On Arguments and Arguing

The other day we were talking about how so many contemporary "philosophers" do little more than present old arguments dressed up in new clothes. There is nothing wrong with this as such. Modern manufacturers, in order to sell an alarm clock, create a new plastic casing for a device that has barely been improved upon in decades.  A danger of declination in thought lurks here, however, in three stages.
1. "Philosophers", by focusing on the presentation, forget about the substance of what they are exploring.
2. In order to persuade others of the truth as they know it, they confuse philosophy with rhetoric or apologetics.
3. They end up thinking that there is little difference between reason and passion. 

About forty years ago Fulton Sheen noticed that contemporary self-professed "thinkers" typically rely less on reason and more on feeling in order to persuade others. Here is part of what he had to say.

There is one lost art that has not been definitely recovered, and without which no civilization can long survive, and that is the art of controversy. The hardest thing to find in the world today is an argument. Because so few are thinking, naturally there are found but few to argue. There is prejudice in abundance and sentiment too, for these things are born of enthusiasms without the pain of labor. Thinking, on the contrary, is a difficult task; it is the hardest work a man can do—that is perhaps why so few indulge in it. Thought-saving devices have been invented that rival laborsaving devices in their ingenuity. Fine-sounding phrases like “Life is bigger than logic” or “Progress is the spirit of the age” go rattling by us like express trains, carrying the burden of those who are too lazy to think for themselves.

Not even philosophers argue today; they only explain away. A book full of bad logic, advocating all manner of moral laxity, is not refuted by critics; it is merely called “bold, honest, and fearless.” Even those periodicals that pride themselves upon their open-mindedness on all questions are far from practicing the lost art of controversy. Their pages contain no controversies, but only presentations of points of view. These never rise to the level of abstract thought in which argument clashes with argument like steel with steel, but rather they content themselves with the personal reflections of one who has lost his faith, writing against the sanctity of marriage, and of another who has kept his faith, writing in favor of it. Both sides are shooting off firecrackers, making all the noise of an intellectual warfare and creating the illusion of conflict, but it is only a sham battle in which there are plenty of explosions but never an exploded argument.
The causes underlying this decline in the art of controversy are twofold: religious and philosophical.

Modern religion has enunciated one great and fundamental dogma that is at the basis of all the other dogmas: that religion must be freed from dogmas. Creeds and confessions of faith are no longer the fashion; religious leaders have agreed not to disagree and those beliefs for which some of our ancestors would have died they have melted into a spineless humanism. Like other Pilates they have turned their backs on the uniqueness of truth and have opened their arms wide to all the moods and fancies the hour might dictate. The passing of creeds and dogmas means the passing of controversies. Creeds and dogmas are social; prejudices are private. Believers bump into one another at a thousand different angles, but bigots keep out of one another’s way, because prejudice is anti-social. I can imagine an old-fashioned Calvinist who holds that the word “damn” has a tremendous dogmatic significance coming to intellectual blows with an old-fashioned Methodist who holds that it is only a curse word. But I cannot imagine a controversy if both decide to damn damnation, like modernists who no longer believe in hell.

The second cause, which is philosophical, bases itself on that peculiar American philosophy called pragmatism, the aim of which is to prove that all proofs are useless. ... As a result, there has sprung up a disturbing indifference to truth, and a tendency to regard the useful as the true, and the impractical as the false. The man who can make up his mind when proofs are presented to him is looked upon as a bigot, and the man who ignores proofs and the search for truth is looked upon as broad-minded and tolerant.

Another evidence of this same disrespect for rational foundations is the general readiness of the modern mind to accept a statement because of the literary way in which it is couched, or because of the popularity of the one who says it, rather than for the reasons behind the statement. In this sense, it is unfortunate that some men who think poorly can write so well. Bergson has written a philosophy grounded on the assumption that the greater comes from the less, but he has so camouflaged that intellectual monstrosity with mellifluous French that he has been credited with being a great and original thinker. To some minds, of course, the startling will always appear to be the profound. It is easier to get the attention of the press when one says, as Ibsen did, that “two and two make five,” than to be orthodox and say that two and two make four. (Read the rest here)

Sheen is firmly in the tradition of the British Catholic convert controversialists, which gained great prominence with  St. Edmund Campion and, later, manifest brilliance with Bl. John Henry Newman, and wise humor with G. K. Chesterton. These three have not been surpassed though they have often been imitated. And imitation is not bad, as we find with classical music. Just because music is old does not mean it is not worth playing again. But let's not confuse the work of philosophy with the work of apologetics. The object and method of both are different. Apologetics aims at showing the rationality of the faith (or at least the absurdity of arguments against the faith); it does this through philosophical, Scriptural, and strictly theological arguments, occasionally employing history and art as helpful resources. Philosophy, on the other hand, aims at explicating the truth about being; its tools and methods are those to which every mind naturally has access in principle. 

Apologetics is a fine and noble task. But it is not philosophy. This brings me to consider a lesser Catholic light, an apologist, one worth looking at in this context: Sir Arnold Lunn, himself a convert to the faith. His biographer notes:

Lunn always believed that, as a means of communicating the truths of Catholicism to non-Catholics, debates are incomparably more effective than lectures. Debates tend to attract the unconverted who will rarely attend the formal lecture held under Catholic auspices. ...

