From "Being and One: the Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus", in John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308) Renewal of Philosophy, 25-6:
"The notion of 'unitive containment' expresses a real identity and a real difference of a specific nature that deserves further attention. Scotus traces the origin of the notion to Dionysius the Areopagite's work De divinis nominibus. The passage he has in mind is chapter 5, where it is said that 'in the divine goodness are being itself, the principles of beings, all beings and whatever contains being (esse continentia); and they are in it in an irrepressible, comprehensive and unitive way (unitive). Dionysius wants to make clear that all beings are in God, not, however, as they are in created things, where they possess diversity and plurality, but unitively. From the Dionysian idea Scotus framed the notion of 'unitive containment'. He employs it in the discussion of the question concerning the relation between God and his many attributes, but also applies it to other problems. One of these is the relation betwen being and the convertible transcendentals.
Scotus elaborates the concept of 'unitive containment' in several passages of his work. What is unitively contained are not perfections that are altogether identical, for those are not united but are one. Union presupposes some distinction. Neither are perfections unitively contained that are really distinct in the sense that they are different res, because those are contained mulipliciter or dispersim. The distinction presupposed by unitive containment is, as we have seen, 'a minor real difference,' that is a difference not constituted by the intellect. Elsewhere Scotus calls this difference a 'formal' distinction, because it exists between different formalitates or realititates, which are not things but quiddities independent of the intellect. Thus the model of 'unitive containment' connects a real identity with a formal non-identity. These two features hold for the relation between being and the convertible transcendentals. Scotus's answer to the question whether the transcendental one expresses some other res than being is thus affirmative, provided that 'thing' is understood in the sense of realitas or formalitas."
A mediaevalist trying to be a philosopher and a philosopher trying to be a mediaevalist write about theology, philosophy, scholarship, books, the middle ages, and especially the life, times, and thought of the Doctor Subtilis, the Blessed John Duns Scotus.
Saturday, February 7, 2009
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Stumped
Read the chapter in Stump's Aquinas book on God's knowledge. I have to admit, I'm not convinced that fr. Shanley and Leo Elders didn't know the difference between God's knowledge ad intra and ad extra. Or maybe she was just inventing a false dilemma to ease the literary development of her argument. Some quotes:
p. 177: "That is, God not only makes composites of matter and form, as any craftsman or inventor does, but he also creates the formless matter that underlies the forms of any material object." Hmm...so humans make form and matter? Perhap she only meant that humans make composites, which is what Aquinas actually says.
My favorite quote from the book so far, p. 182: "Medievals, including Aquinas, love the matter-from distinction and tend to apply it indiscriminately to virtually anything at all; but they are speaking figuratively when they do so, not literally or strictly." Really?
p. 177: "That is, God not only makes composites of matter and form, as any craftsman or inventor does, but he also creates the formless matter that underlies the forms of any material object." Hmm...so humans make form and matter? Perhap she only meant that humans make composites, which is what Aquinas actually says.
My favorite quote from the book so far, p. 182: "Medievals, including Aquinas, love the matter-from distinction and tend to apply it indiscriminately to virtually anything at all; but they are speaking figuratively when they do so, not literally or strictly." Really?
Friday, January 23, 2009
Scotus on the Lombard's Christological Models
This is something of a no-brainer. There is a claim made by a prominent Thomist theologian regarding Scotus’ Christology that is slanderous and based on sheer ignorance. Now, I am aware of this claim only through hearsay; several friends have taken this Thomist’s class and told me of the charge. I have not bothered to look it up in any of his published writings, as I doubt he would commit such a charge to writing. In any case, it comes from an intro to medieval theology class. Certain elements (the part about Thomas) of this claim are a central feature of this person’s scholarly work, however.
The Charge: Peter Lombard describes three models for the incarnation. One of them he rules out of bounds; another one he endorses. But there is a third one that he is not sure of. Thomas Aquinas, being a great lover of ancient lore, was always trying to acquire the oldest and best manuscripts of the fathers, councils and other church documents. He stumbled upon the documents of an ancient council (I think it was Constantinople II) and by imbibing them was able to formulate an orthodox Christology. Scotus, however, was not so interested, and so predictably fell into great error and is in fact a heretic.
Here is the text of the Lombard:
Liber III Sententiarum d.6-7
"De intelligentia harum locutionum: Deus factus est homo, Deus est homo, an his locutionibus dicatur Deus factus esse aliquid vel esse aliquid vel non. Ex praemissis autem emergit quaestio plurimum continens utilitatis, sed nimium difficultatis atque perplexitatis. Cum enim constet ex praedictis et aliis plluribus testimoniis, omnesque catholici unanimiter fateantur Deum esse factum hominem, et Christum verum Deum esse et verum hominem, quaeritur an his locutionibus: 'Deus factus est homo', 'Filius Dei factus est filius hominis','Deus est homo' et 'homo est Deus', ...
Alii enim dicunt in ipsa Verbi incarnatione hominem quendam ex anima rationali et humana carne constitutum: ex quibus duobus omnis verus homo constituitur. Et ille hoo coepit esse homo ille. Concedunt etiam hominem illum assumptum a Verbo et unitum Verbo, et tamen esse Verbum. Et ea ratione tradunt dictum esse 'Deum factum hominem' vel 'esse hominem', quia Deus factus est (id est coepit esse) quedam substantia ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens; et illa substantia facta est (id est coepit esse) Deus. Non tamen demigratione naturae in naturam, sed utriusque naturae servata proprietate, factum est ut Deus esset illa substantia, et illa substantia esset Deus. Unde vere dicitur Deus factus homo et homo factus Deus, et Deus esse homo et homo Deus, et Filius Dei filius hominis et e converso. Cumque dicant illum hominem ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistere, non tamen fatentur ex duabus naturis esse compositum, divina scilicet et humana; nec illius partes esse duas naturas, sed animam tantum et carnem. Auctoritates ponit...
Sunt autem et alii qui istis in parte consentiunt, sed dicunt hominem illum non ex anima rationali et carne tantum, sed ex humana et divina natura, id est ex tribus substantiis: divinitate, carne et anima, constare; hunc Christum fatentur, et unam personam tantum esse, ante incarnationem vero solummodo simplicem, sed in incarnatione factam compositam ex divinitate et humanitate. Nec est ideo alia persona quam prius, sed cum prius esset Dei tantum persona, in incarnatione facta est etiam hominis persona: not ut duae essent personae, sed ut una et eadem esset persona Dei et hominis. Persona ergo quae prius erat simplex et in una tantum natura exsistens, in duabus et ex duabus subsistit naturis. Et persona quae tantum Deus erat, facta est etiam verus homo, subsistens non tantum ex anima et canre, sed etiam ex divinitate. Nec tamen persona illa debet dici facta persona, quamvis dicatur facta persona hominis. Facta est igitur illa persona, ut quibusdam placet, quiddam subsistens ex anima et carne, sed non est facta persona vel substantia vel natura. Et in quantum est ille subsistens, composita est; in quantum autem Verbum est, simplex est. Auctoritates ponit...
Sunt etiam et alii, qui in incarnatione Verbi non solum personam ex naturis compositam negant, verum etiam hominem aliquem, sive etiam aliquam substantiam, ibi ex anima et carne compositam vel factam diffitentur; sed sic illa duo, scilicet animam et carnem, Verbi personae vel naturae unita esse aiunt, ut non ex illis duobus vel ex his tribus aliqua substantia vel persona fieret sive componeretur, sed illis duobus velut indumento Verbum Dei vestiretur ut mortalium oculis congruenter appareret.
Aliis quoque pluribus modis illi sententiae [#1] potest opponi: quibus supersedemus, exercitationis studium lectori relinquentes et ad aliam properantes...
Posita est diligenter sententia secunda et eius explanatio. Cui in nullo, vel in modico, obviant auctoritates in tertia sententia inductae, quae iam consideranda est...
Satis diligenter, iuxta diversorum sententias, supra positam absque assertione et praeiudicio tractavi quaestionem. Verumtamen nolo, in tanta re tamque ad agnoscendum difficili, putare lectorem istam sibi nostram debere sufficere disputationem; sed legat et alia melius forte considerata atque tractata, et ea quae hic movere possunt vigilantiore atque intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat; hoc firmiter tenens, quod 'Deus hominem assumpsit, homo in Deum transivit, non naturae versibilitate, sed Dei dignatione: ut nec Deus mutaretur in humanam substantiam assumendo hominem, nec homo in divinam glorificatus in Deum, quia mutatio vel versibilitas naturae diminutionem et abolitionem substantiae facit.'"
