Cornelisse on the Formal Distinction I

I've always been something of a sucker for the old, pre-vat II manuals. At first, as a new catholic, I appreciated the clarity and appearance of scientific rigour found in them and,faced by the maze of modern theology or perhaps "theologies" perhaps wished those days would return. Of course, at the time I was sympathetic to Thomism and indeed considered myself to be a budding Thomist. Now that my opinions have changed, I have no desire to return to the dark days of the neo-scholastic revival. Dark days in the sense that one can find Thomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange completely distorting and misunderstanding the thought of the Subtle Doctor (of course, it wasn't entirely his fault as the editions were so bad), or Spanish Dominicans claiming that all Catholics were required to give religious assent to every proposition from St. Thomas save where the Thomistic commentary tradition itself is unclear on the meaning of Thomas (Cf. Pelzer's article in one of the early issues of Franciscan Studies). Scotism was present, and even tolerated at this time, but apparently restricted to the Franciscan order. Once and a while I am asked what my beef with these neo-Thomists is, as after all I am sympathetic to their attempts to defend the Faith; essentially, it is the inability to admit any opinion other than that of Thomas Aquinas. The Church herself has only recommended Thomas, and can do little more; the issues on which the various scholastic schools disagree have generally not been settled by a formal determination of the Church; multiple opinions can still be held. Yet when one reads the work of certain theologians whom I have discussed elsewhere, whenever the name of Scotus is mentioned, all one finds is a reduction of his views to a transgression of some canon from a council or the Nicene creed (as if Scotus were just plain stuipid). All was not dark, however, for it is to neo-Scholasticism that we owe the relatively brief flourishing of the scholar-priests who edited and studied so much, laying the foundation for the historical-critical study of medieval philosophy and theology.

Rant aside, we come to the topic of this post, my latest acquisition of a manual from this period of neo-Scholasticism, which joins Perrone, Ott and Tanqueray on my shelves: Dorotheus Cornelisse OFM, Tractatus de Deo uno et trino, Quaracchi 1913. At this point I am not sure if this work constitutes a Scotist manual or not; he does quote quite a bit of Thomas without seeming to disagree with him, though he does criticize the Thomistae. On the analogy-univocity question, or rather the natural knowledge of God question, he endorsed the Dionysian three-fold way of which analogy was a subsection. Univocity did not come in for much comment, as in the Wadding edition prior to Scotus's discussion of this topic one finds the spurious phrase to the effect that Scotus only proposes univocity tentatively as it is against the common opinion. My interest now is on the formal distinction, and I will do a series of posts translating his section on it and commenting on its accuracy in the light of modern research.

A few things to note: We can see here the results of several hundred years of controversy between Thomists and Scotists, as the terminology is rather more developed than either of the founders. Scotus uses a variety of distinctions, but never classified them in such a manner. He does give brief definitions for what he thinks the formal distinction or real distinction is, but the modal distinction in particular was never spelled out by him in great detail (though the example used here are the same; the intensity of whiteness). We also see that the term Garriou was using to describe the formal distinction, the formal-actual distinction, probably comes from renaissance or 19th-century Scotism. Note also the denial that the formal distinction can be conceived of as a variety of real distinction, something disputed by the 14th century Scotists as well as contemporary scholars; a recurring theme in Scotism. Finally, note the absence of the influence of the Reportatio, with its notion of secundum quid distinction.

p. 183 ff (translation by me, and as usual done at great speed):

I. Exponitur terminologia thomistica [footnote to Billuart, Summa summae]

1. Distinction is a lacking of identity.

2. One is real, the other is of reason. The real is "a parte rei independenter ab intellectu'. Of reason or logical is held between those things which are 'not distinct a parte rei, but in concept alone.'

3. The real is greater or lesser: the greater is 'betwen perfect beings', between thing and thing. The lesser or modal is between thing and its mode, for example, between Peter and his standing, or between two modes, for example between sitting and standing.

4. Distinction of reason can be of the reasoning reason [rationis rationcinantis] ='without a foundation in the thing', or of a reasoned reason [rationis rationcinatae] = 'with a foundation in the thing', which in the vulgur is known as virtual. An example of the first is between cicero and cicero [don't ask me what this is, the latin is ciceronem et ciceronem], the second between the justice and mercy of God. This virtual distinction is assigned a double foundation: 1. eminence of a thing identifying many perfections really distinct in lower things to itself and 2. imperfection of our intellect.

5. The virtual distinction is subdivided: one is through the mode of excluding or excluded, and therefore is called also 'exclusive precision' or sometimes a 'greater virtual' distinction: for example, animality and rationality in man; for one does not include the other and vice versa, and they can be really separated in diverse subjects, suppose in a brute and in man. The other is through the mode of including and included, and is called therfore a distinction 'widely precise' or also a 'minor virtual' distinction. This obtains when one concept implicitly is contained in another, for example between the transcendental concepts: being, things, one, something, true, good, or between humanity and rationality or animality in man. According to this, these distinctions are also called 'explicit and implicit' or 'inclusive precision'.