Lunn's motto as a debater was St. Augustine's precept, "Love men, slay errors." "Intolerance of error," Lunn pointed out, "must not be equated with intolerance of men in error." Controversy must not lead to quarrelling, and Lunn's tact and composure before this Australian university audience were highly impressive. Indeed, so poor a representative was he of the Church's alleged intolerance that Glanville Cook voiced the opinion that Lunn was not a typical Catholic. "Some men," he remarked, "are better than their creeds" - a suggestion which amused Lunn hugely and prompted the reply that "no man was good enough to live up to the Catholic code or bad enough to live down to atheism." (Read more here)

 The saints would agree with Lunn's claim -- they were no strangers to controversy when such proved more powerful and necessary than good example alone. Occasionally a person rises above the surface of his freely-chosen swim in ignorance enough to realize that certain arguments would be bad for his "intellectually" held position -- and even worse for his personal life. So he avoids arguments at all costs and protests loudly against reason. It is no surprise that pro-abortion professors are unwilling to debate pro-life students. Art has its place in converting souls, but let's not pretend that it can substitute for reason. Pro-life movies might play a role in converting some, but people convinced by movies often have few solid answers to many difficult questions. The mind has powers the passions know nothing of. Yes, we can agree that arguing is rarely helpful, but argumentation, understood as an appeal to reason, compliments a man and can even save his soul. It assumes that he has a brain and it encourages him to use it, even for his own good.

Gilson on the Essence-Existence Distinction

I don't normally like to rag on Gilson since he was unquestionably a great scholar, but I can't pass up the following comment on De ente et essentia where Gilson gives the essence-existence distinction the status of a first principle, which, conveniently enough, can't be proven but only seen. Tough luck for those less subtle and impure minds like Scotus, Henry and the myriads who foolishly wanted proof of the disitnction.

Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 82:

The large number of Christian philosophers and theologians, even among the so-called Thomists, who have rejected the distinction of essence and existence understood in its Thomistic meaning, clearly shows that no demonstration is here at stake. Above all, the careful procedure of Thomas Aquinas himself in handling the notion invites us to consider it less as the conclusion of some dialetical argument than as a prime source of intelligibility whose existence is known by the very light it sheds upon all the problems in metaphysics. So Thomas Aquinas will not attempt to prove it, but we shall see him progressively leading us to it, stating from the very demonstrations of the existence of God, as if it were for him a question of purifying our sight until it becomes able to stand the light of the first principle.

The Opera Theologica of John Duns Scotus

A new volume of studies on Scotus is out, part of the Quadruple congress that went on in 2008. It is edited by Richard Cross (yours truly set the text) and contains essays by several famous scholars and an edition of the anonymous De cognitione Dei. Price: 47 euros.

Here is the publishers blurb:

On 8 November 1308, the great Franciscan scholastic thinker, John Duns Scotus, died and was buried in the friars' convent in Cologne. Building upon the intellectual heritage of his Franciscan predecessors in Paris, Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, Scotus extended this peculiarly Franciscan approach to the philosophical and theological traditions of western Christianity in new and bold directions with unique emphases and implications. These ramifications became the foundation for an important alternate current of philosophical thought known through history as Scotism. On the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the death of John Duns Scotus, international scholars from around the world gathered together to celebrate in a comprehensive manner the life, work and intellectual legacy of the Subtle Doctor. This gathering took on the form of a Quadruple Congress, comprising four conferences, treating four different themes, associated with the intellectual journey and legacy of Scotus, namely Oxford, Cologne-Bonn, Strasbourg and the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University, New York. The corresponding four volumes represent the current state of international Scotus scholarship and will remain an invaluable tool for years to come.

Part 2, offering investigations into the theology of John Duns Scotus, contains contributions by Robert Andrews, Oleg Bychkov, William J. Courtenay, Richard Cross, William A. Frank, Tobias Hofmann and Ludger Honnefelder. Robert Andrews's article provides, for the first time, a complete text of the Scotistic De cognitione dei.

God and the Divine Essence

Sometimes I think the best argument for atheism is analytic philosophy of religion. Witness the following from Hoffmann and Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes, 90.

...Anselm's notion of a self-existent or self-explanatory being is rather obscure. For example, Anselm takes it to be an implication of divine self-existence that (i) God's existence is not explained by anything else, (ii) God's existence is explained by his essence, and hence that (iii) God is a necessary being. Unhappily, (i) and (ii) are incompatible unless God is identical with his essence. Anselm accepts the doctrine that God is identical with his essence; among traditional theologians such as Anselm this doctrine is commonly thought to be an implication of divine simplicity. But as we have argued, it is a category mistake to suppose that God, a substance, is identical with his essence, a quality. Moreover, necessarily, any quality of a concrete entity [of any sort] inheres in that concrete entity. But God's essence is a quality of God, and God is a concrete entity. So, God's essence inheres in God. Since it is impossible for a concrete entity to inhere in itself, it follows that God cannot inhere in himself. Because God's essence inheres in God, but God does not, God and his essence are diverse. For all of these reasons, God and his essence cannot be identical. Hence, (i) and (ii) are incompatible. Thus, if God's existence is explained by his essence, then strictly speaking God's existence is explained by something else. However, God's existence being explained by his essence seems compatible with God's being maximally great. There is no reason to accept without qualification Anselm's assumption that God's existence cannot depend upon something else.

Valid? Sure. Sound? 'Unsound' just doesn't do it justice. I would like to know what the point of having an essence is when it just inheres in a substance along with all the substance's other properties/qualities etc. Fond/convinced as I am of the usefulness of the formal distinction, I don't think I would posit it as obtaining between God and the divine essence.

