Ordinatio Translations

I came across this link  of a webpage for a scholar who has translated several volumes of the Ordinatio (from the Vatican edition). There is also some other material of interest, such as Suarez, and Jerome of Montefortino, an 18th c. Scotist.

Pope Francis on Thomism

The current pope recently had this to say about Thomism:

"The church has experienced times of brilliance, like that of Thomas Aquinas. But the church has lived also times of decline in its ability to think. For example, we must not confuse the genius of Thomas Aquinas with the age of decadent Thomist commentaries. Unfortunately, I studied philosophy from textbooks that came from decadent or largely bankrupt Thomism. In thinking of the human being, therefore, the church should strive for genius and not for decadence."

Ouch! Even I, Scotist though I be, have spent many happy hours poring over Thomist manuals. I can only dream of such an education.

We might ask, why were they decadent? It is contrasted with "thinking of the human being", which perhaps means restricting ones' theologizing and philosophizing to human affairs and human nature. so no transcendental metaphysics, no seven-fold division of distinction? I'm not really sure. Of course, who would disagree that the church should strive for genius and not decadence?

Maybe this is the best response.

Final Volume of the Ordinatio Now Available!

The Vatican Commission has completed their edition of the Ordinatio. The final distinctions of book IV are now available from Quaracchi. But their website is broken. If you want to order, down load this  order form. For the first time that I have seen, we even have the option of ordering the volume in hardcopy!

Here is the publishers' information:

Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita, Tom. XIV (A. 114). - Ordinatio. Liber Quartus. Distinctiones 43-49, pp 441

 Città del Vaticano, 2013                  ISBN 978-88-7013-314-1

Interview with Fabrizio Amerini

Here. An interesting interview with Fabrizio Amerini on his recently translated book, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life. Thanks to one of our readers for sending it in.

A snippet:

Of course, medieval philosophy cannot be proposed again today exactly as it is, Amerini said.

“Even in Continental philosophy, modern philosophers tend to mock it. But in most cases this is the result of an oversimplification of it, or of the false conviction that medieval philosophy can be re-proposed today exactly as it is.”

On many occasions medieval philosophers anticipated (more or less exhaustively) modern theories in philosophy, he said. But medieval philosophers should not be regarded only as forerunners for modern philosophers.

“What is profitable for the current philosophical debates, I believe, is rather the method of medieval philosophy, the medieval thinkers’ philosophical scrupulousness, their almost obsessive attention to language and arguments. Their method may still be useful today, as a stimulus for improving our way of doing philosophy.

“As to the contents, of course, if one wanted to propose medieval philosophy again today, he or she would need to qualify it very carefully and compare it critically with the current philosophical and scientific models.”

Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana

I'm usually the last to know about such things, but it has come to my attention that the Biblioteca Maletastiana at Cesena is being digitized. It contains mss. of works by Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, Francis of Meyronnes, William of Ware, Alexander of Hales, etc. A list of the currently digitized ms. is here.

New Francis of Marchia Edition.

Here. This is the final volume of the edition of Book II of Francis of Marchia's Reportatio. I missed seeing it on the new shelf in the library, and so am late in reporting it. The date is 2012, though I don't think it came out until some point this year. This completes their edition of Book II. It clocks in with more than 300 pages of text and a 150 page introduction, with many tables (which I could not make much sense of, not because of the editors but because a toddler was yammering at me while I was trying to read).

Here is the blurb from the publisher's website:

In the questions contained in this volume, Francis of Marchia explores subjects that earned him his fame in the Middle Ages and in the history of ideas: physics and philosophical psychology. He confronts the key issues in celestial physics, concluding with his well-known proofs for terrestrial and celestial beings having the same type of matter (q. 32). Marchia's discussion of how elemental qualities persist in mixtures (qq. 33-36) leads to a spirited and unique defense of a mind-body dualism: not even the sensory faculties are coextensive with the body (q. 37). Moreover, each living being has two forms: the soul and the form of the body (q. 38). Marchia rejects the Averroistic doctrine of the unicity of the intellect (qq. 39-40), as well as acts of understanding being entirely the result of external stimuli (q. 41). Those positions in turn inform his investigation of the mechanics of thinking and willing, and his establishment of the will's priority over the intellect (qq. 42-47). Finally, Marchia balances human free willing with God's absolute power and cooperation in all matters (qq. 48-49).

Throughout these questions, Marchia shows his originality and sharp intellect. Although at times his solutions look similar to those of John Duns Scotus, they are in fact very different, reflecting Marchia's awareness of the problems and limitations involved in not only Scotus' views, but also those of Aristotle and Averroes, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, among many others.

BnF Manuscripts

Go here for a list of the BnF manuscripts now available online. They look like scans from films to me, rather than from the mss. themselves, though I would love to be wrong.