Faber’s reply:
I don’t have much to say on the Aquinas part of this; I have seen statements of Thomas in which he says he got someone to translate some of the fathers for him. I haven’t seen Thomas saying he got ancient council documents. When it comes to texts of Aristotle, Gauthier has sufficiently demonstrated that Aquinas was aware of Moerbeke’s new translations, but made no special effort to acquire them and used whatever text was at hand in the convent where he was staying.
As for the charge against Scotus, well, our Thomist hasn’t bothered to actually look this question up in Scotus. It has been critically edited, and is found in volume 9 of the Vatican edition, p. 256-59.
Ordinatio III d.6 q.3:
“Last it is asked, without arguments, which of those three opinions, which the Master recites, is to be held.
I respond. The first is not commonly held, because the assuming is not that which is assumed, the Word however is ‘that man’. Whether ‘that man’ can stand for some singular of human nature, and not precisely for the supposit of the Word (just as white can stand for ‘this white’ which is the singular of white in the concrete-in the way in which this is true, ‘every colored is white’- and not for the subject or supposit subsisting in whiteness), will be discussed in distinction 11, ‘whether that man began to be’.
The third opinion in the time of the Master was not heretical, but after the time of Alexander [III, pope] it was condemned, just as is clear from Extra, ‘De haereticis’, Cum Christus [reference to the Decretales of Gregory IX]. Also, the authorites which seem to say that “Christ assumed human nature as a habit” are to be explained on account of some similitude of this nature to a habit: for just as one having a habit is not changed, but having more or habituated is hidden also under a habit, so the divine person is not changed by that union, but the human nature, which quasi hides the person of the Word.
Therefore the second opinion is to be held, that the person of the Word subsists in two natures: in one, from which it has first being [esse], in another (quasi adventicious) from which it has second being [esse], -just as in some way, if Socrates would be said to subsist in humanity and whiteness. But that that opinion says ‘the person of Christ is composite’, this is not commonly held, properly speaking of composition, namely from act and potency (just as from matter and form), or from two potentialities, of the sort which acccording to the Philosoher are called elements integrating the whole.
The authorities of Damascene, which say that person is composite, should be explained, because so truly is the human and divine nature there, just as if they were composing a person, but so inconfusedly that nothing third should be from them, because they do not make composition. And the same says Damascene himself chapter 49 “If according to the heretics Christ is of one composite nature, he is changed from a simple nature into a composite” and “neither is he called God, nor man,” “just as we say man to be from soul and body, or the body from the four elements”. He ought therefore to be explained that Christ is composite because of the truth of the two natures in which he exists-but composition is more truly denied, because one does not perfect another, nor from them is there some third nature.”
And that is the whole question. The Vatican editors speculate it is so short because it had been exhaustively treated by earlier scholastics. They also list parallal passages in the Summa and Sentences of Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure. Determining Scotus’ knowledge of Thomas is tricky (Thomas just wasn’t that important outside the Dominican order, especially prior to the hardening of the viae in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries), but he certainly read Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales. So the whole charge is nonsense. Both Thomas and Scotus know to avoid the Lombard’s third position because of their training in canon law, something all mendicants and seculars were thorougly schooled in (which came out at the recent SIEPM conference, though it should have been obvious).
So where does this slander come from? I really do not know. Ignorance, sloppy scholarship, the age-old rivalry between the followers of Thomas and Scotus. All one can really say is “tolle, lege!”
The Charge: Peter Lombard describes three models for the incarnation. One of them he rules out of bounds; another one he endorses. But there is a third one that he is not sure of. Thomas Aquinas, being a great lover of ancient lore, was always trying to acquire the oldest and best manuscripts of the fathers, councils and other church documents. He stumbled upon the documents of an ancient council (I think it was Constantinople II) and by imbibing them was able to formulate an orthodox Christology. Scotus, however, was not so interested, and so predictably fell into great error and is in fact a heretic.
Here is the text of the Lombard:
Liber III Sententiarum d.6-7
"De intelligentia harum locutionum: Deus factus est homo, Deus est homo, an his locutionibus dicatur Deus factus esse aliquid vel esse aliquid vel non. Ex praemissis autem emergit quaestio plurimum continens utilitatis, sed nimium difficultatis atque perplexitatis. Cum enim constet ex praedictis et aliis plluribus testimoniis, omnesque catholici unanimiter fateantur Deum esse factum hominem, et Christum verum Deum esse et verum hominem, quaeritur an his locutionibus: 'Deus factus est homo', 'Filius Dei factus est filius hominis','Deus est homo' et 'homo est Deus', ...
Alii enim dicunt in ipsa Verbi incarnatione hominem quendam ex anima rationali et humana carne constitutum: ex quibus duobus omnis verus homo constituitur. Et ille hoo coepit esse homo ille. Concedunt etiam hominem illum assumptum a Verbo et unitum Verbo, et tamen esse Verbum. Et ea ratione tradunt dictum esse 'Deum factum hominem' vel 'esse hominem', quia Deus factus est (id est coepit esse) quedam substantia ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens; et illa substantia facta est (id est coepit esse) Deus. Non tamen demigratione naturae in naturam, sed utriusque naturae servata proprietate, factum est ut Deus esset illa substantia, et illa substantia esset Deus. Unde vere dicitur Deus factus homo et homo factus Deus, et Deus esse homo et homo Deus, et Filius Dei filius hominis et e converso. Cumque dicant illum hominem ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistere, non tamen fatentur ex duabus naturis esse compositum, divina scilicet et humana; nec illius partes esse duas naturas, sed animam tantum et carnem. Auctoritates ponit...
Sunt autem et alii qui istis in parte consentiunt, sed dicunt hominem illum non ex anima rationali et carne tantum, sed ex humana et divina natura, id est ex tribus substantiis: divinitate, carne et anima, constare; hunc Christum fatentur, et unam personam tantum esse, ante incarnationem vero solummodo simplicem, sed in incarnatione factam compositam ex divinitate et humanitate. Nec est ideo alia persona quam prius, sed cum prius esset Dei tantum persona, in incarnatione facta est etiam hominis persona: not ut duae essent personae, sed ut una et eadem esset persona Dei et hominis. Persona ergo quae prius erat simplex et in una tantum natura exsistens, in duabus et ex duabus subsistit naturis. Et persona quae tantum Deus erat, facta est etiam verus homo, subsistens non tantum ex anima et canre, sed etiam ex divinitate. Nec tamen persona illa debet dici facta persona, quamvis dicatur facta persona hominis. Facta est igitur illa persona, ut quibusdam placet, quiddam subsistens ex anima et carne, sed non est facta persona vel substantia vel natura. Et in quantum est ille subsistens, composita est; in quantum autem Verbum est, simplex est. Auctoritates ponit...
Sunt etiam et alii, qui in incarnatione Verbi non solum personam ex naturis compositam negant, verum etiam hominem aliquem, sive etiam aliquam substantiam, ibi ex anima et carne compositam vel factam diffitentur; sed sic illa duo, scilicet animam et carnem, Verbi personae vel naturae unita esse aiunt, ut non ex illis duobus vel ex his tribus aliqua substantia vel persona fieret sive componeretur, sed illis duobus velut indumento Verbum Dei vestiretur ut mortalium oculis congruenter appareret.
Aliis quoque pluribus modis illi sententiae [#1] potest opponi: quibus supersedemus, exercitationis studium lectori relinquentes et ad aliam properantes...
Posita est diligenter sententia secunda et eius explanatio. Cui in nullo, vel in modico, obviant auctoritates in tertia sententia inductae, quae iam consideranda est...
Satis diligenter, iuxta diversorum sententias, supra positam absque assertione et praeiudicio tractavi quaestionem. Verumtamen nolo, in tanta re tamque ad agnoscendum difficili, putare lectorem istam sibi nostram debere sufficere disputationem; sed legat et alia melius forte considerata atque tractata, et ea quae hic movere possunt vigilantiore atque intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat; hoc firmiter tenens, quod 'Deus hominem assumpsit, homo in Deum transivit, non naturae versibilitate, sed Dei dignatione: ut nec Deus mutaretur in humanam substantiam assumendo hominem, nec homo in divinam glorificatus in Deum, quia mutatio vel versibilitas naturae diminutionem et abolitionem substantiae facit.'"
