Ordinatio II d.38 Q.unica:
Primo videndum est quid dicitur per hoc nomen ‘intentio’.
“‘Intendere’ enim dicit ‘in aliud tendere’. Hoc potest accipi generaliter, sive ab alio habeat quod tendat in illud, sive a se ‘movente se in illud.’ – Potest etiam aliquid tendere in aliquid ut in obiectum praesens, vel ut in terminum distantem vel absentem.
Primo modo convenit omni potentiae respectu sui obiecti.
Secundo modo magis proprie sumitur pro illo quod scilicet tendit in aliud et non ducitur in illud, sed ducit se in illud; et hoc modo non potest esse alicuius potentiae naturalis, sed tantum liberae, quia - secundum Damascenum cap. 33 – ‘appetitus non-liber ducitur et non ducit,’ et ita est do omni potentia naturali.
Hoc ergo modo proprie accipiendo ‘intendere,’ prout scilicet dicit ‘in aliud tendere ex se,’ erit principaliter potentiae liberae; sed cum ‘libere velle’ sit totius liberi arbitrii, quod includit intellectum et voluntatem (secundam illam tertianopinionem distinctione 25 huius), totius erit ‘intendere’ (et hoc si propriissime sumatur), et non erit alicuius respectu obiecti sui sed respectu finis. Et cum in omni volitione – secundum Anselmum – sit accipere ‘quid’ et ‘cur’, ‘intendere’ non respicit ‘quid’ sed ‘cur’, prout scilicet dicit tendentiam in aliquid ut distans, per aliquid tamquam per aliquid medium.
Erit ergo ‘intentio’ actus liberi arbitrii ratione voluntatis, et erit actus eius respectu eius quod vult. Quod si voliti et eius propter quod est volitum, sit idem actus volendi, idem actus erit usus et intentio; si autem alius, intentio dicet formaliter actum illum quo tendit in finem, et materialiter actum utendi quo refert aliud in illum finem.
Ad ultimum dico quod conferre per modum iudicii est solus intellectus, sicut et intelligere, - sed referre utendo sive ordinando unum amabile ad aliud, est voluntatis; sicut enim voluntas est relexiva, quia immaterialis, ita et collativa vel potens referre suo modo.”
I respond. First it must be seen what is meant by this term ‘intention’. For ‘to intend’ means ‘to stretch into another’. This can be understood generally, either it has from another that which it stretches into that, or from itself ‘moving itself into that.’ – Something is also able to stretch into something as into a present object, or as into a distant or absent terminus. The first way is suited to every power with respect to its object. The second way is understood more properly for that which strains into another and is not led into it, but leads itself into it; and in this way it cannot be of any natural power, but only of a free power, because – according to the Damascene chapter 33 – ‘a non-free appetite is led and does not lead’, and so it is of every natural power. Therefore in this way properly understanding “intention”, inasmuch as it means ‘to strain into another from itself’, it will bwe principally of a free power; but since ‘to will freely’ is of the entire free choice, which includes the intellect and will (according to that third opinion in distinction 25 of Book II), it will be of the totality ‘to intend’ (and this if it is understood most properly), and it will not be of something with respect to its object but with respect to the end. And since in every volition – according to Anselm- it is necessary to understand ‘what’ and ‘why’, ‘to intend’ does not fall under ‘what’ but ‘why’, inasmuch as means a straining into something as distant, through something just as through some medium. Therefore ‘intention’ is an act of free choice under the aegis [ratio: maybe aspect, meaning, definition] of the will, and it will be the act of it with respect of that which it wills. But if of the willed and of that on account of which it is willed, is the same act of willing, the same act will be use and intention. But if another, intention will formally mean that act by which it stretches into the end, and materially the act of using by which it refers another into that end.
To the last I say that to compare through the mode of judgment is of the intellect alone, just as is understanding – but to refer by using or ordering one lovable thing to another, is of the will; for just as the will is reflexive, because it is immaterial, so also it is collative or able to refer in its own way.