More from Petrus Thomae on Intelligible Being

The following are six conclusions and twelve propositions excerpted from Petrus Thomae's QQ. De esse intelligibili, Q.3: "Utrum illud esse intelligibili quod habuit quiditas creabilis ab aeterno sit esse creatum." In the text each conclusion is surrounded by a mass of argumentation, examples, rambling, etc., which I've removed so that they can be seen on their own and some idea can be formed of Petrus' position. After the conclusions and some other stuff the propositions follow in straight sequence.

I. Six Conclusions

i. The intelligibility of the quiddities of creatibles is not caused or produced through a compared act of the divine intellect, as some say.

ii. The intelligibility of creatible things is not caused or produced by the divine intellect directly.

iii. The intelligibility of a creature is not caused or produced by the divine intellection as though principiated.

iv. The [divine] essence does not create the intelligibility of creatible things as an exemplar.

v. The essence does not cause the intelligiblity of creatibles metaphorically.

vi. The intelligibility of created things is not created or caused in any way.

II. Twelve Propositions

i. The divine essence is a certain most perfect intelligible mirror.

ii. In this mirror, out of its own maximal and highest perfection, everything other than itself is represented.

iii. In this mirror everything which can be mirrored has mirrorable being.

iv. Nothing really distinct from either can mediate between that mirror and the mirrorable.

v. There is nothing which is not mirrorable by the divine intellect.

vi. That mirrorable being is neither from the [divine] essence nor by the essence nor by anything else, nor briefly can it be construed with any proposition denoting any causality of any sort meant by 'from' or 'by'.

vii. That mirrorable being, although not from the essence nor by the essence, can still be said to be in it, not subjectively, but as in what necessarily results or follows from it.

viii. The necessity of this following-upon places no imperfection in the divine essence.

ix. This necessity is not one of dependence, but one of a certain necessary following-upon of resolution or of shining-forth, in that way in which, in the perfect mirror, every mirrorable necessarily shines forth.

x. Although there is no dependence between this mirror and this mirrorable, there is nevertheless a correlation between them, for the mirrorable is necessarily correlated with the mirror as that which necessarily results upon it.

xi. This correlation posits an imperfection on the part of the mirrorable and a pefection on the part of the mirror.

xii. Although the quiddity of a creature according to this intelligible being is not caused, still it is truly creatible in itself. For that intelligible being does not prevent it from being placed in actual existence, and so caused.

Does Aquinas confuse Person and Nature?

Summer. That time of the year when the Energetic graduate student throws off his bonds of seminar papers and teaching and is finally free to show the world just how dumb the Latins are, especially that moron Thomas Aquinas who makes so many foolish errors, led on, no doubt, by that fount of lies, Augustine.

While I was in Europe they were busy:

http://energeticprocession.com/2009/07/16/saint-cyril-on-divine-simplicity/#more-586

http://wellofquestions.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/aquinas-conflating-person-and-essence-in-god-redux/

http://www.nicenetruth.com/home/2009/05/problem-quotes-in-aquinas-listed-for-discussion.html

The basic problem seems to be that Aquinas actually says that a person is the same as the essence. Therefore he confuses them, and there is only one person.

The feature of Aquinas' position that our brethren in Christ fail to admit is that Aquinas also thinks that the persons are really distinct from each other. So we have an identity between person and essence and a distinction of the realiter variety between the persons. Sadly, Aquinas does not tell us what a real distinction is. It could be between two discrete things, but it can also obtain within one thing, such as the human person where body and soul are really distinct. This latter example seems to suggest that there is some notion of separability involved, which clearly cannot be the case between the Trinitarian persons, although we are looking at a real distinction within a single object. The real distinction results from the fact that persons are constituted by relations, and some feature of the generic character of a predicamental relation still remains, even in divinis, namely opposition and distinction. It is this opposition of relations towards each other that provides the real distinction between persons, which Aquinas even characterizes as things in their own right (of course, one would think that one fundamenta of the relation would be the divine essence, so properly the relation should be really distinguishing the person from the essence; but I am sure I fail to understand how Thomistic relations work...the Thomists will have to correct me on this. There is also the Scotist argument that real products cannot come from powers that are not themselves distinct).

To actually attempt to answer the argument regarding identification, however, one must consider Aquinas' notion of rationes in God. Basically, in nearly Scotist fashion, Aquinas thinks that if God and features in divinis such as personal properties, relations, attributes could be defined, none of them would be included in the definition of any other nor could they be predicated of each other. That things in God cannot be defined is apparent because definition entails the assigning of genus and species, which are related as potency and act. But, God has no potency-act composition. That we should treat something that cannot be defined as if it could is not so scandalous as it sounds, as Aquinas thinks that the categories themselves cannot be defined, although we assign a ratio to them and act as if they are (they are the ultimate genera, after all, and defining them would entail an infinite regress). So all these divine elements are really identical, but differ by ratione, that is none fall into the definition of the other. To take my defense of Thomas in a scotist line, I would add that the fact that they do not fall into the definition of the other is not due to the operation of an intellect, but is prior to such activity. So I do not think that Aquinas confuses person and nature because these retain distinct rationes which cannot be predicated of each other while being really identical.

