tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post123985241017386161..comments2024-03-11T04:11:06.487-04:00Comments on The Smithy: The Object of Hope in Thomas and ScotusLee Faberhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-61974752333836626732010-09-22T13:32:23.902-04:002010-09-22T13:32:23.902-04:00Smiter,
I don't think univocity is directly r...Smiter,<br /><br />I don't think univocity is directly relevant. Scotus also denies real relations, as I quote in an upcoming post. The discussion in Aquinas is about the signification of names, and so does not involve 'relations' in the sense of Asello's post that I have been defending. In the latin at least, 'relatio' is only used in conjunction with a creature. Aquinas elsewhere is as adamant as Scotus that there are not real relations; in the summa passages they are described as being of 'reason', which scotus would fully allow as well.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-56795794276651830422010-09-20T14:18:43.560-04:002010-09-20T14:18:43.560-04:00Lee, thanks for the reference. It's been a wh...Lee, thanks for the reference. It's been a while since I've looked at that question. Two thoughts:<br /><br />Art. 5 of this question is on univocity. Aquinas's position on the non-mutual relation in 7 seems to depend on this. But, if one accepts Scotus's argument for univocity, rather than Aquinas's against, does that imply that there is now a real relation of God to creature, instead of a relation of idea?<br /><br />In Art.7, replies to objections 5-6, Aquinas seems to be carving out room for a kind of real relation of God to creature temporally, subordinate to the relation in idea of God to creature eternally. If I understand what he's doing here, this is very like what I was trying to get at with my previous comment. Would such a "two layer" solution be defensible?Smiter the Archdeaconhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07741750392014519967noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-48145502277733405432010-09-20T12:49:17.936-04:002010-09-20T12:49:17.936-04:00Smiter, I'll try to write something up more su...Smiter, I'll try to write something up more substantive. in the meantime, see the Summa theologiae, pars I q. 13 a.7 on relative names.<br /><br />Asello, I think you're equivocating on 'individuate'. normally the term refers to contracting a universal to a particular. It generally doesn't refer to the specification or disitnction of powers in a substance. In light of this, I dont think you can say accidents are indivudated by their formal contents. The formal content, for scotus at least, would be the definition or quidditative/formal ratio, which is what it is of itself and in itself is neither universal nor particular (ie, pure formal content would be a common nature).Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-2932083374866745632010-09-20T11:14:42.425-04:002010-09-20T11:14:42.425-04:00Lee, Asello, if what you say:
a real relation requ...Lee, Asello, if what you say:<br /><i>a real relation requires two real terms</i><br />...is true, then it is not possible for the creature to have a real relation with God, either. That just doesn't seem a sensible conclusion. What are we missing, here? In what way is it possible for God to serve as a real term in relation, even though He is not in a category?<br /><br />Can we coherently say that, even though God is not in Himself in a category, nonetheless, given His choice to create anything, His economic will in some sense stands for a category that serves as a real term in relating God to creature and creature to God?<br /><br />Or, can we coherently say that God both is (immanence) and is not (transcendence) in a category?Smiter the Archdeaconhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07741750392014519967noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-13868254956328988432010-09-19T00:24:02.276-04:002010-09-19T00:24:02.276-04:00I'm not sure I follow the argument here (I may...I'm not sure I follow the argument here (I may well be missing something). However one understands the specification of the objects of the will, on Aquinas's account of hope, the object of hope in general is good considered insofar as some power makes it possible to have; if theological hope were not for attainable good it could only equivocally be called hope. Thus the object of hope is not God in Himself; but God understood as something good for us (eternal life) that is possible for us given God's power (divine help). It's true that this relation to us is not in God's formal nature, but I don't see why one would think this relevant: our dispositions take relation to ourselves (and others) as part of their objects all the time, because that depends on how the natures of the objects are apprehended: it is only as apprehended that they are objects at all. Hope is one of these kinds of dispositions: nothing can be an object of hope except insofar as it is apprehended as future, as not yet had by someone. As I said, I may simply be missing something.<br /><br />Does Scotus really think circumstances can't distinguish one virtue from another? That would be a pretty significant divergence from Aquinas; it is absolutely essential to his account of virtue that some of them can.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-8807546193514326092010-09-18T23:41:49.848-04:002010-09-18T23:41:49.848-04:00But, of course, this has only been proved for a pa...But, of course, this has only been proved for a particular accident (theological virtues) and not all of them.Asello Guzmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02353868734730914072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-22888669055847538132010-09-18T23:40:20.675-04:002010-09-18T23:40:20.675-04:00Good distinction, Lee.