II. Terminologia scotistica [sources referenced here are Scotus' "opus oxienses" and various treatises on the controversies between Thomas and Scotus from the 17th s. on]

1. Distinction is the negation of identity.

2. One distinction is of reason or logic alone, the other is a parte rei. Of reason is that which only has actual being [esse actuale] by the operation of some intellect; a parte rei is what is present without any operation of the intellect [adest etiam secluso omni negotio omnis intellectus].

3. Distinction a parte rei is subdivided. 1. real, between thing and thing, which can obtain in multiple ways: between thing and thing specifically diverse = specific real distinction; between thing and thing only numerically diverse=real numerical distinction; between subject and common accident as between a wall and whiteness; between relation and its foundation as between paternity and generation. 2. Another is formal: between those things of which the defintion or essence is not the same or of which one does not enter into the definition of the other (for example, proper accidents do not enter into the definition of the subject), which are diverse things or that do not have the place of the real distinction [??qui sint res diversae seu quin locum habeat distinctio realis]. 3. The other is modal = between the form of some grade, which is not really in the same subect at the same time, but nevertheless is distinguished a parte rei: for example, in the wall between the grade of this whiteness, in man between knowledge of this grade, in the human soul between the soul or substantial principal of life and the rationality of it. It should be noted here that the modal distinction is easily reduced to the real or formal, according as it is used in an accidental or proper sense. We will not treat about the formal distinction.

III. Distinctio scotistica seu formalis a parte rei

1. Therefore the formal distinction a parte rei obtains between those formalities of which the quiddity or ratio significata by a strict definition, 'before every act of this intellect' or a parte rei, is not the same. These are formalities and it is said 'a parte rei' on account of the reason now given, or also for the sake of brevity alone; but the distinctio formalis a parte rei is never called real, because they are two and under contrary divisions of distinctions a parte rei, which is their genus; just as man never philosophically is called a beast or vice versa, although each is an animal.

2. Formality is said from form; but this is aken in multiple senses: 1. for one part of the composite, i.e. the soul, which is called informing, which the Scotists also call partial with respect to the following; 2 for the form of the whole, i.e. for the total nature in abstract as is humanity; this thefore is called total; 3. for an accidental form as whiteness, knowledge 4. for whatever intelleligible reason (I do not say, understood [intellecta]) which in some object a parte rei is truly present and consequently can be known in it by the intellect and abstracted. The formal distinction is treated concerning these intelligible reasons, either they are substantial or accidental.

3. Three conditions are required for this distinction: a) that those formalities are present actually or formally, i.e. explicitly in themselves ant not only virtually or in a sead, in a root or implicity; as for example, a son is conceived in his parents. B) that those formalities are called something positive; for between being and non being is rather posited a real distinction, or as is sometimes said, non-identity. C) that the formalities mean something proper to the thing; for it is formally the same with another formality, i.e. the wisdom and knowledge of God.

4. The formal distinction is subdivided into mutual and non mutual; that is between those things of which neither in its own formal objective ratio formally includes the other, i.e. between wisdom and goodness; the other is between those things of which one does include the other, but not in turn, i.e. humanity includes rationality, but rationality does not include in its own formal concept humamity, although it supposes it.

Quid est "nolle"

Recently, over a beer, a friend and I got into a dispute about what 'nolle' is supposed to be. I, relying on confused memories of Wolter's book of translations on the will and morality and comments made in class, maintained that the act of nolition, translated by Wolter as "nil" and Marilyn McCord Adams as "to will against", was a positive act. On my view of Scotus, the will can either act or not act, and its action can be either volitional or nolitional. My friend, however, as far as I can recall (this was some time ago) maintained that rather we should translate 'nolle' as to 'not will' something, which denies that it is an action at all. He seemed to identify the ability of the will to act or not act with 'velle' and 'nolle'. At the time, as we were in a bar, it was my word against his and we did not get very far in the debate. I believe that the following texts support my interpretation, though really it was just a matter of looking things up. In any case, it highlights the difficulty in translating this word from latin; my handy little 'words' dictionary renders it as "be unwilling; wish not to; refuse to", all of which support my friends interpretation. This should serve to remind us that while we can laugh at Scotus' bad grammar all we want (this is directed at myself as much as anyone else), we have to keep in mind his specialized uses and invention of technical terminology.

Ordinatio II d.6 n.34: "...dico quod est in communi duplex actus voluntatis, scilicet velle et nolle: est enim 'nolle' actus postivus voluntatis, quo fugit disconveniens sive quo resilit ab obiecto disconveniente; 'velle' autem est actus quo acceptat obiectum aliquod conveniens."

I say in common that there is a double act of the will, namely 'to will' and 'to will against'; for 'willing against' is a positive act of the will, by which it flees the disagreeable or by which it recoils from a disagreeable object. 'Willing, however, is an act by which it accepts some agreeable object.

Reportatio IA d. 1 pars 2 n.40 "Probabile tamen est quod ubi non inveniret defectum aliquem boni non posset illud nolle - qui est actus contrarius ipsi velle, et est actus positivus..."

Nevertheless it is probable that where one does not find some defect of the good one cannot will against it: which is a positive act contrary to that act of willing.