Analogy

Here is Steve Long discussing his book on analogy. I wonder what the relation of all this is to Aristotelian third-mode relations. Recall that the third mode of relations are one-way. The example is that of human knowing: one can know an object and consequently there is a relation from the knowing mind to the object but not from the object to the knowing mind.  This isn't so hard to understand. My thinking about a rock isn't going to affect the rock ex natura rei but it is going to affect my thinking. So to return to Long, could one dispense with this talk of analogical analogy and univocal analogicity simply by saying that the relation of God to creatures and e converso is an Aristotelian third-mode relation? This is course what Henry and Scotus do, though they also feel the need to discuss analogy and univocity, so perhaps not.

New From ND Press

Sorry about all the news, but here's another that really made me laugh. A dictionary of the "perennial tradition" which of course means "Thomism". But wait, there's more! Not only terms of Thomism are defined, but those movements with which Thomism has engaged.  So I suppose we will get "univocalist metaphysics" and "necrophobia at the heart of the liturgical city" as well as "Scotus".

From ND press:

New dictionary offers precise and accessible definitions of over 1,000 key philosophical terms

In his encyclical Fides et ratio (1998), John Paul II called on philosophers, "to have the courage to recover, in the flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom and truth." In Words of Wisdom, John W. Carlson responds to the late pope's call for the development of this tradition--often called the "perennial tradition" or "perennial philosophy"--with a much-needed dictionary of terms. Available in paperback and e-book formats, this is a resource for students in colleges, universities, and seminaries, as well as for their teachers.


In addition to key philosophical terms, the dictionary includes:

-- significant terms from philosophical movements with which Thomism has engaged

-- a comprehensive bibliography of works by Aquinas in English

-- examples from the writings of the philosophers and theologians mentioned in dictionary entries and

-- discussions of perennial themes



"The introduction to this work shows how carefully its aim and method have been thought through. The rest of Words of Wisdom demonstrates how well the aim has been achieved and the method employed. An invaluable resource." --Aidan Nichols, O.P., University of Cambridge



368 pages

ISBN 978-0-268-02370-6 / Paper / $45.00

ISBN 978-0-268-07693-1 / E-book (Adobe PDF) / $29.00

More information and to order

Table of Contents

Read an excerpt



Established in 1949, the University of Notre Dame Press is a scholarly publisher of distinguished books in a number of academic disciplines; in poetry and fiction; and in areas of interest to general readers. The largest Catholic university press in the world, the Press currently publishes fifty to sixty books annually and maintains a robust backlist in print. Visit our website to see our full array of available titles.

University of Notre Dame Press
310 Flanner Hall
Notre Dame
Indiana
46556

Another Scotus Grant

From Medieval News. I don't think they reported the Opera Theologica Parisiensia grant, but they did hit the following:


University of Scranton Professor Andrew LaZella, Ph.D., received a development intercession grant from the University for a research project focused on medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus and his analysis of some of Aristotle’s major works, especially “The Categories.” The project is titled “Univocity, Equivocity, and Proper Concepts in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis.”

Dr. LaZella, an assistant professor in philosophy, said that he researched “in the general area” of this topic for his doctoral dissertation and is excited to delve further into the subject. He said that an interesting part of this project is the difference in Scotus’ ideas in his early works compared to his later writings.

“This is a very early work of (Duns Scotus),” Dr. LaZella said. “The question becomes did he change his mind, or are the early and late works compatible?

New Book

Note: Tobias Hoffmann has updated the Scotus bibliography.

Also,

A new book is out from Brepols, the papers from the 2008 Notre Dame SIEPM conference. It is reasonably priced (for the 700+ pages) at 70 euros.

Here is the blurb and Table of Contents.

Most scholars know that the great universities were the institutional setting of Scholastic philosophical and theological activity in the later Middle Ages. Fewer realize, however, that perhaps far more Scholastic learning in the liberal arts and theology took place in the studia or study-houses of the religious orders, which out-numbered the universities and were more widely distributed across Europe. Indeed, most members of the mendicant orders received most or all of their learning in the liberal arts and theology in the studia of their order, and the most famous members of the orders (e.g., Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus) spent more time teaching in the studia than they did serving as Regent Masters in the university proper. As a consequence, the greater part of later medieval Scholastic literature was produced in the institutional context of the studia of the religious orders. Moreover, there were other significant institutional locifor Scholastic learning and discourse in the later Middle Ages besides the universities and the study-houses, namely the Papal Court—notably the Sacred Palace at Avignon—and several royal courts, for example, the courts of Robert the Wise in Naples and of the Emperor Lewis IV in Munich. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the greatest Scholastic masters at different times taught in, or were associated with, all of these venues. This volume, which originated at the XVth annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale held at the University of Notre Dame (USA) in October 2008, contains essays concerning the study and teaching of philosophy and theology in the studia of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinian Hermits, Carmelites, Benedictines and Cistercians, as well as the intellectual activity at the Papal Court in Rome and Avignon and at various royal courts (London, Naples, Munich).

Kent Emery, Jr., Introduction

I. The Dominicans
Alfonso Maierù, Dominican studia in Spain
Joseph Goering, What the Friars Really Learned at Oxford and Cambridge
Adriano Oliva, OP, L’enseignement des Sentences dans les studia dominicains italiens au XIII^e siècle : l’Alia lectura de Thomas d’Aquin et le Scriptum de Bombolognus de Bologne
Alessandro Palazzo, Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican scholae in the Late Middle Ages: The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen
Guy Guldentops, Struggling with Authority: Durand of Saint-Pourçain on the Origin of Power and on Obedience to the Pope
Fabrizio Amerini, The Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy in the Dominican studia of the Roman Province in the Fourteenth Century
Hester Goodenough Gelber, Blackfriars London: the Late Medieval studiumMaarten J.F.M. Hoenen, How the Thomists in Cologne Saved Aristotle: The Debate over the Eternity of the World in the Late-Medieval Period