Thomas would agree that th...Good distinction, Lee.<br /><br />Thomas would agree that the theological virtues are accidents that inhere in the soul of the virtuous person. Now the statement, "accidents are individuated by their subjects," admits of at least two meanings. 1) Accidents are individuated by the subjects in which the accidents inhere; in this case, the person with the virtue. 2) Accidents are individuated by the content (subject) which they concern; in other words, the "subject" of virtues is their object -- Thomas and Scotus agree that virtues are specified by their objects. They also both agree that the object is in some way God. Thomas seems to argue it is God under a particular ratio. My original thought in bringing up individuation was because I thought it showed that God under one ratio cannot be distinguished from God under another ratio due to a circumstance including an accident. But it seems a better way to say this would be to point out that accidents cannot properly be attributed to God -- it seems to be an issue regarding divine simplicity and not individuation at all. <br /><br />Also, it seemed that there was a parallel in Scotus' thinking: just as a circumstance does not distinguish one virtue from another, neither does a circumstance make one thing different from another. <br /><br />In the first case it is because the accident of virtue receives its being from its proper object; and God has no accidents, no circumstances properly attributed to Him. This is because He is pure Being. In the second case, it is because a thing does not receive its being from an accident; in other words, though it is imperfect being, it is more than a circumstance or accident.<br /><br />In sum, it seemed to me that this was based on a general insight that a circumstance does not distinguish one being from another, whether accident or substance.Asello Guzmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02353868734730914072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-83431008260505599402010-09-18T17:02:39.155-04:002010-09-18T17:02:39.155-04:00Smiter, it may only be a relation of reason. I con...Smiter, it may only be a relation of reason. I consulted Scotus, and most of his discussion is devoted to arguing with other scholastics about whether the relation of dependence that creatures have on God is really the same with the creature. God's causality in creation is equivocal and efficient, which doesn't leave much room for a real relation to the creature. And in any case, a real relation requires two real terms, which would require God being in a category.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-5203733806440821112010-09-18T15:25:39.654-04:002010-09-18T15:25:39.654-04:00regarding the post, I don't understand why ind...regarding the post, I don't understand why individuation is relevant here, or what the latin term for "condition" is. Accidents are normally individuated by their subjects, and i assume hope and charity, grace, etc. are accidents. they don't need their own heceitates apart from the substance.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-31888090754854349062010-09-18T13:04:22.769-04:002010-09-18T13:04:22.769-04:00I grant that God is not in a category. But there ...I grant that God is not in a category. But there is still the very real fact that I exist only because God wills me to exist. God's will has a precise effect, it causes the effect intentionally, and both the cause and the effect are (partially but not falsely) known. If that is not a relation of God to creature, what is it?Smiter the Archdeaconhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07741750392014519967noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-50285221556552862432010-09-17T15:53:12.388-04:002010-09-17T15:53:12.388-04:00one reason is that relations are categorical items...one reason is that relations are categorical items. God is not in a category, ergo etc.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-58252823644497343442010-09-17T13:55:47.801-04:002010-09-17T13:55:47.801-04:00How does Scotus distinguish among the three theolo...How does Scotus distinguish among the three theological virtues?<br /><br />One thing I found particularly confusing: "God has no relation with creatures, but they have a relation to Him." But surely God willing each individual creature to exist, constitutes a relation of God to creature, not merely a relation of creature to God?Smiter the Archdeaconhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07741750392014519967noreply@blogger.com