Praeterea, quae necessitas distinguendi inter voluntatem quam ponit principium eliciendi actum, et naturam quam ponit coassistere voluntati elicienti, si tantum est inter ista distinctio rationis, sicut videtur alibi sentire de distinctione attributorum in divinis?
"Furthermore, how is it necessary to distinguish between the will which he posits as the principle of eliciting the act, and the nature which he posits as co-assisting the eliciting will, if there is only a distinction of reason between the two, as it seems elsewhere to think is the case with the divine attributes in God?"
So Henry makes a distinction between two principles in one place, and in another place says or implies that the distinction is only a distinction of reason and not something in reality, negating the explanatory force the distinction had in the first place.
I bring this up because I've seen Henry pull this exact same move in another context. In his Quodlibet IV.16, on spiritual composition, he says that there are various distinct principles in the angels which can account for its real non-simplicity. In order to make sense of the relevant distinctions he sends the reader to his Summa, where he makes a number of relevant distinctions, ranks them in a hierarchy of more and less compositive, and then ruins the whole thing by making it clear that they are all merely intentional distinctions. So where's the real composition?
I haven't read enough Henry to see if he does this sort of thing all the time, but it's pretty fishy.