II. The FranciscansNeslihan Şenocak, The Franciscan studium generale: A New Interpretation
Luca Bianchi, Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans: Some Preliminary Remarks
Alain Boureau, Enseignement et débat dans les ordres mendiants du XIII^e siècle : Le cas des Quodlibeta de Richard de Mediavilla
William O. Duba, The Legacy of the Bologna studium in Peter Auriol’s Hylomorphism
Sylvain Piron, Les studia franciscains de Provence et d’Aquitaine (1275-1335)
Christopher Schabel and Garrett R. Smith, The Franciscan studium in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century
François-Xavier Putallaz, La peine de mort est-elle légitime ? Le studium franciscain de Cologne s’interroge au XIV^e siècle

III. The Augustinians and the CarmelitesGiorgio Pini, Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order
Russell L. Friedman, How ‘Aegidian’ Were Later Augustinian Hermits Regarding Intellectual Cognition? Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa and the Object of the Intellect
Stephen F. Brown, The Early Carmelite Parisian Masters
Wouter Goris, The Critique of the Doctrine of God as First Known in the Early Carmelite School

IV. The Benedictines and the CisterciansThomas Sullivan, OSB, Ut nostra religione refloreat studium: The studia of the Monastic Orders
Amos Corbini, Pierre de Ceffons et l’instruction dans l’Ordre cistercien : quelques remarques

V. The Friars, Philosophy and Theology at Papal and Royal CourtsM. Michèle Mulchahey, The Dominican Studium Romanae Curiae: The Papacy, the Magisterium and the Friars
Jacqueline Hamesse, Les instruments de travail philosophiques et théologiques, témoins de l’enseignement et de l’influence des ordres mendiants à  l’époque de la papauté d’Avignon
Patrick Nold, How Influential Was Giovanni di Napoli, OP, at the Papal Court in Avignon?
Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique, question disputée à la cour pontificale d’Avignon ?
Roberto Lambertini, Political Theory in the Making: Theology, Philosophy and Politics at the Court of Lewis the Bavarian
William J. Courtenay, Concluding Remarks

Maverick Philosopher, Scholastic

The Maverick Philosopher takes a turn towards the substance abusers: Here.
See for example, Franciscus de Mayronis, Quodlibet q. 9 arg. prin. 1 (ed. Venezia 1520, ff. 244va): Utrum christianus sufficienter in theologia instructus possit defenere articulum creationis contra adversarios veritatis quantumcumque peritos.

And it is argued first that one such is not able: because it was a common concept among the philosophers that from nothing nothing is made; but that article [ie. creation, an article of faith] posits that something was made from nothing by divine power; therefore that article is against a common concept of the soul. That however which is against a common concept cannot be defened since it is against reason. 

But against: because Catholics firmly hold that God can create something from nothing. If however they are not able to defend this, they are not able to hold it firmly, although they can be convinced; and consequently they can be ripped away from that truth.

Now, most of the Scholastics, when they are wearing their philosopher's hats, deny that creation can be demonstrated, and in this part ways with the MP.  But wearing their theologian's hats they would agree with the MP (indeed, he mentions Aquinas). They explain the tension between the claim that 'from nothing, nothing is made' and creation ex nihilo precisely by appealing to accounts of divine cognition, i.e. the divine ideas.  For Scotus, see this post where he outlines his view of divine cognition. First, the divine intellect cognizes the divine essence, then in a series of stages it generates the essences of creatables in intelligible being, knows the essences, and reflects on them.  In other passages we learn that following the production into intelligible being, these creatable quiddities are generated into possible being in a later instant of nature (only essences containing non-repugnant terms make it into this instant) and in yet a later instant of nature the divine will actualizes some of these essences in actual existence.

Divine Simplicity III: Univocity

[NB: this is a first draft; I will make every effort in the future to revise by adding commentary and fixing typos, etc.]

As promised, here is the post on the topic that inspired this series of "fundamenta" posts: how can Scotus reconcile his theory of univocity with divine simplicity?

We all know what Thomas says. The terms that we predicate of God from creatures (being, wise, good, just, etc.) exist in a divided way in creatures, as distinct from their essence. But God is simple, admitting no plurality. Consequently, the terms must be predicated analogically, not univocally.

Scotus' discussion of the issue is found in Ordinatio I d. 8 q. 3, entitled "Whether to say that God, or something formally said of God, is in a genus is consonant with divine simplicity.

He is trying to avoid a model of reality in which Being is a genus and God and creatures are species of being. If this were the case, divine simplicity would be violated. This is because there would be a common reality of the genus by which God and creatures would agree, and a reality that was proper to each.  God would then have composition of genus and specific difference.

For the negative position, Scotus examines the opinion of Henry of Ghent (not Aquinas), citing a number of arguments, offering arguments against the position (these are the arguments for univocity I have already posted) and replying to Henry's arguments. He also cites an opinion for the positive position, though it is probably more of a set-up than an opinion anyone actually held (i.e. that God is in a genus).

Scotus, then, holds a middle position:

Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 (ed. Vat. IV, 198):

I hold the middle position, that it stands with divine simplicity that some concept is common to God and to a creature, not nevertheless some concept common as of a genus, because neither a concept said in 'quid' of God, //nor by whatever kind of formal predication said of him// is per se in some genus.

The first part was proved by arguing against the first opinion [i.e. Henry]

So Scotus then argues that the concept is not going to be common like a genus is in common. He has two arguments for this, one from the notion of infinity, the other from the notion of necessary being.

