Carmen

Huc ades, o formosae puella, tibi lilia plenis
ecce ferunt Nymphae calathis; tibi candida Nais,
pallentis violas et summa papavera carpens,
narcissum et florem iungit bene olentis anethi;
tum casia atque aliis intexens suavibus herbis
mollia luteola pingit vaccinia caltha.

--Vergil

Peter of Navarre on Univocity, Cognition of Substance

Here'a quote I ran across from the spanish Scotist theologian Petrus de Atarrabia, on our ability to cognize substances. If those of you who went to the St. Bonaventure should recall from Pini's paper, Scotus himself holds that substance is not directly accessible to our intellect in this life. As is common with Scotus, he goes through various developmental stages. In the end, while he does not think we can know substances immediately, we can infer their existence from the existence of accidents. Being is univocal between them. Ultimately, we probably can't know much about the natures that constitute things in the world either, if all we know is accidents. In class today, Richard suggested that one of the underlying motivations for this position is that Aristotle thinks that cognition has qualities, items in the category of quality, as its object. Note the presence of the Eucharist in the second argument; this was a standard trope in this problem in the late thirteenth-century as well, possibly introduced by Richard of Middleton and also considered by Scotus. I have another quote somewhere by Alexander Bonini of Alessandria that is similar in content which I may post later. The context of the quote is Peter's discussion of univocity. He gives several arguments largely drawn from Scotus though with modifications. This is the end of his second argument. This particular section is followed by one comparing Scotus and Thomas and seeing if they agree.

Peter of Navarre, I Sent. d. 3 pars 1 q. 1

n.14: The second consequence is proved, concerning the cognition of substance: Substance does not immediately move the possible intellect naturally in the wayfaring state; therefore accidents move it immediately, since there is nothing other which can move it. Then, as before: accidents do not include substance either virtually or essentially according to their proper concept [rationem], or according to their common concept, ex hypothesi; therefore they can not cause the knowledge of substance because they can not cause a more perfect concept than their own quidditative one, or of that which it includes, nor can an imperfect concept cause a more perfect one.

n.15. That substance cannot move the possible intellect immediately is proved so: when something immediately moves a cognitive power to cognition of itself, and the power perceives its presence when it is present and absence when it is absent; but our cognitive power cannot perceive the presence of substance when it is present; therefore substance does not immediately move our cognitive power. The minor is proved: it is certain by faith that the substance of Christ is present in the consecrated host, and nevertheless no intellect conjoined can naturally perceive the presence of it there.

Insulting in the Grand Old Style

Audi, Iuppiter; audite, fines mundi novi et veteri; audiat fas. Ego sum publicus nuntius populi eruditi; iuste pieque legatus venio verbisque meis fides sit.

Audi, Iuppiter, et tu, Iane Quirine, dique omnes caelestes vosque, terrestres, vosque, inferni, audite. Ego vos testor quod personam illam Fabrum stultum esse neque cerebellum habere.

Vultus eius etiam turpis est.

Henry of Ghent on compositions, distinctions, and so forth and so forth

I haven't posted in an awful long while, being hard at work (when I'm hard at work at all) on my dissertation. All the posts I meant to post have remain unactualized possibilities. To make up for it, here's a monster post--sorry so many new things are going up on the same day--full of crazy crazy stuff from Henry of Ghent. Only for the true initiates and diehards among our readers, since I'm not translating it at the moment.

From Summae Quaestionum Ordinarium Theologi recepto praeconio Solennis Henrici a Gandavo, cum duplici reportorio, Tomos Prior/Posterior. Venundantur in aedibus Iodoci Badii Ascensii, cum Priuilegio Regio ad calcem explicando, 2 vol., Paris, 1520. Reprinted 1953, New York: Franciscan Institute.