Duns Scotus on the Existence of God

Here is an interesting bit on the proposition "God exists" (Deus est); as we all know, Scotus, like all the other scholastics, argues from effects to a cause in his proof for the existence of God. While the following quote will surprise no one, it is interesting as it sheds some light on what he thinks can be known about this proposition. From Reportatio IA d.2 pars 1 q.3 n.10:

As far as the first question is concerned (Whether some being is simply first), I say that, as was said before, according to no concept possible to us in the wayfaring state per se known [Wolter translates per se nota as "self-evident"] about his existence by a demonstration propter quid, because the middle term for demonstrating existence of him is unknown to us, namely the essence of God as this or deity under the aspect of deity. And therefore this proposition "God exists" is not known per se by us nor known propter quid, nor should we despair of knowing him [I suppose...haec propositio Deus est non est per se nota nec nobis nota propter quid, nec est desperatum a nobis cognosci]. Therefore by a demonstration "quia" alone can he be known by us now, as the middle term is taken from an effect. Relational properties are more immediately known by us in a cause than are absolute properties, because according to relative properties we say that he relates [respicere] to every effect according to the properties of causality and productability; and therefore from properties of this sort we must first establish our thesis [I've paraphrased wolter a bit here...sometimes there just aren't enough verbs!]

Merlin and Giles of Rome

An amusing quote from Aegidius Romanus, which I came across in Pini's article on the Quodlibets of the same, in the Schabel volume p. 249 n.81:

Quodl. I, q.1, Utrum angeli cognoscant futura contingentia. Giles reformulates this question in general terms, i.e. whether angels know contingent future events, but he recollects that the question was posed specifically concerning the knowledge that demons gave to Merlin the Magician. "Et inducebatur haec quaestio propter angelos malos et propter Merlinum. Dicitur enim de Merlino quod ille natus fuerit per auxilium daemonis, ut per artem succuborum et incuborum, et quia ille Merlinus dixit multa contingentia futura quae a multis creditur diabolus eum docuisse, et quia non potuit eum docere nisi ea quae sciret, erat quaestio utrum angelus malus vel diabolus cognoscat futura contingentia.

Natural Reason and Theology

Reportatio IA Prologus q.2 a.2-3 n.221 ff.:

Some random quotes...

I argue against that and make a threefold major. All our natural cognition which we have of God is caused in us by an equivocal effect. Also, all our natural cognition of God is indistinct. Also, it is obscure, which is clear because it is not of an object evident to the intellect according to intellectual existence.

From the first proposition I argue so: all our cognition of God which we have naturally is caused in us by an equivocal effect and is imperfect. But some other cognition, intuitive, which is of him as he exists presently, is possible for us. Therefore from purely natural powers we are not able to arrive at all possible cognition about God.

[...]

Again, from the third proposition it is argued so: what is of perfection in an inferior power is not repugnant to a superior power of the same genus. But it is of perfection in the lower power, sensitive apprehension, to know its object clearly and intuitively in its existence, just as is clear about sight. Therefore this is not repugnant to the intellect with respect to its per se object. God is of this sort, as was shown. Therefore the obscure cognition of him is not the most perfect possible about him.

A.3

From what has been said, the response to the question is clear, namely that some truths can be known about God naturally and some not. For whatever from those things which are nown about God in effects can be known by us by a demonstration "quia" and a posteriori, namley by effect. But many are such which can be known about God from effects, as is clear from the sciences of the philosophers. Many truths are knowable about God which we are not able to know about God by natural reason. Because whatever in a cause cannot be known from those things which are known in effect, cannot be known by us by natural reason. There are many truths knowable about God which are of this sort, as the Trinity of persons and unity of essence and the articles of this sort pertaining to deity, therefore etc. Nevertheless, we can known them supernaturally, as was shown.

[...]

If it is asked further whether theology is maximally one, it is clear that it is because its subject is maximally one. For the subject of the sciences of the philosophers is only one according to reason and apprehension of the intellect, but the subject of this science is maximally singular, indeed it is singularity itself as this deity as this, or this essence as this.

Science and Theology

Ha! Here you thought this would be a post relevent to the world of Today and not about Scotus. Too bad. While researching Scotus's views on the nature of theology and how it is a science in Reportatio I-A, I came across the f0llowing question (and a particularly interesting quotation I shall share below): Utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione deitatis possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris (As Wolter translates it, "Can truths that are knowable per se of God as deity be kown by the intellect of the pilgrim?"). Scotus begins the question with a discussion of Thomas' view that our theology is subalternated to the theology of the blessed in the beatific vision. The principles of the science of theology are not known in the science itself, but are had by the blessed; in this life, they are only believed, not known. Scotus makes five or six arguments against this position which I won't go into here, though they are interesting. Scotus also runs through the debate between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines about Henry's view that theologians have a certain lumen medium by which they know theological truths. As Godfrey (according to Scotus) had used one argument of Averroes against the Christians against Henry's list of saints, Scotus says he ought to be more derided than Henry, even though Henry's position is a bit crazy too. So, Scotus thinks they're both wrong.