Faber’s reply:
I don’t have much to say on the Aquinas part of this; I have seen statements of Thomas in which he says he got someone to translate some of the fathers for him. I haven’t seen Thomas saying he got ancient council documents. When it comes to texts of Aristotle, Gauthier has sufficiently demonstrated that Aquinas was aware of Moerbeke’s new translations, but made no special effort to acquire them and used whatever text was at hand in the convent where he was staying.
As for the charge against Scotus, well, our Thomist hasn’t bothered to actually look this question up in Scotus. It has been critically edited, and is found in volume 9 of the Vatican edition, p. 256-59.
Ordinatio III d.6 q.3:
“Last it is asked, without arguments, which of those three opinions, which the Master recites, is to be held.
I respond. The first is not commonly held, because the assuming is not that which is assumed, the Word however is ‘that man’. Whether ‘that man’ can stand for some singular of human nature, and not precisely for the supposit of the Word (just as white can stand for ‘this white’ which is the singular of white in the concrete-in the way in which this is true, ‘every colored is white’- and not for the subject or supposit subsisting in whiteness), will be discussed in distinction 11, ‘whether that man began to be’.
The third opinion in the time of the Master was not heretical, but after the time of Alexander [III, pope] it was condemned, just as is clear from Extra, ‘De haereticis’, Cum Christus [reference to the Decretales of Gregory IX]. Also, the authorites which seem to say that “Christ assumed human nature as a habit” are to be explained on account of some similitude of this nature to a habit: for just as one having a habit is not changed, but having more or habituated is hidden also under a habit, so the divine person is not changed by that union, but the human nature, which quasi hides the person of the Word.
Therefore the second opinion is to be held, that the person of the Word subsists in two natures: in one, from which it has first being [esse], in another (quasi adventicious) from which it has second being [esse], -just as in some way, if Socrates would be said to subsist in humanity and whiteness. But that that opinion says ‘the person of Christ is composite’, this is not commonly held, properly speaking of composition, namely from act and potency (just as from matter and form), or from two potentialities, of the sort which acccording to the Philosoher are called elements integrating the whole.
The authorities of Damascene, which say that person is composite, should be explained, because so truly is the human and divine nature there, just as if they were composing a person, but so inconfusedly that nothing third should be from them, because they do not make composition. And the same says Damascene himself chapter 49 “If according to the heretics Christ is of one composite nature, he is changed from a simple nature into a composite” and “neither is he called God, nor man,” “just as we say man to be from soul and body, or the body from the four elements”. He ought therefore to be explained that Christ is composite because of the truth of the two natures in which he exists-but composition is more truly denied, because one does not perfect another, nor from them is there some third nature.”
And that is the whole question. The Vatican editors speculate it is so short because it had been exhaustively treated by earlier scholastics. They also list parallal passages in the Summa and Sentences of Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure. Determining Scotus’ knowledge of Thomas is tricky (Thomas just wasn’t that important outside the Dominican order, especially prior to the hardening of the viae in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries), but he certainly read Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales. So the whole charge is nonsense. Both Thomas and Scotus know to avoid the Lombard’s third position because of their training in canon law, something all mendicants and seculars were thorougly schooled in (which came out at the recent SIEPM conference, though it should have been obvious).
So where does this slander come from? I really do not know. Ignorance, sloppy scholarship, the age-old rivalry between the followers of Thomas and Scotus. All one can really say is “tolle, lege!”
Friday, January 16, 2009
The Definition of Baptism
Here is Scotus's definition of baptism, that comes at the end of roughly 400 pages of analysis. I was quite taken by surprise, as a lot of what he was doing seemed haphazard and unfinished, but I was wrong. Following this passage he glosses every word in the definition and shows where he defended it in the previous 400 pages.
Ordinatio IV,, nn.1-2 (XI 411):
"Ex dictis, a principio 3 distinctionis usque huc, potest colligi una ratio baptismi, exprimens omnia quae sunt simpliciter necessaria ad rationem baptismi, quia si ponatur relationem illam signi - quam immportat baptismus - fundari in illa ablutione ut in fundamento totali, habente tamen ad verba habitudinem, et ad alia concomitantia, potest talis ratio assignari ipsius baptismi:
'Baptismus est ablutio hominis viatoris, actualiter vel virtualiter consentientis, vel numquam usu liberi arbitrii disentientis, facta in aqua elementari fluida ab alio simul abluente et verba certa - actum et suscipientem cum invocatione Trinitatis designantia - proferente, tam in abluendo quam in proferendo intendendo facere quod Christus instituit faciendum vel quod intendit facere Ecclesia christiana'"
Ordinatio IV,
"Ex dictis, a principio 3 distinctionis usque huc, potest colligi una ratio baptismi, exprimens omnia quae sunt simpliciter necessaria ad rationem baptismi, quia si ponatur relationem illam signi - quam immportat baptismus - fundari in illa ablutione ut in fundamento totali, habente tamen ad verba habitudinem, et ad alia concomitantia, potest talis ratio assignari ipsius baptismi:
'Baptismus est ablutio hominis viatoris, actualiter vel virtualiter consentientis, vel numquam usu liberi arbitrii disentientis, facta in aqua elementari fluida ab alio simul abluente et verba certa - actum et suscipientem cum invocatione Trinitatis designantia - proferente, tam in abluendo quam in proferendo intendendo facere quod Christus instituit faciendum vel quod intendit facere Ecclesia christiana'"
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Mochrie on Scotus on Economic and Political Philosophy
I just noticed this article, thanks to a link posted by Brandon at Siris. I haven't read it yet, but it looks promising (some historical inaccuracies, but Scotus is a full-time job), just the sort of thing I wish were done more often: exposition of text, with some conclusions as to its usefulness on the contemporary scene.
R.I. Mochrie, "Justice in Exchange: The Economic Philosophy of John Duns Scotus" in Journal of Markets and Morality," 9 (2006).
http://www.acton.org/publications/mandm/mandm_article_26.php#ftnt_11
R.I. Mochrie, "Justice in Exchange: The Economic Philosophy of John Duns Scotus" in Journal of Markets and Morality," 9 (2006).
http://www.acton.org/publications/mandm/mandm_article_26.php#ftnt_11
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
Scotus on Canon law Glosses
He was't a big fan. I had to post this; it's a comment on whether the Poenitentiali of Theodoricus is a valid authority.
Ordinatio IV d.6 pars 4 art. 1 q.2 n. 184 XI 350-51):
"Et si dicas 'licet Theodorus non potuit condere ius, tamen innuit papam condisse, cum dicit "secundum canones"', - respondeo: hoc deberet glossator apponere, quia haec glossa est necessaria; sed nullam ponit ostendendo ubi sit canon super hoc editus. Et hic, sicut in multis aliis locis, apparet inutilis occupatio glossatorum in iure canonico, qui multiplicant concordantias et auctoritates ad unum vocabulum, et postea in suo fine nihil ad propositum, - et alibi, ubi est verbum maximi ponderis, a quo dependet sententia totius capituli, transeunt sicco pedo..."
Ordinatio IV d.6 pars 4 art. 1 q.2 n. 184 XI 350-51):
"Et si dicas 'licet Theodorus non potuit condere ius, tamen innuit papam condisse, cum dicit "secundum canones"', - respondeo: hoc deberet glossator apponere, quia haec glossa est necessaria; sed nullam ponit ostendendo ubi sit canon super hoc editus. Et hic, sicut in multis aliis locis, apparet inutilis occupatio glossatorum in iure canonico, qui multiplicant concordantias et auctoritates ad unum vocabulum, et postea in suo fine nihil ad propositum, - et alibi, ubi est verbum maximi ponderis, a quo dependet sententia totius capituli, transeunt sicco pedo..."
