What is a Formality IV: Franciscus de Mayronis

For the previous posts in the series, see Petrus Thomae, Antonius Andreas, Nicolaus Bonetus. Today I am translating a question from Francis of Meyronnes, the French Scotist known as the Princeps Scotistarum in later ages. I haven't looked much into his commentaries on the Sentences, but apparently there are some three versions. He initially lectured at Paris in 1320, [a bunch of stuff then happened, before, voila] a final version known as the Conflatus appeared and was later printed several times. He died ca. 1328. For more information see the "Franciscan authors" website. What follows is only a translation, as the question is too long to type out in Latin in full.

Conflatus I d. 8 q. 5 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 48vb-49ra):

...Therefore I say that some distinction between the formal rationes or formalities and realities must be posited necessarily, and not as between formality and formality but as between formality and intrinsic mode.

For the evidence of which it must be known first what a formality is, second what an intrinsic mode is.

As far as the first, 'what a formality is', some [people] say that 'formality' is said from 'form', just as materiality is said from matter. And therefore some [people] say that there cannot be many formalities without many forms, just as neither many materialities without many matters.

Against this: that is a very coarse[grossa] and asinine imagination, which is clear from two reasons. First thus: because just as formality is said from form, so 'essential' from 'essence'. We, however, posit in the divine being many essential features, and nevertheless there are not there many essences, as is clear expressly through Blessed Dionysius cap. 3 De unica et discreta theologia. Therefore neither does a multitude of forms follow upon the position of many formal rationes as you say.

Second, because in the person of the Father in the divine being are posited many personal features, namely ungenerated, paternity, active spiration, all of which are personal features and nevertheless the person of the Father is single(unica); therefore, etc.

Furthermore, many material things, according to the ones speaking commonly, are posited in one composite, namely many material accidents; and nevertheless many matters are not posited there; so in man many human features, not nevertheless unless one man.

Therefore others say that formalities are real rationes which are posited in the same simple thing.

Against this: first because formalities are not only posited in simple things but also in composites, according to the ones positing the formalities. Therefore that is not a good description. Second because not all formalities are real, for man in potency has a formality and nevertheless not a reality. Likewise beings of reason have formalities but not realities.

Therefore others say that those formalities are certain modalities.

Against this: for the ones positing them divide them against modes. Second because modes are not able to be first in beings, because a mode is always posterior to that of which it is a mode; but formalities are posited simply first in beings, for the ratio of entity is a certain formality and the ratio of deity, which  are absolutely prior to all others.

Therefore others say that formalities are definitive rationes, for the definitive ratio of each one is called formal and it is clear that it is a formality.

Against this doubly: first because the categories are not definable, becasue they are absolutely simple  and nevertheless they have formalities by which they are formally distinguished [from each other]. Second because the ratio of being and ratio of deity are posited as formalities and nevertheless they cannot be defined because every definition is given through prior [features, such as genus and difference]; but than these [categories] nothing is prior.

I say therefore that a formality is a quiddity of each thing haveing a quiddity whether it is definable or not, because the formal ratio of each thing is that which is present in [inest] it in the first mode of predicating per se; such however are all quidditative [features, aspects].

The Resurrection of the Body

The favorite objection used to be that if a man was eaten by cannibals, there would be certain particles of matter which would belong both to the cannibal and to the victim of the experiment. And it has often been pointed out that, even in civilized countries, we may find ourselves eating mutton that comes from a sheep which has been browsing in the churchyard, and so the same difficulty arises in a rather more circuitous way. And, while arguments like these have suggested to irreverent minds the possibility that there will not be enough bodies to go round, so to speak, on the day of judgement, it is equally easy to suggest that there will be too many bodies going about; because after all you and I change, even in the course of a single year, nearly all the material particles which go to make up our bodies, so that it would be very hard to know which of a series of material bodies we are going to rise with. Sceptical difficulties like these have led some Catholic thinkers to suggest - and I understand that it is an allowable position - that the identity between the earthly and the heavenly body is formal, rather than material; depends upon the persistence, not of actual material particles, but of the form which organized them. The trouble about that is that if you are a good Thomist - if you are a Scotist, I fancy you get out of it, somehow - you hold that the from which organizes our material bodies is nothing other than the soul . . . and it is difficult to see how or why the re-embodies soul in heaven differs from the disembodied soul in purgatory.