His own view is that many truths knowable per se by the wayfarer can be known, not only a posteriori but also a priori, "under the aspect of deity by a form of cognition that is superior and more noble than any knowledge by faith". He proves one part of this by saying that an intellect able to understand a subject under the aspect of a subject [ie the subject of a science] can understand a principle virtually included in the subject, and further conclusions contained in a principle, because as the term of the subject is the cause of the principle so is the principle the cause of a conclusion. The object of the science of theolgy Scotus thinks can be known by means of abstractive cognition (as distinguished against intuitive).

The second part of his position, that the cognition the wayfarer has of God under the aspect of deity is more perfect and more certain than all cognition of faith, Scotus supports with the claim that whatever God can do by means of a second cause, he can do per se efficiently without it. But God by the mediation of some object can cause certain knowledge and certain assent so that the will is not able to dissent. Therefore God can do this per se without a medium (Scotus is thinking of the prophets here, who couldn't dissent from what was revealed to them. apparently).

Now comes the interesting part, and our quote for the evening:

"From this I infer two conclusions. The first is that in the cognition of God there are five grades. The first is to know truths intuitively, truths which are knowable about God and knowable distinctly by the notion of the subject known intuitively and distinctly, and that grade is not commonly possible to the wayfarer. The second grade is to know something certitudinally in something representatively distinctly known, and that grade is possible for a wayfarer. The third grade is to know something with certitude so that its certitude is not subject ot an actof the will, and that grade was in the prophets. The fourth grade is to know explicitly those things which are contained in the Scriptures by which brings pious aid and defends agains the impious by knowing how the solve the doubts of others and to fortify them with good arguments, and that grade is of the great ones in the church ['maiorum':Wolter translates this as elders]. The fifth grade is to know those things which are necessary for salvation, which is of the simple ones, because they are not able to search through all things contained in scripture."

The second conclusion he derives is that the light Henry talks about is not something that comes with extended study, but is there by a supernatural infusion who possesses it as a free gift to the intellect. Which is about as much as I've seen Scotus ever grant to the notion of divine illumination.

Ordinatio I d. 22: On the Divine Names

[distinctio 22, quaestio unica

Whether God is namable by us by some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a “this”]

Concerning distinction twenty-two I ask whether God is nameable by us wayfarers by some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a “this”

[I. Opinion of others]

It is said that just as God is understood by us, so he is able also to be named by us. According to the diverse ways some people think about the cognition of God by the intellect of a wayfarer, consequently they speak in different ways about naming God—and those who deny a common univocal concept between God and creatures and posit two analogous concepts (of which each one, which is of a creature, is attributed to the other, namely, to that one which is of God) will say because of this that God is nameable by a wayfarer by a name expressing that analogous concept.

But I argue specially against that opinion, because every real possible concept that can be had of the divine essence, comes to be in the intellect by the power of that essence (which is proved, because also any minimal intelligible object, naturally makes every real concept that can possibly be had of it); but according to them, only a single concept can be had of the divine essence by its power, although the intellect considering [negotians] can cause and fabricate many concepts concerning that object; therefore, whatever object makes some knowledge of God in our intellect, will make-according to that opinion—a concept of it as it is “this essence”, and so it will be nameable by a wayfarer by a name signifying “this essence” as it is a “this”.

[II. Scotus’s response]

It can be said to the question, briefly, that that proposition common to many opinions—namely that ‘just as it is understood, so also it is named’—is false if understood precisely, because something is able to be signified more distinctly than it can be understood.

Which seems to be persuaded by this, that since substance is not intelligible by a wayfarer unless in the common concept of being (just as was proved in distinction 3), if it cannot be more distinctly signified than understood, no name imposed by a wayfarer would signify some thing of the genus of substance, but just as some property from which a name is imposed is conceived precisely by the intellect of the wayfarer (which property commonly is expressed by the etymology of the name), so precisely such a property would be signified by a name: for example, by the name of stone something of the genus of substance would not be signified, but only something from the genus of action, such as “wounding of the foot”, which the etymology expresses and from which the name was imposed.

And so it can be argued about all other names, with things from the genus of substance having been imposed, because none of them signify something except some accidental property which is understood by the one imposing—or it is necessary to say that a name signifies more distinctly than the one positing it understood.

This may be possible in such a way, it can be understood so, according to the way of Augustine VI De trinitate c.6, in which he proves there to be composition in every creature. For many accidents are conceived by some, concurring in the same, supposes such quantity and such quality, --and neither of those is proved to be the other, because each of them remains without the other; each of those is proved also to have a common subject [??utrique illorum aliquid aliud esse subiectum commune], because each of them can be destroyed with the other not destroyed: therefore something is concluded to be the subject of each, as quality and quantity,--that however which is underneath [subest], is not conceived in a quidditative concept except of being, or of ‘this being’. And when frequently it comes about that such quantity and such quality are joined in something and elsewhere they are not conjoined, and this is not from the nature of quality and quantity, as it was shown—it is concluded that this is from the nature of that third, in which both of those are founded. Not however are things so much joined in that total, as much as in that: for from which they are joined in different ways in diverse things, it is concluded that the substrate of these is different from the substrate of those, and from this it is concluded that this is another from another third. But those others, so distinct (whatever that may be which is joined with them, which are being understood), imposing a name to something. That seems to be the proper sign of “this”, under the aspect which it is “this”, so that by imposing a name, one intends to signify that essence of the genus of substance: and just as one intends to signify, so the name which he imposes is a sign, and nevertheless he does not understand that distinctly, which he intends to signify distinctly by this name or this sign.

