Duns Scotus the Papalist?

I came across the following quote today, in a discussion of the Joachim of Fiore's criticism of Peter Lombard, to the effect that his views entail a quaternity in divinis. It is from Reportatio I-A, d.5 pars 1 q.1 n.10: 

"Quantum ad primum errorem, respondet Papa et tenet pro Magistro Petro; et in hoc Papa confirmat et canonizat opinionem Petri, cuius auctoritas forte maior est quam scripturae vel sanctorum-sed non curo hoc asserere- et ostendit quod non sequitur consequentia quaternitatis..."

"As far as to the first error, the Pope responds and holds to Master Peter [Lombard]; and in this the Pope confirms and canonizes the opinion of Peter, whose authority perhaps is greater than scripture or the saints-but I do not care to assert this-and he shows that the consequence of quaternity does not follow..."

Now the relative pronoun 'cuius' is ambiguous, and could refer to either the Pope or Peter Lombard. In translation my natural sense is that it refers to Lombard, though that would be a rather odd claim. A bishop of Paris, who compiled various sayings of the fathers into a textbook is possessed of greater authority than the saints or scripture themselves? It seems more likely that it is referring to the Pope; after all, as one can read in his discussions of the Eucharist, Scotus is a firm believer in the authority of the Church to determine doctrine and holds to transubstantiation purely on the authority of Lateran IV.  This passage could be meant along those lines. And it is not so terribly far from the modern teachings on infallibility, etc., though one probably not want to take this to mean that the Pope has authority over scripture. Perhaps we might want also to substitute 'magisterium' for pope here. Well, that's all folks.

Hilarious Quodlibetal Questions

Here's a few howlers that I've picked up while going through Glorieux for dissertation information. I'll keep updating this as time goes on.

Anonymus, Quodlibet, "Whether a soldier with the intention of going to a tournament can be absolved"

Eustache de Grandcourt, Quodlibet I q. 2: "There was a certain monster, having a dyaphragmo above 2 heads, 4 arms and 4 breasts and 2 hearts; but below one instrument of generation and 2 feet; it is asked whether such a monster can contract matrimony"

And again, one that might end up hitting close to home... Quod V q. 3: "Again, the case is such: A woman was married and had a daughter from adultery, but the husband believed that she was his own daughter. In death, the husband left to that daughter 100 books. Afterwards the mother said to her daughter hat she was not the daughter of the dead man, and if he had known he would have never given her the 100 books, and that she should not keep them. Now the question is whether that daughter can retain that legacy from the putative father."

Aegidius, Quodlibet I q.18, "Why men are bald and have a beard and women do not"

Nicolaus de Bar, Quodlibet I q.17 "Whether pygmies are men?"

Nicolaus Trivet, Quodlibet II q. 24: "With it posited that that someone has one withered hand and one useful one, and he commits something for which he merits to have one hand amputated, whether the withered or useful hand ought to be amputated?"

Gonzalve d'Espagne et Duns Scot, "Apogée de l'Ecole Franciscain?""

Nous reprenons cette expression à B. Martel. Elle pourrait être la reproduction d'un regard sur la philosophie du Moyen Age aujourd'hui dépassé. Comme saint Thomas fut le fleuron d'une pensée scolastique entrant après lui en décadence, faut-il faire de Scot le sommet de la théologie franciscaine, à jamais inégalable? Ce serait prêter à cette école une cohérence qu'ell n'eût sans doute jamais. Ce qui est incontestable c'est que le génie personnel de Scot domine largement son époque. Plus métaphysique et éthique, il est d'ailleurs fort différent de celui de son maître Gonzalve d'Espagne, davantage à son aise dans le domaine de la psychologie et de la logique.

--Christian Trottman, "La vision beatifique dans le seconde école franciscaine; de Mattie d'Acquasparta à Duns Scot," Collectanea franciscana, 1994, p. 152.