I trust some real Thomists will come to my defense here, as these are precisely the issues which I think Aquinas is deficient and Scotus is brilliantly not.

I have appended some texts to shed some light on the notion of rationes, and may update this discussion later.

De potentia, q. 8 a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet relatio non addat supra essentiam aliquam rem, sed solum rationem, tamen relatio est aliqua res, sicut etiam bonitas est aliqua res in Deo, licet non differat ab essentia nisi ratione; et similiter est de sapientia. Et ideo sicut ea quae pertinent ad bonitatem vel sapientiam, realiter Deo conveniunt, ut intelligere et alia huiusmodi, ita etiam id quod est proprium realis relationis, scilicet opponi et distingui, realiter in divinis invenitur.

Scriptum, I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 (ed. Mandonnet, 767): “Sciendum est autem, quod ‘ratio’ sumitur dupliciter: quandoque enim ratio dicitur id quod est in ratiocinante, scilicet ipse actus rationis, vel potentia quae est ratio; quandoque autem ratio est nomen intentionis, sive secundum quod significat definitionem rei, prout ratio est definitio, sive prout ratio dicitur argumentatio.”

Scriptum, I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 (ed. Mandonnet, 767): “Dico igitur, quod cum dicitur quod est alia ratio paternitatis et essentiae in divinis, non accipitur ratio secundum quod est in ratiocinante tantum, sed secundum quod est nomen intentionis, et significat definitionem rei: quamvis enim in divinis non possit esse definitio, nec genus nec differentia nec compositio; tamen si intelligatur ibi aliquid definiri, alia erit definitio paternitatis, et alia definitio essentiae. In omnibus autem intentionibus hoc communiter verum est, quod intentiones ipsae non sunt in rebus sed in anima tantum, sed habent aliquid in re respondens, scilicet naturam, cui intellectus huiusmodi intentiones attribuit... et ita etiam ipsa ratio quam dicimus aliam et aliam in divinis, non est in re; sed in ratione est aliquid respondens ei, et est in re [sed...re: sed est in re aliquid respondens ei in = Parma ed.] quo fundatur, scilicet veritas illius rei cui talis intentio attribuitur: est enim in Deo unde possunt rationes diversae ibi convenire.”

Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 27 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut attributa essentialia non sunt plures res, ita nec proprietates uni personae convenientes; sed sunt una res, quae est illa persona; sed tamen quia relatio manet in divinis etiam secundum communem rationem generis, manet etiam relationis distinctio, inquantum est relatio; et ideo potest dici quod sunt plures relationes, et una relatio de alia non praedicatur. Non sic autem est in essentialibus, quae non manent ibi secundum communem rationem generis; unde non distinguuntur secundum rationem alicujus communis, cujus ratio in Deo sit, si tamen accipiatur commune reale, ut significatur nomine primae impositionis; si vero accipiatur commune rationis, quod significatur nomine secundae impositionis, sic commune est omnibus quod sint attributa; et ideo quia dividunt unum commune rationis, secundum hoc non praedicantur de invicem. Non enim dicimus quod hoc attributum sit illud attributum; sed quod est aliud attributum ab illo. Sed quia non dividunt unum commune reale, ideo ratione divinae simplicitatis secundum quodcumque nomen primae impositionis de se invicem praedicantur, ut dicatur: haec res est illa res; vel etiam propriis nominibus, ut: sapientia est bonitas

Festum sanctae Bonaventurae S.R.E. Cardinalis et doctoris ecclesiae

Happy feast of St. Bonaventure, whether you keep the old calendar (in which case the feast is today) or the new (tomorrow, July 15)!

Here's the secret:

Sancti Bonaventurae Confessoris tui atque Pontificis, quaesumus, Domine, annua solemnitas pietati tuae nos reddat acceptos: ut, per haec piae placationis officia, et ill beata retributio comitetur, et nobis gratiae tuae dona conciliet. Per Dominum...

Translation from p. 1315 of the Saint Andrew Daily Missal:

May the yearly festival of saint Bonaventure Thy confessor and bishop, we beseech Thee, O Lord, render us acceptable unto Thy loving kindness; that by means of this office of holy reconciliation, a blessed reward may be rendered to him, and to us the gifts of Thy grace. Through our Lord...

And here's a bit from his Sermones Dominicales, sermo 33, dominica vi post pentecosten (that would be last sunday), ed. G. Bougerol, p.366.

Non enim potest idem homo esse iustus et peccator, bonus et malus, servus Dei et servus diaboli, quia nemo potest duobus dominis, contraria iubentibus, servire. Unde sicut navis existens in aquis plena foraminibus, si eius omnia foramina obturentur praeter unum, nihilominus propter illud unum submergetur in profundum maris; sic peccator, si omnia peccata confiteatur et unum retineat, per illud solum damnabitur.