Art. XXVIII, Q. v. fo. 168-169. “Circa quintum arguitur quod in deo sit compositio ex natura et supposito.”
. . . “Hic primo est advertendum quid appelemus naturam: et quid suppositum: et quid compositionum ex utroque. Dicendum igitur quod naturam hic appellamus essentiam et quidditatem dictam nomine absoluto, qui dat esse rei quam significat definitio [e.g. the essence of man is not his form but form + matter] . . . qualis quidem natura significatur hoc nomine humanitas, quae de essentia hominis simplicem intellectum format et absolutum ab omni ratione subsistendi, vel non subsistendi universalis vel particularis, communis vel singularis, et cuiuslibet alterius intentionis possibilis intelligi circa ipsam. Definitio enim humanitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis et singularitatis, et est cui accidit utrumque. . . . Et sic natura hic eppellatur simplex et nuda et absoluta quidditas sive essentia rei abque omni determinatione cuiuscumque extrinseci conceptus intellecta, inquantum sc. in se considerata est id quod est per essentiam, non per participationem aliquam, ut sunt humanitas, asinitas, . . . angelitas . . . Suppositum vero hic appellatur res subiecta naturae cuius est illa essentia vel natura ut participata ab ea . . . Compositio vero ex natura et huiusmodi supposito intelligitur quemadmodum intelligimus hominem esse compositum ex carnibus et ossibus et anima rationali, tamquam ex participante humanitatem, et ex ipsa humanitate participata ab illo, et hoc non quia natura et suppositum seorsum accepta ut partes concurrunt in constitutionem alicuius tertii ex ipsi sed quia natura ut cadit in supposito recepit in eo compositionem cum re ipsa suppositi inquantum suppositum est, qua determinatur ut sub subsistens in supposito vel definito, in quo habet rationem individui seu particularis . . . Esse tamen in existentia extra intellectum non habebat sine re illa . . . Unde natura et suppositum sive res naturae in creaturis non differunt re, sed sola intentione, dicente Philosopho in vii Metaph . . . Quidditas hominis est homo uno modo, et non est homo alio modo, id est, est forma hominis, et non st homo quod est compositum ex materia et forma. Et est haec compositio multo minor quam precedens qui est ex essentia et esse: quia non potunt intelligi essentia existere nisi determinata in supposito. Est tamen maior quam sequentes ex actu et potentia: quia haec includit illam. Essentia enim non recipit compositionem cum determinatione in supposito: nisi quia id quod ipsa secundum se est in actu, est in potentia ad illam. Qualiter igitur ista compositio contingat in omni creatura: et contrario removeatur a deo, considerandum.
Est igitur sciendum quod qualiscumque essentia intelligatur in creaturis: sive comprehendens materia et formam, ut in materialibus, sive genus et differentiam, ut etiam in immaterialibus, si genus in eis accepi possit, sive formam tantum simplicem, qualis est in substantiis separatis secundum illos philosophos qui ponunt quod non sit in eis distinctio nisi secundum gradus dignitatis et ordinis naturae: In omnibus tamen necesse est ponere compositionem ex essentia et suppositio: quia semper in creaturis intentio naturae sive essentiae ut essentia est, essentia tamen est, ut dictum est: et ideo de se est indeterminatum, quod determinatur in supposito per id quod participat ea: ut sic in quolibet supposito per id quod participat ea: ut sic in quolibet supposito creaturae sit concipere rationem indeterminati ex parte essentiae, et eius in quo determinatur ex parte suppositi. Propter quod in omni creatura dicitur esse compositio ex essentia et supposito: quamvis suppositum ipsum ut suppositum est, includat in se naturam: quia in eis per se semper est alia intentio suppositi qua suppositum est: alia vero intentio naturae qua natura est: licet nihil rei addat suppositum super naturam, tam in compositis ex materia et forma, quam in simplicibus. Semper enim idipsum re significant essentia sive natura, et suppositum: ut humanitas et homo. Differunt autem solum penes modum significandi et intelligendi secundum abstractum et concretum, sive secundum determinatum et indeterminatum, ut dictum est . . . Propter tale ergo diversitatem naturae et suppositi contingit vulgare dictum: quod in omni creatura est reperire compositione ex quod est et ex quo est.” . . .

Art. XXVIII Q4 “Circa quartum arguitur quod in deo sit compositio ex essentia et esse.” fo. 167-168.