Example: is someone were to impose hebrew characters, unaware of hebrew utterances in particular—nevertheless knowing that some utterance is first and some second and some third, he would impose so “something is first, and whatever that is, I intend that it be signified by such a name and such a character’ those characters would be signs of those hebrew utterances, which some hebrew would distinctly know the objects of such signs, a non hebrew however even if he should understand what was being signified by those figures, would not understand that distinctly, but only under the aspect of the first utterance or the second.

Briefly, therefore, it can be said that at least many names are imposed which signify God in common, because so he can be naturally conceived by a wayfarer, as appears in distinction 3; or if it is true that he ‘can be signified more distinctly than conceived’, God can be named by a wayfarer by a name signifying ‘this essence’.

Whatever the case may be about this, it is similar to name God by such a name, and this or that name is imposed by God himself, or by an angel knowing him, or by a wayfarer. For it is similar that there are many names in scripture, signifying that essence distinctly—just as the jews say about the name of God which they call “Tetragrammaton”, and God seems to say in EX. 3: “Say this to the sons of Israel: He who is, sent me to you,’ that is, this is my name; an elsewhere, “I am the God of Abraham,” etc., “this is my name” and “I have not shown my great name of Adonai to them”.

Therefore God is nameable by a wayfarer signifying by a proper name the divine essence as it is ‘this essence’, because the wayfarer can use that sign and intend to express the signified of that sign, or he imposed that sign or another one who knew the signified; and by such a sign or name the wayfarer can use it as a name, although he is not able to impose it as a sign. And if that proposition would be true that ‘no name can be imposed to something more distinctly than it can be understood,’ this is false because ‘no one can use a name, more distinctly signifying a thing, than he himself can understand’ and therefore it must be granted that the wayfarer can use many names, expressing the divine essence under the aspect of the divine essence.

Change--Yes We Can!

Apologies to our legions of adoring fans for not giving you more of what you want--the golden medium aevum, philosophy, theology, and Latin!--and instead wasting precious electrons on politics and the Renaissance. But I read this bit today and in light of the political spirit of the age it seemed so appropriate that I had to share:

To my mind, in public affairs there is no course so bad, provided it is old and stable, that it is not better than change and commotion. Our morals are extremely corrupt, and lean with a remarkable inclination toward the worse; of our laws and customs, many are barbarous and monstrous; however, because of the difficulty of improving our condition and the danger of everything crumbling to bits, if I could put a spoke in our wheel and stop it at this point, I would do it with all my heart . . . The worst thing I find in our state is instability, and the fact that our laws cannot, any more than our clothes, take any settled form. It is very easy to accuse a government of imperfection, for all mortal things are full of it. It is very easy to engender in a people contempt for their ancient observances; never did a man undertake that without succeeding. But as for establishing a better state in place of the one they have ruined, many of those who have attempted it have achieved nothing for their plans.

--Michel de Montaigne, "Of Presumption"

Thomas and Trinitarian Terminology

In a comment to the last post, Mr Robinson says:

I don't think I claimed the subordinating relation was one of concrete particular to abstract generality. It strikes me as odd to think that the scholastics in general thought of the divine ousia as an abstract object, let alone Augustine. Of course, you might want to look at what Aquinas has to say about the relation of the persons to the essence. One swallow does not make a spring.

I have several issues with this. 1) "The scholastics in general" and "one swallow does not make a spring" seems to indicate that Mr Robinson thinks that Scotus is in a serious minority on this issue. Unfortunately 2) having denied my representation of his view, Mr Robinson doesn't clarify what that view is, so it's unclear exactly what Scotus is in the minority on. 3) He directs me to "look at what Aquinas has to say about the relation of the persons to the essence." At what, exactly? I have to guess which text and which opinion of Aquinas' he takes issue with. I admit I don't know which he means. Presumably it has to do with his view that "the scholastics in general thought of the divine ousia as an abstract object" (I'm leaving Augustine out of this for now. Not enough time to get into that).

Of course it's pretty difficult to talk of what "the scholastics in general" thought about a difficult theological issue. When one reads a lot of them one notices that they tend to frequently disagree. What is clear, however, is that none of them "thought of the divine ousia as an abstract object". I hate to have to point this out, but they thought and wrote in Latin, and the slippery transfer between technical Greek words and technical Latin words among people who only spoke one or the other is a prime cause of misunderstanding. We shouldn't say anything about what Latin theologians thought about "the divine ousia" without being extremely careful to say just what we mean by "ousia" in Latin terms.

Thomas does so in a text in which he's discussing the relation of the persons to the essence, Summa theologiae, prima pars, Q.29 A.2, Utrum persona sit idem quod hypostasis, subsistentia et essentia. Thomas carefully distinguishes between a number of terms which might be used in place of it "ousia".