For this reason, the more cautious among Catholic authors are content to point out that we needn't insist on the necessity of reassembling every individual particle of the terrestrial body in heaven. Part will do: and, precisely in view of the large number of transformations which our body has been through, it ought to be possible to make good any losses through cannibalism. I confess that I find it a little difficult to frame my mind with confidence into this particular type of orthodoxy. I should prefer to think that, without meddling with any controversies between Thomists and Scotists, we can take refuge here in our ignorance. [...]

- Ronald Knox, "The Resurrection of the Body", in The Hidden Stream

Books Received: Promptuarium Scoticum

I recently received some beautiful volumes in the mail.  At one point they were for sale here, though I don't see them there now. Anyway, photos below. They are part of a series of reprints, for a series called Scripta Scotsitica Antiqua. (What a great idea!) They claim that they will eventually add several other volumes to the series, such as some of the works of Mastrius and other early modern Scotists. I for for one look forward to that day, as there is nothing more irritating than reading Mastri in the grainy scans one finds on the web. 

The volume I was sent is a reprint of an index by Carolus Franciscus de Varesio and is found in two volumes, reprinted by the Seminarium Theologicum Immaculata Mediatrix.

There is an English introduction by fr. Peter maria Fehlner, F.I.,  from which I will reproduce some snippets.

The goal of this series is to make accessible once again to the general public, particularly that public interested in the study of Bl. John Duns Scotus, the now virtually inaccessible published works of those disciples of Scotus in times past, before the suppression of the many and influential university centres dedicated to the study and promotion of Scotus in the Church and in the world. These works, in fact, constitute a kind of on-going witness to the mind of the historic Scotus and not a Scotus recycled according to the exigencies of current intellectual fashions. Hence, these ancient works are in fact the only adequate objective standard for discerning in modern reconstructions of Scotus' thought what is historically valid, and what is merely reinterpretation to adapt the subtte Doctor to current intellectual fashions and so make him once again "acceptable" in the halls of academe.

These works are for the most part fruit of the systematic, intense, continuous and in large part interacting scholastic activities of those many centres of scotistic study throughout all parts of Europe up to the Protestant reformation, and thereafter to the French Revolution and its aftermath in the 19th century throughout  most of Catholic Europe. The first components of these studia scotistica were present even before the premature death of Bl. John in Cologne, Nov. 8, 1308. Through the efforts of the first disciples formed by the Master himself by the middle of the 14th century Franciscan friaries linked to the Universities of Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, and of Cologne, where Scotus himself either studied and/or taught, and shortly thereafter to that of Naples, and later still to those of Salamanca, Erfurt, Padua, and Bologna, [and Barcelona!!!] to mention only a few of the better known, had become major scotistic centers. There the study and promotion of the via Scoti in theology, philosophy and science, and in the practical order: spirituality, moral theology, jurisprudence and what is today called aesthetics, made Scotus one of the major influences in European thought even to the present days, outside the Church as well as within. Often enough the scotistic provenance of key aspects of this thought are no longer expressly recognized or their original meaning and implications correctly understood and appreciated.

There is a lot more discussion of the history of the decline of Scotism. Fr. Fehlner thinks it is largely because of the immaculate conception. This made the Dominicans bitter enemies of Scotus probably during his lifetime, and the protestants shared this disdain. Apparently the protestants published in 1540 a "Alcoranus Franciscanus" which attacked Scotus, especially the "Franciscan thesis" of the motive for the incarnation.