1. Infinity (ed. Vat. IV 199-203):

A concept having indifference to some things to which a concept of a genus cannot be indifferent can not be a concept of a genus; but whatever is said commonly of God and creatures is indifferent to finite and infinite, speaking of essential [things], or at least to the finite and not finite, speaking of certain others, because a divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to infinite and the finite, therefore etc.

The first part of the minor is clear, because whatever essential perfection is in God, is formally infinite, in creatures finite.

I prove the second part of the minor, because a genus is taken from some reality which according to itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; no infinite is potential to something...

This argument, by treating it further, I understand in this way: that in some creaures the genus and difference are taken from another and another reality (just as by positing many forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive and rational from the intellective), and then that thing, from which the genus is taken, truly is potential and perfectible by that thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there are not there thing and thing (just as in accidents), at least in one thing there is some proper reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called a and the second b: a according to itself is potential to b, so that by precisely understanding a and precisely understanding b, a as it is understood in the first instant of nature, in which it is precisely itself, it is perfectible by b (just as if it were another thing), but that it is not perfected really by b, this is because of the identity of a and b to some total [totum] thing, to which really they are primarily the same, which indeed totum first is produced and in that totum both those realities are produced: if nevetheless one of those would be produced without the other, truly it would be potential to it and truly it would be imperfect without it.

That composition of realities - potential and actual - is the smallest which suffices for the notion of genus and difference, and that does not stand with this that whatsoever reality in something is infinite: for reality, if it would be infinite of itself, however precisely taken, would not be in potency to some reality; therefore since in God whatsoever  essential reality is formally infinite, there is nothing from which the notion of a genus can be formally taken.

2. From necessary being (ed. Vat. IV, 204 ff.)

I argue third from the second middle [term], namely from the notion of necessary being, and this is the argument of Avicenna, VIII Met. ch. 4. If necessary being has a genus, therefore the intention of the genus will be of itself necessary being or not. If the first, 'then [the inquiry] will not cease until there is a difference'. I understand this thus: the genus would then include a difference, because without it it is not in ultimate act and the 'necessary in itself' is in ultimate act; if however the genus includes a difference, then it is not a genus. If the second option is followed, it follows that 'necessary being will be constituted from what is not necessary being.

[there follows an addition by Scotus here] but this argument proves that necessary being has nothing in common with another, because that common intention is 'not necessary being'; hence I answer: an understood intention neither includes necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; that however in reality which corresponds to an intention, in 'this' is necessary being, in 'that' possible (this is disproved if a proper reality corresponds to the intention of a genus, and not if it corresponds to another common intention). [end of addition]

With respect to that which is added in the question 'of whatever formally said of God' [see the opening paragraph], I say that no such is in a genus, because of the same, because nothing is said formally of God  which is limited; whatever is of some genus, whatever genus that might be, is necessarily limited.

But then there is a doubt about what sort are those predicates which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc.

I answer. Being is first divided into infinite and finite than into the ten categories, because one of those, namely the finite, is common to the ten genera; therefore whatever befalls being as indifferent to finite and infinite, or as it is proper to infinite being, befalls it not as determined to a genus but as prior, and consequently as it is a transcendental and is outside every genus. Whatever is common to God and creature, are such which befall being as it is indifferent to finite and infinite: for as they befall God, they are infinite, and as they befall a creature they are finite; therefore first they befall being than being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent [transcendens].

But then there is another doubt, how wisdom can be called a transcendental since it is not common to all beings.

I answer.  Just as it is of the definition of 'most general' that it does not have under itself many species but not to have another genus above it (just as this category 'where', because it does not have a supervening genus it is most general, although it has few or no species), so a transcendental has no genus under which it is contained. Whence it is of the notion(ratio) of a transcendental that it does not have a predicate that supervenes, except being, but that it is common to many inferiors, this befalls it.

This is clear in another way, because being does not have passions/attributes that are simply convertible, just as one, true, and good, but has some passions where opposites are distinguished against each other, just as necessary being or possible being, act or potency, and suchlike. Just as convertible passions/attributes are transcendent because they follow upon being in so far as it is not determined to some genus, so disjunctive passions/attributes are transcendental, and each member of the disjunct is transcendental because neither determines its determinable to a certain genus: and nevertheless one member of the disjunct formally is special, not befalling unless one being, just as necessary being in that division between necessary being or possible being, and the infinite in that division of finite or infinite, and the same is true of the rest. So also wisdom can be a transcendental, and whatever other, which is common to God and creature, although some such is said of God alone, something however is also said of God and some creature. It is not necessary that a transcendental, qua transcendental, be said of every being unless it is convertible with the first transcendental, namely being.

[to the first principal argument, (ed. Vat. IV 221ff):

To the first principal argument I concede that that concept said of God and a creature in 'quid' [i.e. essentially] is contracted by some contracting concepts saying 'quale' , but neither is that concept said in 'quid' a concept of a genus, nor those concepts said in 'quale' are concepts of differences, because that 'quidditative' concept is common to finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus -- those concepts contracting mean the intrinsic mode of the contracted, and not some reality perfecting it: differences however do not mean the intrinsic mode of the reality of some genus, because in whatever grade animality is understood, not on account of this is rationality or irrationality understood to be the intrinsic mode of animality, but still animality is understood in such a grade as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.

But here there is a doubt: how can a concept common to God and creature be understood as 'real', unless by some reality of the same genus, and then it seems that it is potential to that reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, just as was argued before about the concept of a genus and a difference, and then the argument made for the first position still stands, that if there would be some reality distinguishing in re, and another distinct, it seems that a thing is composed, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs.