New Bibliography of Scotistic Studies

For those of you doing serious research on Scotus, be sure to check out the bibliography that Tobias Hoffmann has just completed and posted online; it runs from 1950 to the present and covers some of the early Scotistae in addition to Duns himself.

http://faculty.cua.edu/hoffmann/scotus-bibliography.htm

Conditions for Distinction

Here's an interesting bit from Reportatio IA (well, probably the Additiones magnae) d.33, the distinction on the formal distinction. I'm still digesting the rest (he doesn't bring up the question of whether one can say that things formally non-identical are also formally distinct, the subject of the <Quaestio de formalitatibus> which I am currently editing, but casts the formal distinction as a type of secundum quid distinction, and relates it to Bonaventure's middle distinction). This part is specifically from the second question, where Scotus discusses whether there is a real distinction between the Trinitarian persons:

"Ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distinguantur, requiruntur quatuor conditiones. Prima est, quod sit aliquorum in actu, et non in potentia tantum, quia non distinguuntur ea, quae sunt in potentia in materia, et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu. Secunda est, quod sit eorum, quae habent esse formale, non tantum virtuale, ut effectus sunt in causa virtualiter, et non formaliter. Tertia est, quod sit eorum, quae non habent esse confusum, ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto, sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualitatibus. Quarta, quae sola est completiva distinctionis perfectae, est non identitas, ut patet per Philosophum...ubi dicit diversum et distinctum esse idem."

To this that somethings are distinguished absolutely [simpliciter. one could also say "without qualification"], four conditions are required. The first is that it is of some things in act, and not only in potency, because those things are not distinguished which are in potency in matter, and not absolutely, because they are not in act. The second is, that it is of those which have formal being, and not only virtual, as the effect is in the cause virtually and not formally. The third is that it is of those which do not have confused being, as the extreme in the medium and the mixable in the mixed, but is of those which have distinct being with their proper actualities. The fourth, which is only completive of perfect distinction, is non-identity, as is clear through the Philosopher, where he says that the diverse and the distinct are the same.

Hobbes on Knowing Substance

Well, maybe its Hobbes. I've been reading more of Descartes objections and replies lately, and the third set of objections are from a "celebrated English Philosopher". He makes a few incidental remarks that lead me to think that the problem of knowing substance is not just some crazy thing Duns Scotus dreamed up, but possibily a recurring problem in the Aristotelian tradition. In any case, it would be interesting to compare Scotus' arguments against knowing substance with those of various early modern philosophers who also reject the very concept of substance itself and look for a connnection. Here is Hobbes:

Obj. iv: "The ancient peripatetics also have taught clearly enough that substance is not perceived by the senses, but is known as a result of reasoning."

obj. ix: "I have frequently remarked above that there is no idea either of God or of the soul; I now add that there is no idea of substance. For substance (the substance that is a material, subject of accidents and changes) is perceived and demonstrated by the reason alone, without yet being conceived by us, or furnishing us with any idea. If that is true, how can it be maintained that the ideas which reveal substance to me are anything greater or possess more objective reality than those revealing accidents to us ?"


***Update!

Hobbes isn't the only one...Descartes as well holds this view, as can be seen in the beginning of his reply to the fourth set of objections (in my Great Books ed., p. 153b):

"For we do not have immediate cognition of substances, as has been elsewhere noted; rather from the mere fact that we perceive certain forms or attributes which must inhere in something in order to have existence, we name the thing in which they exist a substance.

But if, afterwards, we desired to strip that substance of those attributes by which we apprehend it, we should utterly destroy our knowledge of it; and thus, while we might indeed apply words to it, they would not be words of the meaning of which wehad a clear and distinct perception."

I also randomly picked up Peter Geach's Mental Acts today, and came across the same problem in his chapter on abstractionism, where he said it was characteristic of "decadent scholasticism", and though the terms and maxims (all from Aristotle) he quotes can all be found in Aquinas (and he likes Aquinas), he probably means Scotus or late medieval philosophy which has unfortunately been tarnished by the notion of "decline" both by Thomists as well as by early modern historiography, which sees it as the time of plague, schism and unrest; and of course, bad times for women. Though Gerson, the nominalist chancellor of of the university of Paris also wanted to get back to the 13th century style of thinking, at least for theology. Anyway, Geach also pointed to Locke, so it seems this problem is found in early modern philosophy as well, though it may only be part of their rejection of scholastic notions. I hope to blog on this more in the future.

