Here's a brief passage I came across only a page over from the bit on the plurality of forms.
Here Scotus is responding to an argument (n.196) that there are not only three divine persons. Here I'm just going to quote from the Wolter/Bychkov translation:
"It seems not to be the case: "all things whatsoeve that are identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other [Euclid, Elementa I]". The divine persons are such; therefore etc. The major is proved: because otherwise every form of the syullogism is perferted, which concludes from teh unity [of the middle term] that one is identical with the otehr because they have the same middle term.
And the reply (n.224):
"To the first argument, it must be said that never from the identity of two to a third is the identityof them among themselves inferred, unless the identity to a third is of such a sort as exists in the case of the extremes, and then inconguity [inconveniens] does not follow."
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