I answer that when some reality with its intrinsic mode is understood, that concept is not so irreducibly simple (simpliciter simplex) that that reality cannot be conceived without that mode, but then it is an imperfect concept of that thing; it is able also to be conceived under that mode, and then it is a perfect concept of that thing. Example: if there would be whiteness in the tenth grade of intensity, howsoever simple it might be in the thing, it can still be conceived under the aspect of such whiteness, and then perfectly it will be conceived by an adequate concept of that thing, or it can be conceived precisely under the aspect of whiteness, and then it would be conceived by an imperfect concept which falls from the perfection of the thing; an imperfect concept however can be common to this and that whiteness, and a perfect concept would be proper.

Therefore a distinction is required between that from which a common concept is taken and between that from which a proper concept is taken not as distinction of reality and reality but as distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, which distinction suffices for having a perfect concept or imperfect of the same, of which the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concept of genus and difference requires the distinction of realities, not only of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.



To summarize:

Scotus takes two doctrines as given, because they were proven elsewhere.

1. Divine simplicity
2. univocal predication of creaturely properties of God, with qualification.

In this question, Scotus expands this picture

3. the properties predicated of God are not in a genus, because this would require a distinction of realities: the reality of the genus is other than the reality of the difference [keep in mind, the model Scotus is trying to avoid is that Being is a genus, and creatures and God are two species of being. There would be one reality, being, by which God and creatures agree, and one reality by which they are distinct]

4. The properties are transcendentals, arranged in four grades: being, attributes of being (one, true, good, maybe thing), disjunctive attributes of being (necessary being vs. possible being, etc.), pure perfections (wisdom, justice, etc.).

5. univocal predication gives us a common concept, say of wisdom; it is common to God and creatures. As such, the common concept is imperfect. The univocal notion can be contracted to God and creatures by means of intrinsic modes. The concept of God or a creature taken with its respective intrinsic mode is imperfect, but this is not a distinction between two realities, but of one reality. Hence the problem mentioned in 3 is avoided.

Scotus on the Scandal of Philosophy

We've all read statements by early modern philosophers complaining about the diversity of opinions held by philosophers and how this is a bad thing.  

But Scotus disagrees.  The following text is from the 1517 John Major printing of the Reportatio (free for download at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek). Eventually, this will be labeled Rep. IB, prol. q. 2 (ed. Major 2va):

Dicitur primo pro quaestione prima, quia utilis est diversitas opinionum propter nostri intellectus imbecillitatem, et scientie profunditatem, et propter studentium profectum, et propter veritatis elucidationem. 

It is said to the first question that a diversity of opinions is useful on account of the weakness of our intellect, and the profundity of knowledge, and because of the progress of the ones studying, and on account of the elucidation of truth.

Review of Brad Gregory's New Book

Here.  The beginning of it is like a bad game of telephone.  The reviewer seems to misunderstand Gregory's explanation of univocity, and Gregory himself misunderstood Scotus.

Some snippets:

The book's first chapter, "Excluding God," begins with what I regard as an accurate portrayal of the modern intellectual's arbitrary and illogical refusal to countenance any explanation of the world's origins, no matter how cogent that explanation may be, if it happens to include God. The roots of this mindset reach back centuries, Mr. Gregory says, to the late-medieval theologian John Duns Scotus, who argued that God and man both exist in the same essence of things and that therefore man may speak of God with "univocal" as opposed to "analogical" language. In Scotus's thinking, the word "wise," for example, might apply to God in the same sense in which it applies to man. This had the effect, says Mr. Gregory, of defining God as if He were bound by the material world rather than transcendent over it. And when this view combined with William of Occam's "razor"—the principle that the best argument is the one with the fewest unnecessary parts—philosophers eventually felt emboldened to exclude God from any explanation of natural phenomena: and, in time, from any argument at all.

Very interesting, one might think—except that the book presents no evidence that any Protestant reformer actually espoused "univocal metaphysics," in the author's phrase. Nothing from Luther or Calvin on the subject, nothing from William Farel or Martin Bucer. Mr. Gregory does mention the Swiss Reformation leader Ulrich Zwingli and his disavowal of Christ's real presence in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper, but that position is hardly the "logical corollary" to univocal metaphysics that the author claims. Transubstantiation is a far more "univocal" reading of the words "This is my body" than Zwingli's interpretation. But never mind. When Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche and, more recently, Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris formulated their skeptical views of religion, Mr. Gregory says, they thought of God in reductive, univocal terms, and this was somehow a long-term consequence of the Protestant Reformation.

[...]

Leaving aside Mr. Gregory's preposterously overwrought characterization of modern Western societies, especially America—he sees little beyond depredation, exploitation, consumerism and global warming—his complaint that modern Western morality elevates acquisitiveness to the status of a virtue is justified. But blaming this state of affairs on events that occurred and people who lived five centuries ago is a sort of rearview-mirror utopianism: If only the right social order had been left in place—if only the Protestant reformers hadn't shattered medieval Catholicism's "institutionalized worldview"—life today would be so much better.

New Henry edition

Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet IV is now available, for a cool 89 euros.

From the website:

Henry of Ghent, the most influential philosopher/theologian of the last quarter of the 13th century at Paris, delivered his fourth Quodlibet during 1279. This Quodlibet was written at the beginning of what could be called the height of his career.

In total there are 37 questions, which cover a wide range of topics, including theories in theology, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical anthropology, ethics, and canon law. In these questions Henry presents his mature thought concerning the number of human substantial forms in which he counters the claims of the defenders of Thomas Aquinas, particularly those in Giles of Lessines’s De unitate formae, but also those found in Giles of Rome’s Contra Gradus. He is critical of Thomas Aquinas’s theories concerning human knowledge, the ‘more’ and the ‘less,’ and virtue. He also is critical of Bonaventure’s analysis of Augustine’s notion of rationes seminales.