Gonsalvus Hispanus

From Patar, B. Dictionnaire abrégé des philosophes médiévaux. Les Presses Philosophiques, 2000. 94-95:

“Gonzalve d’Espagne (Gonsalvus Hispanus)
Ce philosophe et théologien franciscain est très peu connu, non pas pace qu’il serait sans importance, mais parce que, d’une part, son prestige fut éclipsé par son célèbre disciple, Jean Duns Scot, au point même qu’on attribua son traité de métaphysique à ce dernier, et que, d’autre part,, ses oeuvres disparurent de la circulation.
Gonzalve est né probablement ver 1255, en Galice (nord-ouest de l’Espagne). Il vient faire ses études à Paris et a pour maître Pierre Jean Olivi, don’t il reprendra certaines idées. Il obtient sa maîtrise et enseigne à la Faculté de théologie vers 1290. C’est à cette époque fort probablement qu’il fait la connaissance du Docteur Subtil, collaboration que se continuera jusqu’en 1303 (dans une lettre il parle de son confrère comme d’un ami de longue date). . . .
La pensée de Gonzalve d’Espagne est à mi-chemin entre l’aristotélisme et l’augustinisme bonaventurien. Il prend position pour la pluralité des formes dans le composé humain, à l’encontre de saint Thomas et à l’instar du courant de pensée franciscain. Il soutient le caractère hylémorphique de l’âme, et pose en même temps une distinction réelle entre l’âme et ses puissance opératoires. Par ailleurs, pour lui, la capacité de liberté de l’âme ne tient pas à sa fonction essentielle, mais au principe d’agir qu’elle possède. Toutefois, la volonté prime sur la raison: en cela il s’oppose à Maître Eckhart, aux yeux de qui l’intelligence, en Dieu comme en l’homme, est première, et s’aligne sur une opinion largement répandue dans les milieux franciscains.”

Quaestio

So I"ve got a little problem. In reading this material from the Parisian Reportatio on theology, I have encountered a difficulty I can't solve. Basically, Scotus says that for theologia in se (he seems to have abandoned the distinction between God's theology, the theology of the Blessed, and our theology), the object of the science is the divine essence. Now this is problematic for us in the wayfaring state, because it would seem to entail that we have some beatific knowledge of God, rather than the certain cognition that Scotus wants to set up between faith and the beatific vision. Scotus' own way out is by having recourse to his distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. For those in the wayfaring state, God's essence is conceived abstractively, that is, one conceives the divine essence without it being present here and now. But my understanding (which I get from Richard Cross's recent class) is that abstractive cognition still requires intelligible species. But these intelligible species are all abstracted (in the Thomistic/arabic/"Aristotelian" sense) from phantasms derived from creatures. Scotus is quite emphatic in many other passages, however, that God is not formally or eminently contained in any concept derived from a creature (univocity, you recall, yields a confused concept; theology requires a distinct one). So where the &*@! do we get the species used in theology that represents the divine essence? It may be an unsolvable question, as in the appendix to his article on theology as a science, Dumont lists a number of questions about intuitive and abstractive cogntion, of which several of the Scotists seem to be trying to answer this very problem. Dumont himself calls attention to the fact that the Additiones magnae say that God infuses a species, but the Reportatio itself does not say this, though it does distinguish five or so grades of cognition in which this abstractive one is in the middle, next to the cognition of the prophets and ordinary lay folk. So its unclear.

***UPDATE!

I came across the following, in Rep. IA d.3 n.196, which makes things pretty clear. This sort of knowledge is not natural, but comes about by direct infusion from God.

"Sic Deus cognosci quadrupliciter: uno modo secundum suam rationem quiditativam ut secundum rationem deitatis, et isto modo non est naturaliter cognoscibilis a nobis quia licet Deus posset creare in intellectu nostro repraesentativum sui sub ratione deitatis, non tamen potest hoc aliqua creatura causare repraesentativum tale, quia sicut argutum est prius, impossibile est aliquod obiectum causare in nobis perfectius repraesentativum suo proprio repraesentativo quo repraesentat se ipsum."

I suppose the question must be then who is it who has such a species, and how is it we know we have such a species representing the divine essence. Is this something that is included in divine revelation, that is, comes along with grace, baptism or reading Scripture, etc., or is only found in among theologians (somehow I have a hard time believing the likes of Catherine Pickstock or Rosemary Radford Ruether may have abstractive cognition of the divine essence that I don't have, in virtue of their professional status of theologian).

