In my efforts to determine the influence, if any, of Peter Thomae's questions on intelligible being, I have begun leafing through the voluminous pages of the baroque Scotists. In this post I am just going to list a series of conclusions that the Irishman Punch defends (for bio, see the 'Franciscan authors' website).
Ioannes Poncius, Cursus philosophiae, disp. 2 q. 5 (p. 902ff.)
'De esse creaturarum ab aeterno'
Conclusio I: Creatures have no real being simpliciter from eternity.
Conclusio II: All creatures have some being from eternity
This can scarcely be denied, because they were understood by God from eternity and they terminate the act of divine cognition; therefore they had some being according to which they terminate that cognition, whether they terminate it primarily or secondarily.
Conclusio III: That being which they had from eternity, for example a man, does not consist in extrinsic denomination taken from the omnipotence of God, nor in non-repugnance, nor in some ratio, whether real or rational or actual or aptitudinal.
This is of the Doctor [=Scotus] above, and commonly against some Thomists, who seem to say that that being is nothing other than possibile being and that that possible being comes about from denomination taken from divine omnipotence.
Conclusio IV: That being, which creatures have from eternity, is diminished being, a quasi medium between being of reason and being simply real.
Conclusio V: That diminished being is not produced by the act of the divine intellect. [Both Petrus Thomae and William of Alnwick would agree with this].
This is against many Scotists and it seems to be against Scotus, above, but it is not, as will be proved.
It is proved first, because an object of speculative knowledge is not made by that [divine act] but rather is presupposed to it; but the knowledge, by which God knows creatures from eternity, is speculative; therefore it does not give that being to creatures according to which it knows them.
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
Monday, April 23, 2012
Leonine Edition of Thomas's Summa - In Print
As many are already aware, the Internet Archive has
posted electronic scans of the Leonine Edition of St. Thomas's Summa theologiae (except for volume 5) and his Summa contra gentiles. A friend has prepared hardcover print editions of these volumes for his own use some
months ago, but because of the Internet Archive's Terms of Service was unable
to share these publicly.
Now, however, he has happily
received permission from Internet Archive to reprint these volumes publicly.
For those of you who may be interested, therefore, please find below links to
where the individual volumes are available.
Summa theologiae, with the Commentary of Cajetan
Summa contra gentiles, with the Commentary of Franciscus
de Sylvestris Ferrara
Sunday, April 22, 2012
Franciscus de Mayronis on Analogy
Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, Prologus q. 12 (ed. Venezia f. 8rb):
Whether being is said analogically of those things of which it is said.
I say that there are four ways of speaking. Some [people] say that it is said univocally because according to one notion [rationem]. Others say that equivocally because according to diverse notions. Others say that analogically because per prius of one and per posterius of others. Others say that [it is said] ambiguously. They distinguish this, however, from analogy because a certain thing is something according to one notion is said of two, nevertheless more perfectly of one than the other. For the other kind of analogy is what is said of one proprerly and of others by attribution to it. And that is reduced to equivocal.
With this premised, it is said that every term either is equivocal or univocal because when the definitions of some things are given by immediate contraries, they are immediately contrary; but equivocals and univocals are of this kind; therefore, etc. But this is one definition, if being is said equally or unequally of its inferiors.
To this [argument] [we answer/respondetur] with four conclusiones. The first is that being is not predicated according to more and less. The second is that it is not predicated according to prior and posterior. Third that it is not predicated inequally. Fourth that it is not predicated dissimilarly.
They prove all those conclusions with one argument: because when there is some essential predication, it cannot be varied per posterius; but quantitity of power is attended to according to more and less, prior and posterior, equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar. All these are posterior to being and also those of which being is predicated; therefore they do not vary the predication of being which is essential. When therefore something is said to be more perfect than being, it is by something posterior to being and consequently in that prior in which the predication of being is made, it will be uniform.
[that's all, folks. It turned out to be less exciting than I had hoped when I initially saw the question title.]
Whether being is said analogically of those things of which it is said.
I say that there are four ways of speaking. Some [people] say that it is said univocally because according to one notion [rationem]. Others say that equivocally because according to diverse notions. Others say that analogically because per prius of one and per posterius of others. Others say that [it is said] ambiguously. They distinguish this, however, from analogy because a certain thing is something according to one notion is said of two, nevertheless more perfectly of one than the other. For the other kind of analogy is what is said of one proprerly and of others by attribution to it. And that is reduced to equivocal.
With this premised, it is said that every term either is equivocal or univocal because when the definitions of some things are given by immediate contraries, they are immediately contrary; but equivocals and univocals are of this kind; therefore, etc. But this is one definition, if being is said equally or unequally of its inferiors.
To this [argument] [we answer/respondetur] with four conclusiones. The first is that being is not predicated according to more and less. The second is that it is not predicated according to prior and posterior. Third that it is not predicated inequally. Fourth that it is not predicated dissimilarly.
They prove all those conclusions with one argument: because when there is some essential predication, it cannot be varied per posterius; but quantitity of power is attended to according to more and less, prior and posterior, equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar. All these are posterior to being and also those of which being is predicated; therefore they do not vary the predication of being which is essential. When therefore something is said to be more perfect than being, it is by something posterior to being and consequently in that prior in which the predication of being is made, it will be uniform.
[that's all, folks. It turned out to be less exciting than I had hoped when I initially saw the question title.]
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Review of John W. Carlson's "Word's of Wisdom": "Evil"
In my previous entry, I asked, “Given the plethora of dictionaries, one might wonder: do we really need another? Why purchase John W. Carlson's Words of Wisdom?” I examined some of the cognitive narrowness that underlies the bibliography. See also this entry. Here I look at the content of Carlson’s book by examining how he defines one of the terms. In order to give the reader an idea of what he may be missing, I try to be fairly thorough below.