Substantia dicitur duplicter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei: quam quidem substantiam Graeci "usiam" vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. --Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. Et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem: et sic dicitur suppositum. Nominatur etiam tribus nominibus significantibus rem, quae quidem sunt res naturae, subsistentia et hypostasis, secundum triplicem considerationem substantiae sid dictae . . . hypostasis, apud Graecos, ex propria significatione nominis habet quod significet quodcumque individuum substantiae . . . Sed quia nomen substantiae, quod secundum proprietatem significationis respondet hypostasi, aequivocatur apud nos, cum quandoque significet essentiam, quandoque hypostasim; ne possit esse erroris occasio, maluerunt pro hypostasi transferre subsistentiam, quam substantiam.

Thomas does, therefore, conceive of "ousia" as "abstract" (I will not admit the phrase "an abstract object" unless what this means is clarified), if by "ousia" we mean the essence in the sense of quod quid erat esse, what is signified by the definition. But of course a definition is an abstraction! Is signifies what God is but not who God is, i.e. it points out what it means to be God but not any specific divine hypostasis. But this is no way implies that the divine essence or nature is conceived of as some "abstract object" somehow existing above or prior to any of the divine persons. Rather, a divine person simply is this subsistent supposit of the divine nature, the "who" (or, if you like the "this") whose "what" is defined by the essence. When we speak of the divine nature or essence we're speaking of God without speaking of any given person--but this does not imply that Thomas thinks the essence is any thing other than the persons. He certainly doesn't.

God in general?

It's been a long time since I've had an actual argument with the "Energetic Procession" folks, but thinking about their silliness still rankles me, I confess, especially when one of their dubious opinions is brought to mind by something I happen to be reading. One of these opinions is that the Latin tradition of understanding the Trinitarian Persons as subsistent relations subordinates the concrete Persons to an abstract "God in general" of the philosophers. Not so! As our Blessed Scot points out. "Intellecutus non convertitur nisi ut est in aliquo supposito, quia conversio ponitur actio, et actiones sunt suppositorum." I was struck by this remark in Ordinatio I dist. 2 pars 2 Q. 1-4 para. 285 when I came across it, but even more so by the following:

Ubi notandum est quod natura non se habet ad suppositum sicut universale ad singulare, quia in accidentibus etiam invenitur singularitas sine ratione suppositi, et in substantia nostra natura atoma assumpta est a Verbo, secundum Damascenum, non tamen suppositum nostrae naturae. Neque se habet natura ad suppositum sicut 'quo' ad 'quod', nam cuicumque 'quo' correspondet proprium 'quod' vel 'quis', ita habet proprium 'quod' vel 'quis' quod non contrahit ad suppositum, et sicut suppositum est 'quod' vel 'quis', ita habet suum proprium 'quo' quo subsistit et tamen concomitanter suppositum de necessitate est singulare,--et etiam, non potest esse 'quo' respectu alterius, quia est subsistens, non potens esse actus alicuius subsistentis; haec duo dicunt duplicem incommunicabilitatem.

"Whence it must be noted that the nature is not related to a supposit as universal to singular, since singularity is found even in accidents without them being a supposit [sine ratione suppositi], and in our substance an atomic [individual] nature is assumed by the Word, according to the Damascene, but not, however, a supposit of our nature. Neither is nature related to supposit as 'quo' to 'quod', for to any 'quo' [by which] corresponds its own 'quod' [what] or 'quis' [who], and so, as the nature is the 'quo', so it has its own 'quod' or 'quis' which does not contract to a supposit, and as a supposit is 'quod' or 'quis', so it has its own 'quo' by which it subsists and nevertheless at the same time [concomitanter] a supposit is necessarily singular;--and also, it is not able to be 'quo' with respect to another, for it is subsistent, not able to be the act of some [other] subsistent; these two bespeak a double incommunicability."

--Ordinatio I dist. 2 pars 2 Q. 1-4 para.378.

The Divine Nature which the three Persons share is not abstract but concrete and singular, as are each of the three Persons themselves. This Nature is not "prior" to the supposits, nor does it act, for only supposits act. The Persons act through their Nature; but the Nature is not without qualification absolutely identical to any or all of the Persons, for if it were identical to, say, the Father, it could not be identical to the Son without contradiction. But it is certainly not something other than the Persons. Hence the need for the formal distinction--matter for a later post.

Wow.

