Gregory of Rimini on the Formal Distinction

Here's a bit from Gregory of Rimini, a little comment he makes before he begins to argue against Scotus. It is from his Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum (1343-1344), edited by Trapp. et al. It's kind of a gem of quote, illustrating the problem one has in interpretating Scotus' various remarks on the formal distinction.

Recapitulatio interpretativa opinionis Scoti:

Verum, quia in diversis locis iste doctor varie locutus est de ista distinctione formali ex natura rei, aliquando nominans eam distinctionem virtualem, aliquando distinctionem secundum quid, quandoque autem non-identitatem formalem, et aliquando dicendo quod ex parte rei est aliqua pluralitas et distinctio rationum formalium et quidditatum, quarum una non est alia, verbi gratia quod formalitas seu ratio quiddatativa sapientiae existens extra animam in Deo non est formalitas bonitatis, sed sunt distinctae ex natura rei, aliquando autem dixit sapientiam non esse formaliter bonitatem nec quiddative et hanc 'sapientia est bonitas;' non esse formalem et quidditativam in primo modo dicendi per se-ex quo aliqui sequaces eius dixerunt non fuisse intentionis hiuius doctoris ponere aliquam multitudinem vel pluralitatem formalitatum aut rationum quidditativarum extra animam ex natura rei distinctarum in Deo, sed tantummodo negare unam de alia praedicari formaliter, ut sic ly 'formaliter' sit potius determinatio compositionis in propositione quam extremorum et syncategorema quoddam, et quod aguentes contra eum in primo sensu procedunt ex ignorantia intentionis dicti opinantis-ideo ostendam quod ipse posuit et ponere habuit consequenter ad dicta sua quod in Deo est quadam multitudo entitatum, quas vocabat formalitates et rationes quidditativas, ex natura rei actualiter extra animam distinctarum, quarum una non est talia.

Translation:

In diverse places that doctor spoke variously about that formal distinction from the nature of the thing, sometimes naming it a virtual distinction, sometimes a qualified distinction [secundum quid], sometimes formal non-identity, and sometimes saying that 'from the side of the thing' is some plurality and distinction of formal reasons and quiddities, of which one is not the other, for example, that the formality or quidditative reason of wisdom existing outside of the soul in God is not the formality of goodness, but that they are distinct from the nature of the thing; sometimes however he said that wisdom is not formally or quidditatively goodness and this 'wisdom is goodness' is not formal and quidditative in the first mode of per se predication-from which some of his followers said that it was not the intention of this doctor to posit some multitude or plurality of formalities or of quidditative reasons outside the soul distinct in God from the nature of the thing, but only to deny that one is predicated formally of the other, so that the term 'formally' is rather a determination of composition in the proposition than the extremes, and a syncategorematic term, and that arguing against him in the first sense proceeds from ignorance of his opinion-therefore I will show according to his own words that he was able and consequently had to posit a certain multitude of entities, which he called formalities and quidditative reasons, from the nature of the thing actually distinct outside the soul, of which one is not the other.