To see the relative value of Carlson's entries, we can turn to an example -- "evil," for instance. Carlson uses a similar method in his introduction, n. 11, where he demonstrates the inadequacies of various modern dictionaries by analyzing their definition of “being”. Here I will compare Carlson’s entry to that of other dictionaries in the same genre (unmentioned in his introduction or bibliography): Wuellner's Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy (1956), and Signoriello's Lexicon Peripateticum Philosophico-Theologicum (1931); this is more than a dictionary because of the helpful “Effata” section, which I will describe below. For additional interest, I will briefly look at Peter of Bergamo's Tabula Aurea (1484); because of its scope, it is both more and less than a dictionary. Less, because it provides only Thomas's definitions and uses of terms; these may be too narrow for other scholastic traditions to agree with. More, because it provides many references for Thomas's various uses of a term; this is far more than one can expect from even a good dictionary.
1. Carlson: evil:
Not merely the lack of good, but the absence of a good that ought to be present -- e.g., blindness in an eye. Evil is commonly distinguished into "natural" or "physical" evil and "moral" evil, the latter involving bad personal acts, which result specifically from defective uses of the will. In Scholastic terminology, moral evil is sometimes called "evil of fault" (Latin malum culpae) or "evil done."
2. Wuellner: evil:
The privation or lack of a good which naturally belongs to a nature; the absence of a good which is natural and due to a being.
[Wuellner divides “evil” into six categories (I will not provide the definitions he gives for each)]
- metaphysical evil: anything finite, because lacking in complete goodness; any limitation even though it is natural to a being (Leibniz; but not accepted in scholasticism as a correct description of evil).
- moral evil: privation of rectitude in human acts; a sin. [Moral evil has three species: formally evil, intrinsically evil, and materially evil.]
- Occasion of evil
- Physical evil
- Principle of evil
- Supreme evil
Wuellner also provides his usual concise references: “St. Augustine, Confessions, passim. S.T., I, 48, aa 1-3; 49, a. 1; I-II, 18, a. 1; 19, a. 5; C.G. III, cc 6-8. De Malo.”
3. Signoriello: malum (my translation):
[First entry directs the reader to Defectus-Malum-Peccatum-Culpa]
Defectus (defect) simply signifies the negation of some good. But malum (evil) signifies privation, or a defect of being in the thing, of something which it naturally ought to have; e.g., “the lack of life in a stone can be called a defect but not evil; but for man death is a defect and evil” (In lib. II Sent. , d. 30, q. 1, a. 2). The evil that is vulgarly called metaphysical, or the defect of every mode of perfection in a created being, is not properly evil because any created being excludes perfection, still less calls for it. Peccatum (sin) consists in action, “insofar as what is not upright as the end demands; for example a grammarian not writing well, or a doctor not preparing a medicine well” (ibid). Culpa (fault) “adds to sin, since it is an act of the will”; for “sin is in things which exist according to some art; but fault cannot exist unless it is in things that exist through the will; for reason cannot obtain fault except in what is condemnable, nor condemnation should be given on account of an inordinate act unless that act was under the subject’s dominion; but to have dominion over one’s acts, such as able to do something or not to do something, is characteristic of the will” (In lib. II Sent., d. 35, q. 1., a. 1).
[Second entry on malum: malum naturae and malum culpae]
The malum naturae (evil of nature) is an entiative privation to something due; its kind in man is the privation of an eye or a foot, etc. This evil of nature “whenever it arises from natural causes, then it is called an evil of nature not only because a good of nature is lacking, but also because it is an effect of nature, such as natural death, and other similar defects: but other times an evil of nature proceeds from a non-natural cause, such as death which is violently inflicted in persecution” (I-II, q. 42, a. 2). The malum culpae or morale (evil of fault or moral evil) consists in a discrepancy between one’s actions and right reason.[Effata: scholastic philosophic axioms. I list only the axiom, not the rather helpful explanations for each]
Evil is the contrary to both good and evil.
Evil in some way follows from good.
Evil is praeter intentionem (other than the intention) in the thing.
Evil is in the many, good is in the few, or, evil more than the good is found in the many.
Evil is not some nature. From this axiom follows others:
Nothing is able to be per se evil.
Evil is in some good.
The supreme evil simpliciter is not able to be.
Evil does not wholly devour (consumit) good.
Evil has some sort of cause.
4. Bergamo: malum:
[Bergamo’s analysis of Thomas’s use of malum is so extensive that I can provide only an outline of his entry. He provides categories of analysis. I will provide a couple of examples for each category.]
Quid: 1 Evil is something, and it is a being
of reason, but not a real being. 2 Evil is not a pure negation, but the
privation of a good. 3 Nothing is evil essentially, nor through participation,
but through the privation of participation.
Comparatio: 15 It is impossible for a
greatest evil to exist. 16 Thus there is no greatest evil. . . . 18 It is
impossible for evil to be a first principle.
Causa: 23 Evil is not a cause, except per
accidens. 24 Evil is a cause per accidens in two ways: as a deficient
good, or doing evil aside from one’s intention.
Effectus: 30 From evil good arises, and the
converse; nevertheless, occasionally and not directly.
Divisio: 31 Evil is twofold: evil in itself
and partaking of evil. . . . 40 The evil of pain is opposed to the good of the
creature, but the evil of fault is opposed to the uncreated good, not as it is
in us, but as it is in itself.
Naturae: 43 In natural things, the evil of the
agent arises from the evil of the actions, but in voluntary things the converse
is the case. [e.g., a tree is called “bad” because it bears rotten fruit, but a
person’s actions are called “bad” when the person who performs them is rotten
morally]
Mali: 59 Evil persons are worse than beasts are
like to them, for they follow passions like beasts, for they love bestial
things. 60 Evil people pretending to be innocent are worse than public sinners.
. . . 63 The company of the evil is to be avoided for many reasons, and the
company of the good is to be desired for many reasons.
Here, then, are some thoughts on Carlson’s Words of Wisdom:
A)
His definition of “evil” is poorly
worded. He begins, “Not merely the lack of good . .
