This is a follow-up to the post on the pseudo-Francis. Here I will give (in translation) a series of 12 propositions and six corollaries that Peter Thomae gives in his Quaestiones de modis distinctionum. This work was written in the late 1320's at Barcelona, and is devoted to teasing out the meaning of the various kinds of distinctions in use among the scholastics, as well as defending Scotus from the first generation of critics (such as Hervaeus Natalis, Gerardus Boloniensis, and Peter Auriol). Note that I give only the statement of the proposition, not the defense of it. In the last corollary Peter attacks Francis of Mayronis' definition of an intrinsic mode, which was accurately reported by the pseudo-Francis, to wit, an intrinsic mode is that which supervenes on a quiddity without changing its formal definition.
Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de modis distinctionum, q. 11 a. 1 (cf. Naples, BN, Ms. VIII.F.17, f. 83vb-84ra):
Propositions:
1. An intrinsic mode is in itself in the thing from the nature of the thing (mous intrinsecus est in se in re ex natura rei).
2. An intrinsic mode is not formally a second intention.
3. An intrinsic mode is not formally a quiddity of a thing or part of a quiddity, for if so, therefore every quiddity would be a mode or composed from modes, which is not fitting.
4. An intrinsic mode is not formally a reality, for there is some reality which is not an intrinsic mode, therefore etc.
5. An intrinsic mode is properly in respect to a formality, for a thing is that which it is by means of a formality.
6. An intrinsic mode is not formally a negation, since no negation is intrinsic to something positive; but an intrinsic mode is intrinsic to the thing of which it is the mode; therefore etc.
7. An intrinsic mode is not formally something relative nor something absolute.
8. An intrinsic mode is formally not a grade of intention or remission, because if it were, only that which admits of intension would have an intrinsic mode, which is false.
9. An intrinsic mode is not formally a quantity or magnitude of power as some say.
10. An intrinsic mode does not formally limit something to a certain genus.
11. An intrinsic mode is transcendent [i.e. super-categorical]
12. An intrinsic mode of a thing is a certain positive and transcendent ratio which neither is a quiddity nor part of a quiddity (all these conditions can be elicited from the previous propositions).
Corollaries:
1. An intrinsic mode of a thing has a proper concept.
2. A proper concept of an intrinsic mode is not quidditative but modificative.
3. The ratio of a difference cannot be taken from an intrinsic mode.
4. An intrinsic mode is inseparable in actual existence from the thing of which it is, for it exists things intrinsically, and according to its intimacy [intimitatem], on account of which is impossible that the intrinsic mode be separated from the thing of which it is in actual existence.
5. The statement of the ones saying that an intrinsic mode is that which does not have a precise concept from that of which it is is not true, since indeed it has a proper concept according to which it can be conceived without the thing of which it is a mode being conceived.
6. The statement of those saying that an intrinsic mode is that which supervening on something does not change its formal ratio is not true. For an intrinsic mode is not of the thing of which it is supervening, rather it is prevening, at least by the mode of conceiving, since it has a contracted ratio. Second, because if it did, then that mode would not be intrinsic but accidental, and so there would be an intrinsic mode of that, which is false, etc.
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