tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post2393391961908268538..comments2024-03-11T04:11:06.487-04:00Comments on The Smithy: Formal DistinctionLee Faberhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-19973580755336818952011-03-12T15:17:26.143-05:002011-03-12T15:17:26.143-05:00Well, the Trinitarian persons are really distinct ...Well, the Trinitarian persons are really distinct from each other, but each one is formally distinct from the divine essence. And people have told me (ie., I haven't actually read this in Scotus) that Scotus makes per impossibile arguments based on the separability of the persons.<br /><br />It is a good point about the real distinction, though. Scotus mentions separability in only two places, and neither of those places contains any mention of the formal distinction. So my schema may be a bit artificial. In the passages dealing with the formal distinction scotus talks about "real-actual" and "real-potential distinctions" but doesn't say what they are.<br /><br />Perhaps another way to go about it is to just accept that the precise sense of real that Scotus has in mind when he contrasts the real and formal distinctions is "distinct prior to the operation of the divine/human/ mind." This sidesteps the separability issue, and then allows talk of formalities and realities to fill in the blank of how the distinction is consonant with divine simplicity.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-60558805690919217442011-03-10T22:10:07.717-05:002011-03-10T22:10:07.717-05:00Alright, I guess I'll have to look elsewhere f...Alright, I guess I'll have to look elsewhere for those texts.<br /><br />The point about separability is interesting. Real distinction that is not formal distinction has long been explained in terms of separability, which is an easy way to understand it and reason about it. However, separability is not a fully adequate criterion because there is a real distinction (3 of them) where there is no separability: the divine Persons are really (and not merely formally) distinct, but are not separable because it is absurd for any Person to not exist.<br /><br />Perhaps it would be better to say that there is a real distinction where the existence of at least one distinguendum is not dependent upon the other. In creatures, this reduces to separability.Julius Russonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-50333143305903843442011-03-10T01:44:42.113-05:002011-03-10T01:44:42.113-05:00Basically, a distinctio simpliciter is a real dist...Basically, a distinctio simpliciter is a real distinction, in the sense of separability. Scotus, in other texts I did not quote, does explicitly equate the formal disinction with a secundum quid distinction. Note that the non-identity that "completes" the simpliciter distinction is described as completing a perfect distinction. A perfect distinction would presumably be a fully real distinction. A formal distinction is distinct as far as the first three conditions are concerned. It cannot be fully real because of divine simplicity.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-50861957719378936992011-03-10T01:42:28.363-05:002011-03-10T01:42:28.363-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-59543902636306100502011-03-09T19:24:24.235-05:002011-03-09T19:24:24.235-05:00Could you clarify why it is that Scotus in his Oxf...Could you clarify why it is that Scotus in his Oxford period must consider the formal distinction to be merely <i>secundum quid</i>? We have seen how he distinguishes real from formal identity. Thus, it would seem that the non-identity required for two things to be distinct <i>simpliciter</i> could be either a lack of formal identity or a lack of real identity. Whence it would follow that a formal distinction is made <i>simpliciter</i>, on the basis of a formal non-identity.Julius Russonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-7728925377908425642011-03-03T09:29:40.665-05:002011-03-03T09:29:40.665-05:00My mistake. "non tantum est unum illi unitate...My mistake. "non tantum est unum illi unitate unionis"<br /><br />'illi' is dative and refers backwards. Thus 'not only is it one with **that thing** by a unity of union ...'Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-36347199957282524422011-03-03T08:59:00.141-05:002011-03-03T08:59:00.141-05:00Translation: ‘idem cuilibet’ - ‘the same as’ is mo...Translation: ‘idem cuilibet’ - ‘the same as’ is more English-friendly. In ‘illi unitate unionis’, ‘illi’ agrees with ‘unitate’ not ‘unionis’. I’m confused by ‘aliqua distincta’. ‘aliqua simpliciter distinguantur’ – aliqua is plural not singular. ‘ut effectus sunt’ – is also plural. ‘of those which have distinct being by their own actuals’ looks correct.<br /><br />Typo: ‘per say’, ‘is existning’Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-35694201635112380262011-03-03T08:45:01.645-05:002011-03-03T08:45:01.645-05:00Beautiful Latin-English tables.Beautiful Latin-English tables.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2472139466585018053.post-51019996484120407962011-03-02T22:00:02.937-05:002011-03-02T22:00:02.937-05:00Eventually I'll update this with some comments...Eventually I'll update this with some comments on ultimate abstraction.Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.com