Monday, January 5, 2009
Random Remarks on Baptism
Ordinatio IV d.5 q.1: Utrum malitia ministri impediat conferri baptismum
Item, Augustine in De unico baptismo, after the middle: "the glorious martyr Cyprian, who refused to recognize the baptism given by heretics and schimatics" etc. From this it is argued thus: one erring around an article of faith, if he dies in that error, is condemned because "without faith it is impossible to please God, Hebr. 11; Cyprian said that true baptism, at least one given by a heretic or schismatic, cannot be conferred by an evil minister, and in that opinion he endured to the end, and nevertheless he is not condemned but is a glorius martyr; therefore that opinion is not erroneous nor against some article of faith. [and so on]
To that about Cyprian I say that some things are so absolutely(simpliciter) about the substance of the faith that all-perhaps the ones receiving after they receive the use of reason-are held explicitly to believe them, just as are the articles about the incarnation (as Christ has been born and died), about which there are special solemnities in the Church, and whoch the people are able to conceive because they are about Christ the man; others are explicitly required of the substance of the faith, observed by the great ones[or majority? maioribus] of the Church (such as God is trine, and things pertaining to spiritual and imaginable things of this sort). And that distinction is clear from Augustine, XIV De Trinitate ch. 1. Others are which are neither necessarily nor explicitly believed by them nor by those, because they are not yet declared by the Church; of this sort are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith. But before they are declared by the Church it is not necessary that anyone believe them-nevetheless it is necessary sober opinions should be held about them, as namely man is prepared to hold them for the time in which the truth is declared.
In this way I say that 'baptism is a sacrament of the new law necessary for salvation' immediately was a truth of the Christian faith because it was expressed in the Gospels; but t hat it can be conferred by a heretic was not immediately expressed, indeed nor was it declared in the time of Cyprian; on account of which about the declaration of that truth Augustine greatly labored in his books, as is clear from De unico baptismo and Contra Donatistas.
Hence if Cyprian and so thought, namely that there is no baptism among heretics, because he would have been prompt to hold with his mind what the Church had declared, he erred in nothing, unless perhaps by sinning venially, because he strenously asserted that which neither reason nor authority was urging. For his argument was not valid, namely "that which someone does not have he is not able to give" because the one baptizing does not give grace, but a sacrament, and he has that in power, because he has Orders [...].
And in this way Abbat Joachim can be excused, because even if he spoke an erroneous statement, as is clear from Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica,' that 'three persons are not some one t hing which does not generate nor is negerated nor spirates nor is spirated,' because he is not said to have defended this pertinaceously but to have left all his books to be corrected according to the judgment of the Church.
Item, Augustine in De unico baptismo, after the middle: "the glorious martyr Cyprian, who refused to recognize the baptism given by heretics and schimatics" etc. From this it is argued thus: one erring around an article of faith, if he dies in that error, is condemned because "without faith it is impossible to please God, Hebr. 11; Cyprian said that true baptism, at least one given by a heretic or schismatic, cannot be conferred by an evil minister, and in that opinion he endured to the end, and nevertheless he is not condemned but is a glorius martyr; therefore that opinion is not erroneous nor against some article of faith. [and so on]
To that about Cyprian I say that some things are so absolutely(simpliciter) about the substance of the faith that all-perhaps the ones receiving after they receive the use of reason-are held explicitly to believe them, just as are the articles about the incarnation (as Christ has been born and died), about which there are special solemnities in the Church, and whoch the people are able to conceive because they are about Christ the man; others are explicitly required of the substance of the faith, observed by the great ones[or majority? maioribus] of the Church (such as God is trine, and things pertaining to spiritual and imaginable things of this sort). And that distinction is clear from Augustine, XIV De Trinitate ch. 1. Others are which are neither necessarily nor explicitly believed by them nor by those, because they are not yet declared by the Church; of this sort are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith. But before they are declared by the Church it is not necessary that anyone believe them-nevetheless it is necessary sober opinions should be held about them, as namely man is prepared to hold them for the time in which the truth is declared.
In this way I say that 'baptism is a sacrament of the new law necessary for salvation' immediately was a truth of the Christian faith because it was expressed in the Gospels; but t hat it can be conferred by a heretic was not immediately expressed, indeed nor was it declared in the time of Cyprian; on account of which about the declaration of that truth Augustine greatly labored in his books, as is clear from De unico baptismo and Contra Donatistas.
Hence if Cyprian and so thought, namely that there is no baptism among heretics, because he would have been prompt to hold with his mind what the Church had declared, he erred in nothing, unless perhaps by sinning venially, because he strenously asserted that which neither reason nor authority was urging. For his argument was not valid, namely "that which someone does not have he is not able to give" because the one baptizing does not give grace, but a sacrament, and he has that in power, because he has Orders [...].
And in this way Abbat Joachim can be excused, because even if he spoke an erroneous statement, as is clear from Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica,' that 'three persons are not some one t hing which does not generate nor is negerated nor spirates nor is spirated,' because he is not said to have defended this pertinaceously but to have left all his books to be corrected according to the judgment of the Church.
New Blog
Be sure to check out Scot William's new Henry of Ghent blog if you haven't already. It promises lots of food for thought. The link is on the sidebar.
Thursday, January 1, 2009
Scotistic Censorship
The following is a segment that I noticed was dropped from two manuscripts (Wien 1494 and Paris 3490) of Peter Thomae's Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q.4 a.3. In this passage Peter criticizes Scotus and says that he contradicted himself. I submit that this is an act of censorship. It does not constitute an homoeoteleuton but is a simple omission. After the omitted passage, the text continues with the words "Ideo tenendo eandem conclusionem cum ipso". A few paragraphs later, there is another omission by the same two manuscripts of the words "in quo contradico isti Doctori". Apparently, some Scotists don't like the master being criticized and suppress text that does. Here is the lenghty section of omitted text:
NB: * = lectio incerta
"Preterea, in hoc quod dicit in quarto dicto, quod videlicet esse intelligibile non producitur per memoriam sed per intelligibilitatem, contradicit sibi in primo, vbi expresse dicit quod memoria est principium creaturarum in esse intelligibile et hoc magis videtur esse verum quam illud, nec enim video quod intelligentia habeat rationem productiui, nam principium productivum intellectionis etiam in nobis non ponitur intelligentia set memoria que quidem habet producere intelligibilia.
Quintum etiam dictum licet sit verum in se * ipsum ad predictam non videlicet quia remota causa remouetur effectus. Set hic remouetur hoc quod ipse supponit scilicet quod esse intelligibile sit a memoria uel intelligentia cum sit ab essentia ut supra ostensum est.
Similiter motiva sua predictam non videntur cogere prima enim tria petunt principium quondo enim dicitur in primo illud quod est principium productionis necessarie et contingentis, ista maior petit et accipit vnum falsum, petit si quid in hoc quod accipit quod intellectus est principium creature in esse intelligibile; hoc enim est questio. Si dicas quod ipse tantum intendit ibi loqui de existentia siue de esse in effectum, contra hoc est hoc quod ipse dicit in secundo articulo; ibi enim dicit quod omnis rationes que * sunt in primo | [N 96va] articulo de esse reali possunt fieri de isto esse intelligibili. Secundo accipit falsum, scilicet quod illa productio quidditatis in esse intelligibili sit contingens cum tamen sit necesse ut preostensum est.
Secunda ratio similiter deficit, supposit enim quod hoc esse intelligibile sit a potentia intellectiua quod falsum est.
Consimiliter tertia ratio, cum dicitur prior est habitudo nature ad suppositum,et cetera. Hic namque supponitur quod esse intelligibile sit per aliquam productionem uel actionem quod falsum est, et ita patet ad primas tres rationes.
Ad alias que ponuntur in principio secundi articuli, ad primam, quando dicitur si productionem intrinsecam precedit esse intelligibile creabilium et cetera, non video aliquod inconveniens rei illa cum quia etiam secundum ipsum in tertio instanti voluntas complacet in illis quidditatibus et ista complacentia est necessaria quia ante determinationem voluntatis. Similiter potest dici quod non sequitur quod amor creature sit necessarius, quia precedit non sicut ratio illius productionis intrinsece set sicud consequens necessario esse essentie.
Secunda etiam ratio non valet, quia cum deberet arguere de esse intelligibili, arguit de esse cognito seu intellecto. Illud etiam assumptum est falsum, quia non credo quod Filius habeat esse prius esse cognitum quam esse productum, non enim cognoscitur antequam producatur.
Tertia etiam ratio non valet ymaginatur enim quod ex hoc sequiretur relatio realis prime producentis ad illud esse intelligibile precedens productionem intrinsecam; set hoc non est verum. Dicerem enim quod verbum non nascitur seu gignitur de illis que in esse intelligibili essentiam consequntur; set primo et per se de ipsa essentia nec illa intelligibilia precedunt verbum ut de quibus ait uel fiat set ut necessario consecuta rationem essentie * autem sit intelligendum dictum AUGUSTINUS quod etiam ille Doctor contra se adducit et non soluit dicentis quod verbum nascitur de omnibus que sunt in Patris scientia dicetur inferius.