Scotus on Knowing Principles and Subalternation

I'm still busy at my other, realtime, life and haven't had time to post much lately, but here's a first stab at fulfilling "e"'s request of some time ago that I post on Scotus' criticism of Thomas' views on the nature of theology and subalternation. This quote comes from the end of this section where he attacks Thomas. One should bear in mind that Scotus in the prologue to the Reportatio maintains a notion of theology which he labels "theologia in se", which denies traditional distinctions between divine science, the knowledge of the blessed, and our theology. On Scotus' view ther is only one theology, which is the quidditative knowledge of the divine essence. Other things, such as the divine attributes, ideas, notions, etc. are virtually contained in the knowledge of the essence, and are "quasi-derivative" from it. Scotus comes up with the idea that one can consider things that are distinct in reason as if they were really distinct, an idea which he gets from an "ancient" argument about the Anselmian pure perfections, that for something in which something is distinct in reason there corresponds something really distinct in something else. This is a bit scattered, but you get the idea. If you really care, I could email you my Kalamazoo paper on the subject after I get done writing it. The following quote is about they way we know principles, and ends with the nifty claim that by knowing metaphysics we are better prepared for knowing other sciences.

Reportatio IA, prologus, q. 2 n. 157: "To the authority of the Philosopher I say that principles can be known in two ways. In one way by a confused knowledge, as if the terms are apprehended confusedly by sense and experience, and this suffices for scientific knowledge of terms in any special science, as that a line is length while being ignorant of whether the quiddity of it is substance, quantity or quality, etc. In another mode distinct knowledge can be known, by knowing to which genus their quiddity pertains, when the definitions of terms are known distinctly from the evidence of the terms, and this happens in metaphysical science by dividing and composing. And so all sciences can be said to be subalternated to it, namely metaphysics. And therefore with the science of metaphysics possessed, the principles of any other science are known in it by their own proper principles. Consequently, another science is known more perfectly if metaphysics is known.

Carmen

Huc ades, o formosae puella, tibi lilia plenis
ecce ferunt Nymphae calathis; tibi candida Nais,
pallentis violas et summa papavera carpens,
narcissum et florem iungit bene olentis anethi;
tum casia atque aliis intexens suavibus herbis
mollia luteola pingit vaccinia caltha.

--Vergil

Peter of Navarre on Univocity, Cognition of Substance

Here'a quote I ran across from the spanish Scotist theologian Petrus de Atarrabia, on our ability to cognize substances. If those of you who went to the St. Bonaventure should recall from Pini's paper, Scotus himself holds that substance is not directly accessible to our intellect in this life. As is common with Scotus, he goes through various developmental stages. In the end, while he does not think we can know substances immediately, we can infer their existence from the existence of accidents. Being is univocal between them. Ultimately, we probably can't know much about the natures that constitute things in the world either, if all we know is accidents. In class today, Richard suggested that one of the underlying motivations for this position is that Aristotle thinks that cognition has qualities, items in the category of quality, as its object. Note the presence of the Eucharist in the second argument; this was a standard trope in this problem in the late thirteenth-century as well, possibly introduced by Richard of Middleton and also considered by Scotus. I have another quote somewhere by Alexander Bonini of Alessandria that is similar in content which I may post later. The context of the quote is Peter's discussion of univocity. He gives several arguments largely drawn from Scotus though with modifications. This is the end of his second argument. This particular section is followed by one comparing Scotus and Thomas and seeing if they agree.

Peter of Navarre, I Sent. d. 3 pars 1 q. 1

n.14: The second consequence is proved, concerning the cognition of substance: Substance does not immediately move the possible intellect naturally in the wayfaring state; therefore accidents move it immediately, since there is nothing other which can move it. Then, as before: accidents do not include substance either virtually or essentially according to their proper concept [rationem], or according to their common concept, ex hypothesi; therefore they can not cause the knowledge of substance because they can not cause a more perfect concept than their own quidditative one, or of that which it includes, nor can an imperfect concept cause a more perfect one.

n.15. That substance cannot move the possible intellect immediately is proved so: when something immediately moves a cognitive power to cognition of itself, and the power perceives its presence when it is present and absence when it is absent; but our cognitive power cannot perceive the presence of substance when it is present; therefore substance does not immediately move our cognitive power. The minor is proved: it is certain by faith that the substance of Christ is present in the consecrated host, and nevertheless no intellect conjoined can naturally perceive the presence of it there.