. . . “Idcirgo ergo in qualibet creatura sit ratio et intentio seorsum qua est res a reor reris: alia qua est essentia: alia qua est existentia quaedam. Omne autem quod ex se dicit indeterminatum quid receptabile determinationis extra suam intentionem, compositionem facit cum illo in eodem, ut dictum est supra. Oportet igitur in qualibet creatura inquantum creatura est, ponere ex tribus intentionibus duplicem compositionem, unam quae primum omnium est, sc. ex eo quod res est secundum se a reor reris dicta, et esse essentiae eius: et alia ultiorem ex eo quod est essentia quaedam: et esse existentiae suae in effectu. Et sunt istae compositiones ex differentibus secundum intentionem et conceptum mentis: licet non ex differentibus re, ut habitum est ex predeterminatis. . . .”
[One kind of distinction arises wholly on the side of the reasoning intellect and has no corresponding difference in the thing; a second kind arises partly from the side of the intellect and partly from the thing] . . . “Secundo autem modo distinguit intellectus suo conceptu diversitatem eorum quae sunt indivisa in re composita ex eis, sed inter se divisa: et hoc vel in natura et essentia: ut contingit in diversitate materiae et forma in composito ex utroque: et ideo talis diversitas dicitur esse secundum rem et naturam: vel sunt indivisa re et natura, sed non intentione, ut contingit in diversitate generis et differentiae in specie, et essentiae a supposito, et essentiae ab esse. Dico actualis existentiae: quia cum ipsa facit compositionem in creatura: non autem ab esse essentiae: quia illud est propirus actus eius essentialis: sicut vivere et actus vitae in vivente. Unde in creatura ex essentia et esse essentiali non est aliqua compositio: sicud neque in vivente ex vivere et vita. Et ideo talis diversitas dicitus esse non secundum rationem tantum: neque secundum rem et naturam: sed secundum intentiones diversas circa eadem rem simplicem consideratas, quarum una seorsum accipitur ab alia nec eam includit in se: et ideo quasi accidentaliter ei advenit . . . Et sic quia extra intentionem essentiae rei creatae est suum esse actuale, licet nihil rei absolutae addat essentiae, ut habitum est supra: Ideo contingit quod in omni creatura sit compositio ex essentia et esse, ut sit esse intentio alia extra intentionem essentiae: ex quasi accidentalis eis: secundum modum supratactum. Et accipio hic in hac quaestione essentiam large pro eo quod quid est: et re cuius est: de quibus proponitur quaestio sequens.” . . .

Art. XXVIII Q 6 fo. 169-170.