Translation: For the same man cannot be just and a sinner, good and evil, a servant of God and a servant of the devil, because no one can serve two masters with contrary commands. Whence just as a ship existing in water full of holes, if all its holes be repared except one, still because of that one it will sink into the depths of the see; so a sinner, if all his sins be confessed and one held back, through that one alone will be damned.

What is a Formality: Petrus Thomae

Busy week, so here's a short bit from Petrus Thomae, QQ de modis distinctionum, q.7 a.1:

De tertio dico ista: primum est quod formalitas accipitur a formali, sicut enim a forma formale, illa a formali formalitas. Unde ipsa formalitas est quoddam abstractum sumptam ab isto concreto ‘formali’ ut ab albo albitas vel a reali realitas et sic de aliis. 

Secundum est quod formalitas non est ipsa perseitas primi modi, illa enim dictu solum maior modum compositionis qui quidem modus non videtur intrinsece pertinere ad quidditatem. Formalitas autem ipsa videtur dicere aliquid quidditative pertinens ad quidditatem sicut et proprium* formale a quo descendit. 

Tertium est quod formalitas non est proprie ratio definitiva; patet aliquibus enim potest convenire formalitas quibus non competit definitio, ponitur enim formalitas in differentiis et transcendentibus. 

Quartum est quod formalitas proprie loquendo est idem quod ratio quidditativa alicuius nec aliud per formalitatem intelligo licet ab aliis diversimode describatur et isti rationi formalitatis sic accepta vere conveniunt omnes conditiones formales. Ipsa enim est illud quo aliquid formale tale dicitur quo aliquid, si illud cuius est sit productum producitur.

Translation:

"First is that 'formality' is taken from 'formal', for just as 'formal' is from 'form', so 'formality' from 'formal'. Whence formality is a certain abstraction taken from that concrete 'formal' , as whiteness from white and reality from real.

Second is that formality itself is not the perseity of the first mode, for it seems to mean a greater mode of composition than that, which mode indeed does not seem to pertain intrinsically to quiddity. Formality however seems to mean something quidditatively pertaining to quiddity, just as does 'formal', from which it is derived.

Third is that formality is not properly a definitional ratio, for it is clear that it can befall somethings to which definition cannot, for it is posited in differences and the transcendentals.

Fourth is that formality properly speaking is the same as the quidditative ratio of something, nor do I understand anything else by 'formality', although it is described in different ways by others, and to that definition of formality so understood, truly all formal conditions befall it. [I delete the last line...must be something wrong with the ms.]"

As always, I invite comment on my attempts to render scholastic terminology into English.

Exempla pro Fabrum

I. DE DIABOLO QUI DUXIT UXOREM CUIUS LITIGIA NON POTERAT SUSTINERE

Audivi quod quidam daemon in specie hominis cuidam diviti homini serviebat et, cum servitium eius et industria multum placerent homini, dedit ei filiam suam in uxorem et divitias multas. Illa autem omni die ac nocte litigabat cum mario suo nec eum quiescere permittebat. In fine autem anni dixit patri uxoris suae: "Volo recedere et in patriam meam redire." Cui pater uxoris ait: "Nonne multa tibi dedi ita quod nihil desit tibi? Quare vis recedere?" Dixit ille: "Modis omnibus volo repatriare." Cui socer ait: "Ubi est patria tua?" Ait ille: "Dicam tibi et veritatem non celabo; patria mea est infernus, ubi numquam tantam discordiam vel molestiam sustinui quantam hoc anno passus sum a litigiosa uxore mea. Malo esse in inferno quam amplius cum ipsa commorari." Et hoc dicto ab oculis eorum evanuit.

II. DE BACHONE QUI PENDEBAT IN QUADAM VILLA

Aliquando transivi per quandam villa in Francia, ubi suspenderant pernam seu bachonem in platea hoc conditione ut, qui vellet iuramento firmare quod uno integro anno post contractum matrimonium permansisset cum uxore ita quod de matrimonio non paenituisset, bachonem haberet. Et cum per decem annos ibi perpendisset non est una solus inventus qui bachonem lucraretur, omnibus infra annum de matrimonio contracto paenitentibus.

III. EXEMPLUM CONTRA MALITIAM MULIERUM ET DE ILLO CUI PATER DEDIT UXOREM

Ecce quam pauci hodie uxoribus suis adhaerent fide et dilectione sicut instituit Dominus noster Iesus Christus qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

Ut autem de malitia filiarum Evae aliquid subdam, nolui sub silentio praeterire quod audivi de quodam iuvene, qui rogabat patrem suum ut ei duas uxores daret. Cumque vehementer instaret dedit ei pater unam, promittens quod in fine anni daret alteram. Illa vero adeo primo anno maritum afflixit quod non poterat sustinere sed mallet mori quam vivere. Cumque pater finito anno diceret filio: "Vis habere secundum uxorem?" respondit ille: "Si una me afflixit fere usque ad mortem, quomodo duas ferre possem?" Accidit autem in civitate illa ut caperetur maleficus et latro pessimus, qui multos de civitate illa spoliaverat et occiderat. Cumque cives convenirent et quaereret iudex a singulis ut quilibet consilium suum daret quomodo latro ille magis torqueri valeret, quibusdam dicentibus; "Distrahatur caudis equorum et suspendatur," aliis dicentibus: "Igne cremetur," ceteris vero consulentibus ut vivus excoriaretur, cum perventum fuisset ad illum qui malam habebat uxorem, respondit: "Date illi uxorem meam; non video qualiter ipsum magis affligere valeatis."