There are 33 known manuscripts which contain the text of Quodlibet IV, and the critical text is reconstructed based upon manuscripts known to have been in Henry’s school, as well as manuscripts copied from two successive university exemplars in Paris.

Table of contents

Foreword

Critical Study

The Editions and Manuscripts

The Editions

The Manuscripts

Quodlibet IV: Authorship and Date
§1. The Authorship of Quodlibet IV§2. The Date of Quodlibet IV

The Text Examined Exteriorly: Historical and Codicological Elements Used for the Establishment of the Text
§1. Quodlibet IV: Distributed by Means of Two Successive Exemplars by the University in Paris
A. The First University Exemplar
B. A Second Parisian University Exemplar

The Text Examined Interiorly: The Relationships among the Manuscripts, Established by a General Test Collation
§1. The Common Accidents
A. The Groups of Manuscripts Characterized by the Number of Common Accidents
B. The Groups of Manuscripts Characterized Individually
1. Manuscript A
2. The Group of Manuscripts Dependent upon the First Parisian University Exemplar
a. The sub-group of mss. 8 and 27
b. The sub-group of mss. 4 and 5
c. The sub-group of mss. 22 and 33
d. A Possible English Family of Manuscripts
3. The Group of Manuscripts Dependent upon the Second Parisian University Exemplar
§2. The Isolated Accidents
An Earlier Redaction of QQ. 7 & 8

Manuscript 25 (Paris, BNF, Lat. 15848) and the University Examplars
§1. Manuscript 25 and the First Parisian University Exemplar
§2. Manuscript 25 and the Second Parisian University Exemplar

The First Parisian Exemplar

The Second Parisian University Exemplar

The Reconstruction of the Critical Text

The References and Sources in Quodlibet IV

The Edition of Badius

The Genesis of the Exemplars, Represented by a Diagram

Technique of the Edition

Symbols
1. In the Text Itself
2. In the Critical Apparatus

Abbreviations
1. In the Critical Apparatus
2. In the Apparatus of Citations

Sigla of the Manuscripts

Quodlibet IV
1. Utrum relatio prius sit in divina essentia quam in persona
2. Utrum imago conveniat Spiritui Sancto sicut et Filio
3. Utrum in Christo sint duae reales filiationes, una ad Patrem, alia ad matrem
4. Utrum sint idem re natura et suppositum
5. Utrum unum principium numeri quantitatis discretae sit alterius naturae quam unitas rerum substantialis
6. Utrum forma numeri denarii sit aliquid extra intellectum
7. Utrum intellectus creatus se ipsum et ea quae per essentiam eorum sunt in ipso intelligat per se absque omni specie rei intellectae vel per aliquam speciem eius qua informatur
8. Utrum beatus videns seu intelligens Deum nude per essentiam suam formet in se verbum de Deo
9. Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus ex puris naturalibus possit videre seu intelligere nude divinam essentiam
10. Utrum caritas re differat a gratia
11. Utrum Deus a creatura intellectuali dilectione pura naturali possit diligi super omnia alia
12. Utrum post resurrectionem erunt aliqua individua composita in isto mundo inferiori
13. Utrum in quidditate rerum sensibilium materialium cadunt plures formae substantiales re differentes
14. Utrum in materia sit ratio seminalis, quae est formae inchoatio
15. Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus
16. Utrum in angelis sit materia, ut debeat dici compositus ex materia et forma
17. Utrum angelus moveatur de loco ad locum
18. Utrum beatus Paulus potuit occidi ante suam conversionem
19. Utrum in isto singulari praedestinato, demonstrato quocumque, sit ratio sive causa suae praedestinationis
20. Utrum bonum sit omnia esse communia in civitate
21. Utrum intellectus coniunctus possit aliquid intelligere
22. Utrum morales virtutes sint in voluntate
23. Utrum iidem habitus sint virtutes, dona, beatitudines et fructus
24. Utrum bona mortificata reviviscant recuperata
25. Utrum caritas aliqua viatoris possit adaequari caritati contemplatoris
26. Utrum liceat mendicantibus petere ultra necessitatem
27. Utrum pro servitio in filio usurarii instruendo liceat sumere pecuniam quam serviens novit acquisitam per usuram
28. Utrum bona communia sint de iure evangelii
29. Utrum alicui liceat repetere debitum cum scandalo
30. Utrum adeptus beneficium per simulationem debeat illud resignare
31. Utrum homo possit esse non risibilis
32. Utrum, in aequali facilitate exsequendi utrumque, homo semper tenetur ad melius faciendum
33. Utrum doctoribus contrariantibus circa aliquod agibilium et agere secundum unam opinionem est sine omni periculo peccati, agere vero secundum aliam est in dubio peccati mortalis, mortaliter peccet ille qui agit illud de quo est dubium an sit peccatum mortale, puta in emendo redditus ad vitam vel accipiendo ultra sortem
34. Utrum peccator paenitens statim tenetur confiteri
35. Utrum religiosus per abbatem suum episcopo praesentatus ad curam et ab episcopo institutus plus debet oboedire abbati revocanti ipsum a cura ad claustrum, an episcopo praecipienti quod in cura sua persistat
36. Utrum species sacramenti Eucharistae nutriant
37. Utrum in sacramentis Novae Legis sit virtus creativa gratiae

