Here is the objection [almost unintelligible] that he responds to, Ord. I d. 39 q. un. n.8:
And furthermore, if some universal law is first offered to the divine intellect (for example, that something should be glorified or gratified/graced [i'm lazy], and the divine will accepts that (and from this the law of wisdom is established), and second the intellect offers to the will that Peter should be beatified - if the will accepts that, it seems from this that the intellect knows that Peter should be glorified, and this by dictative [?] cognition, not received in itself formally from the will, although the will will have verified the premises from which the intellect has it.
Ord. I d. 38 q. un n.10:
"Ad secundum dico quod intellectus divinus non sic cognoscit aliqua, discurrendo, sicut procedit argumentum; sed distinguendo de instantibus naturae, in primo apprehendit quodcumque operabile (ita illa quae sunt principia operabilium, sicut operabilia particularia), et in secundo offert omnia ista voluntati (quorum omnium aliqua acceptat, tam principiorum practicorum quam particularium operabilium), et tunc in tertio signo intellectus scit aeque immediate illa particularia sicut illa universalia, et ita non acquirit cognitionem illorum particularium ex principiis praedeterminatis per voluntatem. Hoc magis patebit in quaestione De scientia Dei respectu futuorum contingentium."
To the second, I say that the divine intellect does not so understand somethings, discursively, as the argument alleges; but by distinguishing out of instants of nature, in the first he apprehends whatever operable (those which are the principles of operables, just as particular operables), and in the second he offers all those to the will (some of all those he accepts, both of practical principles as of particular operables), and then in the third instant the intellect knows equally immediately those particulars just as those universals, and so he does not acquire the cognition of those particulars from principles predetermined by the will. This will be clearer in the question about God's knowledge of future congingents.