MacIntyre's view of Scotism

This tidbit is from MacIntyre's new book, God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition, p. 100-101

"Scotus's teaching secured him a large following in the later middle ages especially--and not only in the Franciscan order--and an even more numerous following in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some of his views and arguments have been influential in later secular philosophy, most notably perhaps his thesis that being is and must be ascribed univocally, a thesis powerfully reinterpreted by Gilles Deleuze in our own time. Scotus's later Franciscan followers presented his views and arguments as the articulation of a system, giving it the name 'Scotism', so that Scotism and Thomism were presented as two rival scholastic systems. Yet this is misleading. For Scotus is philosophically--not theologically--a significantly less systematic thinker than Aquinas, someone who tends to address problems piecemeal, drawing on his predecessors in a creatively ad hoc manner.

In this respect he is followed by another philosophically remarkable Franciscan, William Ockham (1283-1347). Ockham's work shows Scotus's influence in other ways. Ockham agrees with Scotus and disagrees with Aquinas in holding that the soul is not the form of the body, that embodied human beings do not have the kind of unity that Aquinas ascribed to them."

I almost tremble to post this; in the past I've been part of graduate student reading groups in which certain members, not even all of them Thomists, become exceedingly outraged that someone would dare to criticize the great MacIntyre, flower of catholic intellectuals and fount of philosophy.

But I will make a few remarks...the first being that this is from a very short chapter entitled "After Aquinas". In general, throughout this book we see the generic narratives and metanarratives inherited from 19th century Thomism. The nice thing I will say about the book is that he does at least know enough about Scotus to point out that Aquinas is not the primary target. He even mentions Henry of Ghent, so he is at least somewhat aware of modern scholarship, even if he can't resist following this up by giving brief, bad, descriptions of three or four areas in which Scotus and Aquinas are at odds.

Both the quotes posted are rather absurd. I only post them as there is no one on the popular level defending Scotus, who is constantly maligned by the pomo crowd and the Thomists. Interestingly, it is the contemporary analytic philosophers that give Scotus the honor of actually trying to figure out what he actually said before they criticize him.

Passage 1: This is rather contradictory. Scotus is said to have had a large following in the later middle ages (pshaw--even in his own lifetime and certainly during the 14th century) and the 17th and 18th centuries, but somehow Scotism does not count as a school like Thomism. One would think a large following, filling in the gaps of the master and defending him would count as a school, in fact this seems to be the very definition of a school. But, the usual Thomist practice is that one can count as a Thomist only if one only says what Thomas says and does not add a jot or a tittle, so I can sort of see where MacIntyre is coming from here. Of course, he does admit that there is a Scotist system where theology is concerned, so why no Scotism? And why distinguish between Scotus's theology and philosophy as between systematic and non-systematic? Scotus followed the same method in each: detailed analysis of contemporary opinions followed by the careful exposition of his own opinion. I'm reaching here, I really don't understand what the last two or three sentences of this paragraph are supposed to mean. It just sounds like a cheap, almost political, shot to guarantee that only Thomism is an acceptable candidate for the catholic intellectual.

We can also add that being is not univocal, only the concept of being, and, contra Suarez, the Thomists, the Cambridge Phantasists and Brad Gregory, Scotus accepted 'real' analogy.

Passage 2: This one is just plain stupid and I only included it as it followed directly from the above and it is so patently false and reveals such a poor understanding of the issues that I thought it needed to be pointed out. Pretty much all of the scholastics think that the soul is the form of the body. End of story. The notable exception is Peter of John Olivi, whose views on the matter were condemned at the council of Vienne. Even such a Thomist-leaning theologian as Ludwig Ott in his Fundamentals takes pains to point out that the censure of Olivi has no bearing on the plurality of substantial forms debate, that Scotus' opinion is not also included in the censure. The debate is whether the rational soul informs prime matter directly, or through the mediation of another substantial form, the forma corporeitatis. Scotus holds this latter position, and thinks that all lower forms are in potency to higher forms, with the ultimate actuality of the composite deriving from the rational soul. He can hold this and also that the rational soul is the form of the body, and I have personally come across numerous references attesting to his belief in this latter position (his discussion of the plurality of forms is to be found in his discussion of eucharistic conversion, for any who are interested and do not already know).

A Distinction from Petrus Thomae

Now that I got the following cleaned up (the Salamanca ms. was quite helpful), I think it might be worthy of posting.