.”Definitions should always state positive content and not mere
negations of something else.
B)
His definition does not explain why
good “ought” to be present. The other scholastic dictionaries note that it
is a lack of something due to the nature of the thing.
C)
His definition is breezy and thin.
He divides evil into two categories (natural/physical evil and moral
evil) but discusses only moral evil. And his definition of moral evil (“involving
bad moral acts” [redundant] “which result specifically from defective uses of
the will”) leaves out the crucial matter. Why are moral evils defective?
Because, as Signoriello points out, it diverges from right reason. But, as
Wuellner shows, this counts only for formally evil moral acts; other
evil moral acts are such intrinsically, that is, aside from the
intention of the person. Oddly, Carlson has an entry instrinsic(ally) evil
that is not linked to the main entry on evil; he defines intrinsically
evil according to its object, which is more precise than Wuellner’s focus on
deviation from “the norms of morals . . . and eternal law”.
D)
His historical analysis is
somewhat convoluted and thereby unhelpful. He says, “Historically, questions
have been raised about the ‘real existence’ of evil. Here the perennial
tradition follows and clarifies the position of St. Augustine: evils are ‘real’
as privations, but they do not ‘exist’ in the sense of being themselves
metaphysical subjects of being.” First, as throughout the dictionary, he
does not explain which voice in the “perennial tradition” makes the claim that
he does. Apparently he knows the “perennial tradition” so well that he can
confidently be its voice. He then nods to St. Augustine without providing any
citation, leaving one unconvinced that the Church Father would have nodded back
and agreed that Carlson accurately summarized what he meant. Finally, Carlson’s
understanding of “real” and “subject” is confused. Peter of Bergamo claims that,
according to St. Thomas, “Evil is something, and it is a being of reason, but
not a real being.” Bergamo’s citation is I, q. 48, a. 2, the relevant section
of which reads, “evil is neither a being nor a good,” and Thomas gives the
example of an morally evil end which deviates from the order of reason. Hence,
one could conclude that evil is a being of reason (i.e., a privation of right
reason and an acceptance of specious reasoning). Thus, contrary to Carlson, a
privation is not “real” being. Furthermore, Carlson’s use of the word “subject”
implies that being is an accident that inheres in a thing. But this is a controverted
philosophical claim, one discussed in detail by the scholastics. If he wanted
to follow Thomas, it would have been preferable to say, as Bergamo says, “Nothing
is evil essentially, nor through participation, but through the privation of
participation.” Whether or not one accepts Thomas’s understanding of
participation, this at least does not presume that the “perennial tradition”
agrees that a subject is “something that exercises being or existence,”
itself a problematic definition (I leave it to my fellow bloggers to discuss
it).
Against my critiques, one might say that Carlson is doing the best he can, that his work is better than nothing, and that at least it is in print. But I wonder if he wouldn’t have helped himself out much more by translating an older scholastic dictionary, or by re-working Wuellner’s dictionary (which is both more accurate and less than half the length) in light of contemporary developments and concerns. As it is, Carlson’s Words of Wisdom: A Philosophical Dictionary for the Perennial Tradition bites off more than he can chew. There is as much theology as there is philosophy in it, which is another indication of the dictionary’s over-reaching nature. I am sad to say that what could have been very valuable is only minimally so.
"Evil words corrupt good manners," says the old proverb, variously attributed to St. Paul (1 Cor 15:33), Menander, and Aeschylus. This much one can derive from The Wordsworth Dictionary of Proverbs. That information, combined with nuggets gleaned from a Biblical commentary and Wikipedia, reminds me that a variant on the translation -- "Bad company corrupts good morals" -- was the inspiration of the name of a 1970's rock band. My point here is that there are so many sources of information available that another dictionary needs to be pretty remarkable to justify its existence. Being in print does not count as being remarkable, unless you happen to be the publisher. If a dictionary does not serve its purpose and clarify the meanings of words, it is attaching vague ideas to terms that the student will later use to the detriment of authentic learning and conversation. "Vague words are bad manners," one might say. Or, "Muddy terms pollute the stream of conversation." Thus, regarding the entries in Words of Wisdom themselves, their usefulness lies mostly in a) reminding a reasonably well-read student of philosophy or theology of what he already knows, b) suggesting descriptions of a term that often cohere with more accurate definitions found in truly scholastic and Thomistic works, and c) hinting to the reasonably well-read student that he turn elsewhere for a more careful analysis of the term in question.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
John W. Carlson's "Words of Wisdom": Bibliography
Samuel Johnson inaugurated the age of the English dictionary, or "word-book" as he would say, and as it becomes easier and easier to mechanically reproduce texts, there are more dictionaries now than ever. There's nothing like a computer to help the book industry, right?
Given the plethora of dictionaries, one might wonder: do we really need another? Why purchase John W. Carlson's Words of Wisdom? Perhaps the publisher was hoping a catchy title would signal the book's pretensions: "This is no ordinary philosophic dictionary," the title seems to say, "rather, this dictionary cares about wisdom and tries to foster it." Ambitious. Does it succeed?
Regarding the bibliography, the cut-and-paste powers of the computer were well-employed here. There is little one couldn't find in the bibliography of a contemporary Thomistic-oriented dissertation. Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier in this blog, the perspective of these bibliographies is rather limited. Here are the divisions with my thoughts on them.
My next post on this book will examine the dictionary entries themselves.
Given the plethora of dictionaries, one might wonder: do we really need another? Why purchase John W. Carlson's Words of Wisdom? Perhaps the publisher was hoping a catchy title would signal the book's pretensions: "This is no ordinary philosophic dictionary," the title seems to say, "rather, this dictionary cares about wisdom and tries to foster it." Ambitious. Does it succeed?
Regarding the bibliography, the cut-and-paste powers of the computer were well-employed here. There is little one couldn't find in the bibliography of a contemporary Thomistic-oriented dissertation. Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier in this blog, the perspective of these bibliographies is rather limited. Here are the divisions with my thoughts on them.