Insulting in the Grand Old Style

Audi, Iuppiter; audite, fines mundi novi et veteri; audiat fas. Ego sum publicus nuntius populi eruditi; iuste pieque legatus venio verbisque meis fides sit.

Audi, Iuppiter, et tu, Iane Quirine, dique omnes caelestes vosque, terrestres, vosque, inferni, audite. Ego vos testor quod personam illam Fabrum stultum esse neque cerebellum habere.

Vultus eius etiam turpis est.

Henry of Ghent on compositions, distinctions, and so forth and so forth

I haven't posted in an awful long while, being hard at work (when I'm hard at work at all) on my dissertation. All the posts I meant to post have remain unactualized possibilities. To make up for it, here's a monster post--sorry so many new things are going up on the same day--full of crazy crazy stuff from Henry of Ghent. Only for the true initiates and diehards among our readers, since I'm not translating it at the moment.

From Summae Quaestionum Ordinarium Theologi recepto praeconio Solennis Henrici a Gandavo, cum duplici reportorio, Tomos Prior/Posterior. Venundantur in aedibus Iodoci Badii Ascensii, cum Priuilegio Regio ad calcem explicando, 2 vol., Paris, 1520. Reprinted 1953, New York: Franciscan Institute.

Art. XXVIII, Q. v. fo. 168-169. “Circa quintum arguitur quod in deo sit compositio ex natura et supposito.”
. . . “Hic primo est advertendum quid appelemus naturam: et quid suppositum: et quid compositionum ex utroque. Dicendum igitur quod naturam hic appellamus essentiam et quidditatem dictam nomine absoluto, qui dat esse rei quam significat definitio [e.g. the essence of man is not his form but form + matter] . . . qualis quidem natura significatur hoc nomine humanitas, quae de essentia hominis simplicem intellectum format et absolutum ab omni ratione subsistendi, vel non subsistendi universalis vel particularis, communis vel singularis, et cuiuslibet alterius intentionis possibilis intelligi circa ipsam. Definitio enim humanitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis et singularitatis, et est cui accidit utrumque. . . . Et sic natura hic eppellatur simplex et nuda et absoluta quidditas sive essentia rei abque omni determinatione cuiuscumque extrinseci conceptus intellecta, inquantum sc. in se considerata est id quod est per essentiam, non per participationem aliquam, ut sunt humanitas, asinitas, . . . angelitas . . . Suppositum vero hic appellatur res subiecta naturae cuius est illa essentia vel natura ut participata ab ea . . . Compositio vero ex natura et huiusmodi supposito intelligitur quemadmodum intelligimus hominem esse compositum ex carnibus et ossibus et anima rationali, tamquam ex participante humanitatem, et ex ipsa humanitate participata ab illo, et hoc non quia natura et suppositum seorsum accepta ut partes concurrunt in constitutionem alicuius tertii ex ipsi sed quia natura ut cadit in supposito recepit in eo compositionem cum re ipsa suppositi inquantum suppositum est, qua determinatur ut sub subsistens in supposito vel definito, in quo habet rationem individui seu particularis . . . Esse tamen in existentia extra intellectum non habebat sine re illa . . . Unde natura et suppositum sive res naturae in creaturis non differunt re, sed sola intentione, dicente Philosopho in vii Metaph . . . Quidditas hominis est homo uno modo, et non est homo alio modo, id est, est forma hominis, et non st homo quod est compositum ex materia et forma. Et est haec compositio multo minor quam precedens qui est ex essentia et esse: quia non potunt intelligi essentia existere nisi determinata in supposito. Est tamen maior quam sequentes ex actu et potentia: quia haec includit illam. Essentia enim non recipit compositionem cum determinatione in supposito: nisi quia id quod ipsa secundum se est in actu, est in potentia ad illam. Qualiter igitur ista compositio contingat in omni creatura: et contrario removeatur a deo, considerandum.
Est igitur sciendum quod qualiscumque essentia intelligatur in creaturis: sive comprehendens materia et formam, ut in materialibus, sive genus et differentiam, ut etiam in immaterialibus, si genus in eis accepi possit, sive formam tantum simplicem, qualis est in substantiis separatis secundum illos philosophos qui ponunt quod non sit in eis distinctio nisi secundum gradus dignitatis et ordinis naturae: In omnibus tamen necesse est ponere compositionem ex essentia et suppositio: quia semper in creaturis intentio naturae sive essentiae ut essentia est, essentia tamen est, ut dictum est: et ideo de se est indeterminatum, quod determinatur in supposito per id quod participat ea: ut sic in quolibet supposito per id quod participat ea: ut sic in quolibet supposito creaturae sit concipere rationem indeterminati ex parte essentiae, et eius in quo determinatur ex parte suppositi. Propter quod in omni creatura dicitur esse compositio ex essentia et supposito: quamvis suppositum ipsum ut suppositum est, includat in se naturam: quia in eis per se semper est alia intentio suppositi qua suppositum est: alia vero intentio naturae qua natura est: licet nihil rei addat suppositum super naturam, tam in compositis ex materia et forma, quam in simplicibus. Semper enim idipsum re significant essentia sive natura, et suppositum: ut humanitas et homo. Differunt autem solum penes modum significandi et intelligendi secundum abstractum et concretum, sive secundum determinatum et indeterminatum, ut dictum est . . . Propter tale ergo diversitatem naturae et suppositi contingit vulgare dictum: quod in omni creatura est reperire compositione ex quod est et ex quo est.” . . .