Petrus Thomae, QQ de esse intelligibli, q. 2 a.1 (ed. me):

Distinctio est ista: intellectualitas, intellectivitas, intelligibilitas et intellectitas hoc modo se habent, nam prima duo respiciunt suppositum intelligens, alia vero duo obiectum quod intelligitur. Dico ergo primo quod prima duo respiciunt suppositum quod intelligit, tamen differenter, nam intellectualitas respicit naturam qua suppositum dicitur intelligibile; sed ipsa intellectivitas respicit principium vel virtutem vel potentiam qua vel per quam suppositum potest in talem actum exire. Alia autem duo respiciunt obiectum similiter diversimode, quoniam intelligibilitas ponit in obiecto solum aptitudinem intelligendi; sed intellectitas ponit circa idem obiectum respectum actualem ipsius obiecti intellecti ad actum.

Translation:

"The distinction is this: intellectuality, intellectivity, intelligibility and intellectness(!) are related in this way: the first two are said of an understanding supposit, but the other two are said of the object which is understood. I say first that the first two are said of the supposit which understands, nevertheless differently, for intellectuality looks to the nature by which a supposit is said to be intelligible, but intellectivity looks to the principle or power by which or through which the supposit is able to go into such an act. But the other two look towards the object, likewise in diverse ways, since intelligibility posits only an aptitude of understanding[perhaps it should be intelligi] in the object, but intellectness posits in the object the actual relation of the understood object to the act of understanding."

Gotta love "intellectitas". For quite a while I wasn't even sure if I was expanding the abbreviation correctly, but this Salamanca ms. spells it out without any contraction marks. As it turns out, the entire article is about the relation between intellectitas and intelligibilitas, which in turn is the source of Peter Thomae's (And Alnwick's for that matter) disagreement with Scotus on the production of creatures in intelligible being.

Bassols and Rubio, oh my!

check out the following link for a wealth of sentence commenaries. I found the William of Rubio and John Bassols commentaries, as well as some cursus philosophici iuxta mentem Scoti and some disputationes iuxta mentem Scoti as well. They also have lots of Thomist stuff if that's the way you swing

Update: I didn't realize how much they actually have...they have Wodeham, Ockham, William of Vourillion, Richard of Middleton, Auriol, Thomas of Strasbourg, Biel, Gregory of Rimini, Capreolus, and the Lombard himself.

http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/

Aquinas on Divine Ideas I: Scriptum super Sententias

While investigating fontes for my edition of the intelligibile being treatise I read d.35 and 36 of Aquinas' commentary on the Sentences, and offer here a summary of his position with some short reflections. In an earlier version of this post I accused him of contradiction, but I do not now think it is so simple as that. 

1. Creatures (i.e. the quiddities of creatures) are not contained in the divine essence.

2. Creatures are known by the divine intellect, which is their principle of production (presumably in esse reale; at least he does not specify intelligible being)

3. God does not know creatures by knowing their essences, but in a higher, more nobler manner by knowing the divine essence

4. The divine essence is the exemplar of created things.

5. The divine essence is the ratio or principle by which the divine intellect knows.

Interestingly, I think (3) gets Aquinas out of a Plantinga-like attack, which claims that the divine intellect "depends" on the "platonic horde" which is apparently distinct by some unspecified distinction from the divine essence. Scotus and the Scotistae probably need a little extra work to get out of it.

What I'm not clear on is how the divine essence can be an exemplar without containing creatures in some sense. Perhaps all it means is that the essence can be imitated by creatures and so is an exemplar, and the divine intellect knows that the essence can be imitated by creatures and so contains them. 

What seems to be implied, and in the light of Scotus seems to be a necessary step, is the production of the essences of creatures in intelligible being by the action of the divine intellect knowing the essence, however one wants to explain it, by logical instants, instants of nature, order, etc.

Pius Guilelmus

Guilelmus de Alnwick, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q.6 (ed. Ledoux 161):

"Therefore it seems to me that, although the one so opining [i.e. Scotus] says in many places that creatures according to their eternal intelligible being are produced by God, and that the divine intellect by understanding a creature institutes it in intelligible being, nevertheless his arguments in many places show the opposite, and therefore I think that if he had held a special question about this he would have spoken carefully; for in this matter he was speaking according to the common opinion, which then was running in the mouth of men saying that creatures had no being from themselves, and therefore also according to intelligible being they are produced from another, and this indeed I have experienced in him, that by following the common opinion of the ones speaking he was accustomed with them to say that creatures according to their eternal intelligible being are produced by God. But now by more diligently inquiring after the truth the contrary is completely clear to me. So also the Solemn Doctor, Master Henry of Ghent, said many things in determining some questions which then did not pertain to his principal intention, and this indeed according to the common opinion of others, of which nevertheless he said the opposite afterwards when he held a special question over the matter, and so I save each doctor from contradiction. So also Aristotle said many things according to the common opinion of the philosophers, of which nevertheless he said the opposite when he determined about them specially from intention."