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Ash Wednesday

Hodie, dilectissimi, sacrum Quadragesimae tempus ingredimur, tempus militiae chrisitanae. Non nobis est singularis haec observatio: una omnium est, quicumque in eadem fidei conveniunt unitatem. Quidni commune sit Christi ieiunium omnibus christianis? Quidni Caput suum membra sequantur? Si bona suscepimus ab hoc Capite, mala autem quare non sustineamus? An respuere tristia volumus, et communicare iucundis? Si ita est, indignos nos Capitis huius participatione probamus. Omne enim quod patitur ille, pro nobis est. Quod si in opere salutis nostrae ei collaborare piget, in quo deinceps coadiutores nos exhibebimus illi? Non est magnum si ieiunet cum Christo, qui sessurus est ad mensam Patris cum ipso, non est magnum, si compatitur membrum capiti, cum quo et glorificandum est. Felix membrum, quod huic adhaeserit per omnia Capiti, et sequetur illud quocumque ierit. . . . Mihi omnino adhaerere tibi bonum est, o Caput gloriosum et benedictum in saecula, in quod et angeli prospicere concupiscunt. Sequar te quocumque ieris: si transieris per ignem, non evellar a te nec timebo mala, quoniam tu mecum est. Tu dolores meos portas, et pro me doles; tu prius transis per angustum passionis foramen, ut latum praebeas sequentibus membris ingressum.

Today we enter the holy time of Lent, the time of Christian battle. This observance is not undertaken by us piecemeal: it is one and the same for all, for whoever convene in the same unity of faith. And why should the fast of Christ not be common for all Christians? Why should the members not follow the Head? If we receive good things from this head, why should we not receive evil ones? Should we refuse sad things, and share in the pleasant ones? If so, we prove ourselves unworthy of participation in this Head. For all that he suffers is for us. Shall it irk us to collaborate with him in the work of our salvation, in which we show ourselves to be co-helpers with him? It is no great thing if we fast with Christ, we who are to sit with him at the table of the Father, it is no great thing if the member suffers along with the head, with whom it is also to be glorified. Happy the member who cleaves through all things to the Head, and follows him wherever he goes. . . . It is good for me to cleave wholly unto you, O Head glorious and blessed forever, whom even the angels long to behold. I shall follow you wherever you go: if you pass through the fire, I shall not be torn from you, nor shall I fear any evil, for you are with me. You bear my griefs, and you grieve for me; you first cross through the narrow passageway of suffering, that you might provide the broad entryway to the members following you.

--St Bernard, In Quadragesima Sermo 1

Speaking of Essentially Ordered Causes . . .

Faber's last post reminded me of a bit I whipped up some time ago along similar lines. It's not a straight quote from the Latin, but our readers may or may not appreciate having a bit of extrapolation and analysis. Anyway here it is. Sorry if its non-scholarly tone and lacks of references seems to bring down our level somewhat.

Someone asked me "Is the efficient cause [of a house] the builder, or the force he directs in his hammer blows?" This was a good question because it pointed to the need for a kind of distinction between causes that Aristotle does not provide. There seem to be (at least) two efficient causes of the house, the builder and the hammer; the builder seems further removed from the application of force to the materials, and yet he also seems more responsible for the result. How to class these kinds of efficient causality?

Now consider a chain of builders. Bob the builder has a son who became a builder named Rob, who has a son named Nob, also a builder in what is becoming the traditional family profession. Bob is the efficient cause of Rob, and Rob is the efficient cause of Nob; so, remotely, Bob is the efficient cause of Nob as well, and Rob can only cause Nob because Bob first caused Rob. But this causal chain Bob-Rob-Nob seems different from the causal chain Bob-hammer-house. What's the difference?

Duns Scotus (surprise!) gives what I think is an excellent answer in postulating a distinction between essentially ordered causal chains and accidentally ordered causal chains.

This is not the same distinction Aristotle makes in Book II of Physics in which he separates essential causes (the builder builds the house) from accidental causes (the musical man builds the house). So far as I know the present distinction does not appear in Aristotle and may have originated with Scotus, though I could be wrong on the latter point.

Essentially ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered ones, according to Scotus, in three ways:

1) In essentially ordered causes a second cause (such as the hammer) depends for its causality on the first (the builder), but in accidentally ordered causes a second cause (such as Rob) does not depend for its causal power on the first (namely, Bob). That is, the hammer causes the house to be built and the brush causes the portrait to be painted, but neither could do so without the builder or the painter causing its causality. Without Da Vinci causing the brush to cause the painting, the Mona Lisa would not get painted. Brushes and hammers cause paintings and houses, but only because people cause them to so cause. On the other hand, Bob does not cause Rob's causing of Nob. Bob shouldn't even be there when Rob begets Nob (boy would that be embarrassing!). Bob caused his son's existence by begetting him, but Bob does not cause his son's generative act. So Bob the grandfather's causation of his grandson Nob is accidentally ordered, unlike Bob the builder's causation of the house, which is essentially ordered.

2) In essentially ordered causes the causality of the first cause (such as the builder) is of a "superior and more perfect" kind than that of the second (such as the hammer), but this is not so in accidentally ordered causes. Da Vinci's causation of the Mona Lisa, or of his brush's causation, is of an essentially higher and better kind than his brush's causation. He could have used some other brush to cause the painting, but with another painter that brush could not have caused that painting. On the other hand, Bob causes Rob in just the same way that Rob causes Nob, i.e. by biological generation. Bob does not have a higher kind of causality just because he comes earlier in the chain.