- Section I, Works by St. Thomas Aquinas in English. This confirms what the title of the book implies: that the target buyer-peruser of this work is an under-educated student or professor of philosophy or theology -- the sort who skims a book in order to have more time to mention it while discussing politics over a couple of beers. When a bibliography lists the works of an author only in translation, it implies that the reader would not or could not make use of the author's works in their original language. In other words, it assumes that scholars will probably not find the bibliography (implied: the dictionary) valuable.
- Section II, Recent Commentaries and Elaborations on Perennial Themes. This section could also be entitled, "Books I Like That You Should Consider Reading." The books in this section are mostly by Thomists from 1940 onward (e.g., Maritian, Lonergan, Giles Emery), along with personalists (e.g., Wojtyla, von Hildebrand), and a handful of others who, for some reason, count as the lucky few (e.g., Henri de Lubac, John Milbank). There is at least one notable exception to what I have said. This section, as a good dictionary shouldn't, stretches the meaning of a term. How could the works of John [Poinsot] of St. Thomas (included here) count as "contemporary" and on perennial themes, but the works of Friedrich Nietzsche (included below) counted as either not contemporary or not on perennial themes? A single explanation suggests itself: Carlson misuses words to fit his own purposes: he includes John of St. Thomas in Section II because he agrees with that way of thinking, while he sticks Nietzsche in Section III because the German fellow is disagreeable. Thus, a brief dictionary of Carlson's language would be as follows. "Perennial theme" = "Whatever Carlson thinks is true" = an amalgam of Poinsotian Thomism mixed with personalism and other contemporary (mostly-) Catholic thought for good measure.
- Section III, Works by Other Authors Cited in This Dictionary. One of the chief jobs of a good dictionary is to make clear distinctions. If a dictionary of flora and fauna does not clarify the difference between an apple and an Adam's apple, then it is better used to prop up my desk rather than to raise my understanding. In this case, Carlson makes a division in his bibliography that manifests what books are worthwhile in his judgment. They are, in descending order: 1st, the works of Thomas in English. 2nd, the works of people who agree with or expound on Thomas, or who are pretty much good chaps whose books are still in print. 3rd, everyone else. Since they are neither contemporary nor Thomists, they count as "other." This implies they are lesser (otherwise, why not include studies on them in the Section II?). Although Carlson gestures toward Albert the Great, Aristotle, Augustine, Cicero, Plato, Scotus, and Suarez, among others, his entries rely far more on the authors in Section II of his bibliography than the authors in Section III.
My next post on this book will examine the dictionary entries themselves.
Saturday, April 7, 2012
What Plato Couldn't Know About Christ
As Easter is almost upon us, this is a good time to consider what Plato predicted about Christ--and what he could not have predicted. Whether or not the early Church Fathers were correct in saying that Plato borrowed from the Hebrews, the Greek philosopher had a partial glimpse into what the prophets foretold.
First, what he did predict. Having experienced some of the depths of the wickedness of men, Plato understood that an absolutely just man would have suffered absolutely at the hands of his neighbors. He says through Glaucon:
What Plato did not predict, what he could not have predicted, was that the absolutely just man would live again after his crucifixion and death. St. Justin Martyr points out that there are pagan analogues to Christ's resurrection -- Odysseus coming back from the underworld, the rising of the phoenix -- but the Greeks did not imagine that a Jewish man could physically rise from the dead by his own power (see First Apology chs. 18-20). Once again we find that the two central mysteries of Christian faith are the Incarnation and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.
First, what he did predict. Having experienced some of the depths of the wickedness of men, Plato understood that an absolutely just man would have suffered absolutely at the hands of his neighbors. He says through Glaucon:
Though he do no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test. ... But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just. ... Such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified. (Republic II, 361c-e passim)Here Plato's account is practically a prophecy. Although its precision is astonishing, it remains in the natural order, since inspiration is not required to see the logical conclusions of sin.
What Plato did not predict, what he could not have predicted, was that the absolutely just man would live again after his crucifixion and death. St. Justin Martyr points out that there are pagan analogues to Christ's resurrection -- Odysseus coming back from the underworld, the rising of the phoenix -- but the Greeks did not imagine that a Jewish man could physically rise from the dead by his own power (see First Apology chs. 18-20). Once again we find that the two central mysteries of Christian faith are the Incarnation and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Monday, April 2, 2012
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
On Arguments and Arguing
The other day we were talking about how so many contemporary "philosophers" do little more than present old arguments dressed up in new clothes. There is nothing wrong with this as such. Modern manufacturers, in order to sell an alarm clock, create a new plastic casing for a device that has barely been improved upon in decades. A danger of declination in thought lurks here, however, in three stages.
1. "Philosophers", by focusing on the presentation, forget about the substance of what they are exploring.
2. In order to persuade others of the truth as they know it, they confuse philosophy with rhetoric or apologetics.
3. They end up thinking that there is little difference between reason and passion.
About forty years ago Fulton Sheen noticed that contemporary self-professed "thinkers" typically rely less on reason and more on feeling in order to persuade others. Here is part of what he had to say.
1. "Philosophers", by focusing on the presentation, forget about the substance of what they are exploring.
2. In order to persuade others of the truth as they know it, they confuse philosophy with rhetoric or apologetics.
3. They end up thinking that there is little difference between reason and passion.
About forty years ago Fulton Sheen noticed that contemporary self-professed "thinkers" typically rely less on reason and more on feeling in order to persuade others. Here is part of what he had to say.
There is one lost art that has not been definitely recovered, and without which no civilization can long survive, and that is the art of controversy. The hardest thing to find in the world today is an argument. Because so few are thinking, naturally there are found but few to argue. There is prejudice in abundance and sentiment too, for these things are born of enthusiasms without the pain of labor. Thinking, on the contrary, is a difficult task; it is the hardest work a man can do—that is perhaps why so few indulge in it. Thought-saving devices have been invented that rival laborsaving devices in their ingenuity. Fine-sounding phrases like “Life is bigger than logic” or “Progress is the spirit of the age” go rattling by us like express trains, carrying the burden of those who are too lazy to think for themselves.
