could also be advanced against this conclusion. I composed that material, and almost everything else in book one, before I had seen the view recited here. Whoever wants to should look for those arguments there and apply them." [arguments follow]

Theoremata Scoti, Pars I

The first part of Scotus' infamous Theoremata is concerned with the universal, and its relation to the singular existent on the one hand and the intellect on the other hand. There are six main propositions, with explanations and--as always with Scotus--some rabbit trails. This preliminary study will be English-only, since I don't feel like typing in the Latin (hey, if you want real scholarship, read a print journal!), but for the record I'm using as my text Vol. II of Scotus' Opera Philosophica.

I. The intelligible precedes intellection by nature.

"Which is because reception [passio] presupposes an agent and every action is about something." If we are to understand something there must be something to understand. The intellect does not create all of its own intelligible content, any more than the sense power creates the objects of the senses: sight presupposes the visible object as well as light and a working eye. Unlike sight, of course, the intellect can create some of its intelligible content.

II. It is impossible for the first intelligible to be caused by intellection.

"Which is from comparing intellection and the intelligible to the same intellect." Even if the intellect received no information from outside itself it would still have to understand something other than its own concepts: no intellect could know nothing but logic. The intellect itself is an intelligible object before it understands or is understood.

III. We understand the universal first.

Scotus spends a lot of time arguing this point. Unlike, say, Thomas, Scotus admits that the singular is intelligible per se, since for him singularity is a formal property, not some material detritus. Why then is the singular not the first intelligible object? After all, it is the singular thing which acts, not its abstracted universal nature, and so the singular should be the first thing to act on the intellect. Scotus reminds us, however, that there is for us no science of the singular, that the intellect forms a universal by separating the intelligible nature from the leftover singularity. "It is true [that it is the singular which acts], but not insofar as it is singular. For the nature is the ratio of acting." Just as in natural generation the species is multiplied, but not the individual, so in cognition the singular gives rise to an intelligible universal, not a proper concept of the singular.

Our lack of knowledge about the singular per se is neither because we fail to actualize our capacity for it, nor because the singular is unintelligible per se, but because our intellect is too imperfect to achieve it. Just as an intrinsically visible object might not be seen by feeble eyes in weak candlelight, the light of our intellect is strong enough to illumine the nature but not the singularity. Our knowledge then is always imperfect. "For although in a precise comparison the nature is a more perfect knowable than the singularity, nevertheless the cognition of a singular nature is more perfect than that of the nature alone, because it is more distinct."

Scotus goes on to discuss possible reasons for this weakness of the intellect at some length, with more comparisons to the sense powers.

IV. To any universal there corresponds in reality [in re] some grade of entity, in which the things contained under the universal itself coincide.

Scotus says this should be clear from I. and II. For if the universal is not created by the intellect then it must have something corresponding to it in reality. This correspondence is not fictional, but real, or else there could be no true quidditative predication and metaphysics would not differ from logic.

V. In essential predication it is impossible to go to infinity.

Otherwise nothing would be knowable, since we can't pass through an infinite series, nor can our finite intellect apprehend an infinite series all at once. Definition has a limit, and we can really know what something is, even if only confusedly.

VI. It is simply impossible for the first and most universal to be plural.

There cannot be a plurality of first and most universal concepts or grades of entity. In analyzing we always proceed to the simpler concept, and therefore eventually to the first and simplest. And as in any order it is impossible to find two firsts, it is even more so in the highest order, to which multitude is more repugnant.

To conclude:

I. The universal, although produced by the agent intellect, is strictly speaking not caused by it, because something in reality corresponds to it. II. That universal, insofar as it has being in something or with something singular, we first understand as a kind of primary whole object, although the intellect from its imperfection can per se understand the nature as a quasi-part of the primary whole object, and can distinguish this from that [i.e., can distinguish the nature as such from the whole object], while not conceiving the other part, namely the singularity.--For which intellection the action of the agent intellect is required. Whence any part of the first whole object can be first for the intellect, and afterwards the intellect can per se distinguish it from another. Whence a child first distinguishes his father from non-man, then from non-father.