Comments: Not much in the way of argument here, but the passage does contain some precious historical information. Prior to reading this I had thought that Scotus' opinion was a novelty (if you recall, Scotus posits the production of the quiddities of creatures by the divine intellect in a series of four instants of nature) but Alnwick describes it as the common opinion. Probably the common opinion didn't involve instants of nature; just that the divine intellect or divine essence in some manner generates the essences of creatures. Both Alnwick and Peter Thomae argue against this opinion of Scotus/common opinion, although without attacking the use of instants of nature, while the rest of the Scotistae in the 14th century up to Maestrius et al. follow Scotus. Both Alnwick and Peter Thomae in the end remained without any influence (although they have quite convinced me). It is an interesting  that Alnwick, and probably other scholastics as well, were aware of contradictions in the thought of the great masters (even Thomas changed his mind on the verbum, as Auriol pointed out), but still try to harmonize them anyway. Well, sort of. In some of the questions in this work Alnwick exploits Scotus' contradictions by using the arguments from his Parisian period in the Reportatio and Quodlibet against the Oxford positions expressed in the Ordinatio.

Smithy Update

I am back from my "sprachurlaub" excursion to Munich and Italy, and while I probably did more on the "urlaub" side of things I did pick up a little German. So things should pick up around here. I hear Michael has  finished a draft of his dissertation, so he may step up with a few posts as well.

Thomism as Protestantism?

As a post a while back made clear, I recently read Joseph Owens' An interpretation of existence. One thing that struck me forcefully at a number of places throughout the book was the peculiar and familiar character of some of his statements. Consider the following passage:

. . . But the genetic leap to judgment as a distinct synthesizing cognition that apprehends an existential synthesizing in the thing appears for the first time in Aquinas. It ushers in a profoundly new metaphysical starting point. Nor is there any evidence that it was understood or appreciated by his successors. The distinction between simple apprehension and judgment did become a commonplace in Scholastic tradition. But the logical background of the distinction proved too dominant to allow the metaphysical import of the Thomistic texts to make itself felt. . . . The Thomistic insight that the judgment itself was the original knowledge of the existential synthesis eluded the attention of the later Scholastic thinkers. The notion that the intellectual activity of synthesizing was itself the knowing of existence escaped them. In Kant's penetrating scrutiny, however, the notion that a synthesis underlies conceptual knowledge reappears . . .

There seems to me something uncannily like what the Protestants like to say about St Paul here. Substitute "Paul" for "Aquinas", "Scripture" for "Thomistic texts," "Scholastic tradition" for "Christian tradition," and what do we get? Paul says something which everyone forgot about or misinterpreted for centuries until Luther rediscovered its true meaning, enabling him to discard all previous Christian tradition at his whim and thereby making it unnecessary for Protestants to even become familiar with the contents of that tradition. (By the way, Owens is by no means the only Thomist who talks like this. I recall both Gilson and Maritain saying very similar things.)

And this is just what many (most?) Thomists do! Like Protestants, they read their sacred texts in isolation from both the historical context of the texts themselves and from the way that the later tradition read them. Thomists tend not to read other scholastics, or not much. Instead they read Thomas in the context of contemporary philosophical and theological thought--like Protestants!--and, lacking the proper context and really appreciating Thomas for his "relevance" to our own concerns rather than for his own sake, they (first subtly, then increasingly drastically) distort Thomas' thought itself, all the while maintaining its supremacy--like Protestants!

The other thing that struck me in Owens' book was this: several times he mentions Heidegger's suggestion in the latter's Introduction to Metaphysics that "being", however interpreted, holds "the spiritual destiny of the West." Owens uses the phrase with approval and makes Heidegger's question his own epigraph. Now here's the funny thing: I was recently also reading Heidegger's book and it stuck me that the very same Protestantlike element pervades Heidegger's own thought! Just replace "Paul" or "Aquinas" with "the Greeks" and take as our texts the Presocratics, and make the tradition the tradition of all Western philosophy, and don't we have almost the exact same claim, namely that the "true meaning" of the original insights were almost immediately forgotten and abandoned by every successor, who mouthed the relevant words under a devastating and ruinous interpretation, until a lone genius prophet rediscovered the Gospel for himself and brought it back to the world? Isn't Heidegger just Luthor redux?

Coincidence? Or is this where the Thomists learned to talk like this? Or am I nuts?

One might in fairness note that many many philosophers have made similar gestures ever since Descartes, though not usually as radically as Heidegger. But if so this may simply reinforce my long-standing suspicion that modern philosophy is in large part simply the rationalistic flip-side of Protestant thinking.

Brad Gregory on Scotus

That's Brad Gregory, one of ND's historians, in an article: "Forum: God, Science, and Historical Explanation", in History and Theory 47 (2008), 495-519.