Not even philosophers argue today; they only explain away. A book full of bad logic, advocating all manner of moral laxity, is not refuted by critics; it is merely called “bold, honest, and fearless.” Even those periodicals that pride themselves upon their open-mindedness on all questions are far from practicing the lost art of controversy. Their pages contain no controversies, but only presentations of points of view. These never rise to the level of abstract thought in which argument clashes with argument like steel with steel, but rather they content themselves with the personal reflections of one who has lost his faith, writing against the sanctity of marriage, and of another who has kept his faith, writing in favor of it. Both sides are shooting off firecrackers, making all the noise of an intellectual warfare and creating the illusion of conflict, but it is only a sham battle in which there are plenty of explosions but never an exploded argument.
The causes underlying this decline in the art of controversy are twofold: religious and philosophical.
Modern religion has enunciated one great and fundamental dogma that is at the basis of all the other dogmas: that religion must be freed from dogmas. Creeds and confessions of faith are no longer the fashion; religious leaders have agreed not to disagree and those beliefs for which some of our ancestors would have died they have melted into a spineless humanism. Like other Pilates they have turned their backs on the uniqueness of truth and have opened their arms wide to all the moods and fancies the hour might dictate. The passing of creeds and dogmas means the passing of controversies. Creeds and dogmas are social; prejudices are private. Believers bump into one another at a thousand different angles, but bigots keep out of one another’s way, because prejudice is anti-social. I can imagine an old-fashioned Calvinist who holds that the word “damn” has a tremendous dogmatic significance coming to intellectual blows with an old-fashioned Methodist who holds that it is only a curse word. But I cannot imagine a controversy if both decide to damn damnation, like modernists who no longer believe in hell.
The second cause, which is philosophical, bases itself on that peculiar American philosophy called pragmatism, the aim of which is to prove that all proofs are useless. ... As a result, there has sprung up a disturbing indifference to truth, and a tendency to regard the useful as the true, and the impractical as the false. The man who can make up his mind when proofs are presented to him is looked upon as a bigot, and the man who ignores proofs and the search for truth is looked upon as broad-minded and tolerant.
Another evidence of this same disrespect for rational foundations is the general readiness of the modern mind to accept a statement because of the literary way in which it is couched, or because of the popularity of the one who says it, rather than for the reasons behind the statement. In this sense, it is unfortunate that some men who think poorly can write so well. Bergson has written a philosophy grounded on the assumption that the greater comes from the less, but he has so camouflaged that intellectual monstrosity with mellifluous French that he has been credited with being a great and original thinker. To some minds, of course, the startling will always appear to be the profound. It is easier to get the attention of the press when one says, as Ibsen did, that “two and two make five,” than to be orthodox and say that two and two make four. (Read the rest here)
Sheen is firmly in the tradition of the British Catholic convert controversialists, which gained great prominence with St. Edmund Campion and, later, manifest brilliance with Bl. John Henry Newman, and wise humor with G. K. Chesterton. These three have not been surpassed though they have often been imitated. And imitation is not bad, as we find with classical music. Just because music is old does not mean it is not worth playing again. But let's not confuse the work of philosophy with the work of apologetics. The object and method of both are different. Apologetics aims at showing the rationality of the faith (or at least the absurdity of arguments against the faith); it does this through philosophical, Scriptural, and strictly theological arguments, occasionally employing history and art as helpful resources. Philosophy, on the other hand, aims at explicating the truth about being; its tools and methods are those to which every mind naturally has access in principle.
Apologetics is a fine and noble task. But it is not philosophy. This brings me to consider a lesser Catholic light, an apologist, one worth looking at in this context: Sir Arnold Lunn, himself a convert to the faith. His biographer notes:
Apologetics is a fine and noble task. But it is not philosophy. This brings me to consider a lesser Catholic light, an apologist, one worth looking at in this context: Sir Arnold Lunn, himself a convert to the faith. His biographer notes:
Lunn always believed that, as a means of communicating the truths of Catholicism to non-Catholics, debates are incomparably more effective than lectures. Debates tend to attract the unconverted who will rarely attend the formal lecture held under Catholic auspices. ...Lunn's motto as a debater was St. Augustine's precept, "Love men, slay errors." "Intolerance of error," Lunn pointed out, "must not be equated with intolerance of men in error." Controversy must not lead to quarrelling, and Lunn's tact and composure before this Australian university audience were highly impressive. Indeed, so poor a representative was he of the Church's alleged intolerance that Glanville Cook voiced the opinion that Lunn was not a typical Catholic. "Some men," he remarked, "are better than their creeds" - a suggestion which amused Lunn hugely and prompted the reply that "no man was good enough to live up to the Catholic code or bad enough to live down to atheism." (Read more here)
The saints would agree with Lunn's claim -- they were no strangers to controversy when such proved more powerful and necessary than good example alone. Occasionally a person rises above the surface of his freely-chosen swim in ignorance enough to realize that certain arguments would be
bad for his "intellectually" held position -- and even worse for his
personal life. So he avoids arguments at all costs and protests loudly against reason. It is no surprise that pro-abortion professors are unwilling to debate pro-life students. Art has its place in converting souls, but let's not pretend that it can substitute for reason. Pro-life movies might play a role in converting some,
but people convinced by movies often have few solid answers to many difficult
questions. The mind has powers the passions know nothing of. Yes, we can agree that arguing is rarely helpful, but argumentation, understood as an appeal to reason, compliments a man and can even save his soul. It assumes that he has a brain and it encourages him to use it, even for his own good.