. . . “Loquendo autem de potentia passiva illa qui receptiva est alicuius in re ad salutem et perfectionem: intelligendum quod cum omnis potentia talis est in aliquo et respectu alicuius in aliquo ut in imperfecto, et respectu eius quo debet perfici, secundum quod in materia est potentia ad susceptionem formae intra se: et in forma est potentia ut informaret materiam: et sic in composito mutuo perficitur: Unde anima anima separata a corpore imperfecta est in suo esse: nec perficitur potentia eius et appetitus nisi fuerit corpori unita: De tali igitur potentia et actu intelligendum quod potest intelligi potentia componi ut cum actu cum eo in quo est: quod est sutractum potentiae, vel cum eo ad quod est, quod supervenit ipsi potentiae: et ei cui substracta est. Primo modo est compositio ex potentia et actu in omni eo quod est in potentia ad aliud secundum uniendum: et sic in materia secundum se ut nuda considerata absque omni forma, consideratur compositio ex essentia materiae et possibilitate eius ad susceptionem formae. Similiter in quolibet susceptibili alicuius accidentis vel accidentalis in se, intelligenda est compositio aliquam ex eo quod est secundum se, et potentia qui est susceptum alterius in se. Et similiter talis compositio est in essentia cuiuslibet formae materialis: ex eo sc. quod ipsa est in se: et ex potentiae qui est unibilis alteri ad eius informationem. Et est compositio in essentia cuiuslibet creaturae: ex eo quod res est in se absolute considerata dicta a ratitudine: et potentia ad esse essentiae suae. Est etiam in essentia cuiuslibet creaturae ex eo quod est secundum se et absolute, et potentia ad terminationem suam in supposito. Est etiam in ipso supposito quocumque creaturae absolute considerato cum potentia ad esse existentiae. Et est in illis quae habent existentia incompleta in materia cum potentia ad esse completum acquirendum per agens educens id quod in potentia est ad actum. Est etiam in natura generis cum potentia quam habet ad differentias ad constitutionem speciei. Sed iste modus compositionis non est vere compositio: quam ut infra videbitur, potentia non est nisi respectus fundatus in eo cuius est, in respectu ad aliud qui comparatus ad is super quod in illo fundatur, cadit in eius essentia. Comparatus vero ad aliud, habet natura respectus: qui non facit compositione aliquam cum eo cuius est: ut similter infra videbitur. Iste autem modus compositionis et si esset vera compositio in creaturis, omnino in deo cadere non potest . . . Potentia enim materiae qua materia est susceptiva formae, perficitur per formam: et potentia formae qua inclinatur ad materiam, perficitur per esse suum in materia, et similiter est in compositione accidentis cum subiecto: et rei cum esse essentiae, et essentiae cum supposito: et suppositi cum esse existentiae: et incompleti in esse existentiae vel essentia cum suo complemento. Materia enim est in potentia ad formam et econverso: et subiectum ad accidens: et econverso: et res ut res ad esse essentiae: et essentia ad suppositum: et suppositum ad existentiam: et incompletam ad completum. Et sic patet quod compositio ex actu et potentia communissima est et simplicissima: et in omni alio modo compositionis includitur, non econverso. . . . Licet enim in simplicissimis creaturis: sique tamen tales sint . . . Nullum tamen eorum statis[??] est id quod est per existentiam, licet enim essentia eorum per generationem non vadit de incompleto ad completum: quia non fiunt ex materia: nec ex aliquo preexistente in potentia: vadit tamen essentia eorum per creationem de non esse ad esse: ad quod ipsa rei essentia inquantum est essentia, in potentia est: quia solus deus in se est necesse esse. Omne autem aliud quantum est de se solum est possibile esse. Et ideo in quolibet talis necesse est concipere compositionem ex illo quod est in se, sc. ex potentia qua est susceptivum in se [et] actus alicuius ab alio a se.”

Note on Identity

Here's a brief passage I came across only a page over from the bit on the plurality of forms.

Here Scotus is responding to an argument (n.196) that there are not only three divine persons. Here I'm just going to quote from the Wolter/Bychkov translation:

"It seems not to be the case: "all things whatsoeve that are identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other [Euclid, Elementa I]". The divine persons are such; therefore etc. The major is proved: because otherwise every form of the syullogism is perferted, which concludes from teh unity [of the middle term] that one is identical with the otehr because they have the same middle term.

And the reply (n.224):

"To the first argument, it must be said that never from the identity of two to a third is the identityof them among themselves inferred, unless the identity to a third is of such a sort as exists in the case of the extremes, and then inconguity [inconveniens] does not follow."

Reportatio Statements on the Plurality of Forms

Scotus has often been accused by certain people of violating the Council of Vienne's censure of Olivi's position on the plurality of substantial forms. Thomists would have us belive that Vienne endorsed the Thomistic unicity of substantial form, though Ludwig Ott believes that the Council was only censuring an extreme view, not affirming the Thomistic view and closing the discussion. At issue is the relation of the intellective soul to the body. According to Ott (p. 97 of the "Fundamentals"), the intellective soul is the per se form of the body.

Scotus' view in Ordinatio IV is that there are two substantial forms in the human composite, the intellective soul and the form of the body. He sees humans as being consituted by a series of potency-act relationships, a situation in which lower elements (bones, organs) are in potency to higher, more complex elements. The top of this little pyramid is the intellective soul which brings the ultimate actuality to the substance. He is aware of the Thomistic position and criticizes it extensively. In short, he denies Thomas' view that there can be only one substantial form per esse, instead holding that all these various grades of form have a partial esse, which join together to form the single, complete esse of the substance. In these discussions he is also quite clear that the intellective soul is the form of the body, though there is also a mediate actuality of the body as such, the forma corporeitatis (which, I think can better account for such things as organ transplants or persistent vegetative states than can the Thomistic view, to say nothing of the rather absurd consequence in the latter view that upon death the substanial form of a man is replaced by the numerically different substantial form of a corpse).