See also:

Reading and interpreting these stupendous contributions to the theological-philosophical tradition of the Church, however, involves something more than availability of a good text (and perhaps a good dictionary). Without a living tradition made up of masters whose ability to provide the hermaneutic key to these writings derives in unbroken fashion from Scotus himself, there exists in practice no sure and reasonably easy to apply neutral criterion for discerning in current reconstructions of his thought what is the sense of Scotus himself and what is merely an accommodation to current intellectual fashion."

So there you have it. The series will publish the works of the great masters of the Scotist tradition to aid in the study of Scotus. This is what I have learned to do myself, though I largely confine myself to those who would have known Scotus personally or would have known those that did (so up to basically the 1340's, I suppose). Hopefully some of them will go into the series as well. So many thanks to my benefactors, and keep up the good work!

What is a Formality III: Nicolaus Bonetus

Bonetus was a French thinker who was active during the 1330s. He became a master of theology in 1333, and later organized and might have participated in an embassy to the great khan. He wrote numerous philosophical treatises, such as on natural theology and metaphysics. His Metaphysics, a selection of which is translated below, was the first systematic treatise on metaphysics ever written (unless of course you count Aristotle's as being systematic, disorganized as it is). That is, it is not a commentary on Aristotle, but an independent treatise starting with the foundations of metaphysics (for example, he starts in bk I with the discussion of what a science is and the definition of the terms 'univocity,' 'equivocity' and 'analogy'.  He is sometimes credited with being the first to articulate a distinction between general and special metaphysics (but in fact he is here following Francis of Marchia). From the following text we can conclude that he was a Scotist, even if he deviates from the verba ipsissima of the master, because he is using the basic vocabulary and distinctions devolped by Scotus.

Note: A scholar who works on Bonetus sent me an email correcting my punctuation, translation, and bio. So thanks are in order. It's always nice to know that when I post these translations of obscure Scotist texts that someone actually reads them!

Metaphysica III c. 3 (ed. Venezia 1505, f. 19vb-20ra):

Circa hunc terminum 'formalitas' vel 'quiditas' quod sit et quod non. Et quotiens dicuntur est insistendum. Omne illud est 'formalitas' vel 'quiditas' (quod idem est) quod additum alteri variat rationem formalem ipsius, scilicet constituti ex illo et altero cum additur, vel per se est inclusum in ratione formali alicuius. 

Ex primo sequitur quod omnes differentiae superiores et mediae et specificae spectant ad quiditatem, quia additae quidditati contrahibili variant rationem formalem constitutorum per illam, ut hominis et bruti. Ex hoc sequitur quod differentiae individuales non sunt quiditates nec formalitates, cum non varient rationem formalem per illas constitutorum, immo constituta per illas sunt eiusdem rationis et speciei.

Ex secundo sequitur quod omne contrahibile per se per differentiam aliquam cum qua facit per se unum est quiditas vel formalitas, ut prima quidditas et primum contrahibile et prima omnino formalitas sit ens in quantum ens, deinde praedicamenta et sic descendendo usque ad speciem specialissimam, que est ultima quiditas per se includens omnes superiores in linea predicamentali.

Translation:

...everything is a 'formality' (or a 'quiddity', which means the same) that either: 1)  when it (a) is added to another (b), it (a) changes the formal description [ratio] of it, that is, of what is constituted from that thing (a) and that other thing (b) when (a) is added to (b); or 2) is per se included in the formal description of something.

From 1) it follows that all superior, middle and specific differences pertain to the quiddity, because when they are added to a contractible quiddity they alter the formal description of what it constitutes, such as of 'human being' or 'beast'. From this it follows that individual differences are neither quiddities nor formalities, since they do not alter the formal description of the things  they constitute, rather the things  they constitute have the same description and species.

From 2) it follows that everything that is per se contractible by some difference with which it makes a per se unity is a quiddity or formality, as the first quiddity and the first contractible and the absolutely first formality is being qua being, and then the categories, and so descending until the most specific species, which is the final quiddity including per se all the quiddities above it in the predicamental line (or sequence).

