Friday, November 30, 2018
Petrus Thomae's De ente: Prologue
Here is a translation of the prologue from the Quaestiones de ente, the critical edition of which was recently published here.
[Quaestiones de ente]
Just as the Philosopher says in I Physics chapter 7, “first according to nature we say common things and thence speculate about proper things.” For with common things unknown, so also are proper things unknown, according to him elsewhere, and therefore “it is necessary to proceed from universals into singulars,” from I Physics chapter 1. Since therefore the transcendentals are the most common, it is opportune to treat something of them for the acquisition of scientific knowledge; among the transcendentals being itself holds the first and chief place, as will be seen below. And therefore, in order to acquire knowledge of the transcendentals, we will procede in this order: first we will inquire about the concept of being, second about what follows [consequentibus] it, third about the first parts of being.
Concerning the first [part] we proceed thus:
First we ask whether the concept of being is known per se or is knowable from others
Second whether the concept of being is quidditative
Third whether the concept of being is maximally first
Fourth whether being has a proper concept distinct from the concept of every special being
Fifth whether the argument from a certain and doubtful concept concludes necessarily
Sixth whether among quidditative concepts only the concept of being is irreducibly simple
Seventh whether true analogy and true univocity are compatible in the same concept
Eighth whether the concept of being is one only by a unity of equivocation
Ninth whether the concept of being is one only by a unity of confusion
Tenth wehther the concept of being is one by a unity of univocity
Eleventh whether the univocity of the concept of being is real
Twelfth whether being is predicated ‘in quid’ of its proper attributes
Thirteenth whether being is predicated ‘in quid’ of ultimate differences
Fourteenth whether the concept of being is immediately contractible by some differences
Fifteenth whether there can be something univocal to real being and being of reason.