I came across the following passage in Reportatio IA, which is also quite explicit on the role of the intellective soul to the body (d.2 pars 3 q.4 n 218-219); the general context is that he is giving four arguments for there being no contradiction between holding that there is a unity of essence with trinity of persons in divinis. This consitutes his third argument.

"Tertio hoc idem declaratur ex ratione infinitatis divinae. Et pono exemplum familiarius de anima intellective quae tota est in toto et tota in qualibet parte, ita quod in anima perfectionis est quod sine sui divisione det esse totale pluribus partibus corporis eo quod tota in toto etc. Et in hoc excedit omnes formas materiales quae certam partem corporis perficiunt.

Tria autem sunt imperfectionis in anima intellectiva prout perficit corpus. Primo quod dat esse per informationem materiae; secundum quod non dat totale esse corpori, sed esse partiale ut esse intellectum; tertium quod plures partes eiusdem totius quas perficit, sunt distinctae realiter eo quod non dat partibus distinctis alicuius tertii esse. Ergo ablatis isti imperfectionibus, reservando quod est perfectionis in ea, possible est manuduci in aliam essentiam quae det esse totale, non per informationem, pluribus distinctis quae non sunt partes alicuius totius et quae erunt per se subsistentes. Et sic potest intelligi una essentia numero esse in tribus personis."

Translation:
Third, this same conclusion is declared from the notion of divine infinity. And I give a more familiar example about the intellective soul, which is total in the total and total in every part so that in the soul it is of perfection that without division of itself it gives total being to many parts of the body, because it is total in total, etc. And in this it exceeds all material forms which perfect a certain part of the body.

Three things are of imperfection in the intellective soul insofaras it perfects a body. First that it gives being through the information of matter; second that it does not give total being to the body, but partial being as intellectual being [esse intellectum]; third that many parts of the same whole which it perfects, are distinct really because it does not give to distinct parts the being of some third thing. Therefore with those imperfections removed, and by reserving what is of perfection in it, it is possible to think of another essence which gives total being, not by informing, to many distinct things which are not parts of some whole and which would be subsisting per se. And so can be understood the idea of an essence one in number with three persons.

Cornelisse on the Formal Distinction I

I've always been something of a sucker for the old, pre-vat II manuals. At first, as a new catholic, I appreciated the clarity and appearance of scientific rigour found in them and,faced by the maze of modern theology or perhaps "theologies" perhaps wished those days would return. Of course, at the time I was sympathetic to Thomism and indeed considered myself to be a budding Thomist. Now that my opinions have changed, I have no desire to return to the dark days of the neo-scholastic revival. Dark days in the sense that one can find Thomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange completely distorting and misunderstanding the thought of the Subtle Doctor (of course, it wasn't entirely his fault as the editions were so bad), or Spanish Dominicans claiming that all Catholics were required to give religious assent to every proposition from St. Thomas save where the Thomistic commentary tradition itself is unclear on the meaning of Thomas (Cf. Pelzer's article in one of the early issues of Franciscan Studies). Scotism was present, and even tolerated at this time, but apparently restricted to the Franciscan order. Once and a while I am asked what my beef with these neo-Thomists is, as after all I am sympathetic to their attempts to defend the Faith; essentially, it is the inability to admit any opinion other than that of Thomas Aquinas. The Church herself has only recommended Thomas, and can do little more; the issues on which the various scholastic schools disagree have generally not been settled by a formal determination of the Church; multiple opinions can still be held. Yet when one reads the work of certain theologians whom I have discussed elsewhere, whenever the name of Scotus is mentioned, all one finds is a reduction of his views to a transgression of some canon from a council or the Nicene creed (as if Scotus were just plain stuipid). All was not dark, however, for it is to neo-Scholasticism that we owe the relatively brief flourishing of the scholar-priests who edited and studied so much, laying the foundation for the historical-critical study of medieval philosophy and theology.