Vatican Digitized Manuscripts

Available here. I didn't look hard enough for anything scholastic, but there was one of Boethius' Consolatio.

A Definition of Medieval Logic

From a forthcoming book advertised on amazon.com, entitled Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, Language, and Logic. Chapter 8 is called "The Power of Medieval Logic" and is written by Terence Parsons.  Here is his definition of medieval logic:

The first task is to decide what to count as medieval logic. Medieval logic consists of centuries of work by some very smart people working in a difficult area. I will be libertine about what is included in medieval logic. If any medieval logician ever said it, and if it is worthwhile, it is part of medieval logic.

Is the Absolute Primacy of Christ A-Historical?

Fr. Maximiliam Mary has a post up here defending the primacy of Christ against a Jesuit critic on the issue of whether contrafactuals are ahistorical. There is also a link in the article to an article written by Dietrich von Hildebrand about Teillard de Chardin, who may not be the most relevant theologian today, but one does here his name mentioned from time to time.

Cardinal Burke on Scotus

Cardinal Burke was in Wisconsin blessing a statue of Scotus.  Here is his homily on the occasion, here is the video.

Thomism and the Magisterium

From time to time I receive emails about Thomism and whether one is required to hold, in the Church of Today, Thomistic theses instead of Scotistic ones.  So here I summarize my views/posts on the matter.

There are numerous Thomist links one could post about how one must in some way be Thomist.

Here. Here. Here.

There have been posts to the contrary on this blog about these issues before,

Here. Here. And the Church Authority category on the sidebar.

The reason for this is that the popes have authoritatively proclaimed that the 'perennial philosophy' is a necessary foundation for Catholic dogma and Aquinas is the primary exponent of this philosophy.

My thoughts on the matter are thus (and my co-blogger should feel free to add/revise this post):

1. The magisterial prescriptions generally recommend Aquinas as a model, but do not prescribe particular doctrines as to be held. But everyone admits Aquinas is great and a model for theologizing or philosophizing in accordence with the Church.  But this isn't very helpful in determining whether the real distinction between essence and existence is a point of dogma. When particular doctrines are mentioned, they are ones that all or most of the scholastics agree about, such as the existence of God, or divine conservation.

2. Current canon law mentions Aquinas only once, in canon 252.3; but this only states that seminarians should be educated in Thomism. Again, it does not prescribe any particular thesis. Fr. Z claims that Aquinas is mentioned implicitly in canon 151; this canon mandates that seminarians be educated in philosophy by recourse to the perennial philosophy.  

3. There is also this shocking statement from JP II's Veritatis splendor: "Certainly the Church's Magisterium does not intend to impose upon the faithful any particular theological system, still less a philosophical one."

For the sake of argument, let's assume the opposite: Thomism is universally binding on every catholic, down to its particular theses.  What might follow?

1. Philosophy is destroyed and we are left with fideism.

2. Theology becomes mere commentary on Aquinas through the adjudication of the Thomistic commentary tradition.

3. Papal interventions will be required to dogmatically establish the interpretations of Thomistic texts (if the real distinction between essence and existence is a Thomistic thesis it is dogmatic; but some thomists have denied that Aquinas holds that essence and existence are really distinct; ergo we need authoritative interpretations of Aquinas' texts.

4. The Immaculate conception will have to be abandoned.

So it seems that the individual catholic philosopher can think what he/she/ likes (given that it does not contradict revealed truth).  This shouldn't surprise the non-Thomist overmuch. When one looks at the context and objects of the early modern statements on Thomism, they are generally directed at modern novelties, not novelties within the Scholastic tradition.

There you have it; the combox awaits.

Update:

Commentator Jared has posted some printed sources that bear on the question, which I repost here.

Willibrord Lampen, Bl. Ioannes Duns Scotus et Sancta Sedes (Rome, 1929).