Scotus the Spinozist

Here is an interesting historical tidbit that I don't believe I have posted on: the Kleutgen-Stockl model of medieval philosophy. They were mid-19th century Jesuits who developed the model of medieval philosophy that we all know and love today: all previous human philosophical endeavours lead up to the pinnacle of Aquinas, who was immediately followed by a catastrophic decline into filthy Scotism, Ockhamism, modernism, protestantism and so on. You can read all about it in John Inglis, Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy (Brill 1998). Here I post Inglis' summary of Kleutgen's judgement of Scotus.

Inglis, p. 97

Duns Scotus and his followers are termed "formalists" by Kleutgen because they fail to appreciate that physical things are more than mere forms. Kleutgen argues that since, for Scotus, the individualizing principle of any particular thing is yet another form, he does away with actual individual subjects, and in doing so abolishes the philosophical foundation that is necessary in order to distinguish between individuals. What we have in Scotus is, according to Kleutgen, an endless number of predicates with no subject to which they could adhere. Since the Scotists offer a view of forms without subjects, they must conclude that the entire world is a single subject. Even though Scotus and his followers do not claim to be pantheists, the logic of their view leads inevitably to the conclusion that all is one.

So one begins to understand why at the dawn of the 20th century, Scotists such as Parthenius Minges were compelled to write articles defending Scotus from the pantheist charge. Luckily he was successful in this, even if the general model of decline and fall remains.

Mind, Metaphysics, and Value

I recently acquired a book edited by John Haldane called Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions at the Notre Dame $5 booksale. I thought I would post controversial quotes from the volume from time to time, to generate combox controversy/discussion. Here's one to start out:

Fergus Kerr, "Aquinas after Wittgenstein," p. 1

Anthony Kenny once suggested that 'the points on which Aquinas differed from his medieval critics are precisely the points on which Wittegenstein, in his later philosophical writing, was at variance with positivist thought.' On several important issues, 'Aquinas was opposed by Scotus in a way remarkably similar to the way in which Wittgenstein was opposed to the positivists'.

...

...there are, on the other hand, four topics about which Aquinas and Wittgenstein may be regarded as being on the same side against Scotists and logical positivists respectively. Aquinas favoured analogy, Scotus believed in univocity. Wittgenstein deployed 'family likeness' over against verificationism. Scotus misunderstood Aristotelian hylomorphism; Wittgenstein mocked logical atomism. For Scotus the mind had direct knowledge of particulars; Wittgenstein attacked the notion of the primacy of ostensive definition. Finally, for Aquinas intellectual knowledge was an active process, whereas Scotus regarded it as receptive, like sense-perception; logical-positivist epistemology made a similar mistake, while Wittgenstein strove to elimante sense-datum theories.

Scotism and Phenomenology

A snippet from an article the abstract of which I posted some time ago.

William E. Tullius, "Haecceitas as Value and as Moral Horizon: A Scotist Contribution to the Project of a Phenomenological Ethics", ACPQ 87 (2013), p. 462.

In this paper, I will argue that a phenomenological elucidation of the Scotist notion of haecceitas can further contribute to the development of the phenomenological ethical project, particularly in the way in which the individuality of one's personal essence can become thematic for us as a unique being representing a unique moral calling to each individual...

It is my hope that, through a phenomenological investigation of haecceitas, phenomenology might obtain a more complete articulation of its ethical insights,which are based so heavily in the problems of individuality. Scotus, having paved the way in philosophy for a cogent discussion of this theme, might be able to provide certain insights into the primal data of the phenomenon of individuality by reenacting the Scotist insight into the originary basis for the individuality of the person. At the same time, it is my hope that phenomenology will provide something of an expansion of the Scotist project into new fields of investigation, particularly the field of moral vocation.To that extent, this paper is attempting to make a concrete contribution to a growing body of literature that recognizes in Scotist thought a peculiar openness to phenomenological modes of investigation that would make of phenomenology itself a method of doing philosophy within which the Scotist tradition can readily find a home for the continuation of its philosophical research within a contemporary setting.

Scotists in the News

The co-director of the Scotistic Commission of America is interviewed about the Pope's twitter account here.

Thomism After Vatican II

So apparently there is a "Renewal of Thomism" conference going on in DC right now. Here is a link to one of the papers, 'Thomism after Vatican II", by fr. T.J. White OP. I found it a very encouraging read, if it is representative of the younger Thomists. He expresses some interest in Aquinas' contemporaries, eschews the pratice of accusing all medieval thinkers save Aquinas of  Heideggerian ontotheology, and even argues that Thomism and Catholicism are not synonyms, that one can be the latter without being the former. Somewhere in the past few days I read a report of a conference in Prague devoted to Thomism that took place a few years ago; they said over 100 professors of Thomism where present. In light of that fact, and the encouraging sings in the linked paper, I think we can safely pronounce that Thomism has been renewed.

Boehner on Logic and the Decline of Scholasticism

Philotheus Boehner, Medieval Logic, 92-93:

Medieval Logic in its stage of maturity in the 14th century has become an essentially consequential logic. A consequential logic, however, is a highly formalistic logic.