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
Gilson on the Essence-Existence Distinction
I don't normally like to rag on Gilson since he was unquestionably a great scholar, but I can't pass up the following comment on De ente et essentia where Gilson gives the essence-existence distinction the status of a first principle, which, conveniently enough, can't be proven but only seen. Tough luck for those less subtle and impure minds like Scotus, Henry and the myriads who foolishly wanted proof of the disitnction.
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 82:
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 82:
The large number of Christian philosophers and theologians, even among the so-called Thomists, who have rejected the distinction of essence and existence understood in its Thomistic meaning, clearly shows that no demonstration is here at stake. Above all, the careful procedure of Thomas Aquinas himself in handling the notion invites us to consider it less as the conclusion of some dialetical argument than as a prime source of intelligibility whose existence is known by the very light it sheds upon all the problems in metaphysics. So Thomas Aquinas will not attempt to prove it, but we shall see him progressively leading us to it, stating from the very demonstrations of the existence of God, as if it were for him a question of purifying our sight until it becomes able to stand the light of the first principle.
Monday, February 20, 2012
The Opera Theologica of John Duns Scotus
A new volume of studies on Scotus is out, part of the Quadruple congress that went on in 2008. It is edited by Richard Cross (yours truly set the text) and contains essays by several famous scholars and an edition of the anonymous De cognitione Dei. Price: 47 euros.
Here is the publishers blurb:
Here is the publishers blurb:
On 8 November 1308, the great Franciscan scholastic thinker, John Duns Scotus, died and was buried in the friars' convent in Cologne. Building upon the intellectual heritage of his Franciscan predecessors in Paris, Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, Scotus extended this peculiarly Franciscan approach to the philosophical and theological traditions of western Christianity in new and bold directions with unique emphases and implications. These ramifications became the foundation for an important alternate current of philosophical thought known through history as Scotism. On the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the death of John Duns Scotus, international scholars from around the world gathered together to celebrate in a comprehensive manner the life, work and intellectual legacy of the Subtle Doctor. This gathering took on the form of a Quadruple Congress, comprising four conferences, treating four different themes, associated with the intellectual journey and legacy of Scotus, namely Oxford, Cologne-Bonn, Strasbourg and the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University, New York. The corresponding four volumes represent the current state of international Scotus scholarship and will remain an invaluable tool for years to come.
Part 2, offering investigations into the theology of John Duns Scotus, contains contributions by Robert Andrews, Oleg Bychkov, William J. Courtenay, Richard Cross, William A. Frank, Tobias Hofmann and Ludger Honnefelder. Robert Andrews's article provides, for the first time, a complete text of the Scotistic De cognitione dei.
Friday, February 17, 2012
God and the Divine Essence
Sometimes I think the best argument for atheism is analytic philosophy of religion. Witness the following from Hoffmann and Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes, 90.
Valid? Sure. Sound? 'Unsound' just doesn't do it justice. I would like to know what the point of having an essence is when it just inheres in a substance along with all the substance's other properties/qualities etc. Fond/convinced as I am of the usefulness of the formal distinction, I don't think I would posit it as obtaining between God and the divine essence.
...Anselm's notion of a self-existent or self-explanatory being is rather obscure. For example, Anselm takes it to be an implication of divine self-existence that (i) God's existence is not explained by anything else, (ii) God's existence is explained by his essence, and hence that (iii) God is a necessary being. Unhappily, (i) and (ii) are incompatible unless God is identical with his essence. Anselm accepts the doctrine that God is identical with his essence; among traditional theologians such as Anselm this doctrine is commonly thought to be an implication of divine simplicity. But as we have argued, it is a category mistake to suppose that God, a substance, is identical with his essence, a quality. Moreover, necessarily, any quality of a concrete entity [of any sort] inheres in that concrete entity. But God's essence is a quality of God, and God is a concrete entity. So, God's essence inheres in God. Since it is impossible for a concrete entity to inhere in itself, it follows that God cannot inhere in himself. Because God's essence inheres in God, but God does not, God and his essence are diverse. For all of these reasons, God and his essence cannot be identical. Hence, (i) and (ii) are incompatible. Thus, if God's existence is explained by his essence, then strictly speaking God's existence is explained by something else. However, God's existence being explained by his essence seems compatible with God's being maximally great. There is no reason to accept without qualification Anselm's assumption that God's existence cannot depend upon something else.
Valid? Sure. Sound? 'Unsound' just doesn't do it justice. I would like to know what the point of having an essence is when it just inheres in a substance along with all the substance's other properties/qualities etc. Fond/convinced as I am of the usefulness of the formal distinction, I don't think I would posit it as obtaining between God and the divine essence.
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Analogy
Here is Steve Long discussing his book on analogy. I wonder what the relation of all this is to Aristotelian third-mode relations. Recall that the third mode of relations are one-way. The example is that of human knowing: one can know an object and consequently there is a relation from the knowing mind to the object but not from the object to the knowing mind. This isn't so hard to understand. My thinking about a rock isn't going to affect the rock ex natura rei but it is going to affect my thinking. So to return to Long, could one dispense with this talk of analogical analogy and univocal analogicity simply by saying that the relation of God to creatures and e converso is an Aristotelian third-mode relation? This is course what Henry and Scotus do, though they also feel the need to discuss analogy and univocity, so perhaps not.
Thursday, February 9, 2012
New From ND Press
Sorry about all the news, but here's another that really made me laugh. A dictionary of the "perennial tradition" which of course means "Thomism". But wait, there's more! Not only terms of Thomism are defined, but those movements with which Thomism has engaged. So I suppose we will get "univocalist metaphysics" and "necrophobia at the heart of the liturgical city" as well as "Scotus".
From ND press:
New dictionary offers precise and accessible definitions of over 1,000 key philosophical terms
In his encyclical Fides et ratio (1998), John Paul II called on philosophers, "to have the courage to recover, in the flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom and truth." In Words of Wisdom, John W. Carlson responds to the late pope's call for the development of this tradition--often called the "perennial tradition" or "perennial philosophy"--with a much-needed dictionary of terms. Available in paperback and e-book formats, this is a resource for students in colleges, universities, and seminaries, as well as for their teachers.
