Ex praedictis concludo corollarie, primo quod veritas formaliter est in re, nam veritas et entitas convertuntur: cum ergo entitas sit in re formaliter, ergo et veritas. Secundo, quod veritas non est formaliter secunda intentio. Tertio, quod veritas non est formaliter et completive id quod est per intellectum, ut ponit Thomas, Parte I, quaestione 16. Quarto, quod veritas non est essentialiter in intellectu tantum, ut dicit Godefridus. Quinto, quod non habet tantummodo esse obiective in intellectu, ut dicunt Hervaeus et Durandus. Sexto, quod veritas non est sola indivisio esse et eius quod est, ut dicit Alexander Minor in Scripto super Primum Sententiarum. Septimo, quod veritas non est formaliter conformitas producti ad producens, ut Scotus dicit Super VIII Metaphysicae: tunc enim non converteretur cum ente, cum non omne ens sit productum, ut patet de Patre in divinis et de ipsa divina essentia. Octavo, quod veritas non est formaliter conformitas rei ad intellectum vel e converso, vel adaequatio rei et intellectus, ut dicunt plures. Nono, quod veritas non est formaliter manifestativitas vel declarativitas, ut dicut alii: haec enim formaliter respectum importare videntur. Decimo, quod veritas non est formaliter assecutio debiti. Undecimo, quod non est formaliter segregatio ab extraneo. Duodecimo, quod non est formaliter ipsa rei quiditas. Tertiodecimo et ultimo, quod vanum est quaerere quid sit veritas, nam quaestio quid est de aliquo, ad quam non potest proprie responderi nisi in praedicamento, videtur vana; sed ad istam quaestionem qua quaeritur quid est veritas, non potest proprie responderi nisi quod veritas est ipsa veritas; ergo vanum videtur de ipsa quaerere quid est.
From the aforesaid I conclude as corollaries: 1) That truth is formally in the thing, for truth and entity are convertible: therefore since entity is in the thing formally, therefore so is truth. 2) That truth is not formally a second intention. 3) That truth is not formally and completively that which is through the intellect, as Thomas says in Prima Pars Q.16. 4) That truth is not essentially in the intellect alone, as Godfrey says. 5) That it does not have only objective being in the intellect, as Hervaeus and Durandus say. 6) That truth is not just the indivision of being and its essence, as Alexander Minor says in I Sent. 7) That truth is not formally the conformity of the produced to its producer, as Scotus says in QQ In Met. VIII: for then it would not be convertible with being, since not every being is produced, as is clear of God the Father and of the divine essence itself. 8) That truth is not formally conformity of the intellect to the thing and conversely, or the adaequation of thing and intellect, as many say. 9) That truth is not formally manifestivity or declarativity, as others say: for these [definitions] seem to formally bring in a relation. 10) That truth is not formally the comprehension of what should [be comprehended]. 11) That it is not formally the segregation [of the essence] from what is extraneous to it. 12) That it is not formally the quiddity of the thing itself. [N.B. 10-12 are aimed at Aureol, who is not named here because Petrus has discussed his opinions by name earlier in the question.] 13) Lastly, that it is vain to ask what truth is, for the question "what is it?" about anything, to which there can be no proper response except in a category, seems vain: but to this question, by which it is asked what truth is, there can be no proper response [because truth is not a categorical formality, but a transcendental], except that truth is truth itself: therefore it seems vain to ask about it what it is.
On the one hand, Petrus seems to have some good points. If truth is in fact considered to be a transcendental, such that it is convertible with being and goodness, then it does seem difficult to see how it can exist in the intellect alone, or as a relation. On the other hand, it's singularly unsatisfying to be told "truth is truth, and that's all there is to it". Earlier he has stated that the term truth is a "simply simple" concept, that that it cannot be reduced to anything more primitive and so is incapable of definition. This is all well and good, but some explanation would be nice.
To be fair to Petrus, after dealing with goodness in similar terms--"goodness is goodness and there's no definition of it"--he does go on to examine and try to explain how truth and goodness as transcendental properties existing in every being are related to their apprehension by the intellect and the will. But the way he goes about here is funny and a little shocking at first.