NB: * = lectio incerta
"Preterea, in hoc quod dicit in quarto dicto, quod videlicet esse intelligibile non producitur per memoriam sed per intelligibilitatem, contradicit sibi in primo, vbi expresse dicit quod memoria est principium creaturarum in esse intelligibile et hoc magis videtur esse verum quam illud, nec enim video quod intelligentia habeat rationem productiui, nam principium productivum intellectionis etiam in nobis non ponitur intelligentia set memoria que quidem habet producere intelligibilia.
Quintum etiam dictum licet sit verum in se * ipsum ad predictam non videlicet quia remota causa remouetur effectus. Set hic remouetur hoc quod ipse supponit scilicet quod esse intelligibile sit a memoria uel intelligentia cum sit ab essentia ut supra ostensum est.
Similiter motiva sua predictam non videntur cogere prima enim tria petunt principium quondo enim dicitur in primo illud quod est principium productionis necessarie et contingentis, ista maior petit et accipit vnum falsum, petit si quid in hoc quod accipit quod intellectus est principium creature in esse intelligibile; hoc enim est questio. Si dicas quod ipse tantum intendit ibi loqui de existentia siue de esse in effectum, contra hoc est hoc quod ipse dicit in secundo articulo; ibi enim dicit quod omnis rationes que * sunt in primo | [N 96va] articulo de esse reali possunt fieri de isto esse intelligibili. Secundo accipit falsum, scilicet quod illa productio quidditatis in esse intelligibili sit contingens cum tamen sit necesse ut preostensum est.
Secunda ratio similiter deficit, supposit enim quod hoc esse intelligibile sit a potentia intellectiua quod falsum est.
Consimiliter tertia ratio, cum dicitur prior est habitudo nature ad suppositum,et cetera. Hic namque supponitur quod esse intelligibile sit per aliquam productionem uel actionem quod falsum est, et ita patet ad primas tres rationes.
Ad alias que ponuntur in principio secundi articuli, ad primam, quando dicitur si productionem intrinsecam precedit esse intelligibile creabilium et cetera, non video aliquod inconveniens rei illa cum quia etiam secundum ipsum in tertio instanti voluntas complacet in illis quidditatibus et ista complacentia est necessaria quia ante determinationem voluntatis. Similiter potest dici quod non sequitur quod amor creature sit necessarius, quia precedit non sicut ratio illius productionis intrinsece set sicud consequens necessario esse essentie.
Secunda etiam ratio non valet, quia cum deberet arguere de esse intelligibili, arguit de esse cognito seu intellecto. Illud etiam assumptum est falsum, quia non credo quod Filius habeat esse prius esse cognitum quam esse productum, non enim cognoscitur antequam producatur.
Tertia etiam ratio non valet ymaginatur enim quod ex hoc sequiretur relatio realis prime producentis ad illud esse intelligibile precedens productionem intrinsecam; set hoc non est verum. Dicerem enim quod verbum non nascitur seu gignitur de illis que in esse intelligibili essentiam consequntur; set primo et per se de ipsa essentia nec illa intelligibilia precedunt verbum ut de quibus ait uel fiat set ut necessario consecuta rationem essentie * autem sit intelligendum dictum AUGUSTINUS quod etiam ille Doctor contra se adducit et non soluit dicentis quod verbum nascitur de omnibus que sunt in Patris scientia dicetur inferius.
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Scotistic Flair
It only works in latin.
Ordinatio IV d.3 q.3 n.100 (XI 192):
"Et ideo non urget nos illa dubitatio, Decretum 1, quaestione 1, "Detrahe", ne forte asinus bibat sacramentum, quae vere est dubitatio asinina, quia illa ablutio non durat nisi in fieri, et quantumcumque posset aqua bibi vel huc vel illuc transfundi, ipsa ablutio non."
Also, a few pages later he said beer and mead were not proper matters for baptism.
Ordinatio IV d.3 q.3 n.100 (XI 192):
"Et ideo non urget nos illa dubitatio, Decretum 1, quaestione 1, "Detrahe", ne forte asinus bibat sacramentum, quae vere est dubitatio asinina, quia illa ablutio non durat nisi in fieri, et quantumcumque posset aqua bibi vel huc vel illuc transfundi, ipsa ablutio non."
Also, a few pages later he said beer and mead were not proper matters for baptism.
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
A Warm and Fuzzy Syllogism
I have not read much in medieval sacramental theology, so I do not know if this position is common or not. It came up when I was reading a series of questions on the efficacy of circumcision; the question I have quoted from below is from one dealing with whether there was some remedy for original sin prior to the institution of circumcision.
Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.1 pars 4 incidentalis q.2 n.389 (XI 138):
"Nullo tempore dimisit Deus cultores suos sine remedio necessario ad salutem; sed omni tempore-post lapsum-fuit necessaria ad salutem deletio originalis; ergo quocumque tempore erat aliquod remedium efficax ad deletionem illius peccati"
At no time did God leave his worshippers without a remedy necessary for salvation; but at every time after the fall the removal of original [sin] was necessary for salvation; therefore at every time there was some efficacious remedy for the removal of that sin.
Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.1 pars 4 incidentalis q.2 n.389 (XI 138):
"Nullo tempore dimisit Deus cultores suos sine remedio necessario ad salutem; sed omni tempore-post lapsum-fuit necessaria ad salutem deletio originalis; ergo quocumque tempore erat aliquod remedium efficax ad deletionem illius peccati"
At no time did God leave his worshippers without a remedy necessary for salvation; but at every time after the fall the removal of original [sin] was necessary for salvation; therefore at every time there was some efficacious remedy for the removal of that sin.
Sunday, December 28, 2008
Peter Thomae Contra Scotus
After reading William of Alnwick and the huge amount of space he devotes to criticizing Scotus, Peter Thomae turns out to be a bit of a disappointment in his treatise of the same name as William's. He is much more concerned with Auriol (Ledoux didn't allege any Auriol in his fontes, but maybe it hadn't occurred to him to look). Peter does have some brief comments which I have posted below. He does mention Scotus's Oxford position with the four instants of nature but hasn't directly criticized it (yet; I have only read the first two questions), and seems to be on the whole defending Scotus's Parisian position. On the whole is rather mild compared to Alnwick.
Peter Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 2 a. 3 (from mss. NP1W):
"Tertium dubium circa dicta videtur esse quia Scotus, cuius doctrinam sequor ut plurimum, videtur dicere quod intellectus divinus producat creabilium quidditates in esse cognito. Hoc enim ipse dicit distinctione 35 Primi in responsione ad unum argumentum ubi enim dicit quod divinus intellectus in primo instanti intelligit essentiam suam sub ratione mere absoluta. In secunda autem instanti producit quidditates creabilium in esse intelligibili.
Ad tertium dubium, si Scotus velit dicere quod divinus intellectus ut ab essentia distinctus producat quidditatem in esse intelligibili, loquendo proprie de productione, non teneo cum ipso. Si tamen dicatur quod ista productio est mere equivoca et metaphorica ut ipse etiam videtur dicere, detur sibi, licet improprie dicatur."
Translation:
The third doubt seems to be because Scotus, whose doctrine I follow as do many, seems to say that the divine intellect produces the quiddities of creatable things in 'the act of being thought'. For this he says in distinction 35 of the first Book [of the Sentences] in response to an argument where he says that the divine intellect in the first instant understands his own essence under an aspect merely absolute. In the second however he produces the quiddities of creatable things in intelligibile being.
To the third doubt, if Scotus meant to say that the divine intellect as distinct from the essence produces a quiddity in intelligibile being, speaking properly about production, I do not hold this with him. If however it is said that that production is merely equivocal and metaphorical as he himself seems to say, let it be granted him, althought he spoke improperly."
Oh yes; if you don't know who Peter Thomae is, consult Bert Roest's website for a list of literature. Basically, he was born in Galicia (no one knows when), and ended up at the franciscun studium in Barcelona, later served as Papal penitentiary and abbreviator for John XXII, and seems to have fallen out of favor under Benedict XII as he was jailed on charges of sorcery. He died in prison in Noves, in the spring of 1340.