Rant aside, we come to the topic of this post, my latest acquisition of a manual from this period of neo-Scholasticism, which joins Perrone, Ott and Tanqueray on my shelves: Dorotheus Cornelisse OFM, Tractatus de Deo uno et trino, Quaracchi 1913. At this point I am not sure if this work constitutes a Scotist manual or not; he does quote quite a bit of Thomas without seeming to disagree with him, though he does criticize the Thomistae. On the analogy-univocity question, or rather the natural knowledge of God question, he endorsed the Dionysian three-fold way of which analogy was a subsection. Univocity did not come in for much comment, as in the Wadding edition prior to Scotus's discussion of this topic one finds the spurious phrase to the effect that Scotus only proposes univocity tentatively as it is against the common opinion. My interest now is on the formal distinction, and I will do a series of posts translating his section on it and commenting on its accuracy in the light of modern research.

A few things to note: We can see here the results of several hundred years of controversy between Thomists and Scotists, as the terminology is rather more developed than either of the founders. Scotus uses a variety of distinctions, but never classified them in such a manner. He does give brief definitions for what he thinks the formal distinction or real distinction is, but the modal distinction in particular was never spelled out by him in great detail (though the example used here are the same; the intensity of whiteness). We also see that the term Garriou was using to describe the formal distinction, the formal-actual distinction, probably comes from renaissance or 19th-century Scotism. Note also the denial that the formal distinction can be conceived of as a variety of real distinction, something disputed by the 14th century Scotists as well as contemporary scholars; a recurring theme in Scotism. Finally, note the absence of the influence of the Reportatio, with its notion of secundum quid distinction.

p. 183 ff (translation by me, and as usual done at great speed):

I. Exponitur terminologia thomistica [footnote to Billuart, Summa summae]

1. Distinction is a lacking of identity.

2. One is real, the other is of reason. The real is "a parte rei independenter ab intellectu'. Of reason or logical is held between those things which are 'not distinct a parte rei, but in concept alone.'

3. The real is greater or lesser: the greater is 'betwen perfect beings', between thing and thing. The lesser or modal is between thing and its mode, for example, between Peter and his standing, or between two modes, for example between sitting and standing.

4. Distinction of reason can be of the reasoning reason [rationis rationcinantis] ='without a foundation in the thing', or of a reasoned reason [rationis rationcinatae] = 'with a foundation in the thing', which in the vulgur is known as virtual. An example of the first is between cicero and cicero [don't ask me what this is, the latin is ciceronem et ciceronem], the second between the justice and mercy of God. This virtual distinction is assigned a double foundation: 1. eminence of a thing identifying many perfections really distinct in lower things to itself and 2. imperfection of our intellect.

5. The virtual distinction is subdivided: one is through the mode of excluding or excluded, and therefore is called also 'exclusive precision' or sometimes a 'greater virtual' distinction: for example, animality and rationality in man; for one does not include the other and vice versa, and they can be really separated in diverse subjects, suppose in a brute and in man. The other is through the mode of including and included, and is called therfore a distinction 'widely precise' or also a 'minor virtual' distinction. This obtains when one concept implicitly is contained in another, for example between the transcendental concepts: being, things, one, something, true, good, or between humanity and rationality or animality in man. According to this, these distinctions are also called 'explicit and implicit' or 'inclusive precision'.

II. Terminologia scotistica [sources referenced here are Scotus' "opus oxienses" and various treatises on the controversies between Thomas and Scotus from the 17th s. on]

1. Distinction is the negation of identity.

2. One distinction is of reason or logic alone, the other is a parte rei. Of reason is that which only has actual being [esse actuale] by the operation of some intellect; a parte rei is what is present without any operation of the intellect [adest etiam secluso omni negotio omnis intellectus].

3. Distinction a parte rei is subdivided. 1. real, between thing and thing, which can obtain in multiple ways: between thing and thing specifically diverse = specific real distinction; between thing and thing only numerically diverse=real numerical distinction; between subject and common accident as between a wall and whiteness; between relation and its foundation as between paternity and generation. 2. Another is formal: between those things of which the defintion or essence is not the same or of which one does not enter into the definition of the other (for example, proper accidents do not enter into the definition of the subject), which are diverse things or that do not have the place of the real distinction [??qui sint res diversae seu quin locum habeat distinctio realis]. 3. The other is modal = between the form of some grade, which is not really in the same subect at the same time, but nevertheless is distinguished a parte rei: for example, in the wall between the grade of this whiteness, in man between knowledge of this grade, in the human soul between the soul or substantial principal of life and the rationality of it. It should be noted here that the modal distinction is easily reduced to the real or formal, according as it is used in an accidental or proper sense. We will not treat about the formal distinction.