3) In essentially ordered causes all the causes in the chain are simultaenously required to produce the final effect, whereas in accidentally ordered causes they are not. For the Mona Lisa to come to be there must be a) Da Vinci, b) his brush, c) paint on the brush, d) etc., all simultanously working in their various ways in order to produce the colored canvas. Without any of these elements cooperating with the rest the painting would not happen. Da Vinci could be painting the air, or moving a dry brush across the canvass, with the exact same motions, but would not cause the painting. Whereas even if Bob is dead Rob can cause Nob. Bob has done his job in causing Rob and no further causation is required on his part for Nob to come to be.

It should be clear that this distinction is not an alternative to the Aristotelian four-cause model of causality, but an amplification of it. It gets at real differences in the way things happen that merely picking out the efficient, formal, material, and final types of causality does not, for something can be efficiently caused by more than one cause and in more than one way. Similarly things can have more than one final cause, or end, or for-the-sake-of-which, which can be ordered to each other in different ways. There are layers or levels in the materials and forms of which things are constituted. This kind of additional distinguishing is not mere logic-chopping or excessive subtlety, but an attempt to refine one's explanatory apparatus of what is after all a complicated reality.

Concurrent Causality

An important distinction in Scotus, that of concurrent causality, whereby two causes cooperate in some effect. Here is a discussion of several types of this. This crops up for the intellect (agent intellect operating in conjunction with object/phantasm) and the will (will and intellect essentially coordered to an act of volition).

Ord. I d. 3 pars 3 q. 2

"Qualiter autem hoc sit intelligendum, distinguo de pluribus causis concurrentibus ad eundem effectum.

Quaedam enim ex aequo concurrunt, sicut duo trahentes aliquod idem corpus. Quaedam non ex aequo, sed habentes ordinem essentialem, et hoc dupliciter: vel sic quod superior moveat inferiorem, ita quod inferior non agit nisi quia mota ex superiore, et quandoque causa talis inferior habet a superiore virtutem illam seu formam qua movet, quandoque non, sed formam ab alio, et a causa superiore solam motionem actualem, ad producendum effectum; quandoque autem superior non movet inferiorem, nec dat ei virtutem qua movet, sed superior de se habet virtutem perfectiorem agendi, et inferior habet virtutem imperfectiorem agendi. Exemplum primi membri huius divisionis: de potentia motiva quae est in manu, et baculo et pila; exemplum secundi: si mater ponatur habere virtutem activam in generatione prolis, illa et potentia activa patris concurrunt ut duae causae partiales, ordinatae quidem, quia altera perfectior reliqua; non tamen imperfectior recipit suam causalitatem a causa perfectiore, nec tota illa causalitas est eminenter in causa perfectiore, sed aliquid addit causa imperfectior, in tantum quod effectus potest esse perfectior a causa perfectiore et imperfectiore quam a sola perfectiore.

Monsters

Qualiter debeat baptizari monstrum nascens cum duobus capitibus.

1. Quaeritur secundo de baptizatione monstri nascentis cum duobus capitibus, qualiter debeat baprizari, utrum sicut unus aut sicut duo.

2. Et videtur quod sicut duo: Quia ubi duo capita, ibi duo corda, quia membra sunt sibi correspondentia. Ergo, si sint duo capita, debent baptizari ut duo.

3. Contra: Monstra nascuntur aliquando cum 24 digitis et cum aliis organis multiplicatis, et tamen non est ibi nisi una anima rationalis. Ergo a simili potest esse in capitibus duobus.

4. [Responsio] Quando monstrum nascitur, aut certum est duas esse animas rationales, aut non. Certum autem est, si sint duo capita et duo colla et duo pectora, erunt per consequens duo corda. In tali casu, sunt baptizandi ut duo. Et quamvis praesumatur quod plures possint simul baptizari dicendo 'ego baptizo vos' etc., tutius tamen est eos baptizare sigillatim. Amplius si est dubium, verbi gratia, si non sint duo capita bene distincta vel duae cervices fundatae in eadem nuca, tunc primo baptizandus est unus, et deinde, illo baptizato, potest aliter dubie baptizari dicendo 'si non es baptizatus, ego baptizo te' etc.

5. Ad obiectum dicendum quod non est simile de monstris omnibus.

"The question concerns the baptism of a monster born with two heads: how should it be baptized, as one or as two?

And it seems that as two: for where there are two heads, there are two hearts, because the members correspond to each other. Therefore, if there are two heads, they should be baptized as two.

But on the contrary, sometimes monsters are born with 24 digits and with other multiple organs, and yet there is only one rational soul there. Therefore there can be a similar case with two heads.

[Response] When a monster is born, either it is certain that there are two rational souls or not. It is certain if there are two heads and two necks and two chests; there will be consequently two hearts. In such a case, they are to be baptized as two. And although it might be presumed that several [people] can be baptized at once by saying 'I baptize you' etc., nevertheless it is safer to baptize them each in turn. If there is a greater doubt, for instance if there are not two heads sufficiently distinct or two necks rooted in the same [trunk?], then the first is to be baptized as one, and then, he being baptized, the other can be conditionally baptized by saying 'if you are not baptized, I baptize you' etc.

To the objection it must be said that not all monsters are the same."

--John Peckham, Quodlibet II Q. 24.

I have to admit, that last line really sells it for me.