In addition to key philosophical terms, the dictionary includes:
-- significant terms from philosophical movements with which Thomism has engaged
-- a comprehensive bibliography of works by Aquinas in English
-- examples from the writings of the philosophers and theologians mentioned in dictionary entries and
-- discussions of perennial themes
"The introduction to this work shows how carefully its aim and method have been thought through. The rest of Words of Wisdom demonstrates how well the aim has been achieved and the method employed. An invaluable resource." --Aidan Nichols, O.P., University of Cambridge
368 pages
ISBN 978-0-268-02370-6 / Paper / $45.00
ISBN 978-0-268-07693-1 / E-book (Adobe PDF) / $29.00
More information and to order
Table of Contents
Read an excerpt
Established in 1949, the University of Notre Dame Press is a scholarly publisher of distinguished books in a number of academic disciplines; in poetry and fiction; and in areas of interest to general readers. The largest Catholic university press in the world, the Press currently publishes fifty to sixty books annually and maintains a robust backlist in print. Visit our website to see our full array of available titles.
University of Notre Dame Press
310 Flanner Hall
Notre Dame
Indiana
46556
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
Another Scotus Grant
From Medieval News. I don't think they reported the Opera Theologica Parisiensia grant, but they did hit the following:
University of Scranton Professor Andrew LaZella, Ph.D., received a development intercession grant from the University for a research project focused on medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus and his analysis of some of Aristotle’s major works, especially “The Categories.” The project is titled “Univocity, Equivocity, and Proper Concepts in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis.”
Dr. LaZella, an assistant professor in philosophy, said that he researched “in the general area” of this topic for his doctoral dissertation and is excited to delve further into the subject. He said that an interesting part of this project is the difference in Scotus’ ideas in his early works compared to his later writings.
“This is a very early work of (Duns Scotus),” Dr. LaZella said. “The question becomes did he change his mind, or are the early and late works compatible?
University of Scranton Professor Andrew LaZella, Ph.D., received a development intercession grant from the University for a research project focused on medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus and his analysis of some of Aristotle’s major works, especially “The Categories.” The project is titled “Univocity, Equivocity, and Proper Concepts in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis.”
Dr. LaZella, an assistant professor in philosophy, said that he researched “in the general area” of this topic for his doctoral dissertation and is excited to delve further into the subject. He said that an interesting part of this project is the difference in Scotus’ ideas in his early works compared to his later writings.
“This is a very early work of (Duns Scotus),” Dr. LaZella said. “The question becomes did he change his mind, or are the early and late works compatible?
Monday, February 6, 2012
New Book
Note: Tobias Hoffmann has updated the Scotus bibliography.
Also,
A new book is out from Brepols, the papers from the 2008 Notre Dame SIEPM conference. It is reasonably priced (for the 700+ pages) at 70 euros.
Here is the blurb and Table of Contents.
Most scholars know that the great universities were the institutional setting of Scholastic philosophical and theological activity in the later Middle Ages. Fewer realize, however, that perhaps far more Scholastic learning in the liberal arts and theology took place in the studia or study-houses of the religious orders, which out-numbered the universities and were more widely distributed across Europe. Indeed, most members of the mendicant orders received most or all of their learning in the liberal arts and theology in the studia of their order, and the most famous members of the orders (e.g., Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus) spent more time teaching in the studia than they did serving as Regent Masters in the university proper. As a consequence, the greater part of later medieval Scholastic literature was produced in the institutional context of the studia of the religious orders. Moreover, there were other significant institutional locifor Scholastic learning and discourse in the later Middle Ages besides the universities and the study-houses, namely the Papal Court—notably the Sacred Palace at Avignon—and several royal courts, for example, the courts of Robert the Wise in Naples and of the Emperor Lewis IV in Munich. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the greatest Scholastic masters at different times taught in, or were associated with, all of these venues. This volume, which originated at the XVth annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale held at the University of Notre Dame (USA) in October 2008, contains essays concerning the study and teaching of philosophy and theology in the studia of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinian Hermits, Carmelites, Benedictines and Cistercians, as well as the intellectual activity at the Papal Court in Rome and Avignon and at various royal courts (London, Naples, Munich).
Kent Emery, Jr., Introduction
I. The Dominicans
Alfonso Maierù, Dominican studia in Spain
Joseph Goering, What the Friars Really Learned at Oxford and Cambridge
Adriano Oliva, OP, L’enseignement des Sentences dans les studia dominicains italiens au XIIIe siècle : l’Alia lectura de Thomas d’Aquin et le Scriptum de Bombolognus de Bologne
Alessandro Palazzo, Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican scholae in the Late Middle Ages: The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen
Guy Guldentops, Struggling with Authority: Durand of Saint-Pourçain on the Origin of Power and on Obedience to the Pope
Fabrizio Amerini, The Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy in the Dominican studia of the Roman Province in the Fourteenth Century
Hester Goodenough Gelber, Blackfriars London: the Late Medieval studiumMaarten J.F.M. Hoenen, How the Thomists in Cologne Saved Aristotle: The Debate over the Eternity of the World in the Late-Medieval Period
II. The FranciscansNeslihan Şenocak, The Franciscan studium generale: A New Interpretation
Luca Bianchi, Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans: Some Preliminary Remarks
Alain Boureau, Enseignement et débat dans les ordres mendiants du XIIIe siècle : Le cas des Quodlibeta de Richard de Mediavilla
William O. Duba, The Legacy of the Bologna studium in Peter Auriol’s Hylomorphism
Sylvain Piron, Les studia franciscains de Provence et d’Aquitaine (1275-1335)
Christopher Schabel and Garrett R. Smith, The Franciscan studium in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century
François-Xavier Putallaz, La peine de mort est-elle légitime ? Le studium franciscain de Cologne s’interroge au XIVe siècle
III. The Augustinians and the CarmelitesGiorgio Pini, Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order
Russell L. Friedman, How ‘Aegidian’ Were Later Augustinian Hermits Regarding Intellectual Cognition? Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa and the Object of the Intellect
Stephen F. Brown, The Early Carmelite Parisian Masters
Wouter Goris, The Critique of the Doctrine of God as First Known in the Early Carmelite School
IV. The Benedictines and the CisterciansThomas Sullivan, OSB, Ut nostra religione refloreat studium: The studia of the Monastic Orders
Amos Corbini, Pierre de Ceffons et l’instruction dans l’Ordre cistercien : quelques remarques
V. The Friars, Philosophy and Theology at Papal and Royal CourtsM. Michèle Mulchahey, The Dominican Studium Romanae Curiae: The Papacy, the Magisterium and the Friars
Jacqueline Hamesse, Les instruments de travail philosophiques et théologiques, témoins de l’enseignement et de l’influence des ordres mendiants à l’époque de la papauté d’Avignon
Patrick Nold, How Influential Was Giovanni di Napoli, OP, at the Papal Court in Avignon?
Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique, question disputée à la cour pontificale d’Avignon ?
Roberto Lambertini, Political Theory in the Making: Theology, Philosophy and Politics at the Court of Lewis the Bavarian
William J. Courtenay, Concluding Remarks
Also,
A new book is out from Brepols, the papers from the 2008 Notre Dame SIEPM conference. It is reasonably priced (for the 700+ pages) at 70 euros.
Here is the blurb and Table of Contents.
Most scholars know that the great universities were the institutional setting of Scholastic philosophical and theological activity in the later Middle Ages. Fewer realize, however, that perhaps far more Scholastic learning in the liberal arts and theology took place in the studia or study-houses of the religious orders, which out-numbered the universities and were more widely distributed across Europe. Indeed, most members of the mendicant orders received most or all of their learning in the liberal arts and theology in the studia of their order, and the most famous members of the orders (e.g., Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus) spent more time teaching in the studia than they did serving as Regent Masters in the university proper. As a consequence, the greater part of later medieval Scholastic literature was produced in the institutional context of the studia of the religious orders. Moreover, there were other significant institutional locifor Scholastic learning and discourse in the later Middle Ages besides the universities and the study-houses, namely the Papal Court—notably the Sacred Palace at Avignon—and several royal courts, for example, the courts of Robert the Wise in Naples and of the Emperor Lewis IV in Munich. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the greatest Scholastic masters at different times taught in, or were associated with, all of these venues. This volume, which originated at the XVth annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale held at the University of Notre Dame (USA) in October 2008, contains essays concerning the study and teaching of philosophy and theology in the studia of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinian Hermits, Carmelites, Benedictines and Cistercians, as well as the intellectual activity at the Papal Court in Rome and Avignon and at various royal courts (London, Naples, Munich).
Kent Emery, Jr., Introduction
I. The Dominicans
Alfonso Maierù, Dominican studia in Spain
Joseph Goering, What the Friars Really Learned at Oxford and Cambridge
Adriano Oliva, OP, L’enseignement des Sentences dans les studia dominicains italiens au XIIIe siècle : l’Alia lectura de Thomas d’Aquin et le Scriptum de Bombolognus de Bologne
Alessandro Palazzo, Philosophy and Theology in the German Dominican scholae in the Late Middle Ages: The Cases of Ulrich of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen
Guy Guldentops, Struggling with Authority: Durand of Saint-Pourçain on the Origin of Power and on Obedience to the Pope
Fabrizio Amerini, The Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy in the Dominican studia of the Roman Province in the Fourteenth Century
Hester Goodenough Gelber, Blackfriars London: the Late Medieval studiumMaarten J.F.M. Hoenen, How the Thomists in Cologne Saved Aristotle: The Debate over the Eternity of the World in the Late-Medieval Period
II. The FranciscansNeslihan Şenocak, The Franciscan studium generale: A New Interpretation
Luca Bianchi, Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans: Some Preliminary Remarks
Alain Boureau, Enseignement et débat dans les ordres mendiants du XIIIe siècle : Le cas des Quodlibeta de Richard de Mediavilla
William O. Duba, The Legacy of the Bologna studium in Peter Auriol’s Hylomorphism
Sylvain Piron, Les studia franciscains de Provence et d’Aquitaine (1275-1335)
Christopher Schabel and Garrett R. Smith, The Franciscan studium in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century
François-Xavier Putallaz, La peine de mort est-elle légitime ? Le studium franciscain de Cologne s’interroge au XIVe siècle
III. The Augustinians and the CarmelitesGiorgio Pini, Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order
Russell L. Friedman, How ‘Aegidian’ Were Later Augustinian Hermits Regarding Intellectual Cognition? Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa and the Object of the Intellect
Stephen F. Brown, The Early Carmelite Parisian Masters
Wouter Goris, The Critique of the Doctrine of God as First Known in the Early Carmelite School
IV. The Benedictines and the CisterciansThomas Sullivan, OSB, Ut nostra religione refloreat studium: The studia of the Monastic Orders
Amos Corbini, Pierre de Ceffons et l’instruction dans l’Ordre cistercien : quelques remarques
V. The Friars, Philosophy and Theology at Papal and Royal CourtsM. Michèle Mulchahey, The Dominican Studium Romanae Curiae: The Papacy, the Magisterium and the Friars
Jacqueline Hamesse, Les instruments de travail philosophiques et théologiques, témoins de l’enseignement et de l’influence des ordres mendiants à l’époque de la papauté d’Avignon
Patrick Nold, How Influential Was Giovanni di Napoli, OP, at the Papal Court in Avignon?
Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique, question disputée à la cour pontificale d’Avignon ?
Roberto Lambertini, Political Theory in the Making: Theology, Philosophy and Politics at the Court of Lewis the Bavarian
William J. Courtenay, Concluding Remarks
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