III. Distinctio scotistica seu formalis a parte rei

1. Therefore the formal distinction a parte rei obtains between those formalities of which the quiddity or ratio significata by a strict definition, 'before every act of this intellect' or a parte rei, is not the same. These are formalities and it is said 'a parte rei' on account of the reason now given, or also for the sake of brevity alone; but the distinctio formalis a parte rei is never called real, because they are two and under contrary divisions of distinctions a parte rei, which is their genus; just as man never philosophically is called a beast or vice versa, although each is an animal.

2. Formality is said from form; but this is aken in multiple senses: 1. for one part of the composite, i.e. the soul, which is called informing, which the Scotists also call partial with respect to the following; 2 for the form of the whole, i.e. for the total nature in abstract as is humanity; this thefore is called total; 3. for an accidental form as whiteness, knowledge 4. for whatever intelleligible reason (I do not say, understood [intellecta]) which in some object a parte rei is truly present and consequently can be known in it by the intellect and abstracted. The formal distinction is treated concerning these intelligible reasons, either they are substantial or accidental.

3. Three conditions are required for this distinction: a) that those formalities are present actually or formally, i.e. explicitly in themselves ant not only virtually or in a sead, in a root or implicity; as for example, a son is conceived in his parents. B) that those formalities are called something positive; for between being and non being is rather posited a real distinction, or as is sometimes said, non-identity. C) that the formalities mean something proper to the thing; for it is formally the same with another formality, i.e. the wisdom and knowledge of God.

4. The formal distinction is subdivided into mutual and non mutual; that is between those things of which neither in its own formal objective ratio formally includes the other, i.e. between wisdom and goodness; the other is between those things of which one does include the other, but not in turn, i.e. humanity includes rationality, but rationality does not include in its own formal concept humamity, although it supposes it.

Quid est "nolle"

Recently, over a beer, a friend and I got into a dispute about what 'nolle' is supposed to be. I, relying on confused memories of Wolter's book of translations on the will and morality and comments made in class, maintained that the act of nolition, translated by Wolter as "nil" and Marilyn McCord Adams as "to will against", was a positive act. On my view of Scotus, the will can either act or not act, and its action can be either volitional or nolitional. My friend, however, as far as I can recall (this was some time ago) maintained that rather we should translate 'nolle' as to 'not will' something, which denies that it is an action at all. He seemed to identify the ability of the will to act or not act with 'velle' and 'nolle'. At the time, as we were in a bar, it was my word against his and we did not get very far in the debate. I believe that the following texts support my interpretation, though really it was just a matter of looking things up. In any case, it highlights the difficulty in translating this word from latin; my handy little 'words' dictionary renders it as "be unwilling; wish not to; refuse to", all of which support my friends interpretation. This should serve to remind us that while we can laugh at Scotus' bad grammar all we want (this is directed at myself as much as anyone else), we have to keep in mind his specialized uses and invention of technical terminology.

Ordinatio II d.6 n.34: "...dico quod est in communi duplex actus voluntatis, scilicet velle et nolle: est enim 'nolle' actus postivus voluntatis, quo fugit disconveniens sive quo resilit ab obiecto disconveniente; 'velle' autem est actus quo acceptat obiectum aliquod conveniens."

I say in common that there is a double act of the will, namely 'to will' and 'to will against'; for 'willing against' is a positive act of the will, by which it flees the disagreeable or by which it recoils from a disagreeable object. 'Willing, however, is an act by which it accepts some agreeable object.

Reportatio IA d. 1 pars 2 n.40 "Probabile tamen est quod ubi non inveniret defectum aliquem boni non posset illud nolle - qui est actus contrarius ipsi velle, et est actus positivus..."

Nevertheless it is probable that where one does not find some defect of the good one cannot will against it: which is a positive act contrary to that act of willing.