Peter Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 2 a. 3 (from mss. NP1W):
"Tertium dubium circa dicta videtur esse quia Scotus, cuius doctrinam sequor ut plurimum, videtur dicere quod intellectus divinus producat creabilium quidditates in esse cognito. Hoc enim ipse dicit distinctione 35 Primi in responsione ad unum argumentum ubi enim dicit quod divinus intellectus in primo instanti intelligit essentiam suam sub ratione mere absoluta. In secunda autem instanti producit quidditates creabilium in esse intelligibili.
Ad tertium dubium, si Scotus velit dicere quod divinus intellectus ut ab essentia distinctus producat quidditatem in esse intelligibili, loquendo proprie de productione, non teneo cum ipso. Si tamen dicatur quod ista productio est mere equivoca et metaphorica ut ipse etiam videtur dicere, detur sibi, licet improprie dicatur."
Translation:
The third doubt seems to be because Scotus, whose doctrine I follow as do many, seems to say that the divine intellect produces the quiddities of creatable things in 'the act of being thought'. For this he says in distinction 35 of the first Book [of the Sentences] in response to an argument where he says that the divine intellect in the first instant understands his own essence under an aspect merely absolute. In the second however he produces the quiddities of creatable things in intelligibile being.
To the third doubt, if Scotus meant to say that the divine intellect as distinct from the essence produces a quiddity in intelligibile being, speaking properly about production, I do not hold this with him. If however it is said that that production is merely equivocal and metaphorical as he himself seems to say, let it be granted him, althought he spoke improperly."
Oh yes; if you don't know who Peter Thomae is, consult Bert Roest's website for a list of literature. Basically, he was born in Galicia (no one knows when), and ended up at the franciscun studium in Barcelona, later served as Papal penitentiary and abbreviator for John XXII, and seems to have fallen out of favor under Benedict XII as he was jailed on charges of sorcery. He died in prison in Noves, in the spring of 1340.
Monday, December 15, 2008
Alnwick contra Scotus
For all of you just dying to know what went on in the 14th century after Scotus came up with his controversial views on the production of the quiddities of creatures by the divine intellect (see the previous post, the only one listed under the "intelligible being" rubric), here's some relief. Apparently, according to the 17th century Scotist Mastrius (and even this info is second hand, though T. Hoffmann has written a book on this), the 15th and 16th century Scotists accept Scotus's view of the production of creatures in intelligible being and the instants of nature theory that this requires. But the 14th century boys I've looked at are pretty incensed by it. Here is Alnwick, from his Quaestiones de esse intelligibili (ed.Ledoux, p. 136). This is from q.5, which is devoted to analyzing the basic position that Scotus adopts, though Alnwick says it is common to many "moderni". In the first excerpt he is responding to Scotus and refuting him on his own terms.
"Again, second, I prove the same by means of another principle of one holding the opposite, namely that the divine essence, compared to no other, represents all other things, and not by a relation of reason. Then so: whatever befalls the divine essence according to itself and not by the comparison of the intellect, befalls itself prior according to reason than other things are understood. But the divine essence, according to its absolute and infinite perfection, represents all other secondary objects, and not by a relation of reason; therefore other things are first represented by the essence than they are understood by the divine intellect, therefore other things are not instituted by God in intelligibile being by an act of divine understanding. Hence John Dons [sic], who says that creatures are instituted in intelligible being by an act of divine understanding, and nevertheless that the essence according to its absolute perfection represents all other things, says expressly the opposite, because if the divine essence according to its absolute perfection represents all other things, then first they are repsresented to the intellect than they are understood by the divine intellect, and so first they are intelligible before they are understood by the divine intellect."
Here is another argument, one from the beginning where he is also directly criticizing Scotus's position (Ledoux 125):
"Again, third thus: a creature is first intelligible before it is understood by God, therefore it is not constituted by an act of divine understanding. The consequence is clear, because nothing is constituted by an act posterior to it. I prove the antecedent, becase every other intelligible in act that is understood by God is represented by the divine essence, because the essence is the means of understanding all other things. But the essence first represents all intelligibiles before the intellect understands them, because it has the capacity to represent from it itself and not from the intellect. For the intellect does not grant the power of representing other intelligibiles to the essence, because to represent all intelligibiles is a pure perfection (perfectionem simpliciter), because in anything it is better to be something than not to be. But the intellect does not grant a pure perfection to the essence. Therefore a creature first is an intelligible represented by the divine essence than the intellect understands, thefore, etc.
The argument is confirmed: to represent many in act is of greater perfection than to represent fewer; therefore to represent infinite intelligibiles in act is of infinite perfection, but the divine essence, since it is an infinite sea, does not have infinite perfection from the divine intellect, therefore neither does it have from the intellect that it can represent infinite intelligibiles in act. Since therefore the essence distinctly represents infinite intelligibiles, it follows that the essence, as preceding the act of understanding, represents in act infinite intelligibiles, and as a consequence creatures have intelligibile being before God understands them."
According to Tim Noone's article where he edits Scotus's Reportatio account of the divine ideas, Scotus is reviving the opinion of Bonaventure. One question one might ask as well in this context (I think Alnwick dismissed it as not directly germain to the question but said he'd discuss it elsewhere) is how all this relates to the procession of the other two Trinitarian persons. Are persons and creatures understood by the divine intellect in the same instant of nature as creatures? That seems inconveniens somehow.
Perhaps I should mention, the person in question here is William of Alnwick, Scotus' socius at Paris, who is responsible for the Additiones magnae, a sentence commentary, the questions I've translated here, a Quodlibet and some sermons (including one on the beatific vision). He was made a bishop in Italy, and died around 1333.
"Again, second, I prove the same by means of another principle of one holding the opposite, namely that the divine essence, compared to no other, represents all other things, and not by a relation of reason. Then so: whatever befalls the divine essence according to itself and not by the comparison of the intellect, befalls itself prior according to reason than other things are understood. But the divine essence, according to its absolute and infinite perfection, represents all other secondary objects, and not by a relation of reason; therefore other things are first represented by the essence than they are understood by the divine intellect, therefore other things are not instituted by God in intelligibile being by an act of divine understanding. Hence John Dons [sic], who says that creatures are instituted in intelligible being by an act of divine understanding, and nevertheless that the essence according to its absolute perfection represents all other things, says expressly the opposite, because if the divine essence according to its absolute perfection represents all other things, then first they are repsresented to the intellect than they are understood by the divine intellect, and so first they are intelligible before they are understood by the divine intellect."
Here is another argument, one from the beginning where he is also directly criticizing Scotus's position (Ledoux 125):
"Again, third thus: a creature is first intelligible before it is understood by God, therefore it is not constituted by an act of divine understanding. The consequence is clear, because nothing is constituted by an act posterior to it. I prove the antecedent, becase every other intelligible in act that is understood by God is represented by the divine essence, because the essence is the means of understanding all other things. But the essence first represents all intelligibiles before the intellect understands them, because it has the capacity to represent from it itself and not from the intellect. For the intellect does not grant the power of representing other intelligibiles to the essence, because to represent all intelligibiles is a pure perfection (perfectionem simpliciter), because in anything it is better to be something than not to be. But the intellect does not grant a pure perfection to the essence. Therefore a creature first is an intelligible represented by the divine essence than the intellect understands, thefore, etc.
The argument is confirmed: to represent many in act is of greater perfection than to represent fewer; therefore to represent infinite intelligibiles in act is of infinite perfection, but the divine essence, since it is an infinite sea, does not have infinite perfection from the divine intellect, therefore neither does it have from the intellect that it can represent infinite intelligibiles in act. Since therefore the essence distinctly represents infinite intelligibiles, it follows that the essence, as preceding the act of understanding, represents in act infinite intelligibiles, and as a consequence creatures have intelligibile being before God understands them."
According to Tim Noone's article where he edits Scotus's Reportatio account of the divine ideas, Scotus is reviving the opinion of Bonaventure. One question one might ask as well in this context (I think Alnwick dismissed it as not directly germain to the question but said he'd discuss it elsewhere) is how all this relates to the procession of the other two Trinitarian persons. Are persons and creatures understood by the divine intellect in the same instant of nature as creatures? That seems inconveniens somehow.