Art. XXVIII Q4 “Circa quartum arguitur quod in deo sit compositio ex essentia et esse.” fo. 167-168.

. . . “Idcirgo ergo in qualibet creatura sit ratio et intentio seorsum qua est res a reor reris: alia qua est essentia: alia qua est existentia quaedam. Omne autem quod ex se dicit indeterminatum quid receptabile determinationis extra suam intentionem, compositionem facit cum illo in eodem, ut dictum est supra. Oportet igitur in qualibet creatura inquantum creatura est, ponere ex tribus intentionibus duplicem compositionem, unam quae primum omnium est, sc. ex eo quod res est secundum se a reor reris dicta, et esse essentiae eius: et alia ultiorem ex eo quod est essentia quaedam: et esse existentiae suae in effectu. Et sunt istae compositiones ex differentibus secundum intentionem et conceptum mentis: licet non ex differentibus re, ut habitum est ex predeterminatis. . . .”
[One kind of distinction arises wholly on the side of the reasoning intellect and has no corresponding difference in the thing; a second kind arises partly from the side of the intellect and partly from the thing] . . . “Secundo autem modo distinguit intellectus suo conceptu diversitatem eorum quae sunt indivisa in re composita ex eis, sed inter se divisa: et hoc vel in natura et essentia: ut contingit in diversitate materiae et forma in composito ex utroque: et ideo talis diversitas dicitur esse secundum rem et naturam: vel sunt indivisa re et natura, sed non intentione, ut contingit in diversitate generis et differentiae in specie, et essentiae a supposito, et essentiae ab esse. Dico actualis existentiae: quia cum ipsa facit compositionem in creatura: non autem ab esse essentiae: quia illud est propirus actus eius essentialis: sicut vivere et actus vitae in vivente. Unde in creatura ex essentia et esse essentiali non est aliqua compositio: sicud neque in vivente ex vivere et vita. Et ideo talis diversitas dicitus esse non secundum rationem tantum: neque secundum rem et naturam: sed secundum intentiones diversas circa eadem rem simplicem consideratas, quarum una seorsum accipitur ab alia nec eam includit in se: et ideo quasi accidentaliter ei advenit . . . Et sic quia extra intentionem essentiae rei creatae est suum esse actuale, licet nihil rei absolutae addat essentiae, ut habitum est supra: Ideo contingit quod in omni creatura sit compositio ex essentia et esse, ut sit esse intentio alia extra intentionem essentiae: ex quasi accidentalis eis: secundum modum supratactum. Et accipio hic in hac quaestione essentiam large pro eo quod quid est: et re cuius est: de quibus proponitur quaestio sequens.” . . .