More from Petrus Thomae on Intelligible Being

The following are six conclusions and twelve propositions excerpted from Petrus Thomae's QQ. De esse intelligibili, Q.3: "Utrum illud esse intelligibili quod habuit quiditas creabilis ab aeterno sit esse creatum." In the text each conclusion is surrounded by a mass of argumentation, examples, rambling, etc., which I've removed so that they can be seen on their own and some idea can be formed of Petrus' position. After the conclusions and some other stuff the propositions follow in straight sequence.

I. Six Conclusions

i. The intelligibility of the quiddities of creatibles is not caused or produced through a compared act of the divine intellect, as some say.

ii. The intelligibility of creatible things is not caused or produced by the divine intellect directly.

iii. The intelligibility of a creature is not caused or produced by the divine intellection as though principiated.

iv. The [divine] essence does not create the intelligibility of creatible things as an exemplar.

v. The essence does not cause the intelligiblity of creatibles metaphorically.

vi. The intelligibility of created things is not created or caused in any way.

II. Twelve Propositions

i. The divine essence is a certain most perfect intelligible mirror.

ii. In this mirror, out of its own maximal and highest perfection, everything other than itself is represented.

iii. In this mirror everything which can be mirrored has mirrorable being.

iv. Nothing really distinct from either can mediate between that mirror and the mirrorable.

v. There is nothing which is not mirrorable by the divine intellect.

vi. That mirrorable being is neither from the [divine] essence nor by the essence nor by anything else, nor briefly can it be construed with any proposition denoting any causality of any sort meant by 'from' or 'by'.

vii. That mirrorable being, although not from the essence nor by the essence, can still be said to be in it, not subjectively, but as in what necessarily results or follows from it.

viii. The necessity of this following-upon places no imperfection in the divine essence.

ix. This necessity is not one of dependence, but one of a certain necessary following-upon of resolution or of shining-forth, in that way in which, in the perfect mirror, every mirrorable necessarily shines forth.

x. Although there is no dependence between this mirror and this mirrorable, there is nevertheless a correlation between them, for the mirrorable is necessarily correlated with the mirror as that which necessarily results upon it.

xi. This correlation posits an imperfection on the part of the mirrorable and a pefection on the part of the mirror.

xii. Although the quiddity of a creature according to this intelligible being is not caused, still it is truly creatible in itself. For that intelligible being does not prevent it from being placed in actual existence, and so caused.

A Distinction from Petrus Thomae

Now that I got the following cleaned up (the Salamanca ms. was quite helpful), I think it might be worthy of posting.

Petrus Thomae, QQ de esse intelligibli, q. 2 a.1 (ed. me):

Distinctio est ista: intellectualitas, intellectivitas, intelligibilitas et intellectitas hoc modo se habent, nam prima duo respiciunt suppositum intelligens, alia vero duo obiectum quod intelligitur. Dico ergo primo quod prima duo respiciunt suppositum quod intelligit, tamen differenter, nam intellectualitas respicit naturam qua suppositum dicitur intelligibile; sed ipsa intellectivitas respicit principium vel virtutem vel potentiam qua vel per quam suppositum potest in talem actum exire. Alia autem duo respiciunt obiectum similiter diversimode, quoniam intelligibilitas ponit in obiecto solum aptitudinem intelligendi; sed intellectitas ponit circa idem obiectum respectum actualem ipsius obiecti intellecti ad actum.

Translation:

"The distinction is this: intellectuality, intellectivity, intelligibility and intellectness(!) are related in this way: the first two are said of an understanding supposit, but the other two are said of the object which is understood. I say first that the first two are said of the supposit which understands, nevertheless differently, for intellectuality looks to the nature by which a supposit is said to be intelligible, but intellectivity looks to the principle or power by which or through which the supposit is able to go into such an act. But the other two look towards the object, likewise in diverse ways, since intelligibility posits only an aptitude of understanding[perhaps it should be intelligi] in the object, but intellectness posits in the object the actual relation of the understood object to the act of understanding."

Gotta love "intellectitas". For quite a while I wasn't even sure if I was expanding the abbreviation correctly, but this Salamanca ms. spells it out without any contraction marks. As it turns out, the entire article is about the relation between intellectitas and intelligibilitas, which in turn is the source of Peter Thomae's (And Alnwick's for that matter) disagreement with Scotus on the production of creatures in intelligible being.