Perhaps I should mention, the person in question here is William of Alnwick, Scotus' socius at Paris, who is responsible for the Additiones magnae, a sentence commentary, the questions I've translated here, a Quodlibet and some sermons (including one on the beatific vision). He was made a bishop in Italy, and died around 1333.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
From the Realm of Spells and Fairies
Stump, Aquinas, 61:
"Aquinas's account of the virtues is rich and complex, and his discussion them is situated in an intricate network of medieval lore. This lore includes the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, at least three of which are twins of the intellectual virtues: courage, piety, fear, counsel (consilium), wisdom, scientia (generally translated as 'knowledge'), and understanding. In addition, Aquinas also weaves into his account the twelve fruits of the Holy Spirit...and the seven beatitudes."
Lore?! What is medieval lore? So anything that might come from a theological tradition such as the Bible and not from the fertile minds of analytic philosophers counts as lore. These days I am becoming increasingly aware that the study of medieval philosophy is considered at worst a waste of time by philosophy departments and at best a branch of history. With friends like Stump, "Medieval philosophy" doesn't need enemies.
"Aquinas's account of the virtues is rich and complex, and his discussion them is situated in an intricate network of medieval lore. This lore includes the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, at least three of which are twins of the intellectual virtues: courage, piety, fear, counsel (consilium), wisdom, scientia (generally translated as 'knowledge'), and understanding. In addition, Aquinas also weaves into his account the twelve fruits of the Holy Spirit...and the seven beatitudes."
Lore?! What is medieval lore? So anything that might come from a theological tradition such as the Bible and not from the fertile minds of analytic philosophers counts as lore. These days I am becoming increasingly aware that the study of medieval philosophy is considered at worst a waste of time by philosophy departments and at best a branch of history. With friends like Stump, "Medieval philosophy" doesn't need enemies.
Monday, December 1, 2008
Letter of Pope Benedict XVI on Duns Scotus
From Giovanni Lauriola: http://www.centrodunsscoto.it/articoli/Articoli_html/Papa_per_Scoto.htm
RECENSIONE
BENEDICTI XVI
SUMMI POTIFICIS
EPiSTULA APOSTOLICA
Venerabili Fratri
IOACHIMO SIRE. CXD1NALI MEISNBR
Archiepiscopo Co1othensi
cunctisque ex toto orbe terrarum participibus
congressus scientifici internationalis
DCC annis elapsis ab obitu beati Ioannis Duns Scoti
Laetare, Colonia urbs, quae doctissimum ac pientissimum virum Ioannem Duns Scotum intra tua moenia quondam recepisti, qui die VIII mensis Novembris anno MCCCVIII e vivis discessit et ad caelestem patriam profectus, eiusque magna admiratione ac vener servas exuvias.
Quem porro Venerabiles Servi Dei Paulus VI et Ioannes Paulus II, Decesores Nostri, amplissimis verbis, exaltarunt, illum Nos quoque nunc merita laude circumadare volumus eiusque patrocinia invocare.
Iure quidem meritoque septimum nunc ab eius pio transitu centenarium celebratur. Ac dum hac felici occasione in diversis mundi partibus in honorem beati Ioannis Duns Scoti acroases integraque opera publici iuris fiunt necnon conventus aguntur, inter quos sollemnis paratur ille Coloniensis, qui diebus V-IX proximi mensis Novembris evolvetur, muneris Nostri officium esse putamus hoc in ambitu quaedam dicere de tam eximio viro, qui bene meritus est de doctrina Ecclesiae et de scientia hominum amplianda.
Ipse enim pietatem cum intellectuali investigatione coniungens, iuxta illam sum precem: “Primum rerum Principium mihi ea credere, sapere ac proferre concedat, quae ipsius placeant maiestati et ad eius contemplationem elevent mentes nostras”1 , subtilissimo ingenio arcana veritatis tam naturalis quam revelatae ita profunde penetravit ac exinde talis generis doctrinam deprompsit, ut Doctor Ordinis, Doctor Subtilis et Doctor Marianus appellatus sit ac dux Scholae Franciscanae necnon lux et exemplar totius populi christiani evaserit.
Animos itaque doctorum virorum et omnium credentium ac non credentium convertere desideramus ad viam ac rationem quam Scotus secutus est in statuenda concordia inter fidem et rationem, in definienda tali modo natura theologiae, ut iugiter extulerit actionem operationem, praxim, amorem potius quam pura speculationem quo in opere exsequendo ductus fuit Magisterio Ecclesiae ac sano sensu critico circa incrementum notitiae veritatis, atque persuasum sibi habebat scientiam tantum valere quantum ipsa in praxim deduceretur.
In fide catholica confirmatus, veritates fidei lumine naturalis rationis conatus est inte1legere, illustrare et defendere. Quapropter nihil reliqui fecit quominus veritates omnes, et naturales et supernaturales, quam ex uno eodemque Fonte promanant, in consonantiam deduceret.
Prope Sacram Scripturam divinitus inspiratam, Ecclesiae auctoritas ponitur. Ipse videtur sequi sancti Augustini effatum: “Evange1io non credere, nisi Ecclesiae credidissem”2. Nam auctoritatem supremam Successoris beati Petri Doctor noster in peculiarem lucem haud raro ponit. Secundum sententiam eius “licet Papa non possit dispensare contra ius naturae vel divinum (quia sua potestas est utroque illo lure inferior), tamem cum sit
1-Duns Scotus, Tractatus de primo Principio, c.1,1(ed. Muller M.).
2 Idem, Ordinatio I d. 5, n. 26.
Successor Petri, Principis Aposto1orum habet eandem potestatem quam et Petrus”.
Itaque Ecc1esia Catholica, quae tamquam Caput invisibile habet ipsum Christum, qui in beato Petro ac Successoribus eius suos Vicarios reliquit, a Spiritu veritatis directa, est authenticus custos depositi revelati et regula fidei. Ecclesia est firmum et stabile criterium canonicitatis Sacrae Scripturae. Ipsa enim “decrevit qui sunt libri habendi in auctoritatem in canone Bibliae”4
Alibi respondet quod “eo Spiritu expositae sunt Scripturae, quo conditae, et ita supponendum est quod Ecclesia catholica eo Spiritu exposuit quo tradita est nobis fides, Spiritu scilicet veritatis edocta”5
Postqum ex ratione theologica variis argumentis probaverat ipsum factum praeservationis Beatae Virginis Mariae a peccato originali, omnino paratus erat hanc sententiam reicere, si constaret quod repugnaret auctoritati Ecclesiae, dicendo: “Si auctoritati Ecc1esiae et auctoritati Scripturae non repugnet, videtur probabile, quod excellentius est, attribuere Mariae”6.
Primatus voluntatis in lucem ponit Deum ante omnia esse caritatem. Hanc caritatem huic amorem, Duns Scotus prae oculis habet cum theologiam vult reducere ad unum habitum, ad theologiam practicam. Ad eius menten, cum Deus sit “formaliter dilectio et formaliter caritas”7 , bonitatis suae et amoris radios liberalissime communiçat extra se 8. Revera, ex amore Deus “elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immacu1ati in
3 Idem, Rep. Par. IV d. 33, q. 2, n. 19.
4 Idem, Ordinatio I, d. 5, n. 26.
5 Ibid., IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 15.
6 Ibid., IV d. 26, q. 1, n. 13.
7 Ibid., I d. 17, n. 173.
8 Cf ibidem, Tractatus de primo Principio, c. 4, n. 127 (ed. Muller M.)
conspectu eius in caritate, qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum in ipsum” (Eph 1, 3 4).
Tamquam fidelis assecla sanctis Francisci Assisiensis beatus Ioannes assidue contemplatus est et praedicavit Filii Dei incarnationem et passionem salvificam. At caritas seu amor Christi ostenditur peculiari modo non solum in Calvariae loco, sed etiam in sanctissimo Eucharistiae sacramento, absque quo “periret omnis devotio in Ecclesia, nec exhiberetur actus latriae Deo nisi propter reverentiam huius”9 . Porro, hoc sacrametum est sacramentum unitatis et amoris, quo inducimur ut amemus ad invicem, et ut amemus Deum tam quam bonum commune et condiligendum ab aliis.
Et quemadmodum hic amori haec caritas, fuit initium omnium, ita etiam in amore, in caritate tantum erit nostra beatitudo: “volitio sive dilectio est simpliciter vita aeterna, beata et perfecta”10.
