Thursday, February 16, 2023

Conference on Scotism and Platonism, May 2023

Announcing a conference on the interrelations between Scotism and Platonism, Bonn 2023. I hope to see you there! note that you can also attend via zoom.



7 comments:

Wesley C said...

Does anyone here know what Scotus believed about God knowing creation posterior to its existence?

I've recently wondered this when thinking of how Genesis 1 repeatedly says God did something and then SAW it & said it was good. This seeing seems to imply knowledge in God that is posterior to creation's very existence.

What's the Scotist position on this, if anyone knows?

Garrett said...

I think the genesis account can't be literal, otherwise there would be change in the divine knowledge. For Scotus one could say that the definition of a divine idea is that it is the creature as known (creatura intellecta), which could entail the existence of the creature. or perhaps the creature is represented with its existence by the divine essence.

Wesley C. said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Wesley C. said...

@Garrett Well obviously God isn't temporal, and so Genesis 1 isn't saying God's seeing is
temporally posterior to creation's existence. But I think this leaves open the option that God knows the existence of creation posteriorly (or perhaps simultaneously?) with its existence?

Because God's knowledge of creation isn't just of the abstract idea of creatures and His choice to create them - it also includes knowing that they have being since they possess being, and even perhaps knowing their very being in some way.

I seem to recall Scotus saying God knows creatures directly and immediatly, not through His essence; this was criticised by many of the other Scholastics, while others either agreed or didn't have a problem with it (like Suarez).

Maybe Scotus's insistence on God knowing creatures directly, instead of through Himself, could be applied to their very being once they possess that being? Of course God doesn't know it temporally, but it's still a direct knowledge OF the being creatures have, which wouldn't be the case if they didn't exist.

What do you think?

Garrett said...

i don't think scotus held that God knows creatures directly in the sense you describe. god is always there looking, creatures come and go in being, God's knowledge would then change, or be false (Scotus would accept the basic theory of divine knowledge from Met. XII). His theory of instants of nature is sort of like the Themistian 'glance' of the divine mind to creatures and back, a growing or exapnsion of the divine vision beyond the essence to include creatures. But how God knows an actually existing creature for Scotus at least I think is that god knows the creatre as a representation or possible from the divine essence, actualizes the creature in real being via the divine will, and then knows the acts of the divine will through the divine intellect.

Wesley C. said...

@Garrett Couldn't one propose an externalist theory of knowledge here? Where for God to know created beings directly doesn't imply an intrinsic modification in God; rather, God's knowledge is constituted by being in a relation to the created, which is extrinsic to God, yet also at the same time truly vivid & complete?

For example, on an unmediated theory of vision, our seeing a red object in front of us doesn't modify our minds or eyes in any way, rather it's just us being in a relation to the red object - our minds truly go out / are in contact with the external world. This model of sight is unmediated and direct, but also doesn't imply there being any intrinsic modifications corresponding to or being caused by the red thing, like a belief that the red things is in front of us.

Some call this type of direct unmediated knowledge, knowledge-by-acquaintance as well, and it's also considered non-propositional.

Some Thomists, such as Norris Clarke, have also written that the relation of God to creation is an intentional one - where the intentionality terminates God's actions towards creation by the intentional act to sustain their existence, without this implying any change in God's being, or an acquiring of an accident. Similar to how our own free will is self-moving and produces acts of willing without this changing our substance.

I think the unmediated externalist view of knowledge could allow for God directly knowing creatures in principle - is there anything in Scotism though similar to such a view? Could one combine it with a Scotist view of divine knowledge?

Wesley C. said...

One last question, unrelated to unmediated or externalist knowledge - how does Scotism generally view God's knowledge of created beings AS EXISTING being?

Because from what you said, God doesn't just know the essence or formality of creatures, but also knows that they exist, IF they happen to exist, which is of course due to God sustaining them.

Is it just God knowing His act of bringing creatures into being along with it being efficacious because God's omnipotence can't fail to produce effects, or is it something more? And even if God knows existing creatures by knowing Himself, couldn't this still leave open the possibility God truly knows the existing being of creatures as it actually is, just through knowing Himself as the medium, but still knowing the SUSTAINED BEING of the object of His knowledge, which is creation?