Art. XXVIII Q 6 fo. 169-170.

. . . “Loquendo autem de potentia passiva illa qui receptiva est alicuius in re ad salutem et perfectionem: intelligendum quod cum omnis potentia talis est in aliquo et respectu alicuius in aliquo ut in imperfecto, et respectu eius quo debet perfici, secundum quod in materia est potentia ad susceptionem formae intra se: et in forma est potentia ut informaret materiam: et sic in composito mutuo perficitur: Unde anima anima separata a corpore imperfecta est in suo esse: nec perficitur potentia eius et appetitus nisi fuerit corpori unita: De tali igitur potentia et actu intelligendum quod potest intelligi potentia componi ut cum actu cum eo in quo est: quod est sutractum potentiae, vel cum eo ad quod est, quod supervenit ipsi potentiae: et ei cui substracta est. Primo modo est compositio ex potentia et actu in omni eo quod est in potentia ad aliud secundum uniendum: et sic in materia secundum se ut nuda considerata absque omni forma, consideratur compositio ex essentia materiae et possibilitate eius ad susceptionem formae. Similiter in quolibet susceptibili alicuius accidentis vel accidentalis in se, intelligenda est compositio aliquam ex eo quod est secundum se, et potentia qui est susceptum alterius in se. Et similiter talis compositio est in essentia cuiuslibet formae materialis: ex eo sc. quod ipsa est in se: et ex potentiae qui est unibilis alteri ad eius informationem. Et est compositio in essentia cuiuslibet creaturae: ex eo quod res est in se absolute considerata dicta a ratitudine: et potentia ad esse essentiae suae. Est etiam in essentia cuiuslibet creaturae ex eo quod est secundum se et absolute, et potentia ad terminationem suam in supposito. Est etiam in ipso supposito quocumque creaturae absolute considerato cum potentia ad esse existentiae. Et est in illis quae habent existentia incompleta in materia cum potentia ad esse completum acquirendum per agens educens id quod in potentia est ad actum. Est etiam in natura generis cum potentia quam habet ad differentias ad constitutionem speciei. Sed iste modus compositionis non est vere compositio: quam ut infra videbitur, potentia non est nisi respectus fundatus in eo cuius est, in respectu ad aliud qui comparatus ad is super quod in illo fundatur, cadit in eius essentia. Comparatus vero ad aliud, habet natura respectus: qui non facit compositione aliquam cum eo cuius est: ut similter infra videbitur. Iste autem modus compositionis et si esset vera compositio in creaturis, omnino in deo cadere non potest . . . Potentia enim materiae qua materia est susceptiva formae, perficitur per formam: et potentia formae qua inclinatur ad materiam, perficitur per esse suum in materia, et similiter est in compositione accidentis cum subiecto: et rei cum esse essentiae, et essentiae cum supposito: et suppositi cum esse existentiae: et incompleti in esse existentiae vel essentia cum suo complemento. Materia enim est in potentia ad formam et econverso: et subiectum ad accidens: et econverso: et res ut res ad esse essentiae: et essentia ad suppositum: et suppositum ad existentiam: et incompletam ad completum. Et sic patet quod compositio ex actu et potentia communissima est et simplicissima: et in omni alio modo compositionis includitur, non econverso. . . . Licet enim in simplicissimis creaturis: sique tamen tales sint . . . Nullum tamen eorum statis[??] est id quod est per existentiam, licet enim essentia eorum per generationem non vadit de incompleto ad completum: quia non fiunt ex materia: nec ex aliquo preexistente in potentia: vadit tamen essentia eorum per creationem de non esse ad esse: ad quod ipsa rei essentia inquantum est essentia, in potentia est: quia solus deus in se est necesse esse. Omne autem aliud quantum est de se solum est possibile esse. Et ideo in quolibet talis necesse est concipere compositionem ex illo quod est in se, sc. ex potentia qua est susceptivum in se [et] actus alicuius ab alio a se.”

Note on Identity

Here's a brief passage I came across only a page over from the bit on the plurality of forms.