Franz Pelster, “The Authority of St. Thomas in Catholic Schools and Sacred Sciences," Franciscan Studies 13 (1953): 1-26.

Charles Balić, “Duns Scotus in the Present Moment of the Church” in Scotus Speaks Today: 1266-1966: Seventh Centenary Symposium (Southfield, MI: Duns Scotus College, 1966), 21-62

Also, Fr. Finigan has a post from several years ago about this, which involved one of the commentators who has posted here. Fr. Finigan posts the quote from Denzinger about the letter of the Jesuits to the pope about the 24 Thomistic theses.

Another update:

An essay on "traditionalism" that contains relevant material.

More on Thomism and Vatican II

Here's an interesting article on Thomism and Vatican II by fr. Komonchok.  My favorite lines:

"Vae hominis unius libri! Vae Eccleisiae unius doctoris!"

Should we Worship the Divine Ideas?

Ioannes Baconthorpe, Quodlibet II q. 3 (ed. f. 32r):

As far as the second is concerned, it seems it can be said that if 'idea' is understood as entirely the same as the divine essence and not as distinguished in any way, it is adored by latria. But  a distinct being of reason, distinct but which is the same as the divine essence, is to be adored with latria. But on account of another I do not say 'per se' or distinct so that its identity with the essence is not thought of, but as if it is a certain ratio not extraneous from God but rather connatual or by some other mode than itself it befalls God; so it is to be adored per accidens.

From these it is clear that it is not proved that an idea is not a creature as understood in respect to itself outside of God, because as is clear from the premises, everything is to be adored per se as per se divine or on account of the immediate union with God, just as the human nature in Christ, or on account of mediacy, as in those which are adored per accidens as clothes on account of a saint, holy on account of God.

[...]

From these I argue that the ideas or whatsoever other ought to be adored. This is according as they have some comparison or union with God, but in the proposed question we do not dispute that the ideas are creatures known by comparing the ideas to God, but rather by comparing the creatures themselves in understood being to themselves outside God; therefore from that adoration of the ideas it is not proved that ideas are not the creatures themsevles known. 

Baconthorpe was a Carmelite, writing during the 1320's, who defended the Scotist view of a divine idea as the 'creature as known'. He also holds, at least on issues pertaining to the divine ideas, similar views to Petrus Thomae, Alnwick, and James of Ascoli. The latin was a bit choppy, and I translated it in a hurry, so enjoy the resulting mishmash.

Feast of the Immaculate Conception

It's strange, but I have yet to find a mention of Duns Scotus on the catholic blogosphere today, the feast of the immaculate conception. At mass the priest read a long quote from Garrigou-lagrange without ever mentioning Scotus (though my old hand missal mentioned Scotus briefly in its blurb about the history of the doctrine).  All I can find online is Mark Shea's post from a few weeks ago that contained the comment I complained about in the previous post. Scotus really has been cast out of catholic thought these days. He not good for much save a prologue to bashing protestants or condoms.

Voluntarism Again

There was a comment over at the Register (the same site on which I couldn't post a comment) that voices a common misunderstanding of voluntarism. This particular formulation is garbled, but I thought it best to use an example from the wilds of the internet:

If Mary’s rational soul and so her capacity for sin was only infused into her body post conception on what grounds could such an immaculate conception take place? Duns Scotus used Franciscan voluntarism to ‘solve’ his problem where the will rather than the intellect takes precedence. Which taken to its logical conclusion causes all kinds of problems for the principle of non-contradiction [God could create a square circle if He wanted to, perfection could be less than perfect if He wanted to be. Etc.] If St. Thomas (and Dun Scotus) et al had modern biology to base their philosophy and theology upon then there would have been no debate at all. But then if we diden’t have franciscian voluntarism its unlikely we would have had nominalism, conceptualism and the general nuttiness of modern philosophy and theology. 