This article, not really about Scotus but rather about the origins of contemporary attitudes holding that scientific findings disprove religion, endorses what historians playing at being philosophers call "narratives" and runs parallel to the Cambridge Phantasists, to wit, that all those Bad Things about the modern world have their origin in Scotus. In this case, its modern atheism. Now, as is common among historians, there is no discussion of Scotus' ideas beyond which what I will quote below; so, like the Cambridge Phantasists I am not terribly concerned as this just another example of the genetic fallacy. Scotus isn't proven to be wrong because of what other people did with his arguments, but rather when his arguments themselves are proven to be wrong. Naturally, neither Gregory nor the phantasists bother to do this as they are too busy writing stories.

p.501: "The supernatural is both defined over against the natural and understood to belong to the same conceptual and metaphysical framework. So if God existed, God plus the natural world would be components within a more comprehensive reality. This conceptualization of the relationship between God and the natural world in the modern "scientific worldview" is not itself the result of empirical inquiry. No one found or discovered it. Rather, it is contingent on certain theological presuppositions linked to particular metaphysical views: it makes assumptions about what God would be like if God were real. As it happens, the metaphysics of modern science relies on a univocal conception of being first articulated by John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) in response to Henry of Ghent's analogical concept of being, which was then further transformed in the fourteenth century by William of Occam (c. 1285-1347). According to them and to Occam's late-medieval scholastic followers, because being is common to all that exists, including God, it must be conceived as pertaining to God in the same manner as it pertains to all creatures in the natural world, however God is otherwise understood to differ from everything else that exists." [completly false with respect to Scotus. Being isn't common, but a concept of being can be formed that is common. There is no corresponding reality. Scotus is the subtle doctor, after all]

[there follows some talk of someones' brilliant book,] "The particular confluence of theology and and natural science in seventeenth-century thinkers as different as Descartes, Hobbes, Henry More, and Newton combined a nominalist insistence on univocity of expression with neo-Stoic Renassance [sic] conceptions of the homogeneity of nature governed by forces. This combination, plus the de facto methodological assumption of Occams razor, established the framework for the eventual retreat of God in modern science and philosophy." [of course 'ockhams razor' is used of Scotus who ascribes it to Aristotle. maybe we need to roll the clock back to Plato]

[...]

"...perhaps God is real and is radically distinct from the universe; perhaps God is metaphysically transcendent. [...] If God is real and is radically, otherly[sic] transcendent, then every quality univocally predicated of God would be a category mistake, including even his existence--which was the point of Aquinas' insistence that there is no genus, not even the genus of being, to which God belongs along with creatures. It was such a view that Henry of Ghent modified and Scotus rejected, leading to the unanticipated and enormously influential trajectory traced by Funkenstein." [contrary to Gregorys assertion, Scotus is explicit that being is not a genus and God is not in a genus. see Ord. I d. 8 q.3]

[...]

"The metaphysical assertions of modern science can only be agnostic precisely because of its methodological presuppositions. Atheists' heartfelt, personal, subjective beliefs notwithstanding, the findings of science tend toward atheism only if one's theological conception of God presupposes a univocal metaphysics."

[...]

"Scotus insisted on a univocal notion of God [So now God is univocal!!! what can that even mean? that God is univocal to God and creatures? this must have been written late at night] because he recognized that without it, nothing could be said about God directly on the basis of reason or philosophy. By contrast, the traditional Christian conception of a radically transcendent God, which flouts ordinary ways of using language and insists on the reality of what is unimaginable, is neither the outcome of philosophical speculation nor the product of empirical investigation. It is the result of theological reflection on the writings of the Old and New testaments, themselves rooted in the experiences of ancient Israelites, some of whom became first-century Christians."

This is pretty bad. Clearly, the author has never bothered to read Scotus or Ockham on the subject of univocity, to say nothing of the followers of either (they're in manuscript, let me tell you, because I read them), as none of them have a monolithic view of univocity. Scotus' followers alone disagree about every point of its interpretation in Scotus, and Ockham just jumps into the middle of this fracas. The view given here is simply wrong as applied to Scotus. Being is univocal conceptually alone. No corresponding reality outside the mind. I sound like a broken record. Being is not a genus. Of course, one has to be sort of obliquely impressed. After all, Gregory's response continued after the last quote follows in the David Burrell line of "theology is a dance". Scotus' (unread) arguments must be so good that the only alternative is to deny the scientific character of theology, as conceived during the thirteenth century and championed by just about all medieval theologians, Aquinas included.

I'm also suspicious about the link between the nominalists and modern science. Gregory cites literature from the 80's on this, but they look like surveys taking the long view of history, not detailed analyses of individual figures. Anneliese Maier, who held doctorates in physics and philosophy denied any link between fourteenth century science and the renaissance scientists, as the former still maintained most of Aristotle's physical principles that impeded the development of modern science. On her view, even impetus theory was incorrect and still as wrong the rest because it still retained Aristotelian principles. Fr. Wallace in his modelling of nature makes a good case for the "regressus" being common to medieval and modern science, which is basically Aristotle's quia and propter quid demonstrations taken in chains of reasoning. Copleston denies the link as well, for what its worth, though he's no specialist.