Cum vero Nos ab initio officii Nostri caritatem ante omnia praedicavimus, quae Deus ipse est, laetanter cernimus huius Beati doctrinam singularem locum huic praebere veritati, eandemque nostris temporibus censemus maxime pervestigandam et docendam. Quapropter perlibenter obsecundantes precibus Venerabilis Fratri Nostri Ioachimi S.R.E. Cardinalis Meisner, Archiepiscopi Coloniensis, damus hanc epistulam Apotolicatn qua beatum Ioannem Duns Scotum cupimus honorare eiusque Nobis caelestem intercessionem efflagitare. Denique iis, quod quolibet modo in hoc internationali congressu aliusque de hoc S. Francisci eximio filio inceptis promovendis intersunt, Apostolicam Nostram Benedictionem imo ex corde e1argimur
9 Idem, Rep. Par., IV d. 8, q. 1, n. 3
10 Ibid., IV d. 49, q. 2, n. 21.
Datum Romae, apud Sanctum Petrum, die XXVIII mensis Octobris, anno MMVIII, Pontificatus Nostri quarto.
RECENSIONE
BENEDICTI XVI
SUMMI POTIFICIS
EPiSTULA APOSTOLICA
Venerabili Fratri
IOACHIMO SIRE. CXD1NALI MEISNBR
Archiepiscopo Co1othensi
cunctisque ex toto orbe terrarum participibus
congressus scientifici internationalis
DCC annis elapsis ab obitu beati Ioannis Duns Scoti
Laetare, Colonia urbs, quae doctissimum ac pientissimum virum Ioannem Duns Scotum intra tua moenia quondam recepisti, qui die VIII mensis Novembris anno MCCCVIII e vivis discessit et ad caelestem patriam profectus, eiusque magna admiratione ac vener servas exuvias.
Quem porro Venerabiles Servi Dei Paulus VI et Ioannes Paulus II, Decesores Nostri, amplissimis verbis, exaltarunt, illum Nos quoque nunc merita laude circumadare volumus eiusque patrocinia invocare.
Iure quidem meritoque septimum nunc ab eius pio transitu centenarium celebratur. Ac dum hac felici occasione in diversis mundi partibus in honorem beati Ioannis Duns Scoti acroases integraque opera publici iuris fiunt necnon conventus aguntur, inter quos sollemnis paratur ille Coloniensis, qui diebus V-IX proximi mensis Novembris evolvetur, muneris Nostri officium esse putamus hoc in ambitu quaedam dicere de tam eximio viro, qui bene meritus est de doctrina Ecclesiae et de scientia hominum amplianda.
Ipse enim pietatem cum intellectuali investigatione coniungens, iuxta illam sum precem: “Primum rerum Principium mihi ea credere, sapere ac proferre concedat, quae ipsius placeant maiestati et ad eius contemplationem elevent mentes nostras”1 , subtilissimo ingenio arcana veritatis tam naturalis quam revelatae ita profunde penetravit ac exinde talis generis doctrinam deprompsit, ut Doctor Ordinis, Doctor Subtilis et Doctor Marianus appellatus sit ac dux Scholae Franciscanae necnon lux et exemplar totius populi christiani evaserit.
Animos itaque doctorum virorum et omnium credentium ac non credentium convertere desideramus ad viam ac rationem quam Scotus secutus est in statuenda concordia inter fidem et rationem, in definienda tali modo natura theologiae, ut iugiter extulerit actionem operationem, praxim, amorem potius quam pura speculationem quo in opere exsequendo ductus fuit Magisterio Ecclesiae ac sano sensu critico circa incrementum notitiae veritatis, atque persuasum sibi habebat scientiam tantum valere quantum ipsa in praxim deduceretur.
In fide catholica confirmatus, veritates fidei lumine naturalis rationis conatus est inte1legere, illustrare et defendere. Quapropter nihil reliqui fecit quominus veritates omnes, et naturales et supernaturales, quam ex uno eodemque Fonte promanant, in consonantiam deduceret.
Prope Sacram Scripturam divinitus inspiratam, Ecclesiae auctoritas ponitur. Ipse videtur sequi sancti Augustini effatum: “Evange1io non credere, nisi Ecclesiae credidissem”2. Nam auctoritatem supremam Successoris beati Petri Doctor noster in peculiarem lucem haud raro ponit. Secundum sententiam eius “licet Papa non possit dispensare contra ius naturae vel divinum (quia sua potestas est utroque illo lure inferior), tamem cum sit
1-Duns Scotus, Tractatus de primo Principio, c.1,1(ed. Muller M.).
2 Idem, Ordinatio I d. 5, n. 26.
Successor Petri, Principis Aposto1orum habet eandem potestatem quam et Petrus”.
Itaque Ecc1esia Catholica, quae tamquam Caput invisibile habet ipsum Christum, qui in beato Petro ac Successoribus eius suos Vicarios reliquit, a Spiritu veritatis directa, est authenticus custos depositi revelati et regula fidei. Ecclesia est firmum et stabile criterium canonicitatis Sacrae Scripturae. Ipsa enim “decrevit qui sunt libri habendi in auctoritatem in canone Bibliae”4
Alibi respondet quod “eo Spiritu expositae sunt Scripturae, quo conditae, et ita supponendum est quod Ecclesia catholica eo Spiritu exposuit quo tradita est nobis fides, Spiritu scilicet veritatis edocta”5
Postqum ex ratione theologica variis argumentis probaverat ipsum factum praeservationis Beatae Virginis Mariae a peccato originali, omnino paratus erat hanc sententiam reicere, si constaret quod repugnaret auctoritati Ecclesiae, dicendo: “Si auctoritati Ecc1esiae et auctoritati Scripturae non repugnet, videtur probabile, quod excellentius est, attribuere Mariae”6.
Primatus voluntatis in lucem ponit Deum ante omnia esse caritatem. Hanc caritatem huic amorem, Duns Scotus prae oculis habet cum theologiam vult reducere ad unum habitum, ad theologiam practicam. Ad eius menten, cum Deus sit “formaliter dilectio et formaliter caritas”7 , bonitatis suae et amoris radios liberalissime communiçat extra se 8. Revera, ex amore Deus “elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immacu1ati in
3 Idem, Rep. Par. IV d. 33, q. 2, n. 19.
4 Idem, Ordinatio I, d. 5, n. 26.
5 Ibid., IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 15.
6 Ibid., IV d. 26, q. 1, n. 13.
7 Ibid., I d. 17, n. 173.
8 Cf ibidem, Tractatus de primo Principio, c. 4, n. 127 (ed. Muller M.)
conspectu eius in caritate, qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum in ipsum” (Eph 1, 3 4).
Tamquam fidelis assecla sanctis Francisci Assisiensis beatus Ioannes assidue contemplatus est et praedicavit Filii Dei incarnationem et passionem salvificam. At caritas seu amor Christi ostenditur peculiari modo non solum in Calvariae loco, sed etiam in sanctissimo Eucharistiae sacramento, absque quo “periret omnis devotio in Ecclesia, nec exhiberetur actus latriae Deo nisi propter reverentiam huius”9 . Porro, hoc sacrametum est sacramentum unitatis et amoris, quo inducimur ut amemus ad invicem, et ut amemus Deum tam quam bonum commune et condiligendum ab aliis.
Et quemadmodum hic amori haec caritas, fuit initium omnium, ita etiam in amore, in caritate tantum erit nostra beatitudo: “volitio sive dilectio est simpliciter vita aeterna, beata et perfecta”10.
Cum vero Nos ab initio officii Nostri caritatem ante omnia praedicavimus, quae Deus ipse est, laetanter cernimus huius Beati doctrinam singularem locum huic praebere veritati, eandemque nostris temporibus censemus maxime pervestigandam et docendam. Quapropter perlibenter obsecundantes precibus Venerabilis Fratri Nostri Ioachimi S.R.E. Cardinalis Meisner, Archiepiscopi Coloniensis, damus hanc epistulam Apotolicatn qua beatum Ioannem Duns Scotum cupimus honorare eiusque Nobis caelestem intercessionem efflagitare. Denique iis, quod quolibet modo in hoc internationali congressu aliusque de hoc S. Francisci eximio filio inceptis promovendis intersunt, Apostolicam Nostram Benedictionem imo ex corde e1argimur
9 Idem, Rep. Par., IV d. 8, q. 1, n. 3
10 Ibid., IV d. 49, q. 2, n. 21.
Datum Romae, apud Sanctum Petrum, die XXVIII mensis Octobris, anno MMVIII, Pontificatus Nostri quarto.
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