Tables
I. Works cited by Henry (and by the editors in the apparatus)
II. Onomastic table
III. Manuscripts cited
IV. Quoted publications
V. Table of contents

Ockham and Scotus and Natural Theology

Throughout his criticism of Scotus' doctrine of the existence and oneness of God, Ockham remains faithful to his basic philosophical notions, which are radically different from those of the Subtle Doctor. The two theologians do not differ in what they believe about the Christian God, but they diverge on what human reason left to its own resources can prove about him. Ockham finds only "adequate reasons" for affirming his existence - reasons that fall short of strict demonstration. Philosophy assures us of an ultimate ground of the universe: a primary conserving cause or causes, but these might be the heavenly bodies whose causality we experience in our world. Scotus can go further in his rational pursuit of the Christian God because he makes use of a different philosophy, according to which there is real community among beings along with individuality. Ockham fragments the universe into myriad individuals, from which all real community has been eliminated. This leads him to an empirical notion of causality, according to which a cause shares nothing with its effect (except perhaps some of its matter), their bond being simply the recognized presence of effect to cause. As Léon Baudry perceptively remarks, Scotism and Ockhamism are not just two doctrines but two different styles of thinking.

- Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles, 182-183.

I still plan on posting some longer excerpts, but I've been busy over the Christmas season with travels and getting ready for the new semester.

On Unitive Containment

I came across the following quote in the Reportatio the other day while trying to tease out the intricacies of Scotus' theory of divine ydeas.  It is quoted in QQ. in Met. IV q. 2 (OPh IV 355-6) by the editors (though they make transcription and emendation errors).

The title of the question is Utrum imago Trinitatis in anima rationali subsistat in tribus potentiis realiter distinctis is Rep. II d. 16 q. un. (Oxford, Merton College Library, Ms. 61, not foliated/ff. 179v-180r according to the Scotus editors. The following transcription is mine):

De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius V De divinis nominibus quia continentia unitiva non est omnino eiusdem ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive nec esse omnino manentium distincte; requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem. Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo sicut inferius continet superiora essentialia et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis sicut eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine et a qua genus proximum ut color et qualitas sensibilis et qualitas et quamquam essent res alie, unitive continentur in albedine. Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet alia que sunt quasi passiones sicut passiones entis non sunt res alia ab ente quia quecumque detur ipsa, res est ens, vera et bona; ergo ut oportet dicere quod non sunt res alie ab ente vel quod ens non habet passiones reales, quod est contra Aristotelem IV Metaphysice expresse, nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de essentia nec idem quidditatem quam si essent res alia, ideo non sunt potentie idem formaliter vel quidditative nec inter se nec esse[etiam?] essentie anime nec tamen sunt res alie, sed idem identice. Ideo talia habent talem distinctionem secundum rationes formales qualem haberent realem distinctionem si essent res alie realiter distincte. Principium ergo volendi et intelligendi immediatum est in secundo instanti nature et ista principia sunt unitive in essentia anime que est in primo instanti nature quasi pasiones unitive contente.

[...]

In divinis enim quamquam in supposito sint essentia et relatio et essentia continet relationem, non tamen e contra in proposito; nec intellectus continet voluntatem nec e contra, ideo ista sunt idem idemptice, quia in contente solum, non quia ipsa inter se sunt idem sicut sunt attributa divina non solum idem idemptice sed inter se. Similiter quia quelibet persona in divinis est intrinsece infinita ideo perfecte continet intrinsece quamlibet perfectionem simpliciter que est in alia non sic continet intelligentia memoriam, sed solum concomitantur.

Translation:

Dionysius, V On Divine Names, speaks about unitive containment, that unitive containment is not entirely of the same [thing] so that entirely the same [thing] contains itself unitively, nor is it of things remaining entirely distinct; it requires, therefore, but unity and distinction.

Unitive containment is twofold. In one way, as the inferior contains its essential superiors and there the containment is of the essence of the containing just as it is the same reality from which the difference in whiteness is taken and from which the proximate genus, as color and sensible quality and quality, and although there might be other things unitively contained in whiteness.  The other unitive containment is when when a subject unitively contains other things which are quasi attributions/passions just as the attributes of being are not other things than being because whichever one is granted, the thing is being, true and good; therefore either it is necessary to say that they are not other things than being or that being does not have real attributes which is expressly contrary to Aristotle, IV Metaphysics; nevertheless such attributes are not more of the essence nor the same quiddity than if they would be other things. Therefore [the intellect and will] are not formally the same powers or quidditatively, nor between each other nor are they of the essence of the soul nor are they other things [than the soul]; but [they are] the same identically.  Therefore such have such a distinction according to their formal definitions of the sort that would have a real distinction if they would be other things really distinct.

[...]

In the divine, although the essence and the relation are in the supposit and the essence contains the relation, nevertheless it is not to be taken contrariwise in the matter at hand; neeither does the intellect contain the will nor contrariwise, therefore they are identically the same, because they are in the containing along, not becuse between them they are the same just as are the divine attributes, not only identically but among each other.  Likewise, because whichever of the divine persons is intrinsically infinite therefore perfectly contains every absolute perfection found in another [person]; not so does the intelligence contain the memory, but only accompanies it.

Summary:

Unitive containment is a tool at times employed by Scotus derived directly from pseudo-Dionysius.  It is not of the same thing containing itself, nor is it of distinct things remaining completely distinct.  Consequently, it requires recourse to both unity and distinction. There are two kinds of unitive containment: one in which an inferior (in the categorical/predicamental line) contains its superior.  On this kind, there is a similarity of essence.  The second is when the things contained have different essences, and these essences remain formally distinct from each other and from whatever does the containing.