It's really too bad; Gregory is a devout son of the Church, who has chosen to follow liberal anglicans in their blackening of the reputation of a man declared blessed by Pope John Paul II.

Univocity of Being and the Knowledge of Substance

This one's for our esteemed co-blogger, who was so scandalized by Pini's paper at the St. Bonaventure Scotus congress. I don't remember if the following passage came up, so here it is again. Scotus is claiming that we don't have direct access to substance, only accidents. If we are to have any knowledge at all, the being of substance and accidents must in some sense be univocal. This is from the Quaestiones de anima, which, having read the introduction and the entire work, I think actually post-dates the Ordinatio, the editors to the contrary. This is because Scotus is clearly abbreviating people like Gonsalvus (dated to 1302-4), as well as himself. But I do think that the editors sufficiently established that the manuscript tradition derives from Oxford, and that Scotus might have taught the de anima course during his year-long exile from Paris in 1303. However, he could also have taught it in Paris in the franciscan studium. After Scotus' death, the main impetus among his students was to get a copy of the Ordinatio out and circulating. Other works were ignored and then taken back to Oxford. I suspect this was the case with the Logica Scoti/Quaestio de formalitatibus as well as the De anima questions. Owing to these considerations, I don't think it necessary to posit a Parisian period for Scotus in the 1290's to account for his knowledge of Parisian sources as I think he taught after 1302. 

Here's the argument:

Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q.21 n.25 (OPh V 218):

"I prove that the concept of being is common univocally to substance and accident: because if not, we would have no concept of substance. For either we would have of substance a concept proper and quidditative and intuitive, or abstractible; not the first, as was proved; therefore a concept abstractible from substance and accident and common to each; but no concept is common to each unless the concept of being; therefore, etc. That however we are not able to know substance in the wayfaring state by a simple and first concept, is clear from this that all our cognition arises from sense; substance however is not per se sensible; and therefore we are not able to know it intuitively or by a simple concept, but by that mode: because from accidents sensible to us we abstract the concept of being, by saying that they are of being, and by inquiring further we find that it is such being which is inhering to another; it is necessary however for that being to be subsistent, and to such a subsisting one we give the name of substance. And therefore so confusedly do we know substance, by joining its subsistence to being, by saying that it is being per se subsisting; we do not however have an intuitive concept of it in the wayfaring state, by which we know it to be this being, except in the aforesaid way, as experience teaches."

Proof that we do not have a proper, quidditative and intuitive concept of substance from n.12:

"But that substance cannot be the first object [of the intellect], I prove: for it is not first according to predication, because it is not predicated essentially of all intelligibiles, because it is not predicated of accidents. Nor [is it the first object] according to power, because it does not sufficiently move the intellect to knowledge of itself and of others. Which is proved so: because this would only be according to a simple and quidditative and intuitive concept; for this to be first is impossible, because whatever our intellect is able to know intuitively through its presence, it is able to know its absence by nature; but our intellect is not able to know by nature the absence of the substance of the bread in the sacrament of the altar, but only by faith--for equally the substance of the bread is known when it is not there, just as when it is there, therefore etc. The major premise is clear by the example and authority of the Philosopher saying that sight is perceptive of light and darkness, which is the absence of light. Minor is declared. Therefore, etc. Since therefore neither God nor the true nor substance is the first object of the intellect, it follows that being is that first object."

Email from Martin Luther

Judging from the instant responses on facebook to this, it may well be worthy to post on the blog. But it may be funnier to hear about than to actually read. In any case, here it is. I got an email from one "Martin Luther" with the subject "Please Read!!!". This is what the email said:

"Hello,
I am Martin Luther Aggrey the Former Accountant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ghana my office monitors and controls the affairs of all banks and Financial institutions in Ghana concerned with foreign contract payments. I am the final signatory to any transfer or remittance of huge funds moving within banks both on the local and international levels in line to foreign contracts settlement.
I have before me list of funds, which could not be transferred to some nominated accounts as these accounts have been identified either as ghost accounts, unclaimed deposits and over-invoiced sum etc. I can now include your name among the people expecting the funds to be transferred into their account, on this note; I wish to have a deal with you as regards to this unpaid funds. I have all the files before me and hope to fix your data correctly once i hear from you as one of the beneficiaries.
My conditions are as follows: First and foremost That I will send a reasonable sum of the list of funds before me to you. After you have confirmed the transfer of the total sum into your account by telegraphic Transfer, to be confirmed in three Working days. I will fly to your country to meet with you for the sharing which we shall discuss when I hear from you. Secondly, This deal must be kept secret forever, and all correspondence will be strictly by email and telephone, for security purposes. You must assure me of your fully commitment and attention to enable us conclude this transaction in a couple of days. Lastly That There should be no third parties as most problems associated with most businesses are caused by agents or representatives. If you AGREE with my conditions, l will advise you on what to do immediately and the transfer will commence without delay as I will proceed to fix your name on the Payment schedule instantly to meet the three days mandate. Please reply to my email below.
Email: martinlutheraggrey2@o2.pl
Best Wishes
Martin Luther"