tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post4898020024212056046..comments2024-03-11T04:11:06.487-04:00Comments on The Smithy: Scotus vs. HenryLee Faberhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-16730533981185245072010-02-03T12:00:12.998-05:002010-02-03T12:00:12.998-05:00The way you worded it makes it sound as if henry i...The way you worded it makes it sound as if henry is pulling a bait and switch or something, which i don't think is the case. It's just that all attributes are relative to the intellect and will, which themselves are distinct rationes. maybe we're not disagreeing then.<br /><br /><br />According to Henry, rationes + divine essence = no real composition, while intentiones + divine essence = real composition. at least that's what he says in the summa in the passage i mentioned.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-37625050906535559112010-02-03T11:25:24.346-05:002010-02-03T11:25:24.346-05:00Scotus is asking how the distinction between will ...<i>Scotus is asking how the distinction between will and nature can be necessary</i><br /><br />Isn't that what I said?<br /><br /><i>I don't quite see how you can claim that this negates the explanatory force of the distinction</i><br /><br />If something is being assisted by something else which is not really distinct from it, then how it is really assistance? <br /><br />As for the intention distinction, I didn't think it was real, but I'm no Henry expert.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-17714120635807743052010-02-03T10:15:37.283-05:002010-02-03T10:15:37.283-05:00I think you're misinterpreting Henry/Scotus he...I think you're misinterpreting Henry/Scotus here. Scotus is asking how the distinction between will and nature can be necessary (as he here interprets Henry's position) if there is only a distinction of reason beween them. I don't quite see how you can claim that this negates the explanatory force of the distinction (in Henry). <br /><br />Also, I suspect that the intentional distinction is a kind of real distinction. Henry definitely thinks that relative positive attributes are not distinct intentiones, only rationes, because real distinction is a distinction between intentiones and res, as he says in Summa a.32 q.4Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.com