Unfortunately, this peak of the development of medieval logic was reached at the beginning of a rapid decline of scholastic philosophy in general. To interpret this chronological coincidence as a causal relation, and to blame the high standard of 14th-century logic for the ruin of scholastic metaphysics, appears to us extremely ironical. We are not convinced that scholastic metaphysics has to be afraid of an inexorable logic. On the contrary, scholastic metaphysics, in contrast with modern metaphysical systems, has called for logical rigour and has always been averse to any kind of intuitionism. We are rather convinced that scholastic logic in the 14th century finally reached a stage by which it was in a condition to justify its basic metaphysical inferences. For it is a fact that the proofs of the existence of God developed during the Middle Ages, and definitely the proofs of St. Thomas, cannot be sufficiently developed and justified with a logic content with syllogistics. This has been shown by Salamucha as regards the first of the five ways of the Common Doctor. It was likewise stated already in the Middle Ages as regards the proof of the existence of God advanced by Scotus. Petrus Thomae, an immediate disciple of the Subtle Doctor, expressly states that consequences holding in virtue of an extrinsic means, and hence not reducible to syllogisms, are used the construction of his proof.

Historically speaking, then, medieval logic had finally caught up with metaphysics, when, for well-known exterior reasons, a general decline of scientific culture began.

Hackett on Scotus

Via Medievalists.net comes Hackett's article, "Duns Scotus: A Brief Introduction to his Life and Thought", Studies in Scottish Literature 26 (1991).

Available at: http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/ssl/vol26/iss1/37

Recent Work on Scotus

Two recent publications on Scotus have come to my attention, both written out of the continental perspective. The first is Cynthia Nielsen, Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue: On Social Construction and Freedom.

From amazon:

Through examining Douglass's and Fanon's concrete experiences of oppression, Cynthia R. Nielsen demonstrates the empirical validity of Foucault's theoretical analyses concerning power, resistance, and subject-formation. Going beyond merely confirming Foucault's insights, Douglass and Fanon expand, strengthen, and offer correctives to the emancipatory dimensions of Foucault's project. Unlike Foucault, Douglass and Fanon were not hesitant to make transhistorical judgments condemning slavery and colonization. Foucault's reticence here signals a weakness in his account of human being. This weakness sets him at cross-purposes not only with Scotus, but also with Douglass and Fanon. Scotus's anthropology provides a basis for transhistorical moral critique; thus he is a valuable dialogue partner for those concerned about social justice and human flourishing.

The second is from the summer issue of the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. William E. Tullius, "Haecceitas as Value and as Moral Horizon - A Scotist Contribution to the Project of a Phenomenological Ethics."

Abstract:

This paper seeks to provide a phenomenological articulation of the Scotist notion of haecceitas, interpreting Scotus’s principle of individuation at once as an ontological as well as a moral principle. Growing out of certain suggestions made by James Hart in his Who One Is, this interpretation is meant to provide the phenomenological ethics of both Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler with a useful theoretical tool in the Scotist notion of haecceitas interpreted as a horizon of value in order more fully to develop the phenomenological idea of the ethical life as a task that specifically seeks to realize as its highest goal the vocation of the person to his or her ideal, true self. The main implication of Scotus’s thought, here, for phenomenology will be the ability to further delimit haecceitas as an objective moral principle that refutes the frequent charge of relativistic subjectivism in the phenomenological theory of ethics.

Also, an important recent article by Richard Cross, "Duns Scotus and Analogy: A Brief Note" in The Modern Schoolman 89 (2012).

Abstract:

Duns Scotus defends the view that we can speak univocally of God and creatures. When we do so, we use words in the same sense in the two cases. Scotus maintains that the concepts that these univocal words signify are themselves univocal: the same concept in the two cases. In this paper, I consider a related question: does Duns Scotus have the notion of analogous concepts—concepts whose relation to each other lies somewhere between the univocal and the equivocal? Using some neglected texts from Scotus’s attempt to refute Henry of Ghent’s rejection of univocity, I argue that he does, and that he uses his account of univocity to ground the relation of analogy between two concepts. According to Scotus, analogous concepts are compositional, and overlap at a univocal concept. 

From the same issue and journal as Richard Cross's article is Giorgio Pini,  "Scotus on Hell".

Abstract:

The existence of everlasting punishment has sometimes been thought to be incompatible with God’s goodness and omnipotence. John Duns Scotus focused on the key issue concerning everlasting punishment, i.e., the impossibility for the damned to repent of their evil deeds and so to obtain forgiveness. Scotus’s claim was that such an impossibility is not logical but nomological, i.e., it depends on the rules God established to govern the world, specifically on what I call ‘the rule of the permanence of the last volition.’ Scotus does not try to defend God’s decision to implement the rule of the permanence of the last volition. I suggest, however, that that decision can be taken as an indication of God’s preference for a world where this life is given unique value as the only test rational creatures have to prove themselves as moral agents.