Ordinatio III d. 17 q. unica n. 9, 12-15, 18:
Sed estne voluntas creata tantum una in Christo?
Dico quod voluntas potest accipi sub propria ratione, - vel sub generali ratione et nomine, scilicet pro appetitu. Si generaliter accipiatur, sic ad minus in Christo fuerunt tres appetitus, scilicet intellectualis increatus, et rationalis creatus, et irrationalis creatus (scilicet sensitivus); sed proprie voluntas addit supra appetitum, quia ‘est appetitus cum ratione liber’. Et sic, stricte loquendo, tantum fuerunt in Christo duae voluntates.
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Sed quid de voluntate naturali et libera, suntne duae potentiae?
Dico quod ‘appetitus naturalis’, in qualibet re, generali nomine accipitur pro inclinatione naturali rei ad suam propriam perfectionem, - sicut lapis inclinatur naturaliter ad centrum; et si in lapide sit inclinatio illa aliud absolutum a gravitate, tunc consequenter credo quod similiter inclinatio naturalis hominis ‘secundum quod homo’ ad propriam perfectionem, est aliud a voluntate libera. Sed primum credo esse falsum, scilicet quod inclinatio lapidis ad centrum sit aliud absolutum a gravitate et alia potentia, quae potentia habeat aliquam operationem in centrum, ut aliqui imaginantur; mirabilis enim tum foret illa operatio, cum non esset dare terminum illius, quia esset actio transiens; et cum centrum sit conveniens sibi, non agit actionem corruptivam ipsi nec salvativam, quia non posset poini qualis esset illa operatio nec quis terminus ipsius, nisi forte conservando proprium ‘ubi’, quia forte ‘ubi’ suum in centro est continue in fieri (sicut lumen in medio); sed tunc actio illa non est in centrum, quia ‘ubi’ est in locato et non in locante, et centrum est locans corpus in eo; igitur ultra gravitatem non dicit nisi relationem inclinationis eius ad centrum ut ad propriam perfectionem. Tunc dico quod sic est de voluntate, quia voluntas naturalis non est voluntas, nec velle naturale est velle, sed ly ‘naturalis’ distrahit ab utroque et nihil est nisi relatio consequens potentiam respectu propriae perfectionis; unde eadem potentia dicitur ‘naturalis voluntas’ cum respectu tali necessario consequente ipsam ad perfectionem, et dicitur ‘libera’ secundum rationem propriam et intrinsecam, quae est voluntas specifice.
Aliter potest voluntas dici ‘naturalis’ ut distinguitur contra potentiam sive voluntatem supernaturalem; et sic ipsa in puris naturalibus suis exsistens distinguitur contra se ipsam ut informata donis gratuitis.
Adhuc tertio modo accipitur ‘voluntas naturalis’ ut elicit actum conformem inclinationi naturali, quae semper est ad commodum; et sic est libera
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Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod voluntas libera et naturalis sunt duae voluntates, dico quod voluntas naturalis – ut sic et ut naturalis – non est voluntas ut potentia, sed tantum importat inclinationem potentiae ad recipiendum perfectionem suam, non ad agendum ut sic; et ideo est imperfecta nisi sit sub illa perfectione ad quam illa tendentia inclinat illam potentiam; unde naturalis potentia non tendit, sed est tendentia illa qua voluntas absoluta tendit – et hoc passive – ad recipiendum. Sed est alia tendentia, in potentia eadem, ut libere et active tendat eliciendo actum, ita quod una potentia et duplex tendentia (activa et passiva). Tunc ad formam dico quod voluntas naturalis, secundum illud quod ‘formale’ importat, non est potentia vel voluntas, sed inclinatio voluntatis et tendentia qua tendit in perfectionem passive recipiendam.
“But is there only one created will in Christ?
I say that the will can be understood under its proper meaning and name, namely, for appetite. If it is understood generally, so there were at least three appetites in Christ, namely, uncreated intellectual, created rational and created irrational (namely, the sensitive); but properly the will adds over the appetite, because it “is a free appetite with reason.” And so, strictly speaking, there were in Christ two wills.
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But what about the will considered as natural and free, are these two powers? I say that ‘natural appetite’ in whatever thing, is understood by a general name for the natural inclination of a thing for its own proper perfection, - just as a stone is inclined naturally to the center. And if in the stone that inclination is another absolute thing from its weight [gravitate], then consequently I believe that likewise the natural inclination of man ‘according as he is a man’ to his proper perfection, is other than free will. But the first I believe to be false, namely, that the inclination of a stone to the center is another absolute from the weight and another power, which power has some operation into the center, as some imagine. For that operation would then be miraculous, since it would not give an end to that operation, because it would be a transient action; and since the center is agreeable to itself, it does not with with a corruptive nor preservative action towards itself, because it can not be posited what sort of operation that operation would be nor what termination it would have, unless perhaps by preserving its proper ‘place’, because perhaps its own ‘place’ in the ceenter is continuously in becoming [fieri] (just as light in the medium). But then that action is not to the center, because ‘place’ is in the located and not in the locating, and the center is a locating body [locans corpus] in it. Therefore the further weight [ultra gravitatem] does not mean anything but the relation of its inclination to the center as to its proper perfection. Then I say that it is so in the will, because the natural will is not the will, nor is natural willing willing, but the term ‘natural’ separates [distrahit…technical logical term…see peter of spain] from each and is nothing except a relation following [consequens…bad, I know] the power with respect to its porper perfection. Whence the same power is called ‘natural will’ with respect to such necessary following to perfection, and it is called ‘free’ according to its proper and intrinsic definition, which is the will specifically.
Otherwise the will can be called ‘natural’ as distinguished against a supernatural power or will. And so existing in pure nature it is distinguished against itself as having been informed by the free gifts [donis gratuitis].
Still more in a third way ‘natural will’ can be understood as it elicits an act conformed to natural inclination, which always is to the advantageous [ad commodum]; and so the will is free in eliciting an act conformed just as in eliciting a posited act [?] because it is in its power to elicit an act conformed or not so to elicit (the supernatural will elicts only a conformed act).
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To the second, when it is said that the free and natural will are two wills, I say that the natural will – insofar as it is natural – is not the will as power, but only implies the inclination of a power to receiving its own perfection, not for acting as such; and therefore it is imperfect unless it is under that perfection to which that tendency inclines that power; whence the natural power does not tend, but that tendency is that whereby the will tends absolutely – and this passively – for receiving. But there is another tendency, in the same power, as tends by eliciting and act freely and actively, so that one power and a double tendency (active and passive). Then to the form of the argument I say that the natural will, according to that which is implied formally, is not a power or will, but inclinatin of the will and tendency by whuich it tends into receiving a perfection passively.