Here Scotus is responding to an argument (n.196) that there are not only three divine persons. Here I'm just going to quote from the Wolter/Bychkov translation:

"It seems not to be the case: "all things whatsoeve that are identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other [Euclid, Elementa I]". The divine persons are such; therefore etc. The major is proved: because otherwise every form of the syullogism is perferted, which concludes from teh unity [of the middle term] that one is identical with the otehr because they have the same middle term.

And the reply (n.224):

"To the first argument, it must be said that never from the identity of two to a third is the identityof them among themselves inferred, unless the identity to a third is of such a sort as exists in the case of the extremes, and then inconguity [inconveniens] does not follow."

Reportatio Statements on the Plurality of Forms

Scotus has often been accused by certain people of violating the Council of Vienne's censure of Olivi's position on the plurality of substantial forms. Thomists would have us belive that Vienne endorsed the Thomistic unicity of substantial form, though Ludwig Ott believes that the Council was only censuring an extreme view, not affirming the Thomistic view and closing the discussion. At issue is the relation of the intellective soul to the body. According to Ott (p. 97 of the "Fundamentals"), the intellective soul is the per se form of the body.

Scotus' view in Ordinatio IV is that there are two substantial forms in the human composite, the intellective soul and the form of the body. He sees humans as being consituted by a series of potency-act relationships, a situation in which lower elements (bones, organs) are in potency to higher, more complex elements. The top of this little pyramid is the intellective soul which brings the ultimate actuality to the substance. He is aware of the Thomistic position and criticizes it extensively. In short, he denies Thomas' view that there can be only one substantial form per esse, instead holding that all these various grades of form have a partial esse, which join together to form the single, complete esse of the substance. In these discussions he is also quite clear that the intellective soul is the form of the body, though there is also a mediate actuality of the body as such, the forma corporeitatis (which, I think can better account for such things as organ transplants or persistent vegetative states than can the Thomistic view, to say nothing of the rather absurd consequence in the latter view that upon death the substanial form of a man is replaced by the numerically different substantial form of a corpse).

I came across the following passage in Reportatio IA, which is also quite explicit on the role of the intellective soul to the body (d.2 pars 3 q.4 n 218-219); the general context is that he is giving four arguments for there being no contradiction between holding that there is a unity of essence with trinity of persons in divinis. This consitutes his third argument.

"Tertio hoc idem declaratur ex ratione infinitatis divinae. Et pono exemplum familiarius de anima intellective quae tota est in toto et tota in qualibet parte, ita quod in anima perfectionis est quod sine sui divisione det esse totale pluribus partibus corporis eo quod tota in toto etc. Et in hoc excedit omnes formas materiales quae certam partem corporis perficiunt.

Tria autem sunt imperfectionis in anima intellectiva prout perficit corpus. Primo quod dat esse per informationem materiae; secundum quod non dat totale esse corpori, sed esse partiale ut esse intellectum; tertium quod plures partes eiusdem totius quas perficit, sunt distinctae realiter eo quod non dat partibus distinctis alicuius tertii esse. Ergo ablatis isti imperfectionibus, reservando quod est perfectionis in ea, possible est manuduci in aliam essentiam quae det esse totale, non per informationem, pluribus distinctis quae non sunt partes alicuius totius et quae erunt per se subsistentes. Et sic potest intelligi una essentia numero esse in tribus personis."

Translation:
Third, this same conclusion is declared from the notion of divine infinity. And I give a more familiar example about the intellective soul, which is total in the total and total in every part so that in the soul it is of perfection that without division of itself it gives total being to many parts of the body, because it is total in total, etc. And in this it exceeds all material forms which perfect a certain part of the body.

Three things are of imperfection in the intellective soul insofaras it perfects a body. First that it gives being through the information of matter; second that it does not give total being to the body, but partial being as intellectual being [esse intellectum]; third that many parts of the same whole which it perfects, are distinct really because it does not give to distinct parts the being of some third thing. Therefore with those imperfections removed, and by reserving what is of perfection in it, it is possible to think of another essence which gives total being, not by informing, to many distinct things which are not parts of some whole and which would be subsisting per se. And so can be understood the idea of an essence one in number with three persons.