So the complaint is that if the will has "precedence" or "precedes" the intellect, lots of bad thing follow. Philosophically you get God able to create a square-circle, or be less perfect, or whatever. Historically, Scotist voluntarism "causes" (read Brad Gregory for an explanation of this causality) nominalism, conceptualism, and everything the one making the claim doesn't like about the modern world.

The philosophical claim underlying all this seems to be that according to Scotus, possibility and impossibility are dependent on the divine will.

The passage in Scotus to examine is I d. 43 of his commentaries on the Sentences, the Lectura, Ordinatio, or Reportatio.

One thing we find is that the will plays no role in whether something is possible or impossible. For Scotus, possibility and impossibility is a feature of terms (or  natures, essences) which are generated by the divine intellect. The divine intellect generates say, 'rational' and 'animal'; there is no repugnance between these terms, so the species human being is possible.  The terms 'square' and 'circle' are repugnant, so a square-circle is impossible. This is even true if per impossible, God did not exist. If God did not exist, and neither did anything else, a square-circle would be impossible because the terms are repugnant, and human being would still be possible because the terms are compatible. This is what Scotus calls logical potency, and the result of it seems to be that modality is grounded in things themselves or their essences, rather than on God or some feature of God. Now on this tricky point Scotus actually says that possibility is "principiative" from the divine intellect. The idea is that while the terms are repugnant or non-repugnant based on their natures, for there to be any terms or essences at all there must be the divine intellect to generate them.

So whatever other philosophical problems voluntarism might have, at least for Scotus we are not in danger of a world of square-circles or impossible objects walking the streets, or God making himself not-God. Possibility and impossibility arise from the relation of the divine intellect and its thinking about essences.

Alnwick on Virtual Containment

I've been writing on Alnwick's theories of containment lately. He has three: exemplaric containment in the divine intellect, eminent/perfectional containment in the divine essence, and virtual containment in the divine omnipotence.  Here I am going to post some arguments he makes about virtual containment, one of those scholastic notions that has a neo-Platonic origin at least as far back as the pseudo-Dionysius (and therefore Proclus) and gets ridiculed from time to time today. The basic point from the pseudo-D. is that effects are contained in their cause in a more noble manner than they exist as effects. Scotus builds his notion of unitive containment on this notion, and several other versions of Dionysian containment were developed by other Scotists during the early fourteenth century.

The arguments Alnwick makes are meant to defend the claim that "the creatures contained in God virtually according to their perfection are distinguished from God really and formally". Recall that the various modes of containment are attempts to explain how and in what way creatures pre-exist in God prior to their creation.

Guillelmus de Alnwick, Quodlibet q. 8 (ed. Ledoux, 448-9):

Every positive perfection is contained in God formally or virtually; but the perfection of a creature, inasmuch as it is distinguished from God, is some positive perfection, because creatures are distinguished from God by their positive perfections; therefore, the perfection of a creature, inasmuch as it is distinguished from God, is contained in God virtually or formally. Not formally, for so then it would not be distinguished from God absolutely (simpliciter); therefore it is contained as such in God virtually. Then I arguo thus: the perfection of a creature, inasmuch as it is distinguished from God, is contained by God virtually, as now has been proved; therefore the perfection of a creature, inasmuch as it is contained in God virtually, is not the same as God. And so it is clear that the perfection of a creature, insofar as it is contained in God from the side of itself [ex parte sui], is not the same as God.

Again, fourth: whatever is produceable by some agent is contained in it virtually, because nothing is produced by something which is not contained first in its produtive power; but a stone according to its own proper nature is produceable by God; therefore a stone according to its own proper nature is contained in God virtually. But it is clear tha a stone according to its own proper nature is not God, therefore a stone, inasmuch as it is virtually contained in God, is not God but is distinguished from him.

A Counter-Narrative for Brad Gregory

See this post for photos of Duns Scotus in colonial Mexican art. Note especially the winged Scotus and Scotus treading upon the Lutherans.