Et ex hoc contingit quod illi qui plura de Deo noverunt, non sunt qui plus Deum diligunt; quia non sunt sic dispositi secundum voluntatem, quia talia quae apprehendunt de Deo, apprehendunt sub ratione entis simpliciter et veri quasi speculative, et non apprehendunt ista sub ratione convenientis et veri quasi practice. Sicut etiam contingit quod illi qui plus sciunt de moralibus non sunt meliores eadem ratione. Quia, sicut in theologicis notita in universali et quasi speculativa non est principium dilectionis caritativae, sed practica; et ista coexigit dispositionem quae est caritas in voluntate; ita etiam in moralibus, notitia in universali et quasi speculativa de virtutibus non est principium operationis virtuosae, sed notitia practica quae est principium talis operationis coexigit dispositionem quae est habitus quidam virtuosus in appetitu.
From this it comes about that those who know more about God are not the ones who love God more; because they are not so disposed according to the will, because such things that they apprehend about God, they apprehend under the aspect of being and true unqualifiedly in a speculative manner, and they do not apprehend those things under the aspect of the fitting and true in a practical manner. Becuase, as knowledge in theological matters is held in a universal and the speculative way is not a principle of charitable love, but the practical is; that requires the disposition in the will which is charity. So also in moral matters, knowledge in a universal and speculative manner about the virtues is not a principle of virtuous operation, but practical knowledge which is a principle of such operation requires the disposition which is a certain virtuous habit in the appetite.
If only it were otherwise.